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Civil anarchizing for the common good:

Culturally patterned politics of legitimacy in the climate justice movement.

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Compliance with ethical standards

The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest.

All procedures performed in studies involving human participants were in accordance with the ethical standards of the institutional and/or national research committee and with the 196 Helsinki declaration and its later amendments or comparable ethical standards. This article does not contain any studies involving animals performed by any of the authors.

Informed consent was obtained from individual participants at interviews and small-scale observation moments. Due to the mass context of the event studied (+3000 people), gathering individual informed consent during the action was not always possible. In these cases, the personal details of participants were not obtained or included. The inclusion of some anonymized quotes does not pose a threat to their privacy.

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Abstract

This article presents an ethnographic study of the case of Ende Gelände (EG), a German civil disobedience network undertaking action for climate justice. We reveal how a politics of legitimacy in civil society organizations such as EG are structured and constructed through different styles of civic action. Specifically, in our case study, a dominant pattern of '*civil anarchizing*' (CA) emerged, in which legitimacy was continuously negotiated in relation to both external and internal stakeholders. This CA style was also accompanied by a more individual-centered style that we call *personalized politics (PP)*. We compare both styles and describe the tensions that result from their co-occurrence. In addition, we argue that the CA style might be more viable for politicization due to its emphasis on a collective strategy. Finally, we describe how this CA style shaped the participants' politics of legitimacy by functioning as a negotiated hybrid of civil and uncivil expectations.

Keywords: civic action, legitimacy, climate justice, activism, ethnography

Introduction. CSOs: From essentially good to essentially contested.

The environment has increasingly come under threat over recent decades. However, it seems that the more we talk about sustainability, the less sustainable we become. Despite the emergence of a green consciousness, responses to environmental problems are increasingly disputed. Climate change has emerged as one of the most contentious issues. While mainstream policy often looks at climate change as a technical issue of measuring and managing CO_2 emissions, the climate justice movement (CJM) considers the state of our climate within a social justice framework (Hulme, 2009, pp. 842-843). The CJM argues that climate change is intertwined with an unequal distribution of environmental benefits and risks. Climate change

disproportionally affects underprivileged groups such as the world's poor who are least responsible in producing it. Therefore, a radical reduction of greenhouse gasses would be necessary yet insufficient to address this 'wicked problem'. The CJM demands a democratic and just transformation towards a climate neutral society within planetary boundaries (Martinez-Alier et al., 2014). More specifically, the CJM advocates a strategy of (re)politicization of the climate challenge that aims to "leave fossil fuels in the ground" (ClimateJusticeAction, 2017; Kenis & Mathijs, 2014). By invoking imaginaries of alternative futures (Verschraegen & Vandermoere, 2017) and different conceptions of citizenship (Dobson, 2003), as well as by engaging in disruptive actions such as occupations and blockades, the CJM enacts a radical social struggle aimed to fundamentally transform contemporary fossil-fuel-based capitalism (Martinez-Alier, Temper, Del Bene, & Scheidel, 2016). As the CJM calls on citizens and civil society organizations (CSOs) to take the future into their own hands, it embodies a contested form of civic action aiming to delegitimize more mainstream and "depoliticized" versions of climate action and "going green" (Kenis & Mathijs, 2014).

Theoretically, the CJM exemplifies the potential of CSOs to advocate highly different imaginaries of the "common good" (Frantz & Fuchs, 2014). Indeed, the advancement of sustainable and common interests is an essentially contested issue (Swyngedouw, 2014). Neo-institutionalists consider civil society as a habitat in which organizations define and defend their own versions of the common good (Reuter, Wijkström, & Meyer, 2014). CSOs need to legitimate themselves and gain support from different stakeholders. This includes both members and external parties such as political institutions or funding sources. However, the exact organizational and interactional mechanisms through which legitimacy is negotiated remain little understood.

Against this background, we present a case study of Ende Gelände (EG, German for "Until here and no further"), a European network involved in mass civil disobedience for climate justice.

EG presents itself as a broad network of people from the anti-nuclear and anti-coal movements, who share the belief that civic action is needed in order to stop climate change (EndeGelände, 2016a). Our case study focuses on the network's operations in spring 2016, during which it brought together approximately 3500 people to occupy an open-pit lignite (brown coal) mine and its infrastructure over three days, closing down its extractive work. EG represents a current CJM undertaking a contested form of climate action.

Although the EG event took place in the German Lausitz region, its significance reaches beyond it due to international participation, global attention paid to subsequent similar events[a] and being a major example of the growing "blockadia" and environmental justice movements (Owen, Rivin, Cardoso, Brototi, & del Bene, 2017; Temper, Del Bene, & Martinez-Alier, 2015). It is, therefore, a pre-eminent case that allows us to study how CSOs negotiate legitimacy in their everyday work. Using the civic action approach developed by the American sociologists Lichterman and Eliasoph (2014), culturally patterned politics of legitimacy emerged from our data. We reveal how EG's dominant cultural style of *civil anarchizing* and a subordinate style of *personalized politics* shaped the multiple organizational and interactional modalities employed by the participants to negotiate legitimacy.

Below, we first outline our theoretical approach to the study of the culturally patterned politics of legitimacy. Against the broader background of neo-institutionalist insights into the structuring impact of legitimacy expectations, we adopt a micro-sociological and performative perspective through the civic action approach (Lichterman & Eliasoph, 2014). Subsequently, we introduce our empirical case and methodology. We then present our findings on emergent styles of civic action and the tensions between them. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for scholarly interest into the ongoing legitimacy work of CSOs.

In search of legitimacy: From structure to process.

Traditionally, it has been argued that CSOs arise in response to both political and market failures, and by default enjoy legitimacy by addressing the common good. Due to the prevailing emphasis on the civil sphere as distinct from political-economic institutions, the differences and potential conflict between and within CSOs have been overlooked. It is, however, crucial to recognize and scrutinize the continual struggle for legitimacy faced by CSOs – a legitimacy which must be gained and regained, in relation to both external and internal stakeholders. For example, Chambers and Kopstein (2001) noted that civil society encompasses a continuum of legitimate and illegitimate actors and visions, ranging from the WWF to white supremacists. In this fluid space CSOs and their ideas can become hegemonic, while their positions can also become objects of contestation (Demaria, Schneider, Sekulova, & Martinez-Alier, 2013).

In other words, the civil sphere can be considered an arena where CSOs struggle for legitimacy. They may legitimize themselves by trying to alter dominant expectations, or more simply by conforming to standard norms and isomorphic pressures (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). In this vein, neo-institutional theorists have emphasized that organizations are largely guided by institutional rules and norms (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). They elucidate the structuring impact of social conventions, thereby considering institutionalized expectations as equivalent to legal constraints (McKinley, Zhao, & Rust, 2000), or scripts to be followed (Binder, 2007).

