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Muslim Networks, Public Services and Development Intervention in Post-socialist Tanzania: Between Liberalisation and Alienation

FELICITAS BECKER

INTRODUCTION

The period since around 1990 is typically seen in Tanzania as one of both political and economic liberalisation, and of increasing discontent among Muslims, but the relationship between these two developments has rarely been addressed (but see Kaiser 1996). At the level of governance, the government reduced its control over the media, privatised publicly owned companies, adopted a 'market-based' economic model and returned to multi-party elections, the first being held in 1995. As concerns grew over Islamic political activism and Islamist dissent, the landmark events included, on the political plane, the ascendance of the Civic United Front (CUF) opposition party, widely seen as at least implicitly Islamist; the controversy over Zanzibar's attempt to join the Organisation of the Islamic Conference; and the now long-running debate over the re-introduction of Islamic courts. At the level of civic unrest and repression, they included the riots around the mosque of Mwembechai, Dar es Salaam, in 1998; the involvement of Tanzanians in the Al-Qaeda-led embassy bombings the same year; the contribution of Tanzanian security services to the repression of Islamic/Islamist organisations post-9/11; and more recently, the rise and repression of the *uamsho* preaching movement in Zanzibar, which is both Islamist and separatist.

The two trends, of liberalisation and the rise of Islamic activism and protest, can thus be seen as running in parallel, with the retreat of the state from control of the public sphere in the role of facilitator of the efflorescence of Islamist activism. In discussions on Muslims in contemporary Tanzania, moreover, the shift towards political activism and dissent tends to dominate views of Islam in the country post-1990. Given the potential repercussions of Muslims' discontent

in this multi-religious context, this is hardly surprising. Nevertheless, in the discussion that follows here, I seek to both qualify the impression of pervasive alienation between Muslims and the state and to examine how liberalisation may have contributed to this alienation, such as it was, in ways that were more complex than merely making space for it in the public sphere.

The discussion that follows suggests that the relation between Muslim congregations and the Tanzanian state does not fall into neat phases. Rather, it is characterised by a mixture of concurrent interactions that recur in different guises. Perhaps the most striking recurrence is that of ‘working misunderstandings’: situations where representatives of Muslim constituencies on the one hand, and those of state and/or donor authorities on the other, co-operate on aims that they use the same terms to define, while *interpreting* these shared terms very differently. Moreover, as will be seen, even Muslim activists who seek to define their activities in contradistinction to official and donor discourse nevertheless engage with this discourse. Historians of Africa will recognise this process, of state authorities and/or donors setting the terms of discourse, while different constituencies within society more or less discreetly reinterpret them, as of long standing, as similar processes have long been charted in colonial-era indirect rule.

To develop these thoughts, I focus on issues surrounding the delivery of HIV/AIDS services around 2010, when AIDS in Tanzania was shifting from a death sentence to a manageable condition thanks to the increasing availability of anti-retroviral drugs. Different health initiatives and different kinds of services, such as education, will be taken into account when setting HIV/AIDS services in a longer timeframe. Taking inspiration from the work of Mohamed Yunus Rafiq, also in this volume, I seek to trace a history of interaction, as well as alienation, between Muslim authority figures and state institutions. While I am mostly concerned with people involved in the delivery of basic public services, due to the prominence of appeals to, and practical attempts at, development in Tanzanian public life, this entails setting out the wider context of Tanzanian developmentalism. I then examine how a variety of Muslim networks, or social networks made up of Muslims, and a variety of authority figures have either sought to connect to the aid providers and development organisations in the ‘post-statist’ period since the 1990s, or, in the case of organisations with an activist Islamic agenda, have sought to define themselves in contradistinction to them.

Examination of these processes delivers three intermediate points that underpin the broader observations about recurrent stances and working misunderstandings. Firstly, despite the end of the aggressively statist model of development intervention that characterised *ujamaa*-era Tanzania, state institutions continue to interpose themselves carefully within the ‘aid milieu’, structuring

interactions between providers and recipients of funds. There is thus no neat succession from a 'statist' to an 'NGO-driven' model in the delivery of health services. Concomitantly, and secondly, there is no uni-directional change in Muslims' stances towards and involvement in the delivery of aid interventions, the overall rise in oppositional Islamic activism notwithstanding. Rather, there are criss-crossing movements towards engagement on the one hand and rejection on the other. Third, in a context where Muslim Tanzanians need funds and aid organisations need to spend funds, the different sides in these unstable interactions become useful to each other in ways that are both asymmetrical and, nevertheless, mutual. To trace how this situation arises, it is necessary first to examine donor stances on so-called faith-based organisations in Tanzania.

