MOVE TO IMPROVE: DETECTING AND EXPLAINING COMBINATIONS OF PARTY STRATEGIES IN WEST-EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

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Abstract

Political parties adapt to a changing environment by implementing party strategies. Previous studies mainly investigated these party strategies in a fragmented manner. However, I expected that multiple party strategies are simultaneously implemented in a broader framework of rebranding the party. Deriving from the multi-componential political product, four categories of party strategies were detected: programmatic reforms, democratizing party leadership selections, a change of party leader and/or whether or not participating in government. In this study, these four types of party strategies and their combinations implemented by Austrian, Flemish, German and Norwegian parties are explored for over a period of almost thirty years. The results show that combinations of strategies are far more implemented than one separate strategy. Unlike the expectations, the main differences were found between party families and not between mainstream- and niche parties.

Key words: Political competition, Political parties, Comparative politics, Electoral Behavior

INTRODUCTION

During the past few decades, party systems are changing dramatically in Western Europe. Whereas the once almighty mainstream parties were secured of a steady share of the electorate, they have been facing a strong decline in vote share (Dassonneville, 2018; Luypaert, 2019; Meguid, 2003). Despite this general downwards trend, there is variation in the electoral fate between parties and between elections. Clearly, some West-European parties seem to have adapted to this changing and challenging environment (Cross & Pilet, 2015; De Vries & Hobolt, 2020; Hobolt & Tilley, 2016). This paper seeks to investigate **West-European parties' strategies from an integrated point of view, by arguing that parties will adapt by implementing multiple strategies instead of only one during the rebranding of the party**.

Previous studies mainly concentrated on the causes of these party reforms, and in this, scholars often discuss the combination of external stimuli (such as electoral defeat) with the willingness of an internal coalition supporting reforms (Harmel & Janda, 1994; Panebianco, 1988). The type of reforms by which parties responded to electoral decline have only been studied to a limited and fragmented extent. Indeed, there are valuable studies on programmatic reforms (e.g. Abou-Chadi, 2016; Hobolt & Tilley, 2016; Joon Han, 2017), governmental participation (e.g. Hjermitslev, 2020), leadership turnover (e.g. da Silva, Garzia, & De Angelis, 2019; Garzia, 2012; Pedersen & Schumacher, 2015) and leadership selection democratization (e.g. Chiru, Gauja, Gherghina, & Rodriguez-Teruel, 2015; Cross & Blais, 2012; Cross & Katz, 2013).

Quite surprisingly, an **integrated** overview of the different types of party strategies implemented in West-European parties has to my knowledge not been presented yet. Studying party strategies in an integrated way is, however, highly relevant as party strategies often take place in a wider perspective of rebranding the parties' multidimensional product (Speed, Butler, & Collins, 2015; Worcester & Mortimore, 2005). In this paper, the political product includes four components: programmatic stances, party organization image, leader image and governmental competence. Therefore, the effects of a reform on one component of the political product depend on its combination with other components. It might thus be that a strategy on one component only bears fruit in combination with another strategy. The aim of this paper is to give an extensive overview of implemented party strategies on these four components and their combinations in Austrian, Flemish, German and Norwegian parties. In doing so, I will systematically compare and explain partisan organizations and the variation in combined party strategies. In this pilot-study, these four countries were chosen as their data are well documented and include enough variation in yet a comparable setting. The first component of the political product (programmatic stances) predicts a certain limitation of changes for the different party families. Therefore, five party families are compared in an international perspective: social democratic-, Christian democratic-, liberal-, ecological- and radical right parties. The two research question guiding this study are: **(1) to what extent do parties simultaneously combine multiple party strategies and (2) in which way does these adopted combinations differ according to party families and party types?**

Drawing on literature on party reforms (Harmel & Janda, 1994; Kriesi et al., 2008; Mair, Müller, Plasser, 2004; Panebianco, 1988), political competition (De Vries & Hobolt, 2020) and political marketing (Speed et al., 2015; Worcester & Mortimore, 2005), this paper first suggests an integrated framework to study party strategies and their consequences. Afterwards, I discuss the notion of multidimensional political product, the different interrelated components of party strategies and their own theoretical frameworks, which eventually lead to the formulation of several hypotheses. I then discuss the secondary data and the cases under study and report my main findings on the implemented party reforms by Austrian, Flemish, German and Norwegian political parties. The paper closes with the results and their implications. The analysis revealed that political parties adapt to a changing environment by simultaneously implementing strategies. The main differences were found between social democratic- and Christian democratic parties on the one hand and liberal-, ecological and radical right parties on the other hand.

THEORIES OF PARTY CHANGE: WHY DO PARTIES REFORM?

An important perquisite for political competition is that political parties are competitive in nature, meaning that they pursue political office by presenting candidates for this mandate in competitive elections (Harmel & Janda, 1994). Already in 1990, Ström posited three goals parties may follow in competitive elections, namely vote-, office- and policy seeking parties. Although some parties tend to be more policy- or office seeking, the electoral vote share is still essential as it functions often as a means to reach these other goals (Strom, 1990). Therefore, parties try to brand a political product that is appealing to the electorate, even if they are not primary vote-seeking (Worcester & Mortimore, 2005). When an electoral shock indicates that their goal may not be reached (or not as much as they hoped for), political parties are likely to adapt by implementing reforms on the political product (De Vries & Hobolt, 2020). In the section below, different theoretical views on the implementation of party strategies are outlined.

Multiple authors stated that political parties do not only incrementally adapt to a changing situation but also abruptly implement reforms in order to dominate the political market (e.g. Kriesi et al., 2008; Panebianco, 1988). At the intra-party level, party elites implement party reforms in order to (re-) establish power (Harmel, Heo, Tan, & Janda, 1995; Kemahlioglu, Weitz-Shapiro, & Hirano, 2009; Panebianco, 1988). At the party system level on the other hand, party reforms are often explained by the inability to reach a party's goals, such as electoral loss or the absence of participation in government (Chiru et al., 2015; Cross & Katz, 2013; Scarrow, Webb, & Farrell, 2000). Moreover, political parties could copy successful innovations of competitors by implementing the same party reforms (Astudillo & Detterbeck, 2020).

