Acknowledgments

We acknowledge the Wurundjeri people of the Kulin Nation – the traditional custodians of the land on which this Conference is held – and pay our respects to owners and Elders, both past and present.

Conference organizing committee

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Editor: Dr. Sam Butchart, School of Philosophy and Bioethics, Monash University.

Cover Image: The image on the front cover is *Jacob's Ladder*, by local Melbourne artist Lucy Lincoln. (lucy.lincoln@bigpond.com). You can see more of Lucy's work here: http://www.thepicturebox.com.au. (Look under "Gallery", then "Featured Artists – photo media").

DISCLAIMER

While we have attempted to ensure accuracy in the contents of this booklet, the information is subject to change. Besides, most of it has been provided by or written up by philosophers. Accordingly, the University of Melbourne, La Trobe University and Monash University, and any other official body that might thought to be in any way associated with this publication will take no responsibility at all for any loss, damage, frustration or inconvenience resulting from believing anything included here. And that goes for the conference committee too.

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THE UNIVERSITIES

The 2009 AAP Conference has been jointly organized by the three philosophy departments of Monash University, University of Melborune and La Trobe University.

La Trobe Univeristy

School of Communication, Arts and Critical Inquiry

La Trobe University opened its doors to students in 1967, with Brian Ellis as its foundation professor of philosophy. Many of Australia's leading philosophers either studied at La Trobe or taught there for part of their careers, including J. J. C. Smart, John Bigelow, Robert Pargetter and Peter Singer. Frank Jackson took his Ph.D. at La Trobe, taught there for a while and has recently returned as research professor. The Australasian Journal of Philosophy was edited at La Trobe for many years. Under its present chair, Andrew Brennan, philosophy at La Trobe is pluralist, with staff specializing in both analytic and continental philosophy.

University of Melbourne

School of Philosophy, Anthropology and Social Inquiry

Located centrally in cosmopolitan Carlton, the Department of Philosophy at the University of Melbourne is an old one, with a wealth of history and achievements. Philosophy was taught at the University from its foundation in 1853, and the Boyce Gibson Chair of Philosophy, founded in 1886, is, in fact, the oldest chair of philosophy in Australia. Two of its current research strengths are in Applied Ethics (a major interest of Tony Coady, who succeeded Goddard in the Chair) and Philosophical Logic (a major interest of the present Chair, Graham Priest).

Monash University

School of Philosophy and Bioethics

Deep in the South Eastern suburbs of Melbourne, the Monash philosophy department commands a view from the Dandenong ranges to Port Philip Bay from the ninth floor of the modernist Menzies Building. Monash was founded in 1961 and philosophy was there from the beginning. Hector Monro and Camo Jackson were foundation professors, followed by Peter Singer, Frank Jackson, Robert Pargetter and John Bigelow. Current research and teaching strengths at Monash are logic and metaphysics, applied ethics, bioethics, moral philosophy and the history of philosophy.

MAPS

The University of Melbourne

Parkville, Melbourne, Victoria, 3001.

Enter from Grattan Street, Swanston Street or Royal Parade.

Telehone: (+61 03) 8344 4000   After hours emergencies: (+61 03) 8344 6666

Ormond College

Conference buildings located in this region. See next map.

University of Melbourne Campus

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INVITED SPEAKERS

Simon Blackburn

Professor of Philosophy, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Cambridge

Distinguished Research Professor in Philosophy, Department of Philosophy University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

Reason and Representation

Abstract: We talk about reasons to signal what is good about actual or potential movements of the mind. One standard of goodness is that the movement will either put us or keep is in touch with how the world is. But different standards are possible, and even the aim of keeping in touch with the way of the world has different elements, giving rise to different demands and different standards.