A word is needed on my use of the terms 'Muslim constituencies/networks/groups' and 'Muslim authority figures/intermediaries'. I use these relatively unspecific terms, rather than 'Muslim communities' or 'sheikhs', because they better reflect the contingent and fluid character of the groups and actors in question. It has become very evident in the period since the 1990s that Muslims in Tanzania do not constitute one interconnected community, or even series of such communities. Rather, specific groups and individuals come together in response to specific inspirations or challenges. Similarly, the people who emerge as leaders in a given context do so because they have placed themselves at specific conjunctures of the needs and preferences of Muslim constituencies on the one hand, and donors and/or government representatives on the other. For a variety of reasons, they are able to mediate between them, often in the process of what I have termed a working misunderstanding. The next section examines the context constituted by the aid world.

THE 'AID MILIEU' AND ITS MUSLIM OTHERS IN TANZANIA

In the context of liberalisation in Tanzania since around 1990, so-called civil society organisations (CSOs) have been positioned as guarantors of a level of efficiency and accountability in social service provision that the state had failed to deliver (Semboja and Therkildsen 1996; Ferguson 2006). As part of this shift, specifically 'faith-based organisations' (FBOs) have become a regular feature of the delivery of services, especially in health and education (Abrahamsen 2000; Mercer 2003; Green 2012). This chapter, however, starts from, and confirms, the observation that these organisations are at least as likely to come into being in response to donor initiatives to support and empower them as they are to pre-exist these efforts (Green et al. 2010). In other words, aid organisations' institutional framing of the social world they seek to influence encourages the emergence of particular institutional arrangements (Hulme and Edwards 1996; Igoe and Kelsall 2005).

To elaborate: in their quest for local partners to support, aid organisations confront a fluid social world and seek to divide it up into distinguishable and above all supportable entities. A variety of social actors, in their turn, seek to position themselves so as to be visible and qualify for support. For Tanzanian Christians, the Christian Social Services Commission (CSSC), made up of delegates from the major 'mainline', ex-mission churches, has been particularly successful in arranging and providing the institutional structures for co-operative ventures between long-established Christian denominations and government and international donors (Leurs et al. 2011). Less institutionalised Christian congregations, especially among the newer Pentecostal churches, do not participate in these circuits to anything like the same extent (see Dilger 2005).

Muslim congregations, meanwhile, long remained much less visible to the FBO-seeking gaze of international donors, as their informal, networked structures are harder to frame in donors' categories. This outcome forms part of a broader pattern. While Christian churches since the beginning of colonialism tended to be 'surrogates of the state' (Jennings 2008) in terms of service provision, Muslim congregations remained opaque to both colonial and post-colonial officials. Muslim clerics have never been organised into or employed by formal institutions that would parallel the integrated organisational structures of major churches such as the Anglican or Catholic churches. They traditionally depend on donations motivated by respect for their religious role, payment for specific religious services such as weddings or judgments under religious law, or entirely non-religious enterprises such as trading for their livelihoods (Lapidus 2009). Although Muslim religious experts were and are routinely involved in the dispensing of charity, they rarely became visible as representatives of formal, thus familiar, institutions to government officials' gaze.

The institutional structures of Muslim charity and education, then, have been less intelligible to the Tanzanian state than Christian ones, all the more so as Christians tended to predominate among state officials. Early on, the German colonial government investigated Muslim charitable foundations (*awqaf*) as tax avoidance schemes (TNA G 9/39:7), and the post-colonial government shut down the East African Muslim Welfare Society on charges that it lacked nationalist commitment (Nimtz 1980). Although Sufi sheikhs have long worked as teachers and healers, and Sufi chapters double as informal support networks and burial societies, neither colonial officials nor post-colonial ones treated them as potential partners in service provision. To a large extent, this is likely to be due to the lack of understanding for Muslims' organisational structures, as just set out. Moreover, Islamic education was not seen to add to its recipients' value in the labour market to the same extent as its Christian counterpart. Among Muslims, Qur'anic education was closely related to the colonial rise and post-colonial decline of Sufism, which posited an esoteric relationship

between teachers and disciples and focused more on ritual and religious than on labour-market-relevant skills. Recently, reformist Muslim organisations that sought to constitute themselves on more formal lines have faced mistrust over their suspected political agendas (Loimeier 2007; Becker 2008).

This state of affairs affects a great number of people. Although religious affiliation is not covered in censuses, it is clear that Muslims form, at the least, a very large minority in Tanzania (Westerlund 1981; Ludwig 1999). Due to the close association between Christian missions and secondary education, Muslims are consistently underrepresented in secondary and higher education, and by extension in the higher levels of state administration. This marginalisation not only deepens divisions between Muslim and Christian constituencies, but also complicates interactions between Muslim organisations and Western donors, which in turn become more nervous about Islamic radicalism (Loimeier 2007; Becker 2008). Overall, then, Muslims' relationship with the 'aid sector' is weaker and more fraught than that of Christian constituencies.