This classic top-down approach to structural legitimacy does not investigate how the scripts of this apparently "good" and "appropriate" organizational behavior are constructed in the first place. Drawing on the agency-centered research tradition of symbolic interactionism (Blumer, 1969/2012) and more recently on the notion of "inhabited institutions" (Binder, 2007), we acknowledge that cultural patterns do not simply infuse empty institutions with normative content. Rather these institutions and CSOs are comprised of people who act as creative agents actively making sense of their contexts.

While acknowledging the micro-cultural critique of neo-institutionalism, we favor a more balanced approach to the study of legitimacy by focusing on cultural patterns as a means to interact (Eliasoph & Lichterman, 2003; Swidler, 1986). We conceptualize legitimacy as a perceived quality that individuals assign to an organization or event based on judgments of appropriateness. These judgments collectively constitute wider norms but are also subject to isomorphic pressures (Suddaby, Bitektine, & Haack, 2017). Looking deeper into the "structure-agency" dialectic between macro-cultural isomorphic pressures and micro-level flexibility, Eliasoph and Lichterman (2003) posited that publicly shared cultural repertoires indeed gain meaning through interpretation and interaction in social contexts. However, the exact way these collective repertoires are enacted depends on the *style* of the group or scene in which they are found. These *styles of civic action* function as filters in an intermediate layer between institutional logics and everyday practices. By shaping participants' expectations of "what is going on" and "what is good behavior in this setting", styles provide common ground for the participants. Through this theoretical lens, we can see "structure happen" and shed light on how the politics of legitimacy in CSOs are produced and patterned (Lichterman & Eliasoph, 2014).

Lichterman and Eliasoph define civic action as "action coordinated by participants to improve some aspect of common life in society, as they imagine society" (2014, p. 809). This definition rejects the classic notion that CSOs are essentially good. It shifts attention to the inherently contingent process through which space for civic action is created, rather than assuming it only occurs in a certain distinct organizational type or civil society sphere. The central research question thus becomes: *how* do actors coordinate their civic actions in certain scenes? Lichterman and Eliasoph adopt the concept of "styles" to illuminate the durably patterned ways through which participants enact civic action. These styles are "recurrent patterns of interaction that arise out of members' shared assumptions about what constitutes good or adequate participation in the setting" (2014, pp. 813-814). Because participants using a shared style have

similar perceptions of what is going on and how should one behave, a style provides mutual ground for interaction by providing shared meanings for participants. As such, styles also function as "filters", enacting and articulating more widespread cultural concepts such as "civil disobedience" or "loyalty" in a specific way. Civic action styles thus describe *how* people perform civic action, based on their shared assumptions.

While Eliasoph and Lichterman first theorized these styles as "group styles" (2003), they recently focused on "scene styles" to align their framework more consistently with Goffman's dramaturgical approach (2014, p. 815). Scenes are "strips of action" carried out by participants. A certain scene occurs in a specific setting if participants in the scene share assumptions about "what is going on". These interpretations determine participants' behavior. A joke, for example, can become an insult if the scene changes and the action is interpreted differently. Because of this dependency on interpretation, multiple scenes may occur within one organization, sometimes progressing smoothly or at other times entailing abrupt change (e.g., a meeting that erupts into everyday chatter on its closing, or a peaceful protest that escalates into a riot). In addition, participants may even have differing assumptions about an ongoing action strip. This implies that two scenes may be enacted simultaneously, possibly creating frictions due to divergent understandings of how to behave in this situation.

Lichterman and Eliasoph (2014) delineated three heuristic dimensions of civic action styles to study the patterned occurrence of civic action scenes. The first dimension is an implicit and subjective map that depicts participants' external reference points. The map defines ties to non-participant actors such as the audience, allies and opponents, and to relevant concepts such as societal transformation. Within the map they discern whether participants highlight conflict, whether they envision their efforts as contributing to social transformation, or whether they hope to appeal to a socially diverse, universal audience. The second dimension concerns internal bonds which define participants' responsibilities towards each other. Do these bonds

lead participants to behave uniformly as a coherent body or highlight harmonious but personal uniqueness, and do participants expect to have enduring or rather easily disconnected bonds. A third dimension revolves around speech norms that define appropriate ways of expression and whether speech should be strategic, personal, rational, emotional, polite, etc.

Scene styles thus constitute cultural filters and create common grounds for civic action, based on what participants consider appropriate behavior depending on their interpretation of a setting. Below, we will apply this theoretical lens to the case of Ende Gelände to reveal the scene styles it employs and develop an empirical understanding of how the politics of legitimacy are enacted through these styles.

Methods

The civic action approach is embedded in the micro-cultural tradition of symbolic interactionism (Blumer, 1969/2012), which assumes that shared meanings provide shared grounds for interaction. As recommended by Lichterman and Eliasoph (2014) we took an ethnographic approach to gathering data on civic styles. Thereby we aimed to obtain congruence between the theory and our data by focusing primarily on everyday interactions, routines and the constant process of (re)negotiating meanings. We gathered our data from participant observation and from examining frequently cited documents and press materials available on EG's website.

Data collection

The ethnographic data mainly centered on the Belgian branch of EG, whose participants and their interactional dynamics could be studied from the preparatory meetings onwards as well as in the wrap-up process in the period after the protest action. We could observe all Belgian participants (N=120) and had conversations with half of them. Generally, they were relatively younger, highly educated white people, with loose ties to green or radical left-wing

organizations and an activist and alter-globalization background. For many, this was their first experience of direct action or civil disobedience. When interacting with other nationalities, among whom French, German, British and Swedish participants, we did not encounter major differences in terms of the demography of civic activity. The participant observation phase was carried out over eight days and included two days of preparatory action training in two cities; the bus ride back and forth from Brussels to the East-German region of Lausitz; three days of civic action at the camp and the railway blockade; and attendance at an evaluation meeting facilitated by the trainers.

During each of these ethnographic moments, the first author adopted the research role of open participant observation. Upon entering a research setting the ethnographer announced that he was a researcher[b], stated his goals and gave participants a contact file providing additional information and guaranteeing anonymity. He participated in the action through a diversity of settings, representing both frontstage and backstage scenes. Such scenes included chatting while waiting in the food queue at the camp, being in a delegates meeting on the occupied site, joining a demonstration, nervously preparing for the action or informally discussing politics. In these scenes he had conversations with 79 participants – 59 of whom were Belgian. These participants included first time participants and more experienced activists, organizers, trainers, cooks and facilitators. While some of these conversations where short and informal, other interactions took up to four hours and often had a reflexive character, for instance about the role of the police or about horizontal organizing. Generally these conversations revealed insight in the assumptions participants held about maps, bonds and speech norms. Observation notes were guided by the heuristic dimensions of cultural styles and their accompanying sensitive questions (Eliasoph & Lichterman, 2003, pp. 784-787; Lichterman & Eliasoph, 2014, pp. 842-843).

