

Chapter 7

An integrity system framework for the governance of the football World Cups

Géraldine Zeimers and Bram Constandt

Introduction

Integrity has been a long-standing issue for many international sports bodies (Pielke, 2016). FIFA, the international governing body of world football, represents no exception. For many commentators, FIFA has regularly indicated a lack of ethical and good governance practices over its past (Bason et al. 2018; Tomlinson 2014). For instance, FIFA only introduced a code of ethics for the first time in 2004 and an independent ethical committee in 2006 after controversies with the company International Sport and Leisure (Bayle and Rayner 2018; Tomlinson 2014). In comparison, the IOC, forced by the Salt Lake City scandal, adopted substantial governance reforms in 1999 by setting up an ethics commission, drawing up a code of ethics to sanction unacceptable behaviours, limiting terms of office and stakeholders' representation (Chappelet 2016). This led Tomlinson (2014, p. 1161) to note that “ethical issues have been peripheral to FIFA’s concerns for most of its history” and “the culture of corruption and personal gain has long been endemic in the FIFA ‘family’” (p. 1162).

Throughout its history, FIFA has frequently been beset by allegations of corruption and flawed governance (Bayle and Rayner 2018; Beans 2018). The spotlight has been particularly strong on (the selection process regarding) the hosting of the World Cup, with allegations of bribery for the 2006 World Cup in Germany (Spiegel 2016), the 2010 World Cup in South Africa (Harding 2015), the 2014 World Cup in Brazil (Chade 2017), and allegations of vote rigging in relation to the stunning double selection of Russia and Qatar to

host the 2018 and 2022 World Cups in 2010 (Beans 2018; Becker 2013). Several critiques were formulated at that time. FIFA rated Russia “medium risk” and Qatar “high risk”. Qatar did not have a football culture and is characterised by extreme weather conditions. Since 1984 the country selected to host the World Cup was announced six years in advance. The bidding process was changed to jointly award both the 2018 and the 2022 World Cups for the 2010 occasion (Beans 2018).

After the maelstrom generated by this double attribution, FIFA President Sepp Blatter adopted a first wave of “cosmetic reforms” toward more transparency and accountability (Beans, 2018). Between 2011 and 2014, FIFA commissioned governance evaluations with Pieth’s “Governing FIFA” report (Pieth, 2011), Transparency International’s “Safe Hands” Report (Schenk, 2011), and new Independent Governance Committee’s reports recommending various governance changes. In the end, only a few proposals were accepted and implemented by FIFA and its continental confederations (Beans 2018; Pielke 2013). The appointment of Michael Garcia as the independent Chair of the Investigative Chamber of the remodelled Ethics Committee was one of them. In 2013 and 2014, Garcia investigated the selection of Russia and Qatar as World Cup hosts. FIFA initially refused to publish his report that revealed serious violations of bidding rules and the FIFA code of ethics. Six months after Garcia resignation, the so-called FIFAgate broke out. In 2015, FIFAgate culminated in US and Swiss criminal investigations which focused on allegations of corruption of media and marketing rights and vote trading when it comes to the 2018 and 2022 World Cups. These investigations caused the indictment and the arrest of leading officials for charges of racketeering, wire fraud conspiracies, money laundering conspiracies, and bribery, the banning of its President and Secretary General, and major sponsors withdrawing their support (BBC 2016, 2020; Beans, 2018; Cottle, 2019; Richau et al. 2019; Tomlinson 2014).