Nevertheless, it is not non-existent. There is a tradition of philanthropy practised by wealthy Muslims that led to the provision of Dar es Salaam's first hospital, the Sewa Hajji Hospital, and played a crucial role in the history of Muslim education in Zanzibar (Bang 2004). Moreover, current Islamist criticism of the Tanzanian state reflects in part a sense of betrayal arising from Muslims' initially very strong endorsement of the post-colonial political project. Their alienation was gradual. For the 1960s, informants in Lindi on the southern coast remembered the most prominent Sufi leader of the time endorsing public health programmes, taking the lead in lining up for vaccination campaigns (Becker 2008). To this day, many politically quiescent Muslims would see no contradiction in such actions. To some extent, recent political activism by Muslims is driven by a generational conflict between the leaders of Muslim congregations who came to prominence in the early post-independence period and a younger cohort less invested in the national project (Becker 2006).

Some younger Muslim activists, meanwhile, find it easier to position themselves with reference to donor-compatible taxonomies of social activity than the older generation – partly, but not only, because Anglophone donors are no longer the only ones in town. Moreover, there are groups of Muslims who invoke a different social identity – such as that of 'village women' – rather than emphasising religion. For them, in some instances their religious identity can help validate and 'make visible', in the universe of aid donors, shared social practices that feed into broader livelihood strategies. They have thus been able to work with dominant notions of faith-based organisations. The following pages examine different cases of Muslims interacting with the aid industry. They highlight the tensions between donors' notions of representatives of various religions as contributors to social service delivery, and the longer-standing concerns

around social co-operation, public morality and religious legitimacy that inform Muslims' social practice and charity. These tensions can be traced further in the case of services related to HIV/AIDS.

THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF AIDS ACTIVISM IN TANZANIA: PEPFAR, BAKWATA AND TACAIDS

As stated above, the elaboration of a 'voluntary sector' in Tanzania is closely linked to the idea of civil society organisations as a potential answer to African states' institutional weaknesses and democracy deficits. In the following paragraphs, it will be examined in particular in relation to Muslims' participation, or lack of it, in the 'faith-based' provision of AIDS education, counselling and testing; an area where the participation of faith-based providers is built into the plans (PEPFAR 2010).

The US-funded President's Emergency Fund for Aids Relief (PEPFAR), which was established by the George Bush administration under the direct influence of American Christian organisations (Dietrichs 2007), forms an important node in the web of organisations promoting the involvement of CSOs and FBOs in AIDS service provision. In Tanzania, where Christian churches have played a well-established role in health infrastructure going back to the 'medical missions' of the colonial period, their facilities have readily fallen in line with this approach (interview with Mihayo Mageni Bupamba, AMREF office, Dar es Salaam, 2005; Hashim Kalinga, TACAIDS, Dar es Salaam, 2008). By contrast, involving Muslim organisations in AIDS education, prevention and testing proved more difficult. In part, this is due to political history: the institutionally strongest Muslim welfare organisation in the region, the East African Muslim Welfare Society (EAMWS), was shut down on government orders in 1968. This was in keeping with the pronounced 'statism' of Tanzania's government at the time, but also was plausibly connected to the strength of South Asian participation in EAMWS, which fell foul of the racial nationalism then current in the country (Westerlund 1981; Brennan 2012).

The government sought to replace and extend the functions of EAMWS with the founding of the National Muslim Council of Tanzania (Baraza kuu la Waislamu Tanzania, or BAKWATA). But, as has been repeatedly observed (see e.g. Nimtze 1980; Leurs et al. 2010), the legitimacy of BAKWATA as representative of Tanzania's Muslims has consistently remained in doubt. Moreover, its organisational structures and finances are considerably weaker than those of Christian churches, which co-ordinate their programmes with the government through the Christian Social Services Commission (CSSC) (Ludwig 1999; interview with Hashim Kalinga, Dar es Salaam, 2012). In addition, with the expansion of denominational pluralism among Tanzanian Muslims from the

1980s on and an extended phase of widespread dissension among Muslims in the 1990s and 2000s, BAKWATA became a focus of criticism by reformist, often Middle Eastern-influenced, Muslim groups, loosely summarised colloquially under the term *Ansuari* (for *Ansaar Sunna*, the companions of the way [of the Prophet]; see Becker 2008).

In this context, attempts by the African Medical Research Foundation (AMREF), an important Tanzanian PEPFAR partner, to include Muslim intermediaries in the distribution of PEPFAR funds initially encountered little success (interview with Mihayo Mageni Bupamba, Dar es Salaam, 2005). While health facilities with Muslim sponsors have become a part of the Tanzanian cityscape (Dilger 2014), Muslims not aligned with BAKWATA express concerns at the possibility of government interference with funding flows and remain distant from official AIDS policy. As for BAKWATA, its efforts have remained limited to its established role as an umbrella organisation for mosques and schools rather than health facilities (interview with Hashim Kalinga, Dar es Salaam, 2012; interview with Muhammad Hamisi Saidi, Dar es Salaam, 2012). Most Muslim groups object to what they see as the sexual permissiveness implied in official AIDS education, ironically falling in line with conservative Christian, especially Catholic, groups (Becker and Geissler 2009; Dilger and Luig 2010; Dilger et al. 2014). Although the official ‘ABC’ (abstinence, be faithful, use condoms) formula does commend sexual restraint, they feel that there is insufficient emphasis on the need for marriage to legitimise sexual relations. Moreover, the mere use of sexual content in AIDS education is seen as encouraging the inappropriate publicising of sexual appetites and exploits.