Being seen as both a researcher and activist, and having a similar background to most participants, resulted in a semi-insider position (Beech, Hibbert, MacIntosh, & McInnes, 2009;

Sherif, 2001). Mobilizing this position he could obtain data by functioning as a *curiosum*. Participants would for example offer unsolicited suggestions about the research, or vent their frustrations to the researcher as an outsider. However, being also seen as an activist enabled him to gain access to a setting that was wary of infiltration. To maintain some critical distance, his focus alternated between participants who had insider status and those who did not.

Throughout the research process, the ethnographer gathered informant feedback to check emergent findings (Bryman, 2012, pp. 494-495; Schwartz-Shea, 2014, pp. 135-136). This was carried out in three ways. First, initial insights were discussed through informal conversations during the action. Secondly, a month after the participant observation, four in-depth interviews were carried out with Belgian participants who could be considered critical informants because of their reflexive stance towards the organizational process. Thirdly, after the data analysis, findings were presented and discussed with a group of seven trainers involved in the action. Engaging in several member checks at different stages of the research process allowed for improving the multivocality of the data (Ybema, Yanow, Wels, & Kamsteeg, 2009, pp. 8-9). In addition, it served as a 'member check' on the trustworthiness of preliminary interpretations of the data gathered (Creswell John & Miller, 2000, p. 127; Merriam, 1995, p. 54). Finally, having member checks allowed for deepening understanding and further abductive development of hypotheses that emerged from our field notes.

Data treatment

We understand that our data was coproduced by researchers, participants and the contexts in which it was gathered. As researchers we reconstruct and interpret perceptions, experiences and meanings to identify underlying patterns (Timmermans & Tavory, 2012). The data analysis occurred in a cyclical process. After each ethnographic session field notes were transcribed distinguishing between descriptive, reflexive and theorizing notes. In the same sequence, the transcribed field notes were coded according to the heuristic dimensions of style. While

conflict, audience, transformation and the continuum of unity-diversity emerged as important dimensions, speech norms and temporality were less relevant to our data. Tentative hypotheses on the nature of the styles and tensions occurring between participants emerged from the coding process. These hypotheses functioned as an additional focus for subsequent observations and interviews. The interviews were transcribed from audio-recordings and analyzed in a similarly cyclical manner as the field notes.

Case description

As mentioned above, our research focused on a particular mass civil disobedience action that took place in 2016 (May 13-15). This specific action was framed in a global action week labeled "Break free from fossil fuels" and coordinated by climate NGO 350.org. By occupying the Welzow-Sud lignite mine and blocking transport infrastructure, Ende Gelände tried to pressure the Swedish owner Vattenfall and the German State to close down the lignite branch instead of selling it. In a broader framework the action also aimed to bring the phasing out of lignite to the agenda, favoring climate justice and energy grassroots democracy above fossil-fuel-based capitalism. The action was a publicly announced mass blockade, portraying itself as "legitimate but illegal".

Based on our fieldwork, it soon became apparent that distinct organizational characteristics were key to understanding the patterning of civic action in EG. First, people could only participate in the action if they respected the "action consensus" - a document produced through internal discussion - providing a fixed framework for the principles of appropriate conduct. It renounced escalation, destruction and physically endangering the parties involved, while encouraging mutual caring, creativity and diversity (EndeGelände, 2016b). The document asked people to participate at the personal level, not primarily as a member of another organization, and it also asked them to take responsibility for the proper implementation of the action as a whole. The action consensus thus served to create common ground for participating

in the occupation of the mine. During the action we found, however, that participants interpreted the document in various ways, leaving room for discussion but also for autonomy and divergent forms of participation. Nevertheless, as a regulatory tool, the action consensus was central to the politics of legitimacy with respect to internal and external stakeholders.

In addition to this predetermined action framework, the main organizational structures enabling EG's decentralized approach to organization were buddy pairs, affinity groups, delegates meetings and "the Fingers" (see Figure 1).

*** INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE ***

Buddy pairs constituted the lowest level of organization and consisted of two people who mentally and physically look after each other during, before and after the action. Affinity Groups (AFGs) contained several buddy-pairs. They were small autonomous and egalitarian groups consisting of 4-16 people brought together by "affinity"[c] (McDonald, 2002; Mercier vega, 1983). Their task was to function as small circles of participation and caring, in theory enabling everyone to be involved in decision making while feeling comfortable with their role in the action. With a history in Spanish anarchism and direct action groups, AFGs function as units in a decentralized network, making a larger mass of participants more resilient and more difficult to control. In preparation for the action, civil disobedience trainers facilitated the AFG formation process through exercises that elicited participants' personal preferences on how they wished to participate in the action (e.g. how much exposure to police lines they wanted). The Fingers were used as an organizational instrument to coordinate AFGs as they moved toward the mine. A Finger consists of a long column of people in rows of 4-6 that may consist of up to a few hundred participants. It is divided into different AFGs with varying functions such as carrying material, determining the route or forming the first line in case of encounter with the police. Because of limits on information flows – as the participants did not want the police to know about their specific plans – the Finger was more hierarchically

organized. It functioned on the basis of the participants' trust in the "Nail" of the Finger: a leading group at the head of the formation that determined where it would go and in what manner. Thus similarly to action agreement, the Finger reflects how the autonomy of individuals and AFGs is embedded in predetermined organizational frameworks.

While the activists occupied the mining infrastructure they coordinated themselves through meetings between revocable delegates. These delegates meetings occurred a few times a day, involving approximately 40 delegates. They were led by a facilitator and functioned as a platform for discussion and information flow. Both strategic and practical matters were discussed and proposals that gained the consensus of the delegates could be taken to the AFGs, who could then amend them and decide whether or not to carry them out. In contrast to the Finger, the delegate meetings allowed more decentralized coordination. While the setting of the AFG was informal, the more formal and impersonal delegate meetings generally meant that strategic arguments overruled personal preferences.

Chronology – the course of the action

Two single-day action training sessions were held beforehand in Belgium, in which approximately 15 participants prepared for civil disobedience under the guidance of three trainers, practicing organizational and tactical skills through role-playing and briefings. An action camp was set up close to the lignite mine, providing logistical support with field kitchens, composting toilets, legal and medical assistance and large tents to hold plenary meetings – and have parties. Visitors participated in everyday tasks and were asked to make a voluntary financial contribution. Upon arrival, the Belgian participants were asked to join the green Finger that would occupy the railroad tracks, with most of the AFGs agreeing. Two other Fingers also aimed to occupy the railroad tracks, while another two would attempt to enter the mine and another one aimed to block lignite supplies at the power plant.