Few authors have tried to set up a broader framework of the causes of party reforms by combining the intra-party - and party system level. Panebianco (1988, p. 242) clearly summarizes this reasoning: "organizational change is, in most cases, the effect of an external stimulus (environmental and/or

technological) which joins forces with internal factors". Harmel & Janda (1994) outlined in their *integrated theory of party change* the idea of environmental stimulus and the relationship towards internal factors more in detail. Indeed, a coalition of the willing inside the party may lead towards the adaptation of party reforms. However, they claim that the most extensive party reforms result from the inability to reach the party's primary goal as an environmental stimulus. These goals could be vote-, office-, policy maximization (Strom, 1990) and/or intra-party democracy maximization. They state (as does Panebianco, 1988) that parties function as conservative organizations which are reluctant to change. A strong environmental shock such as electoral loss causes, together with a coalition of the willing, the adaptation with party reforms. Recent work of De Vries and Hobolt (2020) sets out the adaptation of political parties towards a changing environment by combining political– and firm competition theory. In this setting, political parties are firms who sell products (to them: promised policies and the competence to implement these policies) to citizens in exchange for votes. According to De Vries and Hobolt, political parties also pursue the three party goals (Strom, 1990), but to a varying extent. Political parties try to gain as many votes as possible in order to get into office and thus being able to implement their promised policies. Moreover, winning votes is associated with other benefits, like monetary benefits and influence on the parliamentary - and political agenda. Therefore, political parties are responsive towards voters in order to dominate the political market. They reform when an external shock occurs (mostly electoral decline) in combination with internal supporters of party reforms. However, these causes will not be the central focus of this study. Instead, there will be focused on the type of party reforms and – strategies implemented and their combinations.

WHICH REFORMS DO PARTIES UNDERTAKE?

To distinguish party reform from any other alternation, the reform must be in direct control of the party and thus emerging from a group decision (Panebianco, 1988). Based on this definition, multiple events can be subsumed under the concept of party reform. However, previous studies mostly focused on one category of party strategies. As a result, programmatic-, personnel-, organizational- and governmental participation are so far studied in a rather fragmented manner.

From studies concerning **programmatic reforms**, we know that parties respond towards electoral loss with a change in policy position and the attention given to issues as electoral support and support from the party activists are based on these programmatic positions (Adams, Clark, Ezrow, & Glasgow, 2006; Aldrich, 1983; Spoon, 2009). Specifically, there are two types of programmatic responses that parties can give to changes in electoral markets: changes in saliency and changes in policy position (Mair et al., 2004). Both can be explained by broader theoretical models. A first theoretical model is the spatial theory, developed by Downs (1957). According to this theory, positions of parties can be ordered on a fault line, going from a left to a right positioning. Voters vote for the party whose position is closest to their own ideological beliefs on the fault line. As a result, a party's share of votes depends on the distribution of voters on the left-right dimension. If parties want to achieve electoral success, they can strategically move their position to a position where many voters position themselves. This theoretical model is confirmed amongst others by Joon Han (2017), who shows that programmatic shifts from

mainstream parties on socio-economic issues result in electoral gains if this shift follows the direction of the voter.

In addition to a change of policy position, parties can also reform the amount of attention they give to an issue. This is the salience approach which forms the basis of the theoretical issue ownership model (Dolezal, Ennser-Jedenastik, Müller, & Winkler, 2014). According to this model, voters associate specific issues with particular political parties. Voters perceive that parties who emphasize an issue more are most successful in resolving the issues in question. As a result, parties with issue ownership have an electoral advantage over other parties on this issue. Consequently, parties are expected to focus in the electoral campaign mainly on issues they own (Petrocik, 1996). However, parties do compete over new issues and even try to take over the issue-ownership from their contenders (Blomqvist & Green-Pedersen, 2004; Holian, 2004). As Walgrave, Tresch, and Lefevere (2015) points out, parties can not only compete for the perceived association between issues and parties but also for their competence to handle the issue. This issue ownership based on competence is especially important in valence politics (Green & Jennings, 2012). Unlike the spatial theory presented above, competition between parties is not about finding equal positions between parties and voters, but rather about presenting the party as the most competent to solve the problem (Green & Jennings, 2012; Walgrave et al., 2015). This converging strategy on niche issues is appealing for mainstream parties in order to deal with niche parties' success (Abou-Chadi, 2016; Spoon, Hobolt, & De Vries, 2014).

Besides a programmatic reform, parties can adapt to electoral loss with **organizational reforms** where the power distribution inside the party is revised (Panebianco, 1988). The strong pressure of an electoral setback can lead to the persuasion of party elites to introduce party organization renewal and intra-party democratization (Astudillo & Detterbeck, 2020). Both the erosion of representative linkages between society and parties, and cognitive mobilization lead to a quest for stronger intra-party representation rights (Katz & Mair, 1995; Norris, 1999). Moreover, parties are in need for an active membership base as members can function as campaign agents (Mjelde, 2013; Scarrow et al., 2000). In order to attract new members, parties have tried to lure them with opening up decision-making processes, such as the party leader's selections process (Detterbeck, 2013; Shomer, Put, & Gedalya-Lavy, 2018).

Another category of strategies studied are **personnel reforms**. Party leaders are an increasingly influential actor in parliamentary democracy (Bean & Mughan, 1989). They are no longer seen as one of the many party actors but as the personification of their parties (Ferreira da Silva, Garzia, & De Angelis, 2021; McAllister, 2007). Citizens increasingly evaluate incumbent party leaders when casting a vote on a party (Lobo & Curtice, 2014; Rahat & Kenig, 2018). This leadership association is one of the most important drivers of individual partisan alignments (Garzia, 2013). However, as previous has shown, the (re-)evaluation of party leaders by voters only leads to short-term effects (Pedersen & Schumacher, 2015; Wauters & Kern, 2020). Moreover, not only the positive evaluation of the party leader, but also the negative evaluation of the party leader (often introduced by other party leaders as part of negative campaigning) can influence vote choice (Garzia & da Silva, 2021). Still, party leaders

remain a target of reform when their party lost in the previous elections (Andrews & Jackman, 2008; Horiuchi, Laing, & Hart, 2015).

Due to their dominant position in the past and the strategic moderate position that they still have today, mainstream parties have a long history of **governmental participation**. Recently, this dominance has come under pressure due to the emergence of niche parties (De Vries & Hobolt, 2020). As a consequence, mainstream parties may have to revise their governmental participation, both in terms of participation and in terms of whom they join (i.e. coalition partners). Following the grievance – asymmetry theory (Nannestad & Paldam, 2002) and the coalition of minorities theory (Mueller, 1970), the absence of governmental participation or participating with a niche party closest to the spatial continuum will be rewarded for mainstream parties. Niche parties themselves, on the other hand, will not be rewarded when they are in government because of their distinctive profile. Niche parties lose their purity as they have to cooperate with those they have always criticized before (Van Spanje, 2011). This cooperation, which comes with compromising to maintain the coalition government, is seen by voters as a weakness of the niche politicians involved which eventually undermines their honesty and leadership qualities in the perception of voters (Ezrow, 2008; Tomz & Van Houweling, 2012). Indeed, this compromising might also affect mainstream parties. However, as research of Fortunato and Adams (2015) shows, compromising affect mainly niche parties. These parties serve mostly as a junior coalition partner, whereby voters' perceptions of junior coalition partners are updated with a congruence towards the policies of senior coalition partners.