Since 2008, the Tanzanian government’s commission on AIDS (TACAIDS) has nevertheless sought to encourage religious constituencies, both locally and trans-denominationally, to develop what it calls ‘mechanisms’ for the use of funds for AIDS control efforts (interviews with Hashim Kalinga, Dar es Salaam, 2008, 2012). It co-operates with the Christian CSSC and works closely with a Muslim umbrella organisation founded in response to its calls, the Tanzanian Muslim Welfare Network (TMWN). Meanwhile, Muslim groups distant from the government have also elaborated their stances on AIDS. The result is an uneven institutional landscape, with different organisational forms and different moral discourses and rationales for medical intervention coexisting and intersecting. This deserves closer examination.

BAKWATA, BAK-AIDS AND THEIR CRITICS

The uneasy relations between BAKWATA and its Muslim critics are played out also on the field of Muslim AIDS activism. Here, a distinction between altruistic and self-seeking behaviour comes into the conversation by way of invective,

as the opposed camps question each other's motives and practices. In these circumstances, participation in the institutional practices of the aid world can be used to delegitimise opponents.

With encouragement from TACAIDS, BAKWATA itself initiated its own programme on AIDS, known as BAK-AIDS, or BAKWATA AIDS project. By 2015, it operated in Kilwa, Dar es Salaam, Tanga and Mtwara, among other places, relying on a mixture of Bakwata's official structure and locally recruited volunteers. In 2019, BAK-AIDS was recruiting staff for work in further rural locations with the help of USAID funding. While it described itself as a 'Faith-Based Organisation (FBO) implementing HIV programs to support Tanzania Government efforts to reduce the rate of HIV pandemic', the posts were described as 'Economic Strengthening and Livelihood Officers'. Their remit was to supervise 'Empowerment Workers' and 'National Peer Educators' in their efforts to map economic strengths and weaknesses, run programmes for disadvantaged youth, train and recruit participants for 'village savings and loan schemes' and roll out 'monetary literacy' education programmes (Tanzania-jobs.com, 2018). Direct references to HIV/AIDS patients or the ways of transmission or prevention of the illness, then, were conspicuous by their absence. In effect, BAK-AIDS focused on general livelihood support with interventions very similar to those run by non-religious or Christian NGOs – and indeed fully compatible with a market-based, liberalising approach to development (Becker 2019).

This manner of sidestepping the more controversial aspects of prevention, sexual practice and gender relevant to HIV/AIDS is in keeping with the *Mwongozo*, or 'guidance document', that BAKWATA had published in 2011 (BAKWATA 2011). In the introduction, BAKWATA reiterates its understanding of itself as the organisation for all Muslims in Tanzania. Overall, the document focuses on the need to live properly religious lives to stay safe. Condoms are not mentioned. Nevertheless, it includes language clearly influenced by standard AIDS policy: 'voluntary testing and counselling', 'combatting stigma', 'living with hope' and so on. Moreover, in keeping with official policy, the *Mwongozo* refers to AIDS as a *janga*, or 'disaster/emergency'. As HIV/AIDS is a problem of poverty and economic vulnerability a major cause of transmission, especially for women, there is no reason to disdain this indirect approach. It nevertheless indicates the persistent divisiveness of the questions of public and private morality and gender relations involved in HIV/AIDS.

Muslim organisations distant from BAKWATA, meanwhile, have elaborated their stances on AIDS rather differently. At one of the larger Dar es Salaam religious centres unaffiliated with BAKWATA, the Masjid Sheikhat Issa in Magomeni, the centre's *msimamizi* (manager), Bakari Ali, indirectly challenged Bakwata on its definition of AIDS as a *janga*. Moreover, he connected BAKWATA's inability to advise or speak for Tanzanian Muslims at

large to its dependence on state funding, in contrast to the Masjid Sheikat's ability to survive on voluntary contributions from believers. Explicitly referring to Bakwata's use of the term *janga* in his comments, he challenged the organisation's policies, implying that they reflect the beliefs of a partisan minority who pay insufficient attention to the Qur'an. Without denying the value of anti-retroviral treatment (he asserted, in fact, that HIV-positive believers at his mosque were encouraged to seek it and that it had helped in the recovery of many), he insisted that

Muslims believe, according to their book ... that there is no illness for which there is no medicine ... They disagree with the explanation given elsewhere that AIDS has no cure ... AIDS has a cure. What is its cure? It is to avoid those dirty matters that the Almighty God has prohibited ... [Only] if you have left the Prophet and God's teachings[,] ... now you will see AIDS as a disaster ... Ninety-nine percent of Muslims understand that AIDS is not a disaster ... They consider it an illness ... but an illness with a cure; its cure is the teachings we have in our book. (Interview, Dar es Salaam, 2012)