Nerves arouse a few hours before the green Finger departed: the AFGs gathered material and tried to work out their role in the Finger. Around 500 people and a samba band left for the train tracks shouting climate justice and anti-capitalist slogans. Surprised to have encountered no police resistance, the group reached its destination after walking eight kilometers. They occupied the tracks for the next 48 hours, waiting to be evicted which did not eventuate. While participants played games and built plastic tent-like shelters to protect themselves from the rain, tactical discussions and task distribution occurred through the delegate meetings that took place every few hours. After lengthy discussion, the AFGs also occupied the loading cranes – called "the Towers" - and on the day they left, they built a "blockade monument" with scrap material. On the bus back to Belgium the participants gave the impression of being exhausted but empowered. Most of them still had dirty faces from the lignite dust as they shared their stories. One week later, an evaluation meeting took place involving approximately 40 of the Belgian participants, where they reviewed the press coverage, presented updates and discussed topics such as the communication structures.

Findings

The findings are reported below in four sections. First, we describe the c*ivil anarchizing* (CA) scene style, a term we coined to make sense of EG's dominant interaction pattern for negotiating legitimacy. Then, we compare CA with a subordinate and more individual-centered style called *personalized politics* (PP). The final two sections focus on tensions that were central to the politics of legitimacy. On the one hand, specific tensions arose from the co-occurrence between the two styles. We discuss how the CA style balanced legitimacy claims to provide common ground for interaction. On the other hand, a particular tension between civil and uncivil scenes emerged from our fieldwork. Although civil and uncivil scenes occurred, the CA style shaped the participants' legitimacy struggles by functioning as a negotiated hybrid form between both.

Civil anarchizing

C*ivil anarchizing* (CA) emerged as a dominant scene style from our fieldwork. The adjective *civil*, in the first instance carries, a descriptive meaning, in the "civic" sense that participants frame themselves as acting citizens. "Civil", however, is also prescriptive, as participants aspire to appear as civilized and as worthy "good citizens" (Tilly, 2010). The verb *anarchizing* refers to participants pragmatically enacting broad anarchist principles. The inspirational role of the anarchist elements becomes evident in the participants' plea for global grassroots anti-capitalist direct action through the affinity groups. Although the coalition's website does not mention anarchism, and it is probably that a large majority of participants would not self-identify as such, they nevertheless enacted these principles and acted on common ground with groups carrying anarchist symbols on flags and banners.

The term "civil anarchizing" thus delineates EG's hybrid character in attempting to combine the civilized and civic with a radical approach and struggle reflecting broad anarchist principles. To further flesh out this scene style, we used two of Lichterman and Eliasoph's (2014) heuristic dimensions: participants' maps highlighting conflict and aiming for societal transformation while acting for a broad and general audience; and their group bonds, expressing a strategic unity-in-diversity.[d]

If one could map the imagined positions taken by the participants in the CA style in relation to other actors, this map would highlight conflict. They positioned themselves on the side of climate justice in opposition to fossil-fuel-based capitalism; as proponents of grassroots democracy opposed to political elites, as activists who constitute an investment risk opposed to the mining company, as disobedient citizens with respect to the police; and as defending left wing values against reactionary right-wingers. In this self-positioning, the EG participants created and applied an image of the common good based on decentralization and socio-ecological harmony. They wanted to express their disagreement with their adversaries in a civil

manner, while not allowing themselves to be controlled by them. As a prominent frontstage document that was generally endorsed, the action consensus stated:

"We will behave in a calm and cool-headed way. Escalation will not be provoked by us. We will not put people in danger. We will block and occupy with our bodies, but we will not destroy or damage any machinery or infrastructure in the process. We will pass through or around the cordons and barriers set up by police and pit security, and we will not respond to provocation"

In accordance with their system-critical positioning, participants in the CA style saw themselves as attempting to achieve broad and fundamental social transformation. They attempted to connect their struggle against lignite mining with issues such as racism, patriarchy, migration and capitalism. One prominent banner used by the Nail of one Finger that which widely used in EG's media reports exemplifies this attempt to connect struggles. It reads "Open all borders, close all coalmines, end capitalism". The participants hope to enact this transformation through campaign-oriented direct action and civil disobedience.

To achieve the broad aim of societal transformation, participants hoped to appeal to a general audience of "ordinary people", reachable through mass media. For this purpose, they positioned themselves as responsible and "normal" citizens and strategically aimed to avoid being marginalized. During delegates meetings, bad images and more aggressive looking tactics were dismissed as counter-productive. More disobedient tactics required "dressing up" to make them appealing or more acceptable to broad audiences. For example, white boiler suits and dust masks were handed out at the camp, protecting people against the lignite dust, as well as rendering them unrecognizable, while straw bags were carried as soft shields to push through police lines.

Within their group, the participants were expected to behave in a manner reflecting "unity-in-diversity". Their group bonds emphasized the main strategic frameworks that were directed at

obtaining legitimacy from a broad audience for their social struggle. Participants coordinated themselves in a decentralized but collective way through the use of the action consensus, AFGs, delegate meetings and Fingers. Within these organizational forms, participants were expected to take up responsibility and behave in mutual solidarity. Moreover, visual unity was provided by wearing the identical white boiler suites and dust masks. A more militant AFG, fully dressed in black, who was discredited during the occupation of the "Towers" even asked at a delegate meeting whether their group could have some white suits as theirs had fell apart after scrambling through bushes. The delegates meeting had a charming response on the AFG's request for symbolic group unity. It was pointed out that the CA group bonds did not aim at tight unity but strive for consensus through long deliberation and, if necessary, by agreeing to disagree.

The CA style thus left room for a certain degree of autonomy and celebrated a diversity of expressions and participation modes. However, this autonomy and diversity had to be embedded within the main strategic frameworks that functioned to purposively craft the common ground. For example, delegates discussed for hours whether they should occupy "The Towers". Some feared escalation and negative outcomes, but consensus took shape: individual AFGs could try to occupy the Towers, but only if they would first attempt a dialogue with the security personnel, and stop if the latter were prepared to use violence.

The CA style was especially visible in strategically focused delegates meetings. Reflecting on the Tower occupation, some activists were strongly opposed to the proposal to occupy it. While they could voice their concerns and felt these were respected, they feared an escalation in tensions with the workers and the loss of public legitimacy even after a compromise was crafted. They eventually stepped back as delegates and did not veto the proposal. Participants in the CA style had to negotiate between what they thought the general audience perceived as appropriate, what they themselves judged as legitimate, and how to weigh both against each other. In the

CA style, the outcome of these politics of legitimacy was that general and pre-constructed strategic frameworks created a common ground on which a unity-in-diversity was celebrated.