In the aftermath of FIFAgate, FIFA adopted a second wave of substantial governance reforms recommended by the 2016 FIFA Reform Committee (Carrard, 2015) and elected Gianni Infantino as President. Notable governance changes included the separation of the governance (i.e., FIFA Council) and management (i.e., General Secretariat) roles, the adoption of FIFA statutes encompassing the commitment to good governance principles and human rights, a new code of conduct, the revision of its code of ethics (by the 68th FIFA Congress in June 2018), enhanced control and disclosure of development funds, confidential reporting mechanisms, FIFA Congress to vote on the award of the World Cup, salary disclosure, limit on president's term, revised presidency electoral regulation, enhanced eligibility, integrity checks, women representation in leadership positions, Football Stakeholder Committee, the creation of an independent Human Rights Advisory Board, with experts from the UN, trade unions, civil society and business partners, and the creation of the FIFA Integrity Department (FIFA Integrity) and related integrity programmes (FIFA 2016, 2019).¹ These reforms implemented between 2016 and 2018 impacted the governance of bidding for and hosting World Cup tournaments. FIFA explicitly reported its intention to “build a stronger institution” with “no room for doubt” and pledged that “the selection of the host of the FIFA World Cup is no longer a synonym of scandal” (FIFA, 2019).

Despite these changes, recent scandals have continued to put FIFA’s integrity and legitimacy into question (see e.g., Constandt and Willem, 2021 about FIFA’s code of ethics and Richau et al., 2019 about FIFA’s leadership legitimacy). The 2018 World Cup was described as “sportswashing event” (The Guardian 2021) and FIFA admitted human rights abuses (Conn, 2017). In 2019, the Swiss authorities opened criminal proceedings against FIFA’s President, Gianni Infantino, the man charged with restoring FIFA's reputation, over a secret meeting between Infantino and the former Swiss Attorney General Michael Lauber

¹ For a discussion of these reforms, please see Bason et al. (2018).

held in 2017 while Lauber investigated FIFA's alleged corruption. This meeting fuelled suspicions of collusion and is investigated on the grounds of breaching official secrecy, assisting offenders, indictment to break the law, and abuse of public office (Bonesteel, 2019). FIFA's Ethics Committee's decided to maintain Infantino despite several concerns raised by the ongoing investigation. The Committee justified its ruling on the basis that FIFA's code of ethics had not been violated and that some accusations towards Infantino were not covered by the provisions of the code (BBC, 2020; Constandt and Willem, 2021). Another voiced criticism was that the Committee applied a "double standard" as the same Committee had temporarily banned Sepp Blatter when the Swiss authorities opened a criminal investigation against him in 2015 (Dupré 2020). For Richau et al. (2019, p. 1), "whether the way FIFA operates has changed since the election of its new president is questionable".

In addition to the above, deplorable labour conditions infringing workers safety, labour law and human rights provisions have been reported repeatedly regarding the situation in Qatar (Amnesty International, 2015; 2016; Cohen, 2013; Kelly et al., 2019; Pattisson 2020). Following another article published by The Guardian stating that at least 6,500 migrant workers had died since Qatar won the bid (The Guardian, 2021a), the football world has started to speak up, later followed by more political and business actors. While these accusations were dismissed by the Qatari World Cup organiser, the Supreme Committee for Delivery and Legacy (SC) (The Guardian, 2021b), a Dutch company eventually refused to work for the 2022 World Cup (Courrier International, 2021). Ahead of the first round of World Cup qualifier matches in early 2021, national teams and FA's from Norway, Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Belgium have protested against the working conditions and human rights in Qatar. For Stale Solbakken, Norway's manager, "It's about putting pressure on FIFA to be even more direct, even firmer with the authorities in Qatar, to impose stricter requirements" (Euronews, 2021). While the decision to boycott the tournament by some FA's

and governments remain improbable, these events have shown that FIFA's stakeholders can make their "contribution to efforts to improve the plight of migrant workers in Qatar" (The Guardian, 2021b).

The abovementioned events are threats to the integrity of football and undermine FIFA's claims to act for the global public good (Tomlinson, 2014). These events are under a constant global scrutiny due to the exhaustive media coverage of the ongoing scandals. Furthermore, these scandals have eroded the public's trust in FIFA and in the bidding for and the hosting of World Cups (Hölzen and Meier, 2019; Pielke, 2016; Richau et al., 2019). As observed by Chris Graid in 2016:

These [scandals] could have been avoided, or mitigated, by a more robust governance regime. It would appear that the checks and balances that have been in place at FIFA's management level have failed to appropriately regulate an organisation whose power and influence has multiplied exponentially as the commercialisation and globalisation of football continues to grow.