Not unlike BAKWATA, however, he limited the Masjid's role to providing advice; the 'experts', *wataalamu*, who provide tests, counselling and treatment, were to be found elsewhere. But Ali asserted that BAKWATA could not claim to speak for the Muslim community on AIDS because its leaders were economically self-seeking, including in response to this health crisis:

They have received [the plans for faith-based provision of AIDS services] as a means to put their lives in order. If you bring them such means, they sort out their own lives ... I don't think they can provide good leadership ... They are not trustworthy ... They were the first Islamic organization [in Tanzania]. They could have provided an example ... as concerns provision of charity ... but you will find that they imitate us ... [Among Muslims,] if someone has wealth, he will donate some of it, for fear of God – if you have three cars, you give one over to the mosque ... BAKWATA had houses that were given as *waqf* [a charitable contribution], eighty of them, here in the city ... If you ask now, they don't have even five ... Where did they go? ... They are given everything by the government ... because they are a department that the government built in order to control us others out here. (Interview, Dar es Salaam, 2012)

The uneasy relations between BAKWATA and its critics in the Muslim community are thus played out over issues of funding and stewardship for the goods BAKWATA inherited from its predecessor EAMWS. BAKWATA

acknowledges that it does have *miradi*, or income-generating schemes, including real estate, although the organisation is somewhat vague about its finances. As for the financing of the Sheikhat Issa Islamic Centre, Bakari Ali was open about the fact that it owed its existence, in its present form, to a generous patron in Abu Dhabi, although the day-to-day running of the centre depended on voluntary work and donations. He explained that the school run by the mosque could be considered an income-generating activity because the students pay school fees that are used to maintain the school building and also other parts of the complex. Yet he emphasised that while menial employees, such as the building caretaker and night watchman, were paid, many of the people involved in its core religious and educational activities, including himself, did not draw salaries, but 'had their livelihoods elsewhere'.

An exemplary religious leader, in this perspective, is one who depends on a mixture of charity that is a direct response to the leadership he provides, and this-worldly livelihood strategies that are kept separate from religious interests. This view is not limited to reformist Muslim groups explicitly critical of BAKWATA, like Bakari Ali's. The Sufi centre at the former residence of the Shadhili Sheikh Nuruddin, now deceased, is supported by a tiny shop run by his widow, selling little more than tea leaves and sugar, out of a shed backing onto his courtyard. His young followers proudly assert that they run the Sufi order, both its day-to-day activities and the annual festivals of *mawlid* and *ziara*, on a mixture of *miradi* (such as this shop and the transport of vegetables to urban markets) and contributions from the faithful (interview with Omari Mkwawa, Dar es Salaam, 2012).

Bakwata's vagueness regarding its own finances suggests that critics like Bakari Ali are winning the public argument. While, in 2000, a researcher was told that BAKWATA had received financial assistance from the Middle East (Lange et al. 2000), I was told that its financing was all Tanzanian. Financial support from the government appears nevertheless likely, as it was in fact set up with government support and endorsement. Evidently, financial independence from government enhances the legitimacy of Muslim organisations in present-day Tanzania. That said, the problem does not lie only in mistrust of the state. Rather, the non-state or, in the case of many donor organisations, effectively para-statal bodies that are supposed to aid 'faith-based' providers to step into the gaps left by faltering state provision carry with them very specific assumptions about the 'proper' organisational structures, employment practices, funding streams and moral discourses of such providers. While Sheikhat Issa was a group that actively sought to distance itself from the state, it also found itself positioned at a distance from the non-governmental sector due to the latter's specific expectations and habits. Meanwhile, elsewhere, the government actively tried to bridge the distance between Muslims and AIDS service providers.

GOVERNMENT-BROKERED RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN THE AID INDUSTRY
AND MUSLIM ORGANISATIONS: TACAIDS AND TMWN

Not all Muslim activists seek to keep their distance from the aid world to the same extent as the Sheikhat Issa mosque. In response to the initial call for the establishment of a funding-deployment mechanism among Muslims, a variety of Muslim groups other than BAKWATA met in Dar es Salaam in October 2008 at a hotel owned and run by Muslims in the Kariakoo neighbourhood. I was invited to attend as an observer. The participants were concerned about the recognition of Muslim networks and organisations as equal players with the institutionally stronger Christian ones, and more broadly with Muslim history as an integral part of Tanzania's history. Yet while some participants were ready to sacrifice inclusion in the TACAIDS orbit to the assertion of these political stances, others pragmatically accepted the need to learn 'donor speak' and interact with the aid world.