Personalized politics

We can contrast this dominant CA style with the more subordinate style of *personalized politics* (PP), as schematized in Table 1. The PP style is one of the six scene styles discerned by Lichterman and Eliasoph (2014, pp. 842-843)[e]. While the CA style favored strategic unity, participants in the PP scenes emphasized individual-centered bonds. They highlighted the unique and diverse contributions of individuals that functioned harmoniously together. Participants loosely collaborated as individuals across different organizational forms, and emphasized their autonomy and personalized self-expression. In PP scenes, mass civil disobedience was seen as a form of self-development. Participants in the action training sessions for example reported that their motive to joining EG was "learning disobedience". Being individual-centered, however, does not necessarily imply an egoistic outlook (McDonald, 2002). The development and expression of their selves may be collective, as long as it is personalized. While similarly engaging in social conflict and hoping to appeal to a broad audience, the strategic organizational framework was less emphasized in PP scenes. Instead, they highlighted participants' autonomy and self-expression. For example, one participant stated that she wanted to "live the revolution". Moreover, the PP style aimed to achieve transformation through expressing and developing the self, while the CA style emphasized goal-oriented campaigns. PP scenes played out less frequently in delegates meetings, and more often in AFGs and between buddy pairs. The following field note illustrates how the need for personalized participation can conflict with dominant strategic frameworks. Jenny, a student in her 20s, expressed the need for individual-centered bonds in an informal talk after the action. She criticized the organization for insufficiently addressing this element of the PP style, and as such she expressed her expectations about the styles:

Jenny didn't like the mass character and coordinated nature of the event. Although she trusted the coordinators in making the right decisions, she felt like a pawn, like one of 3000 people. She would rather participate in a "qualitative" rather than "quantitative" way, by joining in the coordination, or performing a smaller action on the side so she would feel more ownership over the action. She summarized this by stating that she would have preferred that the coordination didn't just need her legs [to run into the mine], but also her knowledge.

While the PP style was retrieved from civic action literature, it was found insufficient to capture the existing politics of legitimacy in our case. Therefore we conceptualized CA as a more specific variation of PP. In PP scenes, the politics of legitimacy are determined by the need for internal legitimacy, which is based on the possibility of self-expression and self-development. In contrast, the CA style emphasized strategic frameworks that were constructed to ensure that the action appeared legitimate to an imagined broad audience.

[***insert Table 1 about here***]

We found the CA style to be dominant at Ende Gelände, while the PP style took a more subordinate position. The former functioned as an overarching strategic framework in which enclaves of the latter could exist. While these scenes could switch harmoniously, they also created friction when occurring simultaneously. In the following section, we elaborate on this friction and how it was managed.

Tension I: Civil anarchizing versus personalized politics.

A tension between differing conceptions of the coordinated nature of the action versus the assumption of horizontal organizing, and between the political instrumentality of the strategic framework versus self-centered activity. Participants seemed to have conflicting interpretations

of what constituted "the good organization". We analytically framed these conflicts as differing scene styles: a dominant civil anarchizing versus subordinate personalized politics scene style.

At certain moments, participants had differing assumptions about "what is going on" and "what is appropriate". The assumption that autonomous affinity groups would work harmoniously and horizontally did not always fit the expectations held of the CA style. The CA style instructed participants to join in and contribute to the pre-structured and coordinated nature of the action. Both the trainings and EG's website assumed the action's coordination would occur horizontally. However, while the affinity groups were principally autonomous in their decisions, they usually took the default positions laid out by the coordination. A field note excerpt illustrates this default positioning:

> *During the bus ride to Germany, most Belgian participants express the idea that they want to see the lignite mine during the action. Upon their arrival at the action camp, however, the coordination proposes that the Belgian AFGs join the green Finger and occupy the railroad tracks. Most of the AFGs put aside their initial preference and follow this laid out choice as opposed to other options, about which no info was given.*

This field note illustrates the information asymmetry between coordination positions and most AFGs. For example, the groups coordinating the Finger, had information on the route that they did not share with the wider groups, as they thought it could expose the group to heavier and more efficient police repression. Moreover participants who were not heavily involved in preparing the strategy or group formation often did not know who was involved in the coordinating roles at all. This was one of the major points of criticism during the Belgians' evaluation in Brussels.

The tension between the CA and PP styles also emerged in conflicting preferences for political instrumentality versus self-centered activity. In PP scenes, participants assumed the "centrality

of the self" (McDonald, 2002)[f] and, for example, described their engagement in the action as being motivated by self-development or as a way of connecting with other like-minded people. However, as the CA strategic frameworks shaped the common ground, this personalized dimension was embedded and redirected towards EG's CA-styled mode of politicizing through mass civil disobedience. In CA's strategic logic, participants are instrumental in a goal-oriented campaign. Recalling Jenny's depiction of herself as a pawn, this strategic logic clearly conflicts with the centrality of the self. During a delegates meeting, another example of this tense embedding of PP scenes in the CA style was enacted. A delegates' need for personal expression conflicted with the goal orientation of the decision making process:

> *A male delegate in his late twenties who was eager to speak had been raising his hand for several minutes. Among the 40 other delegates, he had been neglected by the facilitator. When finally appointed he could raise his points. He spoke frustrated and voiced several concerns at once, mixing comments on the process and content of decision making. With the CA style expectation that delegates should bring short and direct arguments, and only when necessary, his breaching plea was politely ignored, and the decision making resumed.*

Participants used three strategies to deal with these tensions and keep common ground for interaction. First, they were encouraged to trust the organizational capacities of the coordinating teams. In this respect, the action experience of these teams and even the national cliché of efficient German organizing were mobilized. During a preparatory action training in Belgium, participants were debriefing an exercise on how to move through police lines:

> *The group is reflecting on the role of the organizing team's preparation of the action. Claire, the most experienced trainer, explains that a small group of organizers*

determines the action's main course, and which tactics will actually be used: "Participants don't really have another option than trusting the organizing team's strong framework and decent preparation". Lucia answers that since everything seems well prepared she does trust the organizing team.

In a second strategy, coordinating teams attempted to take up leadership roles in supportive and non-authoritarian ways. They facilitated group discussions through the delegates meetings rather than making all the decisions themselves. They also attempted to foster a sense of collective ownership and responsibility for the action. This collective ownership through unity-in-diversity relied on continuous communication. Calm and strategy-oriented speech was preferred in CA scenes to reach consensus in the face of a goal-oriented campaign to shut down lignite mining. One example of how these group bonds and speech norms come together in opposition to adversaries was observed during the railroad occupation:

A few Belgian buddie pairs were already collecting material for the "blockade monument" when a German AFG came over to discuss this with them. The latter expressed their view in a concerned and worried fashion and said that they did not want a blockade monument. As the conversation proceeds, the Belgian pairs assure the others that they have not started building the blockade monument, and say they appreciate the effort of the Germans to come and discuss this with them. The German delegates clearly calm down after this. One of them states that he considers it important not to get frustrated or divided. "The last thing you want is [to feel] "you want nothing to do with those people."