AN INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK OF THE POLITICAL PRODUCT AND ITS STRATEGIES

From this outline, we know that political parties are responsive towards voters and implement different party strategies after electoral loss. These party strategies have mainly been studied separately from each other. As such, an integrated framework investigating the linkage between multiple party strategies and their consequences is still a considerable gap in literature[1]. In order to outline the linkage between multiple party strategies, the insights of Panebianco (1988) and Harmel & Janda (1994) discussed above are supplemented with theoretical insights from political marketing literature in order to derive the hypotheses.

Based on De Vries and Hobolt (2020), political parties try to offer an attractive product to the electorate in order to dominate the political market. When this electorate indicates they do not appreciate the product (for instance after an election or opinion poll), the party will be responsive and in turn rebrand the political product (De Vries & Hobolt, 2020; Marland & Flanagan, 2013). Important to notice is that this **political product** is a **multi-component** phenomenon as numerous elements (such as proposed

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[1] De Vries and Hobolt (2020) focus on a combination of these consequences, but they only take programmatic and competence reforms into account (i.e. distinctive convergence, issue avoidance and competence mobilization).

policies, the party organization image, leader image and governmental competence) form the basis of the voters perception of a political brand (Speed et al., 2015). Therefore, when we want to investigate the consequences of party strategies, I argue that we should observe them in a consistent entity of the political product and thus in their combinations with each other.

The most obvious component of the political product are the **policies** offered by the parties (Spoon & Klüver, 2019; Worcester & Mortimore, 2005). However, voter perceptions of party policies can be blurred and they are in any case supplemented with other cognitive shortcuts and contextual factors (Dahlberg, 2013; Lock & Harris, 1996). In a two-component concept then, the offered policies are supplemented with party image, including the domination of the party leader and divisions inside the political party (i.e.Harrop, 1990; Worcester & Mortimore, 2005). Several authors have proposed a three-component concept with different labels. Farrell and Wortmann (1987) refer to party image, leader image and manifesto, Worcester and Mortimore (2005) talk about issues, **party image** and **leader image** and other scholars (Butler & Collins, 1994; Speed et al., 2015) report on ideology, person and the party. While party (image) and leader/person (image) includes an element of competence (Worcester & Mortimore, 2005), De Vries and Hobolt (2020) replaces these two factors by the broad factor of party **competence** and the parties' personnel to implement policies once in office. Their notion of the political product thus consists of the promised policies and the competence to implement these policies. However, as Worcester and Mortimore (2005) indicates, the image of the party and party leader consists of more items than only their allocated competences such as representation, charismatic characteristics or democratic values. Therefore, party – and personnel image are included as separate components in my notion of the political product as they provide valuable informational shortcuts for voters (Coan, Merolla, Stephenson, & Zechmeister, 2008; Cutler, 2002; Schaffner & Streb, 2002). Yet, my understanding of the political product is supplemented with the idea of allocated governmental competence. Voters do not only evaluate the party, its personnel and its proposed policies, but also their competence to deliver these policies in government. Previous governmental experience could disappoint voters if these parties had to make compromises in a coalition government (De Vries & Hobolt, 2020). In addition, voters might favor larger parties over smaller parties when casting their (tactical) vote with the eye on the chances of office holding (Fisher, 2004). Therefore, the components introduced in my notion of the political product are: **proposed programmatic stances, party organization image, personnel image and governmental competence**.

When a party tries to adapt to a competitive environment, I expect them to overlook their whole political product and implement party strategies on these four components of the political product at the same time. Hence, the consequences of one kind of party strategies depends on their combination with others (as the offered political product consists of multiple components). However, to this day, it is still unclear which components of the political product are simultaneously tackled in a strategic manner. Therefore, I investigate in this paper **which combinations of strategies are implemented by political parties in reality.**

Moreover, from studies such as Harmel & Janda (1994), Panebianco (1988) and Kriesi et al. (2008), we know that political parties are conservative organizations who are reluctant to change. As such, an environmental shock leads to thorough reforms and simultaneously targeting of multiple components of the political product.

H1: Political parties will simultaneously implement multiple strategies including the four components (i.e. programmatic stances, party organization image, personnel image and governmental competence) of the political product.

It might be incautious to expect that all parties implement the same amount and types of strategies regardless of their party characteristics. Next to variation in the amount of strategies, I expect variation in the type of strategies implemented. A first distinction is made between niche- and mainstream parties. In line with Meguid (2005), I define mainstream parties as parties that cover a broad set of issues, and that compete on the main historical line of societal divisions, i.e. the socio-economic dimension (e.g. Wagner, 2012). As already indicated in the governmental competence-section, some strategies are rewarded differently for mainstream- and niche parties. For instance, niche parties may have more doubts to participate in government due to their distinctive profile (Tomz & Van Houweling, 2012). Furthermore, as niche parties are primary policy seeking parties, they are more reluctant to reforms on their niche issue policies (Adams et al., 2006). Mainstream parties on the other hand tend to be more responsive towards voters (Adams et al., 2006). Moreover, parties tend to reform after electoral loss (Harmel & Janda, 1994; Panebianco, 1988). While ecological – and radical right parties experienced an electoral breakthrough during the last thirty years, mainstream parties coped with strong electoral decline (Luypaert, 2019). Therefore, I expect mainstream parties to target more components of the political product when reforming the party.

H2a: Mainstream parties will target more components of the political product when reforming the party compared to niche parties.
H2b: Mainstream parties will implement more frequently reforms compared to their niche competitors.

When implementing party strategies, political parties are constrained by their own **ideological heritage** (Harmel, 2002). When adapting the political product strategically, parties will stay congruent to their ideological past (Lilleker & Lees-Marshment, 2005; Poguntke et al., 2016). The consequences of ideological heritage are most outspoken for programmatic reforms. For instance, it would not be congruent if a social democratic party implemented reforms completely in the favor of the free market. Moreover, political parties are linked with certain issues (Bélanger & Meguid, 2008). Mainstream parties are typically focused on socio-economic issues, while ecological- and radical right parties on respectively environmental protection and multiculturalism. Therefore, the combinations of party reforms differ according to the inclusion of the parties' core issue. As parties are already associated with their core issues by voters, these core issues will less be a target of reform. Ecological parties are for instance

originated in the politicization of environmental protection. Therefore, they will not so rapidly change their position and saliency of this issue. However, a strong environmental shock (like electoral decline) could provide an incentive for changing the whole political product, including the core issue (e.g. Tony Blair and New Labour). Therefore, if the parties' core issue is reformed, it would be part of a combination of reforms.