There are many reasons driving member associations to host the World Cup. The immense economic, industrial, commercial, political, and social interests at stake and FIFA's recent history and failures to prevent and convincingly deal with scandals have called upon transparent bidding and hosting processes and more generally appropriate governance responses in order to install a culture of integrity at FIFA and restore trust (Gardiner et al., 2017; Kihl, 2020).

In light of this background, the purpose of this chapter is to examine how the processes of bidding for and hosting of World Cup tournaments is governed. This will be underpinned by an analysis of ethical practices in both organisation and governance, as well

as by focusing on the recent attempts to improve ethical standards applied to tournament decisions. Acknowledging the definitional ambiguity and the breadth of the constructs of governance, corruption, and ethics, we considered it is appropriate to synthesise these complementary constructs under the notion of integrity. This chapter uses - and argues the utility of applying - the lens of a sport integrity system framework as conceptualised by Kihl (2020) as a relevant governance approach to analyse FIFA's governance and integrity reforms. This chapter employs this framework to offer a number of critical points to take into consideration for future governance and integrity-enhancing initiatives in FIFA.

Governance and Integrity

The concepts of (good) governance, ethics, and integrity are sometimes used interchangeably by academics as well as throughout the sport industry (Vanden Auweele et al., 2016). It is not within the remit of this chapter to analyse the synergies and the contradictions between these terms.² However, after defining and locating the concepts of sport event governance and good governance in the literature, integrity is introduced and will be used throughout the present chapter to encapsulate a broader and holistic governance approach.

Sport Event Governance

Although governance has incrementally become part of the common vocabulary in sport organisations (Chappelet, 2016), an agreed definition remains elusive (Dowling et al., 2018; Parent et al., 2017). Henry and Lee (2004) categorised sport governance studies into three approaches (i.e., organisational, systemic, or political) to illustrate that governance “is not simply about direction, management and power in the context of a single organisational form

² Readers in search for a conceptual discussion on the overlap and commonalities between these concepts are encouraged to look into the work of – among others – Gardiner et al. (2017), Kihl (2020), McNamee and Fleming (2007), and Vanden Auweele et al. (2016).

but also about the direction, management and power across an intricate multi-level network of organisations” (Pielke et al., 2020, p. 484).

Sport event governance explores the structures, ownership models, processes, stakeholders, and institutional dimensions of the given sport event (Leopkey and Parent, 2020). The majority of existing sport event governance research has investigated large and mega sports events, with a strong focus on the Olympic Movement (Dowling et al., 2018). Sport event governance focuses on both the governance of sport organisations and partners as well as on the governance of the sport event per se. In their sport governance review, Dowling et al. (2018) observed little attention paid to the organisational and political forms of sport event governance. The governance process of major event organising committee involves three modes: planning, implementation, and wrap-up (Parent, 2008). Prior to that, the bid and transition are two important stages of the overall sport event governance process. Major sport events are a complex governance system surrounded by internal and external stakeholders influencing the work done by the organising committee and vice versa (Geeraert, 2017; Parent, 2016). These stakeholders include the event owners (e.g., the international sport federation), government bodies (local, regional, national government) and other-event-related stakeholders such as sponsors, media and the community (Parent, 2008). The host governments and the LOC should “ideally act in the ISO’s [International Sport Organization] best interests, yet conflicting interests and information asymmetries give rise to agency problems” (Geeraert 2017, p. 27).