SIMON BLACKBURN (Honorary LLD, University of Sunderland; Ph.D., Cambridge) works in philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, and philosophy of psychology. He is the author of many books, including, *Spreading the Word* (1984); *Essay in Quasi-Realism* (1993); *The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy* (1994); *Ruling Passions* (1998); *Truth* (Co-edited with Keith Simmons, 1999); *Think* (1999); *Being Good* (2001); *Lust* (2004); *Truth: A Guide for the Perplexed* (2005); *Plato's Republic* (2006); and most recently, *How to Read Hume* (2008). He has written extensively on metaethics, philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, metaphysics, and the history of philosophy. Some publications include: "The Individual Strikes Back," *Synthese* (1984); "Error and the Phenomenology of Value," *in Ethics and Objectivity*, ed. by Honderich (1985); "Truth, Realism and the Regulation of Theory," *Midwest Studies* (1988); "How To Be An Ethical Anti-Realist," *Midwest Studies* (1988); "Values and Attitudes," *Ethics* (1988); "Hume and Thick Connections," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* (1990); "Just Causes," *Philosophical Studies* (1991); "Hume on the Mezzanine Level," *Hume Studies* (1993); "Circles, Finks, Smells and Biconditionals," *Philosophical Perspectives* (1993); "Practical Tortoise Raising," *Mind* (1995); "Wittgenstein, Wright, Rorty and Minimalism," *Mind* (1998); "Is Objective Moral Justification Possible on a Quasi-realist Foundation," *Inquiry* (1999); "Normativity a la Mode," *Journal of Ethics* (2001); "Realism: Deconstructing the Debate," *Ratio* (2002); "Fiction and Conviction," *Philosophical Papers* (2003); "Knowledge, Truth, and Reliability," *Studies in the Philosophy of Logic and Knowledge* (2004); "Quasi-Realism No Fictionalism" in *Fictionalism in Metaphysics*, Calderon, ed. by Eli (2005); "Antirealist Expressivism and Quasi-Realism" in *The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory*, ed. by Copp (2006); "Must We Weep for Sentimentalism?" in *Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory*, ed. by Dreier (2006); "The Semantics of Non-Factualism, Non-Cognitivism, and Quasi-Realism" in *The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Language*, ed. by Devitt (2006). He enjoys "mountaineering (declining with age), sailing (sprightly), black-and-white photography (becoming overtaken by digital), reading (constant), conversation (improving)."

Ned Block

Silver Professor of Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience, Departments of Philosophy and Psychology, and Center for Neuroscience, New York University

The empirical case against higher order approaches to consciousness

Abstract: The debate about higher order approaches to consciousness has been mainly focused on a priori considerations, but actually empirical evidence is highly relevant. This talk will consider some of the evidence.

NED BLOCK (Ph.D., Harvard) works in philosophy of mind and foundations of neuroscience and cognitive science and is currently writing a book on consciousness. He arrived at NYU in 1996 from MIT where he was Chair of the Philosophy Program. He is a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, has been a Guggenheim Fellow, a Senior Fellow of the Center for the Study of Language and Information, a Sloan Foundation Fellow, a faculty member at two National Endowment for the Humanities Summer Institutes and two Summer Seminars, the recipient of fellowships from the National Endowment for the Humanities the American

Council of Learned Societies and the National Science Foundation; and a recipient of the Robert A. Muh Alumni Award in Humanities and Social Science from MIT. He is a past president of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology, a past Chair of the MIT Press Cognitive Science Board, and past President of the Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness. *The Philosophers' Annual* selected his papers as one of the "ten best" in 1983, 1990, 1995 and 2002. He is co-editor of *The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates* (MIT Press, 1997). The first of two volumes of his collected papers, *Functionalism, Consciousness and Representation,* MIT Press came out in May, 2007. There was a workshop "Themes from Ned Block" at the Australian National University in 2003. In 2008-2009, he will be Distinguished Visiting Professor, University of Hong Kong; Townsend Visitor, University of California at Berkeley; Hilgard Visiting Professor, Stanford; Smart Lecturer at Australian National University; Efron Symposiast, Pomona College; and Distinguished Visitor, University of Warwick. In 2010, he will give the Josiah Royce Lectures at Brown University, the Royal Institute of Philosophy Annual Lecture, and he will give lectures to the Japanese Neuroscience Society and the National Institute for Physiological Sciences in Okazaki.

Kit Fine

Silver Professor of Philosophy and Mathematics, Department of Philosophy, New York University

Some Puzzles Concerning Ground

Abstract: I will discuss some puzzles that arise from considering the ground for logical truths and will relate them to the semantic paradoxes.

KIT FINE (B.A., Oxford; Ph.D., Warwick) specializes in Metaphysics, Logic, and Philosophy of Language. He is a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and a corresponding fellow of the British Academy. He has held fellowships from the Guggenheim Foundation and the American Council of Learned Societies and is a former editor of the *Journal of Symbolic Logic*. His books include: *Worlds, Times and Selves* (Duckworth, 1977) with A. N. Prior; *Reasoning with Arbitrary Objects* (Blackwell, 1985); *The Limits of Abstraction* (OUP, 2002); *Modality and Tense: Philosophical Papers* (OUP, 2005); *Semantic Relationism* (Blackwell, 2007). In addition to his primary areas of research, he has written papers in ancient philosophy, linguistics, computer science, and economic theory.