A third strategy consisted of a functional distinction through the "compartmentalizing" of CA and PP scenes at different organizational levels. On the coordination levels, such as the Finger coordination and delegates meetings, the CA style predominated, along with its strategic

outlook. Once within the CA-styled strategic frameworks, individuals and AFGs could agree to disagree and enjoy relative autonomy, within PP enclaves.

By looking at how tensions are managed, we can see how the politics of legitimacy are enacted differently in the PP and CA scene styles. In PP scenes, participants' legitimacy judgments lent more towards internal stakeholders' diverse concerns, while the CA style seemed more outward looking, coordinating various efforts in a goal-oriented campaign to "Keep the coal in the ground".

While the tension between the CA and PP scenes might be primarily characterized in terms of participants' different interpretations of "the good organization", the following section deals with divergent assumptions about on "the right action strategy".

Tension II: Civil versus uncivil scenes

Legitimacy-related tensions between civil and uncivil scenes only gradually emerged in our analysis. During participatory observation, tactical and strategic discussions played out on topics such as responses to police, the importance of public legitimacy, the strictness of the action consensus and conflict and escalation. More "radical" groups saw militant action as part of "good and determined opposition", while more "moderate" groups understood "radical" action as "extremist, illegitimate and isolated". The discussion around "Tower II" was one of the main examples where this tension emerged. From our field notes:

> *On the second loading station, "Tower II", the occupying groups installed barricades to prevent eviction by the police. Some of them joked that "Their hands were itching", and asked while laughing that "Neatly dismantling the machine, isn't violent destruction, right?" Later these groups put straw and sticks into parts of the machine to obstruct its functioning. In the delegate meeting, some participants saw this as damaging and as breaching the action consensus, while others framed it as "non-*

destructive sabotage". Also, the police and mining security had expressed their concerns about the barriers.. A discussion ensued on how the obstruction and barricades might escalate the response of the police and security. Some activists were willing to take this on, while others did not trust the police and perceived it as a maneuver to create conflict between activists.

We analyzed this friction, and ample similar ones from our observational data, as eruptions of an underlying conflict between *civil* and *uncivil scenes* of action, in which participants differed in their perceptions of *"what is going on",* and *"what is appropriate behavior in this setting"*.

D'Alisa, Demaria, and Cattaneo (2013) describe "uncivil actors" as making radical demands and refusing to behave as hegemonic "good citizens", in accordance with government expectations of them. Kaulingfreks (2015, p. 188) defined "the uncivil" as the negation of civil behavior. She pointed to behavior that would not fit into the social structures of society or reflect its approved moral codes. Both definitions entail moral and social elements and point to the uncivil as that which breaches norms of civility. These norms regulate conventional liberal democratic rule through determining what is seen as legitimate and appropriate behavior. Kaulingfreks also connected the idea of the uncivil with "unruly" or "ungovernable" behavior. By disrupting mainstream codes of appropriateness, uncivil acts contest these norms of civility and their respective frameworks. They can do this, for example, through civil disobedience and direct action or rioting. The uncivil thus carries alternative imaginaries and takes an antagonistic stance toward the general legitimacy of coercive State institutions such as the police.[g] Both Kaulingfreks and D'Alisa et al. emphasize the importance of the uncivil to contest and create space for politicization through disturbing the political or hegemonic order. We propose to supplement this conceptualization with the help of the performative lens of the civic action approach and study uncivil *scenes* rather than *actors*. As such we can see how the politics of legitimacy are enacted differently in these scenes.

In our case study, the civil and uncivil scenes usually came into conflict around the question of the legitimacy of the State and the police. In more civil scenes, participants put relatively more trust in the police behaving in a decent manner, and they aimed for public approval. Participants depicted mainstream norms of civility as mainly revolving around not appearing militant, not damaging property and overly escalating the tensions with police and workers. In these more civil scenes, the action consensus was interpreted as ruling out the Tower occupation or using more than human bodies to create blockades. In an informal conversation during the return bus ride, Theresa – an international participant who works as a campaigner for an environmental NGO – expressed her thoughts, reflecting a very "civil" map:

> *Police at the "Schwarze Pumpe" power plant intervened, making arrests and using pepper spray when a big group of activists entered the facilities. Some participants responded with anti-police slogans, something Theresa strongly rejected. "The German police works quite well, we should be respectful. If the police don't do what they are supposed to do, we would live in anarchy [in chaos]."*

In contrast to this, participants in more uncivil scenes often took an unyielding stance. They would praise the empowering effects of disobedience and refused to take the standpoint of the police into account. More generally, they would critically approach both dominant civil norms and the State apparatus. During the journey from the camp to the blockade, a German speaking affinity group in the Finger expressed this with a bold slogan: *"Staat, Kapitaal, Scheisse!"* (State, Capital, Shit!).

The assumptions about "good and appropriate action" differ in each scene and push the politics of legitimacy in different directions. We can contrast uncivil imaginaries of ungovernable resistance with the civil scene norms of calm, open and creative civil disobedience, which is intended to appear as legitimate to a general audience and carried out by worthy citizens. We

observed both scenes being played out simultaneously in a discussion between three activists during the construction of the blockade monument:

> *A female activist wearing a black hoodie goes over to a male buddy pair who are building something on the tracks resembling a deer made of metal and branches. She wants to spread their construction material around so the miners have more work – and thus higher costs. The buddies point to the group compromise [decision] for the art blockade that was made in a delegate meeting. They argue that it's supposed to be creative because of the image [it will present] to the outside world. She tells them "Yeah, but we want to piss them off," and leaves without the construction material.*

How the participants understood good strategy differed between the civil and uncivil scenes because of their respective politics of legitimacy: each scene weighed the internal and external stakeholders' norms of appropriateness differently. While participants in uncivil scenes clearly contested dominant norms of "good citizenship" in the hope of politicizing them, participants in civil scenes were more willing to take them into account in order to appear legitimate.

Although both civil and uncivil scenes occurred, the dominant CA scene style functioned as a pragmatic hybrid between them. While civil elements served to appear legitimate towards a general imagined audience embracing mainstream civil norms, the uncivil elements served the purpose of politicizing through the disruption of business as usual. In CA scenes, civil norms such as creativity and openness seemed acceptable, although individuals also rendered themselves unrecognizable by wearing dust masks and white boiler suits. They dressed up and organized to make themselves less able to be controlled by the police, but simultaneously openly announced their action. They had their own spokesperson who communicated with the police, and they ruled out escalation and destruction beforehand.