The governance debate is prescriptive, hence the global quest for “good governance” (Geeraert et al., 2014) and the considerable number of good governance codes, principles, and tools published (for a review see Chappelet and Mrkonjic 2013, 2019; Parent and Hoye, 2018). Transparency, democracy, accountability, and social responsibility (also called integrity) are the four main principles consistently promoted across those codes (Chappelet

and Mrkonjic, 2019; Geeraert, 2018; McLeod et al., 2021). Sport scholars have considered corruption as a symptom of widespread system failures in governance (i.e., systemic governance) (Dowling et al., 2018). In that regard, Geeraert et al. (2014) observed that “complying with good governance is also a means for making sure that an INGSO [International Non-Governmental Sport Organisations] is capable of steering its sport in an increasingly complex sporting world” (p. 283).

These principles apply just as much to sport event stakeholders as it does to international sport organisations owning the sport event. Despite the increased scrutiny by the media, the general public, and other stakeholders on sport event governance (Parent, 2016), limited studies have analysed this issue and specific sport event governance principles have not yet been proposed. Geeraert (2017) pointed that conflicts of interest and information asymmetries between principle and agent affected the event governance.

In this context, this chapter analyses both the governance of organisations involved as stakeholders in sport event hosting (e.g., FIFA and the Local Organising Committee (LOC)) and the governance of the sporting event (i.e., the governance of the FIFA World Cup). Leopkey and Parent (2020) noted little existing knowledge about the FIFA World Cup (beyond the event owner itself) in terms how the event is governed. We therefore aim to provide a better understanding in this regard.

The governance of FIFA

Various governance reports have been conducted to evaluate international sport governing bodies, described above as one of the key stakeholders in terms of sport event hosting. There is a small pool of research conducted on the governance of FIFA (Geeraert et al., 2014; Geeraert, 2017; Pielke, 2013; Tomlinson, 2014). For instance, Geeraert et al. (2014) contended that international sport governing bodies (including FIFA) utilise flawed

governance practices, which involved a lack of accountability, little transparency, a Eurocentric board leadership and a severe lack of female representation. The first Sport Governance Observer (SGO) report (Geeraert, 2015) “debunked the perception that FIFA’s governance deficits are more severe than those of other international federations” (Geeraert, 2018, p. 6). In the second report, Geeraert (2018) observed that FIFA outperforms the other four surveyed international federations on good governance. “Yet although FIFA’s scores reflect the positive impact of its most recent governance reforms, they also show that there is still room for improvement as they reveal a number of important deficits” (p. 26). These benchmarks demonstrated the need for governance improvements across international federations.

The governance of the FIFA World Cup

Like the IOC, when it comes to the Olympics (Leopkey and Parent, 2020), FIFA is the event owner of the World Cup tournaments (FIFA Club World Cup³; FIFA U20 World Cup; FIFA U17 World Cup; FIFA Woman World Cup; and FIFA (Men) World Cup). Each edition, FIFA appoints and delegates the hosting of the World Cup to an Organising Association (OA) (i.e., a national FA). The OA is responsible for the hosting and staging of the World Cup and sets up a LOC (FIFA 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020). The World Cup network also comprises host governments and local businesses. The bidding process is discussed first (but for more details see Chapter 3 in this Handbook), followed by the organisation process. Both processes entail different corruption risks (Zimbalist 2016)

The bidding-process

Prior to 2016. To host the tournament, each interested nation (forming a bid committee) must submit a World Cup bid. Each bid committee needed to demonstrate how the country met and

³ For the FIFA Club World Cup, another organisation is involved in the governance of the tournament in accordance with the FIFA regulations. The FIFA Organising Committee, appointed by the FIFA Council, is responsible for organising the World Cup (FIFA, 2020).

(ideally exceeded) FIFA's requirements for hosting the World Cup. For the first 12 World Cups, FIFA's Congress voted to determine which nation would host the World Cup. In 1966, it became the responsibility of the Executive Committee to vote (Becker, 2013). Although the voting criteria were imprecise, FIFA's requirements related to the presence of stadiums or the ability to build such stadiums in the host nation, stadium capacity and quality, and the potential to create a positive global change. No evaluation guidelines were specified. The votes took place in the form of a secret ballot; therefore, barring a leak or voluntary revealment (Becker, 2013).