Rae Langton

Professor, Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, MIT

Beyond Belief: Pragmatics in Hate Speech and Pornography

Abstract: Hate speech and pornography apparently count as speech. Philosophers interested in speech say our pragmatic framework should connect speech with its purposes, a paradigm purpose being the communication of belief, via 'conversational score' (Lewis) or 'common ground' (Stalnaker), exploiting mechanisms of accommodation. How does this paradigm fit hate speech and pornography? Here, attitudes other than belief are salient: for example, desire, and hate. Can pragmatics shed light on what's going on? Perhaps. I compare a pragmatic approach to other models, including a speech act model, a conditioning model, and an imitation model. I offer an exploratory proposal, extending the accommodation of 'common ground' to take in such attitudes as desire and hate. This is part of an on-going effort to bring philosophy and political theory into closer conversation about what speech does, and why it matters.

RAE LANGTON (Ph.D., Princeton) joined MIT in the Fall of 2004. Her areas of interest include the history of philosophy, ethics, political philosophy, metaphysics, and feminist philosophy. Her book on Kant's metaphysics and epistemology, entitled *Kantian Humility: Our Ignorance of Things in Themselves*, was published by Oxford in July 1998. Her most recent book, *Sexual Solipsism: Philosophical Essays on Pornography and Objectification*, was published by Oxford in January 2009. Born and raised in India, Prof. Langton studied at Sydney University and Princeton University, then taught at Monash

University, in Melbourne, 1990 to 1996; was a Fellow in the Philosophy Program, Research School of Social Sciences, the Australian National University, 1997-98; taught at Sheffield University 1998 to 1999; and the University of Edinburgh 1999 to 2004, where she was Professor of Moral Philosophy, a position for which David Hume was turned down in 1755. (Fortunately for her, he was no longer competing in 1999.) She was the first woman to be appointed Professor of Philosophy in Edinburgh, and indeed in Scotland. She has been a visitor and guest speaker on many occasions at universities in Australia, Canada, the USA, the UK, Ireland, New Zealand, Norway, Germany, India and Switzerland.

Jeff Malpas

Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, University of Tasmania

What is Common to All: Davidson on Agreement and Understanding

Abstract: The essentially social nature of language, and not only of language, but also of thought, is one of the most basic ideas in the philosophy of Donald Davidson. It has not always appeared clear to all readers of Davidson's work, however, just how this claim regarding the social nature of language and thought should be understood. One of the reasons for this is that Davidson also rejected what is probably the most widely accepted account of the nature of the sociality that might be thought to be at issue here, namely, the idea that sociality is based in *convention*—in a set of pre-existing, shared rules. In "A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs," Davidson even goes so far as to suggest that "there is no such thing as a language"—at least not if by "language" one means a clearly defined, shared system of syntactic and semantic rules that exists prior to any particular linguistic encounter. In "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme', Davidson had already presented an argument to a similar, if not identical, conclusion, through his undermining of the idea that there could be radical discontinuities in understanding of the sort

proposed by various forms of radical relativism. In rejecting the idea of a common conceptual scheme as the basis for communication or understanding, Davidson also rejects the particular idea of subjectivity with which that idea is associated: the idea of an inner mental realm that is set apart from the world, "a concept of the mind with its private states and objects." One simple way of putting the underlying point that is at issue here is to say that the notion that Davidson argues against in many of his later essays is the idea that *understanding*, whether or others or of the world, cannot depend on the existence of any form of pre-existing, determinate, "internalised" *agreement*. While Davidson does not deny the need for agreement *of some sort*, the agreement that he takes to be foundational to the possibility of understanding, and that also underpins the social nature of language and thought, cannot be specified in terms of any shared set of propositions, rules, concepts, behavioural dispositions, practices or "forms of life." Instead, it is an agreement that consists in our dynamic, active engagement with a set of worldly events and entities.

JEFF MALPAS (Ph.D., ANU) works in philosophy of place, Heidegger, and Davidson. He is a ARC professorial fellow (2007-2011), and a Humboldt Research Fellow at Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München since 1999. His books include: *Donald Davidson and the Mirror of Meaning* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); *Place and Experience: A Philosophical Topography* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); *Heidegger's Topology: Being, Place, World* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2007). His current research is focused around a number of projects of which the most important are the following. (1) Making Ethics Work: A New Model for Business and Professional Ethics (with Andrew Brennan, LaTrobe; funded by ARC Discovery Grant), which develops a new conceptual framework for understanding ethics in business, management and the professions, one that arises out of and is attentive to actual business, managerial and professional practice. (2) Ethos and Topos: A Philosophical Investigation of the Ethics and Politics of Place (funded by ARC Australian Professorial fellowship), which adopts an interdisciplinary approach within the framework of philosophical analysis, and aims to investigate the possibility of a viable ethics and politics of place that is not linked to violence and exclusion as often