As D'Alisa and colleagues (2013) and Kaulingfreks (2015) emphasize, combining civil and uncivil elements can create a potent coalition. At EG, the hybridity of the CA style shaped common ground for contestation and being difficult to control, while legitimizing contestation through its civil appearance. Thus, the politics of legitimacy were shaped through the complex interaction between internal and external legitimacy claims. After the action, Frank a left-wing party militant, summarized the result of this interplay. When being asked which feeling he takes home from EG, he answers to have gained confidence from the action. "*That activists do radical stuff, isn't that new, but now a lot of 'ordinary' people joined."*

One can derive the dominant front stage character of the CA style from the responses provoked by particular civil or uncivil scenes that did not fit into CA's strategic framework. They were either met with open resistance, or were tolerated through "compartmentalization", which meant they happened backstage in less visible settings (Eliasoph & Lichterman, 2003, p. 772). In addition to the mass civil disobedience action, a legal demonstration was also organized for people unable or unwilling to take the legal risk. However this civil action scene was far less prominent in media reports. Moreover, nuanced comments on the role of the police, or appraisal of some their interventions, were only observed in backstage settings such as interviews or informal talks. When participants in civil scenes made critical remarks about the dominant CA style, their claims were met with resistance. For example, a criticism of the blockade monument by German delegate who considered it too radical and militant was quickly ridiculed and resisted by other delegates who had a more positive interpretation of the interventions. They claimed that "It's not a blockade, it's a collection of their [the mining company] trash," and "Occupying a railroad for two days, that's radical."

[***insert Table 2 about here***]

In contrast, an uncivil scene at the railroad tracks did not receive this treatment because it took place backstage and did not threaten the action's legitimacy with respect to the general audience.

> *The last 300 occupiers leave the railroad heading toward the action camp in a demonstration, making a last show of force. At the rear of the demonstration, some groups gather, seemingly spontaneously, and drag scrap concrete, old sleepers and dead trees onto the tracks covering a few hundred meters, in order to further delay the lignite transport.*

The participants in this uncivil scene did not engage in open consensus decision-making beforehand, and had they done so, a lively discussion would no doubt have ensued. Nevertheless, this uncivil scene seemed to be largely tolerated because, from the CA perspective, it did not threaten internal group bonds, or EG's broader strategic goals due to its invisibility to the general audience.

By negotiating a common ground for social interaction, in which participants hope to politicize the public understanding of lignite mining, the CA style shaped the politics of legitimacy at Ende Gelände. Holding a coalition together through diverse interpretations of what constitutes "good participation" and "good strategy", it is through the embedding and hybridization of these differences within a unity-in-diversity approach that civic actors could engage collectively for the contemporary common good of climate justice.

Discussion and conclusion

Civil society organizations should not be studied as homogeneous entities under the unifying logic of the civil sphere. Rather, the civil sphere should be seen as an arena where heterogeneous actors compete for legitimacy in their respective contexts, both in and between CSOs. We studied these politics of legitimacy at Ende Gelände (EG), a highly visible European mass

action network involved in civil disobedience for climate justice. Taking a performative approach (Lichterman & Eliasoph, 2014), our study revealed two scene styles of civic action that shaped the politics of legitimacy both among the participants and in their external relations.

Based on our in-depth analysis of participants' assumptions about what is going on and what is appropriate conduct in a specific setting, we conceptualized the dominant scene style as *civil anarchizing* (CA). This scene style acted as a strategic framework providing common ground for interaction. The CA map, depicting external relations, emphasized socio-ecological conflict and societal transformation and also took into account a general civic audience. In relation to each other, participants in CA scenes highlighted their "unity-in-diversity," celebrating differences as long as they did not threaten the common strategic ground provided by pre-constructed frameworks such as the action consensus.

A second, subordinate scene style called *personalized politics* (Lichterman & Eliasoph, 2014, p. 846) also became apparent. This style highlights participants' personalized bonds and their self-expression and self-development. While the presence of the two scene styles generated tensions due to diverging expectations, generally the CA style succeeded in overcoming these by embedding personalized politics in the CA strategic framework. A second tension between civil and uncivil scenes, concerning competing understandings of "the good citizen", was dealt with in similar fashion through the construction of a tension-containing hybrid strategic framework.

Through the CA scene style, EG aimed to politicize the public understanding of sustainability by contesting vested interests, dominant norms of civility and hegemonic visions on the common good (D'Alisa et al., 2013; Kenis & Mathijs, 2014; Mouffe, 1992; Rasmussen & Brown, 2002). It did so by bringing the climate justice movement in conflict with lignite mining, emphasizing the latter's unsustainability and occupying its infrastructure. EG undertook a

radical critique of fossil-fuel-based capitalism, proposing a just transformation toward an egalitarian climate neutral society.

The CA style provided participants with a common ground to politicize their activities by enabling their coordination in a specific way. We believe that the emphasis of the CA style on legitimizing action before a general civil audience, without giving up the power to contest, constitutes a major factor in EG's potential to politicize. The strategic synthesis of civil and uncivil elements in the CA style was central in this dynamic of politicizing and legitimizing. More civil elements, such as participants' calm and non-destructive behavior served to avoid their marginalization and to legitimize their actions as those of worthy citizens. Nevertheless, by disobeying police orders and illegally blocking the lignite mining infrastructure, EG participants refused to be governed in the manner of mainstream good citizens. These uncivil elements enabled contestation of lignite mining while inhibiting the co-optation of the action. Through the synthesis of civil and uncivil elements, the CA style had a hybrid nature. In one of the respondents' words, this made EG appear as "radical, but not marginal".

In addition to the CA style being a *means* for a public politics of legitimacy, it was also the *outcome of negotiations* by participants about what they perceived as legitimate. In these intra-organizational struggles for legitimacy, participants negotiate between various positions on what the general audience might judge as legitimate, as well as their own different legitimacy judgments (Suddaby et al., 2017). This also led them to discuss how these "internal" and "external" legitimacy judgments should be balanced against each other. In these complex negotiations**,** the CA style became a common ground shaped by and shaping participants' perceptions of legitimate conduct. For example the construction of the action consensus - a regulatory framework - involved intense negotiations, it structured participants' behavior but was also subject to re-negotiation. In these interpretative battles, tensions occurred between autonomy and coordination, self-expression and strategizing, and civil and uncivil elements.

Participants also differed in their assumptions about how much coordination was desirable, the extent to which the assumed public should be taken into account and how ungovernable a good action should be. Civil, uncivil and personalized politics scenes occurred and contested the internal legitimacy of the CA style. Nevertheless these were subordinate scenes while the CA style remained the dominant pattern. As such it provided a shared basis for coordinating civic action, defining the terms of intra-organizational debates and embedding differences within a common strategy.