This process reinforced "a pay to win mentality" and was highly criticized following the double attribution, with Becker (2013, p. 135) observing that "because of the large amounts of money surrounding the World Cup and FIFA's monopoly, it would behoove FIFA to have strict and transparent standards in the bidding procedures. Unfortunately, under the current FIFA rules, such transparency is non-existent".

Post 2016. The revamped bidding process to select the hosts of the FIFA World Cup involved changes at four levels. First, a *transparent evaluation process*, with bid books, hosting requirements, bid evaluation reports and scores made public. Second, an *independent evaluation process* with a bid evaluation task force responsible for analysing the bids by delivering a bid evaluation report comprising the compliance, the risk (including adverse human rights impacts in connection with hosting the competition) and the technical assessment (involving infrastructure and commercial aspects), and an independent audit company acting as observer. Third, a *new open voting procedure* that puts the final decision in the hands of the 211 member associations at the FIFA Congress (as opposed to what was once a secret vote by the Executive Committee). Finally, *new bidding requirements* with a bid rules of conduct and the formal commitment to respect international human rights and labour standards according to the UN Guiding Principles by the bidders, a declaration of compliance

to FIFA code of ethics, and the reporting of lobbying activities (FIFA 2018; 2019). Despite these important regulatory changes which have already influenced the bidding process for the designation of the FIFA 2023 Women's World Cup and 2026 World Cup, more efforts could be made by considering integrity aspects – especially in relation to transparency – in the evaluation of the bid books.

The organisation process

Prior 2016. The organisation of the World Cup represents another opportunity for corruption which can arise from the capture of the host city by economic interests and reveals a lack of transparency. According to several studies, the 2010 and 2016 World Cup have particularly suffered from corruption behaviours such as in the awarding of contracts (Koval and Jvirblis, 2016; Muller, 2017; Zimbalist, 2016). As observed by Zimbalist (2016):

In either democratic or authoritarian countries, the tendency is for event planning to hew closely to the interests of the local business elite. Construction companies, their unions (if there are any), insurance companies, architectural firms, media companies, investment bankers (who float the bonds), lawyers and perhaps some hotel or restaurant interests may get behind the Olympic or World Cup project. They stand to gain substantially from the massive public funding. Typically, these interests hijack the local organising committee, hire out an obliging consulting firm to perform an ersatz economic impact study, understate the costs, overstate the revenues and go on to procure political consent.” (p. 202-203)

Analysing the 2018 World Cup in Russia, Koval and Jvirblis (2016) reported that the LOC only published the main official source on the preparation process using the FIFA website and Twitter account. They noted that

Both sources focus on the news and very basic information on the stadiums and host cities. They do not provide documents or procedural or financial information on how the main actors are selected, nor do they provide information on how funds are allocated or spent, or even links to other sources containing this type of data. The sole annual report on the LOC's activities that is available on the FIFA website covers 2012 only.

The report [from the Accounts Chamber of the Russian Federation] highlights overpricing, delays in construction and payments, conflicts over land rights, and non-delivery by subcontractors, and addresses governance-related problems, such as timely issuance of governmental decrees and the development of project evaluation methodologies (p. 225)

Post 2016. The reach of the reforms adopted to revise the governance of the World Cup seem to have less profoundly tackled the organising process. For the 2022 World Cup in Qatar, the abolition of the Kalifa system is explicitly presented by FIFA and the LOC as the legacy of the tournament (Qatar 2022, n.d.a). Besides this achievement of which the actual implementation is at least doubtful according to The Guardian, other governance challenges remain such as the lack of in-depth information on the website (with a limited description of the management team and the board of the SC (Qatar 2022, n.d.b), and the lack of a rotation system (Becker 2013)). Moreover, the lack of transparency remains salient as reports disclosing comprehensive information about the budget, the use of public funding, the lobbying activities by companies, and more generally the preparation process are missing to diligently monitor these critical processes. Finally, in its effort “to safeguard the integrity of the process from the start to finish”, FIFA stipulated that “the Bid Rules of Conduct continue to apply during the hosting phase, and FIFA reserves the right to terminate the hosting

agreement if any unethical behaviour is detected” (FIFA 2018). The likelihood of FIFA using this statement remains uncertain. Despite the numerous critics directed toward Qatar, one could wonder if the legacy and the additional social responsibility initiatives (Zeimers et al., 2018) are sufficient to restore trust.