H3a: As political parties are associated with certain issues by voters, these core issues will be less a target of reform.

H3b: When programmatic reforms on the core issues occurs, these will be part of a greater combination of reforms.

Indeed, there are many categorization of party families. They might be categorized by their similarities in origins, name/label, the transnational federations they belong to or party policies and ideologies (Mair & Mudde, 1998). However, in the scope of the political product, the most relevant distinction between party families will be made based on the similarities between party ideology and -policy. Following Mair & Mudde (1998), this heritage is broader than only the current policies they propose. Instead it sets out their domains of identification and attempts to uncover the core identity of the party. Based on this assumption, I follow the categorization of party families based on party manifesto data (Volkens et al., 2020). The party families included in this study are: social democratic -, Christian democratic -, liberal - , radical right - and ecological parties.

The broader party ideology also predicts other types of strategies. Enyedi and Linek (2008) finds three reasons for this correlation. First, the ideology might directly impact the organizational style. The participatory quest of ecological parties for instance, may result in a lower centrality of party leaders and a higher turnover of party leaders (Muller-Rommel, 2019). Radical right parties, on the other hand, are often centered around one charismatic figure (e.g. Jorg Haider, Geert Wilders, Marine Le Pen), making a designation of the party leader less likely (Aarts, Blais, & Schmitt, 2013). However, radical right parties are populistic as thin ideology, which could also suggest that they will implement direct democracy. Recent studies on Belgian populistic parties, however, found that this latter is not the case (Wauters & Pittoors, 2019). Secondly, ideology might impact parties' broader organization by its historical path dependency (Enyedi & Linek, 2008). Thereby, mass parties introduce different reforms compared to newer niche parties. Thirdly, the social background of the party's organization constrains the movements of the party (Enyedi & Linek, 2008). Regarding governmental competence, a social democratic party adopting ecological positions would be more likely to fulfill voters' expectation and eventually govern together with an ecological party. As this latter example indicates, a reform of one component of the political product may eventually lead to reforms of other components. Moreover, there could be contagion inside party families across geographic boundaries as they have the similar ideologies and compete for similar electorates (Ezrow, Böhmelt, Lehrer, & Ward, 2019; Katz & Mair, 1995; Matland & Studlar, 1996). Therefore, this study will pay attention to the heritage brought forward by the multiple party families. As this programmatic component has far-reaching consequences, programmatic reforms

will be placed at the center of this study. Thereby I investigate the differences in the combinations of party strategies, whether or not combined with a reform on the party's core issues **(**e.g. socio-economy, ecology and multiculturalism).

DATA, METHODS AND OPERATIONALIZATION

To investigate the combinations of strategies of political parties, the strategies on the multiple components of the political product implemented by Norwegian, Flemish, Austrian and German parties over the period 1990-2019 are mapped. These countries are chosen as they provide variation of the active parties in yet a comparable setting (i.e. proportional systems, decline of mainstream parties, operating of social democratic, Christian democratic, liberal-, ecological – and radical right parties). Moreover, data of these countries are well documented in each used dataset. However, this is still a pilot study and I hope to conduct more analyses including more European countries and parties in the future.

Each party in the sample obtains a score for each electoral cycle on the separate components of party strategy. In doing so, I distinguish between the four components presented above (i.e. programmatic-, organizational-, personnel- reforms and governmental competence) which all can be pursued in a differing extent. This leads to 16 possible combinations of strategies. To determine the scores of the parties on these strategies, I rely on existing datasets. The units of analysis are individual parties per electoral cycle (or legislative term) since 1990, resulting in 168 cases in total. This delineation in time allows me to capture a period in which the electoral decline of mainstream parties became highly salient (7 percentage points compared to the 1980s) (Luypaert, 2019), a period that is long enough to have some variation in strategies and electoral evolutions, and a period for which data are available and quite easily accessible. The used datasets and operationalization will be discussed more in detail for each component of the political product.

Programmatic reforms

Programmatic reforms are measured by analyzing MARPOR-data (Volkens et al., 2020). This project provides data on parties' policy positions and salience derived from a content analysis of their electoral manifestos. It is based on the coding of quasi-sentences following 56 issue categories (Abou-Chadi, 2014). The data on each issue represent the percentage of the total amount of statements compromised by each issue category. As such, the data are standardized with regard to the manifesto length (Kim & Fording, 2003). The dataset is appropriate for this study because it measures both the salience as the policy positions. As mentioned above, parties can give two types of programmatic responses to changes in electoral markets: a change in saliency and a change in policy position (Mair, Müller, & Plasser, 2004; Meguid, 2003). Both saliency - and policy position convergence on the main niche parties' issues (i.e. ecological and multiculturalist issue) will be investigated. Moreover, in order to gain electorally, mainstream parties does not solely innovate on niche issues as these parties are facing a trade-off between reinventing (e.g. by covering niche issues) and reinforcing their dominant positions (De Vries

& Hobolt, 2020). In this way, mainstream parties will try to preserve their dominant position on the political market by reinforcing the socio-economic issue (De Vries & Hobolt, 2020). Hence, reforms of the saliency and position of the socio-economic issue will also be measured.

The saliency and the position of issues are differently measured. On an issue, parties can emphasize a positive or negative stance. These different stances on the issue are seen as paired nature. Issue salience is the sum of both (Abou-Chadi, 2014). For the issue on multiculturalism, this will be multiculturalism (pos) + multiculturalism (neg).

However, in order to develop a measure of policy position that is independent of salience, the share of a positive category must be subtracted from the share of a negative category. To obtain the net policy position, this difference must be divided with the total percentage of statements regarding this issue (the salience). A parties' policy position can range from -1 to 1, where a larger score indicates larger support of the party towards more rightist policies towards the issue.

Multiculturalism(position): (multicult_neg – multicult_pos)/(multicult_neg + multicult_pos).

The second programmatic convergence investigated here, is ecological parties on environmental protection (per501). To measure the saliency and policy positions we need both a "positive" and a "negative" category. However, "environmental protection" does not have a natural pair. I will follow the operationalization of Abou-Chadi (2014) and use 'productivity' as the negative stance. Productivity is used as an opposite of environmental protection, as proponents of industrial productivity and economic growth 'can be regarded as opposed to a focus on a pollution-free environment and more sustainable growth' (Abou-Chadi,2014, p425). Policy position and salience on the theme of environmental protection are measured through the following formula:

  Environmental protection (salience): per501+per410

  Environmental protection (position): (per501-per410)/(per501+per410).