perceived. (3) Consequences of Hermeneutics (collaborative book project with Santiago Zabala) explores the nature and significance of the hermeneutic tradition for contemporary, and for the future of philosophy, uncovering its roots in the eighteenth and nineteenth century, and its burgeoning in the twentieth, but also arguing for the sui generis character of hermeneutics, and the possibility that it may offer a new way forward for philosophy into the twenty-first century. (4) Engaging Davidson – a volume exploring Davidson's work in relation to a broad range of issues and traditions, connecting Davidson's thinking with figures in the history of philosophy and with problems in both analytic and continental thought. Other projects currently underway include a volume of essays on cosmopolitanism in contemporary Australia (with Keith Jacobs), a volume of essays on the problem of landscape, and a volume on human suffering with Norelle Lickiss.

Peter Menzies

Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, Macquarie University

Presidential Address

Mental Causation in a Physical World

Abstract: Not much of commonsense psychology makes sense if mental states are not causally efficacious. Physicalists about the mind who claim that mental states at the very least supervene or depend on physical states of the brain strive hard to vindicate mental causation. However, a simple argument seems to show that physicalists must repudiate mental causation. The argument is related to Jaegwon Kim's famous Exclusion Argument, though it targets physicalism of both the reductive and non-reductive varieties. Like Kim's argument, the new argument relies on a crucial exclusion assumption about causation: mental states cannot make a difference to behaviour when they supervene on physical states that are already causally sufficient to bring about the behaviour. This paper explores the extent to which this exclusion assumption is supported by different theories of causation. It argues that while a simple counterfactual theory of causation falsifies the assumption in its original form, it actually verifies a more plausible, reformulated version of the assumption under special conditions. The paper draws out some surprising consequences of this result. It argues that far from supporting the new exclusion argument against physicalism, the result actually vindicates the non-reductivist physicalist's claim that the mental is causally autonomous from the physical.

PETER MENZIES (B.A. (Hons), ANU; M.Phil., St Andrews University; Ph.D., Stanford University) works in metaphysics, philosophy of science, and philosophy of mind. He is co-editor with Helen Beebee and Christopher Hitchcock of the forthcoming "Oxford Handbook of Causation". His current research interests include metaphysics (causation, free will, mental causation), philosophy of science (probability theory, Bayesian networks and structural equations modelling, scientific models and idealization, reductionism), philosophy of mind (levels of explanation, status of folk psychology, consciousness), epistemology (rationality, realism and anti-realism), and the philosophy of logic (modality, conditionals). Before arriving at Macquarie in 1995, he was Tutor in the Department of Traditional & Modern Philosophy, University of Sydney, an ARC Research Fellow at the University of Sydney, and a Research Fellow at the Research School of Social Sciences at the Australian National University. He is an Associate Editor of the *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*. He was elected as a Fellow of the Australian Academy of Humanities in 2007, and as the President of the Australasian Association of Philosophy for 2008-2009.

SYMPOSIA

Symposium on Foundations of Morality

Wednesday 8th July, 2.00 – 3.25 pm, Economics & Commerce (148), Wood Lecture Theatre.

Prof. Simon Blackburn

Majesty of Reason

There has been a lot of talk about reason and rationalism in the recent theory of ethics. Many writers envisage a kind of wholesale takeover of ethics by something different: the theory of reason. In this paper I argue that this is wholly chimerical, and that talk of reason and rationality gives us at best a number of notational variants of various kinds of endorsements we feel inclined to make. Writers in the firing line include Williams, Quinn, Parfit, and Wallace.

Prof. Jeff Malpas

Finding a ground for ethics in the everyday (together with a modest conception of reason)

Dick Rorty has claimed that the meaning of basic normative terms such as 'good', 'just' and 'true' is really a problem only for philosophers – that we all know what these terms are well enough for the uses they serve, and do not need philosophers to explain their meanings. I think that there is something to Rorty's point here, although it may be that it is not quite the same as Rorty intended. Rather than begin with the way in which the question of a possible foundation for ethics might be configured within current discussions, I want to begin from a perspective that seems suggested by Rorty's comment, namely, that ethics already carries its own 'foundation' with it, and that it is a foundation given in ethical practice. The approach that I will sketch, and to some extent defend, can be viewed as an instance of a broadly 'hermeneutical' style of thinking that looks always to find the ground of our practices in the practices themselves (a move

that is suggested by, as well as expressed in, the idea of hermeneutical circularity). It seems likely that this will involve some rethinking of what ethics itself might be – perhaps a more modest conception of ethics, in some respects, but also a more robust conception in others. However, since such a hermeneutical approach (which can be seen to be evident, not just in Gadamer, but also in Socrates) itself appears to draw on a certain conception of reason, I will also suggest that the rethinking of ethics at issue here is not such as to remove ethics from the 'space' of reason, although it does involve a view of reason that is similarly 'modest' in character.