Attendance at this conference was mixed. Some attendees were religious activists with uncertain professional status, very committed to their voluntary work whether or not it supported their livelihoods. Others had professional status intelligible to donor organisations, and combined their religious orientation with specialised knowledge in law, education or social work. The former resembled the economically independent sheikhs described above; for them, non-religious economic activity was compatible with their status as religious community leaders. For the latter, their status as committed Muslims in a sense added value to their professional profile and enhanced their potential value as religious figures capable of mediating between Muslim constituencies and the aid world. For example, Sheikh Issa Othman, who has served on the central committee of the Tanzania Muslim Welfare Network (TMWN), has worked as a consultant for Western aid organisations on the development of educational material on AIDS for use among Muslims (interview with Issa Othman, Dar es Salaam, 2008). He remains active in health-related NGO interventions (Health Promotion Tanzania 2019). This second group was also more readily accepting of the need to speak donors' language, both literally (in that they were more likely to speak English well) and metaphorically (by adapting jargon, dress styles and manners familiar to donors).

Yet in spite of TACAIDS's technocratic, inclusive and apolitical language, its relations with religious groups were shot through with politics. When TMWN was set up in 2009, its general secretary was a former BAKWATA official. In the mid-2010s, TMWN's leadership combined ex-BAKWATA personnel with people from the younger, more Anglophone and donor-friendly generation. For the younger Muslim professionals, opting into TMWN was not simply a 'charitable' choice but also a political one: an attempt to build a linkage with

officialdom separate from BAKWATA. The loose 'network' structure means that local groups with fairly diverse doctrinal stances can opt into or out of it, and by 2012 TMWN had grown into a country-wide organisation. Nevertheless, TACAIDS has complained of tensions caused by the tendency of individual Muslim leaders to question the motives of TACAIDS as well as one another, and to demand funding directly for their specific constituencies (interview with Hashim Kalinga, Dar es Salaam, 2012; see also TMWN 2010). Here, the accusation of *kutafuta maslahi*, seeking a livelihood (through participation in TACAIDS-sponsored activities), came into play.

TMWN's AIDS-related activities, moreover, remained largely subsidiary to its core programmes, the running of mosques and schools. In 'donor speak', AIDS education and counselling was 'mainstreamed' into general pastoral and educational activities. Muslim involvement in anti-AIDS measures does not extend to the hosting of test centres or counselling services of the kind once hoped for by AMREF (interview with Mihayo Mageni Bupamba, Dar es Salaam, 2005). AIDS education in this context continues to exist in a grey area where religious activism forms part of a bundle of livelihood strategies. For some religious activists, TMWN aided professionalisation strategies that enhanced their visibility in the aid world, while for others it probably bolstered their standing in more inward-looking networks of religious notables. These personal agendas have combined with the more explicit political stances of Muslim groups outside BAKWATA to both enable and constrain the interaction between TACAIDS and Muslim constituencies. The dynamics of Muslims' engagement with TACAIDS, then, escape the standard donors' accounts of civil society.

THE RAPID FUNDING ENVELOPE (RFE) FOR HIV/AIDS IN TANZANIA AND THE 'FRAMING' OF LOCAL ACTORS

Somewhat ironically, given that TMWN came about partly in response to a call by TACAIDS to provide ways of deploying financial resources through Muslim agencies, TACAIDS officials, reflecting the impact of the post-2008 funding crush on the Tanzanian as well as other governments, had moved by 2012 to discourage Muslim organisations from seeking funding directly from them. Instead, they positioned themselves as facilitators for bids for funding from other organisations. In the mid-2010s, their main path to funding lay through participation (along with the Zanzibar AIDS Commission [ZAC], TACAIDS's counterpart in Zanzibar) in the so-called Rapid Funding Envelope for HIV/AIDS (RFE), which is financed by nine bilateral donors (from the United States and northern Europe) and one Dutch private foundation.

The RFE constituted a new departure in the management of anti-AIDS campaigns. The financial oversight was provided by the management consultancy

Deloitte-Touche, whose logo (unlike those of the donors involved) featured prominently on the website (www.rapidfundingenvelope.org), and the involvement of TACAIDS and ZAC was mediated through a US-based charity called Management Sciences for Health. The donors in question thus appeared to have handed a significant degree of control over their contributions to a combination of private and Tanzanian government interests, though presumably the fact that they provided, and could withhold, the funds safeguarded their influence. The steering committee, in its turn, transmitted much of the responsibility for planning activities to the non-governmental and civil society organisations bidding for funds. In effect, rather than the government or its donors drawing up plans, the organisations seeking funds provided plans for the funders to pick and choose from.

The RFE's choice of projects to fund once again highlighted the way participation in CSO activity has come to form part of diversified livelihood strategies that go well beyond the provision of social services. Among the recipients of RFE grants for activities related to AIDS education, stigma reduction and care for AIDS sufferers and orphans, have been both Catholic and Lutheran dioceses, a department of the University of Dar es Salaam, and a department of the Muhimbili national hospital. The list of RFE's beneficiaries also indicates that some Muslims are now successful in accessing funds as representatives of civil society groups – but not necessarily on the basis of their identity as Muslims. One chapter of BAKAIDS based in the Muslim coastal town of Kilwa obtained funding for a project to train 'trainers of trainers' – a typical category of civil society intermediaries in the aid industry – in combating stigma.