The last issue investigated in this study is the socio-economic one. As mentioned above, parties can reinvent their core issue. The two categories planned – and market economy are taken into account.

  Socio-economic (salience): market economy + planned economy

  Socio-economic (position): (market economy – planned economy)/(market economy + planned economy).

Both reforms of salience as reforms of position on these three issues are investigated in a weighted manner. First, the difference between respectively position and saliency of the issue with the previous election is measured. Secondly, in order to compare the reforms with each other, the amount of change is classified into 4 categories, namely 0; 0,33 ; 0,66 and 1 where zero means no or little change and 1 means a great amount of change. The operationalization of these categories differs for salience- and position reforms. Regarding the salience reforms, the average of the reforms on the respective issue functions as reference point. For instance, the average of reforms in socio-economic salience is 4,00. No amount of reforms (0) is 0-2 , a little amount of reform (0,33) is 2-4 , a larger amount of reforms (0.66) is 4-6, while a total amount of reforms (1) is every reform in socio economic salience larger than 6.

Indeed, this only takes the amount of change into account and not the direction. Next to a greater emphasizes on issues, parties could opt to ignore the issues more. The same numbers are used (as the same amount of change is measured), but with an indication of direction where the reform will eventually appear negative. The same method is used with the operationalization of multiculturalism and socio-economic issues. A reform on position, on the other hand, can only vary between -2 or 2. A complete leftist turnover on in issue will namely result in 2, as the previous stance is 1 (most rightist) and the actual stance is -1 (most leftist). A negative reform is interpreted as a reform to the right on the issue, while a positive outcome on reform is a reform towards the leftist side. A four value set is also used with this reform:

- 0 = no change, meaning a change between -0.5 and 0.5
- (-)0.33 = little change, meaning a change between (-)0.5-(-)1
- (-)0.66, greater change, meaning a change between (-)1 – (-)1.5
- (-)1= greatest change, meaning a change between (-)1.5- (-)2

Organizational reforms

Data from the COSPAL-dataset (Pilet & Cross, 2014) are used to map party organizational reforms in the scope of party image. COSPAL is a project on the Comparative Study of the Selection of Party Leaders, led by William Cross and Jean-Benoit Pilet. It contains information about both formal rules, actual leadership contests, and leaders for Western parties since 1954. In this paper, I will focus on a reform in the party leader selectorate. Following Kenig (2009a), there are six possible party leader selectorates, arranged according to the degree of inclusivity. When opening up the party leader selectorate, a positive electoral effect is expected based on the procedural fairness theory (Ramiro, 2016). When a party democratizes its party leader selectorate during an electoral cycle, it will be coded as one.

Personnel reforms

Data from the COSPAL dataset are also used to map personnel reforms. In this paper, a change of party leader during the legislative period is coded as 1. If multiple reforms occur in this component, the amount of party leader change is coded as the same amount of reforms.

Governmental competence

Data from the parlgov-database (Döring and Manow 2020) are used to map governmental competence. Both the participation in government during the legislative term as a niche party as coalition partner will be studied and coded as one (present) or zero (absent). Indeed, the strategies discussed above are studied as reforms as previous studies expect consequences after a change. The theoretical outline on governmental competence indicates that it is not necessary the change in governmental participation but participation in itself that influence the consequences. Therefore, this category of strategies will not include the reforms on the governmental component but the actual participation and its niche- coalition partner of the political party.

RESULTS

Taken as a whole, the following results provide an extraordinary snapshot in detecting which party strategies and their combinations are implemented by the Flemish, Austrian, Norwegian and German parties. This overview highlights differences and similarities of the strategies implemented between party families and party types.

Separate components

As outlined above, the four components forming the political product on which voters potentially base their preferences on are: programmatic stances, party organization image, personnel image and governmental competence. In what follows, the findings inside the separate components will be outlined, followed by the findings on the different combinations of party strategies.

Programmatic reforms

Proposed programmatic stances are probably the most straightforward component of the political product. In this section I (a) review how many programmatic reforms are detected and (b) compare the changes on the three issues on their average size, number of reforms (%) and which direction they follow the most, followed by detecting differences and similarities between party families and party types. The three issues under study are: socio-economic-, multiculturalist- and ecological issues.

Aggregated overview of programmatic reforms

Table 1 gives an aggregated overview of the programmatic reforms implemented by the Norwegian, Austrian, Flemish and German parties. Out of the 168 cases under study (meaning parties per electoral cycle), 86% responded with a programmatic reform. The programmatic reforms in my analyses are already weighted in order to exclude incremental changes (see section on data, methods and operationalization). In general, parties reformed more with a change in saliency on an issue (57% of the cases) compared with a change in position (30% of the cases). Moreover, the average change of size of attention given to an issue is 3 percent points, mostly with an increase in salience (+). When a party change its position, it is on average changed with 0.41 more towards the leftist side of the spectrum (-). This difference between position - and saliency changes can also be drawn for party families.

However, differences between the five party families remain. Christian democratic parties seem to change the most in terms of position (43% of the cases), while radical right parties reform the most in terms of saliency (61%). Regarding reforms in position, remarkable differences are found between mainstream- and niche parties: mainstream parties tend to reform more their policy positions, both in size and in amount than their niche counterparts do.

Table 1 Aggregated programmatic reforms including socio-economic-, multicultural- and ecological issues

	position			salience		
	av.size	amount (%)	amount direction	av.size	amount(%)	amount direction
Social Democrats	0,48	36%	-	2,36	50%	+
Christian Democrats	0,53	43%	-	2,64	60%	+
Liberals	0,48	36%	-	2,47	61%	-
Ecologicals	0,23	15%	-	2,45	51%	+
Radical right	0,39	24%	=	5,19	64%	-
Total	0,41	30%	-	2,98	57%	+

Overview of separate programmatic reforms

In this study, programmatic reforms on three issues (socio-economy, multiculturalism and ecology) are compared (see table 2). In general, political parties seem to adopt the same amount and size of position reforms on the three issues. Regarding the saliency, 54% and 55% of the cases responded with a reform in emphasis of socio-economic and ecological issues. The attention on the multiculturalist issue seems more a target of reforms (61%). When a change in saliency occurs, it is mostly an increase on the socio-economic and multiculturalist issue, while the ecological issue faces more a decline.

Moreover, there is uniformity in the amount of saliency on the ecological issue (between 52% and 61%). Ecological parties seem to implement the least amount of reforms on the ecological position (only 7%) while the other parties reform between 29% and 48%. This was expected as ecological parties own the ecological issue and are thus expected to revise less the issue (Hypotheses 3a).