In emphasizing a common strategic framework that has a diversity of participation modes embedded in it, the CA style differs from the personalized politics style described by Lichterman and Eliasoph (2014). Although both styles share some dimensions, they differ in how they shape the politics of legitimacy. The CA style emphasizes external legitimacy in hybrid civil-uncivil fashion, while social interaction in the PP style is determined more by internal legitimacy demands, emphasizing self-expression and personal autonomy. This sheds a different light on Lichterman and Eliasoph's tentative hypotheses on outcomes of scene styles. They state that the PP style might provide "less fertile ground for mounting and sustaining collective political action" (2014, p. 849). Due to the individual-centered bonds being combined with abstract principles, PP-scenes might face difficulties maintaining a cohesive and goal-oriented campaign. However, we question whether this hypothesis on the PP style, is also valid for the CA style and propose a counter hypothesis: CA might be a more viable style for public politicization due to its emphasizing a collective strategy. In comparison to PP, CA seems to have a greater goal specificity. By compartmentalizing PP and CA scenes, the CA style at Ende Gelände embedded the personalized bonds of PP into an overarching strategic framework. As the CA style is a negotiated hybrid that aims at obtaining public legitimacy while employing strategic contestation, we argue that its strategic focus might counter or even override the negative effect of personalized bonds on campaign cohesiveness. More comparative research

on these styles and their outcomes is necessary to test this hypothesis of differing outcomes of PP and CA.

Based on our findings, we argue that the civic action approach allows us to grasp the organizational and interactional mechanisms behind the negotiation and strategic enactment of legitimacy with respect to internal and external stakeholders. The theoretical background of symbolic interactionism enables us to see how styles shape legitimacy judgments and the resulting processes of legitimization (Suddaby et al., 2017). While styles shape common ground for social interaction, they also function as filters that shape participants' perceptions of appropriateness – and thus shape legitimacy judgments. Through stylized social interaction, patterns also emerge in participants' maps and bonds concerning what is appropriate. Through this back and forth movement, styles construct, and are constructed by, social interaction. In addition, by providing a shared basis for interaction, styles form cultural-organizational means for processes of legitimization in relation to both internal and external stakeholders.

Our analysis included organizational forms, such as the affinity group, the Finger and the action consensus, as the vehicles and the results of collective sense-making. Seeing organizational structures as "means to act" suggests they can also be studied as part of civic action styles. They both direct social practices, and are enacted and reinterpreted through social practices. As such they also seem to be relevant to the politics of legitimacy.

To conclude, we wish to point out a number of limitations of our study and avenues for further research. First, this study produced insights on civic action patterns in Ende Gelände, a flagship action of the wider "blockadia" and climate justice movements. Future research could develop a comparative approach over multiple cases. It could include critical cases in which the CA style might presumably be found, studies in different contexts or differing scene styles within the same field. Second, the relatively brief time frame of this research calls for more longitudinal research focused on processes of legitimation, and the evolution, distribution and

acceptance of scene styles. Finally, given the enormous challenges posed by climate change, social scientists might become more actively involved in socio-ecological change and further reflect upon the reinforcement of environmental justice, activism and academia.

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[a] EG's tactics have also been employed in other countries, for example by *Code Rood* in the Netherlands, and *Limity jsme my* in the Czech Republic. Although there are contextual differences and small innovations, the main organizational structures and cultural patterns seem not to be restricted to the event we observed.

[b] This was not always possible in mass settings, where the researcher could not make himself known to all.

[c] This affinity could be based on various grounds, but was usually shaped by how people wanted to participate in the action (e.g., take greater or lesser risks).

[d] Participants' speech norms and their temporality emerged as less important in our analysis and will not be dealt with here.

[e] Other scene styles of civic action include: "nowtopianism", community of interest, community of identity, social critics and club-style volunteers (for an in-depth discussion: see Lichterman and Eliasoph (2014, pp. 844-847)).

[f] McDonald (2002) places this emphasis on the self within the emergence of networked social movements.

[g] Looking further into the Gramscian framework of the integral State underlying the conceptualization of the uncivil by D'Alisa et al. (2013), we can examine the role of the State and civil society to understand how the uncivil contests both. The civil society arena and State can be interpreted as two sides of the same coin (D'Alisa & Kallis, 2016). In this view, States possess coercive power while civil society can produce hegemonic ideology through its normative power. As such, the winners in the civic arena can create consent with dominant

interests that are also pursued through the State. Uncivil scenes contest this hegemonic lock-in.

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Figure

Figure 1.



a) b) c)

Figure 1: Main organizational structures of Ende Gelände showing: a) Affinity group consisting of same colored buddy pairs, b) a simplified Finger, built up of four affinity groups (blue) including the nail (orange), c) a delegates meeting (orange) with a facilitator (green) and delegates (orange) coming from different affinity groups (blue).

Table

Table 1: Civic action scene styles and politics of legitimacy at Ende Gelände.

	Dominant scene style **Civil anarchizing**	**Subordinate scene style** **Personalized politics**
MAP		
Conflict	Calm and principled conflict.	Conflict as self-expression and self-development.
Audience	General audience.	General audience.
Transformation	Systemic transformation through coordinated and goal oriented campaigns.	Systemic transformation through expression and development of autonomous selves.
GROUP BONDS		
Unity or diversity	Strategic unity, embedding relative diversity.	Harmonious diversity of autonomous selves.
POLITICS OF LEGITIMACY	Strategic frameworks aim for public legitimacy, balancing its different interpretations and internal calls for autonomy.	Negotiating internal differences.

Adapted from Lichterman and Eliasoph (2014, pp 842-843).

Table 2: Civil and uncivil scenes at Ende Gelände 2016.

	Dominant scene style **Civil anarchizing**	**Subordinate scene** **Civil**	**Subordinate scene** **Uncivil**
MAP			
Conflict	Calm and principled conflict, including police and State.	Open and calm conflict, not including police and State.	Determined conflict, including police and State.
Audience	Appeal to broad audience as radical but legitimate.	Appeal to broad audience as acceptable and legitimate.	Appeal to broad audience as ungovernable and determined resistance.
Transformation	Systemic transformation through civil disobedience.	Unsystemic transformation through calm civil disobedience.	Systemic transformation through uncivil disobedience.
POLITICS OF LEGITIMACY	Aim for legitimate politicizing by partly accepting and rejecting dominant norms of citizenship.	Aim for public legitimation by accepting dominant norms of citizenship.	Aim to politicize by rejecting dominant norms of "good citizenship".

Adapted from Lichterman and Eliasoph (2014, pp. 842-843).