Another recipient, the Masasi Women's Development Association (MAWODEA), was an even clearer example of the ability of applicants to frame their activities in accordance with donor demands. Based in the provincial town of Masasi, a religiously mixed settlement in a poor, predominantly Muslim region (see Ranger 1979), this organisation presented its overall aim as one of 'combatting poverty' and its activities as providing training on financial management, business development and entrepreneurship, including the construction of thirty-six solar driers for fruit and vegetables, and the training of 1,683 women in their use (see RFE 2006–14). Its AIDS-related programme was described as one of nutritional education and care for people living with HIV/AIDS, including the 'training of trainers' through workshops and the production of printed information material. From the information provided, it was not clear whether the solar drier trainees were self-identified as people living with HIV/AIDS, although given the prevailing climate of secrecy around AIDS it is unlikely that this number of people would come forward under this rubric. Evidently, then, the civic activity of providing nutrition education for people living with HIV/AIDS was allied to more

entrepreneurial and profit-driven activities. Workshops in themselves typically provide income in per diem form.

The grant to MAWODEA thus again highlights the ability of diverse social constituencies, Muslim ones included, to 'frame' their activities in accordance with the specifications of donors. This is not the same as saying that such groups 'mislead' their sponsors, any more than the sponsors dictate their terms to the grantees. Rather, what takes place is best understood as a form of negotiation. The civil society group undertakes to provide civil society activities in terms desirable to the donor, and the donor quietly accepts the likelihood of further unstated agendas being involved. With the small-town women who obtained funding through MAWODEA, donors' notions of faith-based 'civic engagement' as a choice made by individual, autonomous citizens run up against the social world of cultivators for whom co-operation is an essential part of survival. The line between disinterested, altruistic or religiously motivated work and self-interested economic activity here becomes more of a grey area. Nevertheless, the policy framework of the post-statist period here shapes the self-representation of Muslims, rather than merely making space for them.

At present, with the Rapid Funding Envelope closed, the search for funding has moved on. Current support from USAID is mediated through an international development NGO headquartered in Washington, PACT. The language in which BAK-AIDS's PACT-funded activities were framed, quoted above in the section on BAKWATA and its critics, is entirely consonant with current development jargon in Tanzania (Becker 2019, Chapter 8). On the one hand, then, Muslim aid recipients represent and structure their activities so as to make them compatible with technocratic orthodoxies. On the other, and perhaps hopefully, the increasing salience of Islamophobia in American public life has not prevented American funders from extending grants to explicitly Muslim recipients. To an extent, it appears, the mainstream Muslims represented by BAKWATA have arrived in the mainstream of development intervention.

CONCLUSION

In the account given here, the useful fictions and mis-descriptions that I have referred to as 'framing' above have emerged as central to the working misunderstandings between donors and Muslim constituencies, and thus to the participation of Muslims in the governance of developmental health interventions. As with Mitchell's (1988) influential use of the term, it refers to 'ways of looking at' a social world: the implicit perceptions that operate in conjunction with explicit discourses. These ways of seeing spread within institutional frameworks and among individual actors, and influence what they accept as real, valid and relevant. But while Mitchell sees framing as the work of powerful strangers on the

Egyptian scene, in the present case the process of framing helps officials manage a particular mixture of strength *and* weakness. While donors dictate the English-language terms and hold the purse strings, they also need results; thus they need acceptable intermediaries. They are under pressure to demonstrate effectiveness, and they have to get along with state authorities as well as aid recipients. In the case of RFE, the practical and discursive ‘framing’ of aid practice and African aid recipients in terms of ‘civil society organisations’ allowed the different aims and interests of petitioners, administrators and donors to converge in terms that *look* clear on paper, whatever the indeterminacies on the ground. Thus all sides compromised, and all obtained something out of the exchange (Green 2012, 2014).

These ‘working misunderstandings’ surrounding the interaction between donors and ‘faith-based’ Muslim constituencies form part of a long tradition of Africans adopting particular public personas so as to link up to foreigners with resources and power. They establish a faint yet suggestive resemblance between today’s aid officials and colonial administrators of yore, ever seeking to identify legitimate leaders (then, of ‘tribes’, as now of ‘civil society’) (see Pels 1996). Consequently, we find, at the interface of Muslim networks on the one hand and donors and funders on the other, a variety of configurations of activism, self-interest and service, and a variety of religious figures with idiosyncratic forms of legitimacy. Sheikh Issa Othman, fluent in English, well-connected in the aid ‘scene’, but also credible as a Muslim activist, was a kind of ‘faith-based’ intermediary who conformed well to the expectations that schemes such as RFE implicitly posit. Meanwhile, Bakari Ali, the volunteer-manager, an activist but not a religious specialist, at Masjid Sheikhat Issa, is perhaps best understood as working his way towards the status of elder in his chosen Muslim community: a patron in the making, drawing on funding from outside the development machine. In contrast to Issa Othman, his strategy depends on his keeping a distance from ‘Western’ funding streams and models of organisation; his role remains invisible to donors on the Anglophone aid scene.