However, the confirmation of this hypothesis is not found with the radical right party and the ownership of multiculturalism. Instead, liberal and Christian democratic parties implement almost the same amount of changes on the saliency of the multiculturalist issue compared to the dominant niche party (radical right, 69%). While the social democrats implement fewer changes on the saliency of the multiculturalist issue compared to their mainstream counterparts, they implement the most reforms on the position (46%), which is even more than radical right parties (22%). Together with Christian democrats and radical rights, social democrats implement mostly rightist position reforms (+). Moreover, mainstream parties are perceived as owners of the socio-economic issue (Meguid, 2003). However, they do not implement less reforms on the socio-economic than niche parties. Mainstream parties implement far more positional reforms on socio-economic issues compared to their niche counterparts (resp. between 33%-48% and 19-21%) while they implement the same amount of reforms on saliency (resp between 42%-62% and 44%-65%). Ecological and social-democratic parties seem to implement the least reforms on salience. On average, only liberals and radical rights emphasize socio-ecological issues less.

Table 2 Separate programmatic reforms on socio-economic, multicultural-, ecological issues

	Socio-economic						Multicultural						Ecological					
	position			salience			position			salience			position			salience		
	av.size	amount (%)	sign	av.size	amount(%)	sign	av.size	amount(%)	sign	av.size	amount(%)	sign	av.size	amount(%)	sign	av.size	amount (%)	sign
Social Democrats	0,42	33%	-	2,44	42%	+	0,65	46%	+	0,79	47%	+	0,41	30%	-	3,86	61%	-
Christian Democrats	0,55	48%	-	3,76	58%	+	0,42	30%	+	1,30	70%	+	0,61	48%	=	2,85	52%	-
Liberals	0,52	40%	-	3,26	62%	-	0,44	32%	-	1,24	68%	+	0,46	36%	-	2,91	54%	-
Ecologicals	0,32	19%	-	2,04	44%	+	0,20	21%	-	1,16	56%	+	0,15	7%	-	4,15	52%	=
Radical right	0,38	21%	-	9,89	65%	-	0,39	22%	+	1,81	69%	=	0,42	29%	=	3,48	58%	-
Total	0,41	30%	-	3,99	54%	+	0,40	29%	+	1,19	61%	+	0,41	31%	-	3,74	55%	-

Organizational reforms

Democratizations of the leadership selectorate were detected in only four out of 184 cases: the Flemish liberals and Christian democrats in the legislative term of 1991-1995, the Flemish social democrats and ecologicals in the legislative term of 1995-1999 and the German greens in the legislative term of 2009-2013. Despite the widespread phenomenon of democratization of leadership selection, countries such as Austria, Germany and Norway apparently resisted the change for a long time [2](Kenig, 2009b) based on the perception that democratizing the selectorate may eventually damage the party unity (Strøm, 1993). Due to lack of positive cases, organizational reforms will not be included when discussing the combinations of reforms (see below).

Personnel reforms

In Table 3, I report the amount of party leadership reforms and its size for each party family during the electoral cycles under study. 59% of all cases implemented a turnover of party leader.

The picture when breaking down the analysis by party family is little surprising: social democrats and ecologicals implement the most personnel reforms (resp. 75,6% and 76%), while the radical right parties the least (34%) (see Hypotheses 3). Ecological parties tend to implement more than one personnel reform in a legislative terms, while the other party families have mostly a change of party leader once in the electoral cycle. This finding correspondents with the ecologicals' participatory call in party organizations (Muller-Rommel, 2019). A rotating leadership structure within a collective leadership group is one element of their decentralized decision-making processes (Aarts et al., 2013). Radical right parties, on the other hand, do not change frequently of party leader. This correspondents with the idea that radical right parties have a charismatic and personalized leadership (Aarts et al., 2013). These strong leaders are often the reason why radical right parties face electoral growth (e.g. Pim Fortuyn, Marie Le Pen, Jorg Haider). Moreover, the party apparatus is centered around this one person as reaction to the mainstream bureaucratic parties. Therefore, the party leader controls the party political agenda, strategies and the party organization (Skenderovic, 2009). A designation of the party leader thereby only occur in extreme cases.

Table 3 Overview personnel reforms

	percentage amount	average size
Social Democrats	76%	1,16
Christian Democrats	52%	1,24
Liberals	65%	1,12
Ecologicals	76%	1,95
Radical rights	35%	1,67

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[2] The German parties CDU/CSU and SPD implemented democratic reforms in respectively 2018 and 2019 (Aylott, Bolin, Jun, & Jakobs, 2020). However, these reforms are not in the scope of this study as the legislative term is not finished yet.

Governmental competence

One of the main differences between niche- and mainstream parties is their governmental experience whereby government participation of a niche party is rather exceptional. However, out of the four countries under study, almost one third of the governments included a niche party. Particularly in Norway, niche party participation is prominent present (43%) due to participation of the communist party together with the social democrats in cabinet and the most recent participation of the radical right party FrP with the conservatives, liberals and Christian democrats.

When performing the analysis at the party family level, (a) the participation of government for each party family and (b) the participation of one party family with a niche party is investigated (Table). Regarding the first, Christian Democratic parties govern the most often, followed by the social democrats. Moreover, radical right parties have more experience in governing compared to their ecological counterparts, although both are comparable low (resp.15% and 11%). When it comes to governing with a niche party, the social democrats have the most experience (18%), while the liberals the least (8%).

Table 4 Overview governmental competence by party family

Party family	participation (%)	together with niche (%)
Social Democrats	61%	18%
Christian Democrats	76%	15%
Liberals	44%	8%
Ecologicals	11%	
Radical right	15%	

Coherent combinations: mainstream- vs. niche parties?

Overall, political parties do implement strategies on the multiple components of the political product at the same time. Out of 128 cases of party reform, 120 parties simultaneously implemented reforms on multiple components of the political product, leading to the confirmation of hypothesis 1. Party reform is only seldom restricted to one component of the party. Yet, some combinations of strategies are far more implemented by political parties than others. For instance, the combination multiculturalism convergence and leader change is implemented 14 times, while the combination greater socio-economic saliency and participation in government together with a niche party is only implemented 4 times.