Integrity

Integrity⁴ is commonly considered as the antithesis of corruption (Gardiner et al. 2017; Gardiner, 2019; Kihl, 2020). Integrity in sport “represents a range of moral values and norms that sport stakeholders and organisations should uphold in different contexts such as sporting and administrative behaviours, decision-making and governance systems” (Kihl, 2020, p. 397). The construct of integrity is used in this chapter for three main reasons. First, a conceptual one, as ‘integrity’ is a significantly under-theorised and under-conceptualised value within sport particularly in its use by a range of organisations fighting corruption in sport (Gardiner et al., 2017). Second, a practice based one. FIFA uses the construct of “integrity”. In its policy document “Protect the Integrity of Football Practical Handbook for FIFA Member Associations” (FIFA n.a.), FIFA stated that:

One of FIFA’s core objectives is to protect the integrity of football. As stated in its Statutes, FIFA’s objectives include “preventing all methods or practices, such as corruption, doping or match manipulation, which might jeopardise the integrity of matches, competitions, players, officials and member associations or give rise to abuse of association football.

Third and finally, governance and integrity management can both be viewed as means to enhance the integrity in and of sport on different levels (see e.g., Constandt, 2019; Gardiner et al., 2017). Sport integrity is a socially constructed, complex, and multifaceted concept that

⁴ In this chapter, the terms “integrity in sport” or “sport integrity” are used synonymously.

might relate to the integrity of people involved in sport (i.e., personal integrity), but also to the integrity of sport organisations (i.e., organisational integrity), sport competitions and events (i.e., procedural integrity), and the inherent integrity of sport itself (e.g., fair play) (Gardiner et al., 2017; Loyens et al., 2021).

This chapter includes viewpoints that mainly focus on the first three dimensions of sport integrity and argues that sport governance is an internal element of an overarching sport integrity system. Sport integrity violations encompass both corrupt and non-corrupt behaviours carried out by individuals, organisations and/or systems (Gardiner et al., 2017; Kihl, 2020). Integrity violations are generally facilitated through poor governance practices. These risks warrant an integrity system that can assist a sport organisation – in this case FIFA – in developing a coherent and consistent approach to create and maintain organisational integrity of FIFA itself, procedural integrity of their World Cup events, and the integrity of the sport competitions organised during these events.

Sport Integrity System Framework

Developing and sustaining a sound sport integrity system can be considered an important way of materialising integrity management intentions in sport organisations, which aims to both prevent and deal with integrity violations (Vanden Auweele, 2011). A successful sport integrity system involves both internal and external mechanisms that ensure integrity and accountability of and in a sport organisation (Kihl, 2020). Aiming to reach this goal, a sport integrity system consists of individuals, institutions, policies, practices, and agencies that contribute to safeguarding (public trust in) a sport organisation by mitigating integrity risks (Head et al., 2008; Huberts and Six, 2012; Kihl, 2020). More precisely, a sport integrity system “is responsible for monitoring, preventing and tackling integrity violations and minimising integrity risks. The central focus of an integrity system is outlining the elements

and conditions necessary for preventing integrity violations and minimising integrity risks in governance and sports competitions.” (Kihl, 2020, p. 400).