In a manner observed by Brown and Green (2015), these religious figures move between representing a community to the aid world and helping to manage it from a vantage point within that world. They are intermediaries who have to actively manage their credibility with their constituencies. This involves adopting stances, sometimes explicitly, sometimes implicitly, on a plethora of ethical, social and political issues, from condom use to the political status of Muslims in today’s Tanzania. These ramifications of their positions make clear how much is elided by the concept of the ‘faith-based organisation’ when it is posited as denoting plucky members of civil society, doing their bit for accountable service delivery. The issue is not that people like Othman do not contribute to both civic involvement and service delivery as donors understand them; they may well do so (though this is not to be taken for granted). But they do so

within a force field of religious, social and political divisions, as well as personal aims, convictions and needs. Personal legitimation, political partisanship and livelihoods are all in play.

The observer may be tempted to ask what is gained by stating that donors' discursive framings elide these factors, given that the Tanzanian Muslim partners in these interactions rarely appear in a position to explicitly challenge the framings, manipulating them instead. One answer is that acknowledging these undercurrents helps 'de-normalise' donor speak, identifying it as a specific political and ideological practice, rather than a neutral description of African realities and humanitarian desiderata. Acknowledgement of this political character, in turn, makes clearer that these discursive framings, willingly or not, contribute to the process of state-making in Africa. Observed carefully, they allow us to see that the constituencies involved in and responding to this process are more diverse than narrowly focused political accounts of African states would suggest (see Abrahamsen 2000). In other words, despite their conflicted, at times alienated, relationship with the Tanzanian state, Muslim constituencies are active players.

Both the powers (sometimes unwitting) of donors *and* their limits become evident when one examines the interaction between Muslim networks and AIDS-related funders seeking channels of faith-based provision. Bakwata's and TMWN's documents on AIDS and the institutional structures supported by the RFE all show the effort to engage with and become acceptable within donors' framing of Tanzanian society, 'civil society' activism and aid provision. But there are limits to this adaptability, as is evident, for instance, in the silence of all these publications and organisations on condom use, despite its centrality in the European anti-AIDS campaigns that served as templates (Iliffe 2006). Donors' framings, in other words, have real effects on institutional practice, but they cannot simply override the religious or ideological commitments of the Tanzanian actors involved. While donors in many ways dictate the terms of the engagement with their Tanzanian constituencies, they also have to make themselves complicit in their redeployments of them. Donors' power here seems peculiarly unstable.

Returning to the issue raised in the introduction, of political and economic liberalisation in Tanzania doing more than merely 'making space' for Islamic activism, the substance of this claim is now clearer. Muslim authority figures, activists and congregations interacted with donor institutions pursuing various refractions of neoliberal policy programmes in a process of negotiation, borrowing, crossover and occasional rejection. While the Muslim parties to the interaction largely maintained their distance from positions proposed in the aid world that signalled social liberalism in matters of gender and the family, organisations like BAK-AIDS and MAWODEA have bought into the language of personal entrepreneurialism and financial responsibility. And yet, whether

individualisation is the method or effect of their projects on the ground is an open question; the Masasi example hardly makes it likely. The fungibility of the prescriptions emanating from the aid world is intrinsic to their influence.

These observations highlight the necessity for caution when examining how neoliberal ideology and interventions work themselves out in Africa (Ferguson 2006). 'Neoliberalism' is not always a giant bestriding contemporary Africa, imposing a narrow yet destructive agenda for state roll-back and so-called free markets (Harvey 2007). Rather, it is likely that some of the European donors involved in an operation like the RFE have priorities in sympathy with European notions of social democracy. Conversely, the rhetoric of individual entrepreneurialism appears to have become if anything stronger in Tanzania in the 2010s, even as it lost some of its triumphalism on the world stage in the aftermath of the financial crisis. Yet even if civil society initiatives are conceived of as an alternative to state provision, TACAIDS's role shows that the government remains closely involved. In the case of MAWODEA, neither donors nor the central government had direct oversight of the group's actual activities, and the women involved had some choice, both in whether to get involved and in how to do so. The framing of the operation as a civil society venture provided a rationale for the provision of funds, whose enabling effects may well have outweighed any constraints imposed by the 'CSO' label. In this sense, the category of CSO was very useful to these rural women.

For aid recipients with an explicitly reformist Muslim identity, meanwhile, alternatives to funding streams 'tainted', so to speak, by their association with the Tanzanian state were clearly welcome, as in the example of the Sheikhat Issa mosque complex. For them, the 'mainstream' aid world was, as it were, not 'non-governmental' enough, as they were clearly aware of the Western provenance of its funds, protocols and prescriptions. Muslims without a reformist agenda, however, were able to pursue opportunities, and provide benefits, here. As is evident in Sheikh Issa Othman's 'straddling' of these worlds, considerable effort and skill were needed for brokerage between them. Nevertheless, the passages made by the likes of Issa Othman serve as a reminder that development intervention and religious practice arguably have more in common than is always appreciated. After all, both are ways of confronting uncertain futures and the painful limitations of imperfect lives.

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