As stated in the theoretical outline, political parties are constrained by their ideological heritage. Therefore, the combinations they implement is expected to differ when combined with the issue they own (Hypotheses 3). In following section, the differences between the combinations of party strategies are outlined with socio-economic saliency, multiculturalism – and ecological convergence. This results in two Venn-diagrams for each issue, where a reform in convergence on an issue will be combined with the three other strategies (change of party leader, governmental participation and a niche party in government) where the parties who own the issue will be compared to their counterparts. In order to

display clear Venn-diagrams, the saliency and position of niche issues are brought together into one programmatic category of convergence towards the niche issue. This convergence is the average weighted change (see section on data and methods) of the position and saliency of the niche issue. As the socio-economic issue has three issue owners (i.e. social democrats, Christian democrats and liberals), only convergence on saliency is taken into account with the socio-economic issue. The darker the color of a combination of party strategies, the more cases this combination shows.

While mainstream parties typically own the **socio-economic** issue, there were no differences found between niche- and mainstream parties on the combinations of strategies with a higher socio-economic saliency (see Table 5 in appendix for specific numbers). Social democrats, Christian democrats, liberals and radical rights all seem to implement around the halve of their combinations with a greater emphasis on the socio-economic issue combined with other strategies (not supporting hypothesis 3a), while this is most frequently done by ecological parties (71%). The combination most frequently implemented by niche parties including the higher socio-economic saliency is its combination with leader change. This combination is mostly undertaken by ecological parties (29% of the ecological cases). The combination most frequently implemented by mainstream parties is leadership change combined with governmental participation. This combination does not include a greater socio-economic saliency.

When a Christian democratic or social democratic party reforms the saliency on the socio-economic issue, it is always combined with at least one other strategy. Liberals, ecologicals and radical rights on the other hand implement in around 10% of their cases solely this programmatic reform.

While mainstream parties often do include a reform in socio-economic saliency, it is mostly part of a greater combination of reforms (Hypothesis 3b).


Figure 1 Socio-economic salience combined with strategies - including social democrats, Christian democrats and liberals

Figure 2 Socio-economic salience combined with strategies - including ecologicals and radical rights

The second Venn-diagram duo shows the combinations of convergence on the **multiculturalism** issue with the other three strategies. As is the case with the other issues, the most popular combination of strategies is a convergence on multiculturalism combined with a change of party leader. This was mostly

implemented by ecologicals and social democrats, while Christian democrats never implemented this combination for over a period of almost 30 years. Yet, we know that Christian democrats participate the most in government (Table 4) and thereby expand this combination with the governmental strategy more often. Surprisingly, radical right parties do include convergence on multiculturalism in 53% of the cases. However, it should be noticed that other party families include in 65% of the reforms multiculturalism convergence. Thereby, hypothesis 3a is not confirmed in absolute but in relative terms (compared to other party families).

Striking are the differences between liberals, ecologicals and radical rights on the one hand and Christian democrats and social democrats on the other hand when implementing multiculturalism convergence. Out of the first group of party families, a considerable amount of cases implement only this programmatic reform. The social – and Christian democrats however, nearly always combine a multiculturalism convergence with other strategies. Unlike the expectations, besides implementing no strategy at all, radical right parties implement most frequently only convergence of the multiculturalism issue (not supporting Hypotheses 3b).


Figure 3 Multiculturalism convergence combined with strategies - including radical rights

Figure 4 Multiculturalism convergence combined with strategies - including social democrats, Christian democrats, liberals and ecologicals

The third Venn-diagram duo shows the combinations of **ecological** convergence, leader change, participating in government and a niche party participating in government. Out of all three issues under study, solely implementing ecological convergence is the most popular programmatic strategy. This strategy is most frequently used by radical right parties (21%), followed by ecological parties (14%) and liberals (13%) (Table 7 appendix). The combination of ecological convergence and leader change is less frequent than the combination of multiculturalism convergence or greater socio-economic emphasizes combined with leadership change. However, this combination is far more implemented by ecological parties than the other party families. Ecological parties do reform solely the ecological issue, but mostly in combination with a change in leadership or a change in leadership and participating in government as niche party (confirming hypothesis 3b).

Figure 5 Ecological convergence combined with strategies – including ecological parties

Figure 6 Ecological convergence combined with strategies – including social democrats, Christian democrats, liberals and radical rights

In sum, political parties do adapt to a changing environment by implementing multiple party strategies. Differences are found between the frequency of combinations of strategies depending on the issues under study. For instance, there were differences found between ecological- and mainstream parties when it comes to the inclusion of a higher socio-economic saliency combined with other strategies. The same conclusion can be drawn for radical right parties compared to other parties when convergence on the multiculturalism issue is combined. Combinations including ecological convergence, however, little differences were found between the party families.

Regarding the amount of components included, only radical right parties mostly include one component when rebranding the party (31% of the radical right cases). Moreover, 25% of the radical right cases did not implement a single strategy, while this occurs between 0%-10% of the other party families' cases. One explanation could be that radical right parties face electoral prosperity in this era (Stockemer, 2016) and thus perceive less pressure for change (Harmel & Janda, 1994). Another explanation could be that radical right parties are not likely to change on the four components under study. For instance, they are primary policy driven and less responsive towards voters (Adams et al., 2006), do favor strong and charismatic leadership which lead to a less frequent leadership change (Wauters & Pittoors, 2019) and do not frequently participate in government (see Table 4). Ecological-, social democratic-, Christian democratic- and liberal parties mostly include strategies on two components.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Over the last few decades, the long dominant mainstream parties are losing ground in Western Europe. While studies indicate electoral decline as one of the main drivers for party reforms, little is known about which type of party reforms are implemented in reality. In this study I argued that parties overlook their whole political product when reforming the party. This political product consists of four components: programmatic stances, party organizational image, personnel image and governmental competence. Based on this notion of the multi-componential political product, this study argued that parties will not

focus solely on one component of the product. Instead, political parties are prepared to implement simultaneously multiple strategies when rebranding the party. This theoretical expectation is confirmed with my dataset on implemented party strategies of Flemish, Austrian, German and Norwegian parties for over a period of thirty years.

The results show that political parties do implement much more multiple strategies at the same time than solely one strategy. When it comes down to the amount of components included when rebranding the party, only radical right parties implement mostly one type of strategy. Moreover, this party family implement the least strategies of all party families under study. This conclusion is not surprising as radical rights implement the least personnel reforms and have little governmental participation. Yet, when it comes down to other combinations of strategies, there are remarkable resemblances between radical right-, ecological- and liberal parties. These three party families often solely implement a convergence on a niche parties' issue, while social democratic- and Christian parties nearly always combines this convergence with another strategy, for instance with a change of party leader. This result provides little confirmation of resemblance between mainstream parties on the one hand and niche parties on the other hand. Why is it that the liberal mainstream party family show more similarities with niche parties? One the one hand, liberal parties might perceive less pressure for change as they do not face the same strength of electoral decline as social – and Christian democratic parties (Luypaert, 2019). On the other hand, the liberal parties included in this study participate less in government. Thereby, they are less able to include the governmental competence component and thus including a third component of the political product when rebranding the party.