Drawing from the broader business ethics and integrity systems literature, Kihl (2020) outlines a sport integrity system framework comprised of three main components: (1) sport actors, (2) an internal environment, and (3) an external environment, which reflect different but interrelated functions in terms of safeguarding integrity. The components of the sport integrity system framework outline the elements and conditions considered important for the integrity of a sport organisation and, in this context, of a sport event and the competitions organised during this event. After all, initially developed to be used in the context of national sport governing bodies, Kihl’s (2020) sport integrity system framework can be applied to examine all kinds of sport organisations on different levels (e.g., local and regional). Hence, Kihl’s (2020) framework is relevant for the purpose of this chapter because it is flexible to adapt to different contexts and types of sport organisations. We contend that this framework is thus also applicable to international sport organisations (e.g., FIFA) and sport events (e.g., World Cups). Moreover, the framework offers a pertinent governance approach to ensure integrity in contrast to FIFA’s widespread and long-standing corruption system and culture (Bayle and Rayner, 2018; Beans, 2018; Tomlinson, 2014; Pielke, 2020; Richau et al., 2018). Such governance approach that highlights the importance of a broad and holistic view on integrity is welcomed, as currently, “the governance of FIFA shows a narrow view of integrity” (Gardiner, 2018, p. 384).

Several reforms in relation to FIFA have been suggested by respected scholars and experts (e.g., Beans, 2018; Becker, 2013; Cottle, 2019). Nevertheless, current propositions have not adopted a systemic approach (Gardiner, 2018). Even in the face of reform, FIFA is still susceptible to more integrity violations due to “its own predominant control over internal reform, limitations for external review of its practices, and limited consequences for rule

violations” (Cottle, 2019, p. 19). Instilling integrity through good governance practices is not sufficient and has revealed its limits. Creating an integrity system to achieve and sustain integrity of FIFA’s World Cups represents a way for FIFA to take “responsibility for the representation of the ‘self’ and one’s commitments” (Gardiner et al., 2017, p. 20). In the World Cup context, this means that FIFA, in collaboration with other stakeholders, should play a role in preventing integrity violations internally (in relation to e.g., its bidding process as well as its operations, employees, board members) and externally (when it comes to e.g., its organisation process and stakeholders including LOC, and respective confederations).

According to Kihl (2020, p. 405), “an effective system (consequence) should limit integrity breaches, as it contains sufficient capacity (e.g., resources, financial support, individuals), and involves coherent cooperation between the various components (actors, organisational governance practices, laws and regulations)”. The following paragraphs review these components of the sport integrity system framework in the context of FIFA and the FIFA World Cups, thereby outlining the elements and conditions considered important to ensure integrity of the World Cup in particular.

Sport actors hold the responsibility of serving as generators and guardians of integrity in sport organisations (Huberts and Six, 2012; Kihl, 2020). They take charge of overseeing the entire system and integrity management infrastructure (Kihl, 2020). It is thereby important that each sport organisation determines which internal and external actors hold this responsibility at the club, regional, state, national, and continental levels (e.g., governing board members, administrators, integrity officers, and ethics committee members) as well as those external to the organisation (e.g., watchdog groups, media) for safeguarding integrity. When responsibilities to uphold integrity are not specified, the risk might be present that no-one feels responsible nor takes responsibility for integrity violations. Despite the inherent shared responsibility in this regard, the main accountability to promote integrity within

FIFA's governance practices resides in FIFA's highest decision-making echelons. However, FIFA continues to indicate a lack of ethical leadership by failing to show credible role modelling that showcases the right way forward. Moreover, there is a risk to "hide behind experts" by allocating the integrity expertise mainly in the hands of specialists with a merely legal background and approach (Constandt and Willem, 2021). The constellation of FIFA stakeholders represents an opportunity as the recent boycott actions illustrate this capacity to voice (Hirschman, 1970).

The internal environment aims to develop a moral framework that guides and strengthens organisational decision-making processes and practices toward ethical behaviour, thereby limiting the likelihood that unethical practices and systemic failures take place (Kihl, 2020). Such moral framework is created through organisational characteristics (i.e., good governance structure and principles, ethical leadership, formal ethics policies, reward systems, socialisation mechanisms, and decision-making processes (Schein, 2010), cultural-behavioural norms, morals, myths, rituals, symbols, stories, and language), as well as by integrity management instruments and processes (Constandt, 2019; Schein, 2010). Such strategies might focus on both rules-based (e.g., codes of conduct) and values-based (e.g., education) initiatives that outline the integrity standards sport stakeholders should accept and uphold (Constandt, 2019; Maesschalck and Vanden Auweele, 2010). In recent years, FIFA has invested in an integrity tool kit relating to formal ethics policy measures such as a regularly revised code of ethics and an ethics committee which could be seen as textbook examples. However, as evidenced by continuing integrity scandals, these formal measures do not always perfectly capture the actual governance intentions and practices when it comes to allocating, planning, and organising the World Cups.

The external environment serves as the checks and balance (guardians and accountability) to the system- who are peripheral to the sport organisation and consists of

independent regulatory environments (i.e., laws, regulations, and external regulatory oversight agencies such as the police, government, and watchdog groups) and social environments (i.e., media, community members, and fans) that ensure that local, regional, and national sport governing boards and stakeholders operate within legal boundaries and social expectations (Kihl, 2020). These external stakeholders have been of fundamental importance concerning the exposure of integrity violations (e.g., vote rigging, bribery, and human rights breaches) regarding the FIFA World Cups. NGO's like Human Rights Watch, Transparency International, and Play the Game; journals such as The Guardian; law enforcement agencies such as the FBI, lawyers, and scholars; and even, to a lesser degree some multinational sponsors have directed public attention towards numerous scandals. Many of these external stakeholders have tried in vain to join forces with FIFA to be involved in the recent reform processes. They have once again highlighted that guardianship and pressure towards accountability is needed because of the failure of sport organisations to self-regulate (Geeraert et al., 2014).

Conclusions

Presently, the FIFA World Cups continue to face a clear lack of public trust in the governance strategies (e.g., tournament allocation) and practices (e.g., tournament planning and organisation) of FIFA and stakeholders. Drawing on the notion of a sport integrity system framework, this chapter has tried to outline the governance activities and reforms that have been implemented over the years to enhance people's trust in the integrity of the FIFA World Cups and in the institutions that organise these events. However, the governance reforms leave unclear how espoused improvements are to be achieved and monitored within FIFA's network. There seems to be a widely acknowledged difference between being formally adopted and becoming collectively accepted as a valid solution to a problem of societal

concern (Haack et al., 2012). In the case of FIFA, it remains difficult to foresee a common ground across its multiple stakeholders' view, culture, values, and interests involved at the different levels of the governance of the World Cups.

Consequently, as scandals continue to highlight integrity failures and risks, the FIFA World Cups are in urgent need for a moral repair that enhances their credibility in the eyes of the millions that consume these sport entertainment products. The conceptual idea of moral repair outlines two conditions to restore trust: i.e., (1) the acknowledgement of past wrongdoings, and (2) the desire to re-install trust, indicated by a genuine investment in a better relationship with those who have been negatively impacted (Olukoya and Ogunleye-Bello, 2021). Considering the FIFA World Cups, both conditions do not seem to be successfully fulfilled. After all, despite its “promises-to-act story” and prevalent narratives separating yesterday’s dark age from tomorrow’s ideal (Haack et al., 2012, p. 830), FIFA continues to downplay the scale and impact of several integrity issues related to organising the World Cups (e.g., the number of dying construction workers, the scale of taking bribes during the bidding process, and potential conflicts of interests), and largely fails to establish better relationships with those who have been hurt by their actions. However, no-one is actually successfully holding FIFA accountable and FIFA is not holding its stakeholders accountable. Hence, despite FIFA's recent reforms moving towards a positive governance direction, not that much seems to have changed eight years after Tomlinson’s (2014) famous observation that FIFA is a “supreme leader that sails on”.

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