Besides the amount of multiple strategies implemented, it was expected that party families would differ in the adopted party strategies according to their ideological heritage. First, ecological- and social democratic parties change the most frequently of party leaders, while radical right parties the least. Second, there are differences found between party families and their relationship towards the (whether or not) inclusion of their core issue in combinations of strategies. The results, however, provided mixed evidence for the expectation that parties will implement less reforms on their core issue. Radical right - and mainstream parties implement less frequently a reform on their core issue compared to other parties. Ecological parties on the other hand do include the same amount of ecological convergence compared to other parties. While ecological- and mainstream parties mostly combine a reform on the core issue with other strategies, radical right parties mostly implement solely multiculturalism convergence.

These findings have important implications for the literature on party strategies. First, the dichotomic concept of niche- and mainstream party is less suitable when explaining variation between the combinations of party strategies. Instead, the scope of electoral decline and/or being in opposition might be a more compelling predictor for the implemented party strategies (Dassonneville, 2018; Pacześniak, Bachryj-Krzywaźnia, & Kaczorowska, 2020). Second, issue ownership has different strategic consequences depending on the party family and their core issue. Mainstream- and ecological parties

reform their core issues in the broader scope of rebranding the party and combine this programmatic reform with other strategies, while this is not the case with radical right parties.

Although this pilot study includes 168 cases for over a period of almost thirty years, future research should include more cases and countries. As mentioned above, country factors such as participating in government could partly explain why liberal parties show resemblances with niche parties when it comes down to combinations of strategies. Other cases where the liberals participate more in government could bring other combinations of strategies. On the other hand, institutional environments and the diffusion effect between political parties inside the same political system could also explain variation between the adopted party strategies (Katz & Mair, 1995). Political competitors observe each other and are willing to copy successful strategies of rival parties to avoid defeat. As such, successful party strategies are often copied by the opponents inside the same party system (Bohmelt, Ezrow, Lehrer, & Ward, 2016; Matland & Studlar, 1996). Future research could focus on breaking down the analysis on party system level.[3] Moreover, by including more countries and cases, more cases including the democratization of party leadership selection procedures could be investigated (as part of the party image component). Although this paper investigated 168 cases, only five included a reform in selection of party leadership procedure. Nevertheless, the operationalization of party image by democratizing party leadership procedure can also be criticized in the scope of party strategies. Parties are namely most willingly to reform aspects which are easily observed, whereby a change in party structures occurs less frequently (Pacześniak et al., 2020). Therefore, another operationalization of party image might be more suitable to investigate this component of the political product.

Despite these nuances, the present study shows that parties do implement simultaneously party strategies on the multiple components of the political product. When investigating one party strategy and its consequences, we should observe them in the whole of the political product and thus combined with other party strategies. Moreover, it could be that these (electoral) effects of the multiple components are conditional upon one another. By conducting further research on this integrated approach, the strategies of political parties will be mapped even more clearly in the future.

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[3] I am planning to conduct this analysis in a further stage of my PhD.

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APPENDIX

Table 5 Salience socio-economic issue, combined with other strategies

SAL_SE	leader	particip	niche_gov	n	soc dem	chr dem	lib	ecol	rad right
0	0	0	0	12	4%	0%	4%	10%	32%
0	0	0	1	5	0%	4%	4%	0%	5%
0	0	1	0	5	4%	12%	4%	0%	0%
0	0	1	1	7	8%	12%	4%	0%	0%
0	1	0	0	10	8%	4%	4%	14%	5%
0	1	0	1	5	4%	4%	9%	0%	5%
0	1	1	0	12	16%	19%	13%	0%	0%
0	1	1	1	5	8%	0%	0%	5%	5%
1	0	0	0	6	0%	0%	9%	10%	11%
1	0	0	1	9	4%	8%	9%	10%	11%
1	0	1	0	5	8%	8%	4%	0%	0%
1	0	1	1	4	0%	4%	0%	0%	11%
1	1	0	0	16	16%	4%	13%	29%	11%
1	1	0	1	10	8%	4%	9%	14%	5%
1	1	1	0	11	8%	15%	4%	0%	0%
1	1	1	1	6	4%	4%	9%	10%	0%

Table 6 Convergence multiculturalism issue, combined with other strategies

CON_MULT	leader	particip	niche_gov	n	soc dem	chr dem	lib	ecol	rad right
0	0	0	0	7	0%	0%	4%	5%	24%
0	0	0	1	5	0%	8%	8%	0%	6%
0	0	1	0	3	4%	8%	0%	0%	0%
0	0	1	1	2	0%	0%	0%	0%	12%
0	1	0	0	12	4%	8%	8%	19%	6%
0	1	0	1	3	8%	0%	4%	0%	0%
0	1	1	0	12	12%	19%	13%	0%	0%
0	1	1	1	2	4%	0%	0%	5%	0%
1	0	0	0	11	4%	0%	13%	14%	18%
1	0	0	1	**9**	4%	4%	4%	10%	12%
1	0	1	0	7	8%	12%	8%	0%	0%
1	0	1	1	9	8%	15%	4%	0%	0%
1	1	0	0	14	20%	0%	8%	24%	12%
1	1	0	1	**12**	4%	8%	13%	14%	12%
1	1	1	0	11	12%	15%	4%	0%	0%
1	1	1	1	9	8%	4%	13%	10%	0%

Table 7 Convergence ecological issue, combined with other strategies

CON_ECOL	leader	particip	niche_gov	cases	soc dem	chr dem	lib	ecol	rad right
0	0	0	0	6	0%	0%	0%	5%	21%
0	0	0	1	4	0%	4%	4%	5%	0%
0	0	1	0	5	12%	4%	4%	0%	0%
0	0	1	1	3	4%	0%	0%	0%	5%
0	1	0	0	17	20%	4%	17%	24%	5%
0	1	0	1	8	0%	8%	13%	10%	5%
0	1	1	0	12	8%	19%	9%	0%	0%
0	1	1	1	3	4%	4%	0%	0%	5%
1	0	0	0	12	4%	0%	13%	14%	21%
1	0	0	1	10	4%	8%	9%	5%	16%
1	0	1	0	5	0%	15%	4%	0%	0%
1	0	1	1	8	4%	15%	9%	0%	0%
1	1	0	0	9	4%	4%	0%	19%	11%
1	1	0	1	7	12%	0%	4%	5%	5%
1	1	1	0	11	16%	15%	9%	0%	0%
1	1	1	1	8	8%	0%	4%	14%	5%