Symposium on skilled action

Tuesday 7th July, 2.00 – 3.25 pm, Old Arts Lecture Theatre B.

Prof John Sutton, Macquarie University

Skilled movement and embodied cognition: expertise in sport, music, & dance

Theorists of embodied and collaborative cognition often refer in abstract terms to the flowing interactive online dynamics involved in jazz improvisation, fast team sports, or animated conversation. But they rarely draw in detail either on experts' own accounts of their experiences, skills, and history, or on the heterogeneous but rich array of empirical studies of sport, music, or dance in diverse fields from cognitive psychology to neuroanthropology. This paper seeks to apply such a broader set of sources and methods to the specific problem of understanding how experts can (sometimes, fallibly) influence their own grooved skilled performances, an applied version of the mind-body problem. Many phenomenologists, cognitive scientists, and expert practitioners alike reject the intellectualist idea that skilled movement is governed by rich internalized motor programs which specify actions in advance. But many over-react by evacuating skilled action of all cognition, awareness, and control: I take Mike Wheeler's recent embodied-cognition-friendly reinterpretation of Dreyfus to exemplify this move. I discuss three empirical research programmes — in sport, music, and dance — which might seem to support the Dreyfus-Wheeler view that skilled movement is 'mindless': I argue that in fact each suggests a more

complex interplay in which flowing real-time action remains open to certain forms of awareness and control. Both phenomenology and cognitive science offer reasons to resist the idea that skilled action is sealed off from cognition.

Dr Wayne Christensen, Macquarie University

Agency in skilled action

Recently Pacherie (2005, 2008) has proposed a 3-level framework for understanding the intentionality of action control. Pacherie's account distinguishes distal intentions from proximal and motor intentions, and argues that there is a control cascade from distal to proximal to motor intentions. Here I set out to extend Pacherie's framework by clarifying the nature of motor intentions, the nature of relations between proximal and motor intentions, and the conditions under which higher intentional control can be effective. Common views of skilled performance see higher intentional control as only impairing action control. That is, skilled action is only skilled to the extent that it is fully automated. I argue to the contrary that there are conditions in which higher intentional control can make a positive contribution to skilled action, and I distinguish several forms of agentic control that may occur in skilled action. Since much human action involves skill these are important cases for understanding the nature and scope of agentic control.

2009 Graduate Career Workshop

Publishing, Perishing and Procrastinating

Tuesday 7th July, 11.00 am – 1.00 pm, Old Arts Lecture Theatre B.

Mark Colyvan (University of Sydney) Helen Beebee (University of Birmingham)

Rachael Briggs (University of Sydney and Griffith University)

Moira Gatens (University of Sydney)

This workshop is now a regular event at the AAP Conference and is devoted to providing information for graduate students and early-career academics on all aspects of academic careers. This year the focus will be on publishing: where to publish, when to publish, what to publish and how to avoid procrastinating. Other topics include: academic CVs, writing a job application, preparing for job interviews, where to find jobs, avoiding the teaching trap, landing grants, collaborative research, and reaching out beyond the academy.

ABSTRACTS

Aesthetics

Dr Luke Russell, University of Sydney

Effortless Cool

The aesthetic virtue of effortless cool is puzzling for two reasons. Firstly, it is not clear how it is possible to be effortlessly cool. If being cool amounts to conforming to a trend or meeting a shifting aesthetic ideal, it seems that the only way to be cool is to have exerted the right kind of effort. Is it the case, then, that effortless cool can never be anything more than a studied pose in which the cool person's effort is artfully concealed? Does a cool person care deeply about conforming with the group or meeting the ideal while pretending not to care? Secondly, it is not clear why it is preferable to be effortlessly cool rather than studiously cool. Why do excessive self-regard and conformism seem to be the hallmarks of pseudo-cool, while effortless cool strikes us as the real thing? In this paper I aim to illuminate these puzzles by comparing effortless cool with varieties of effortlessness that are required by some moral virtues.

Dr. Jenny McMahon, University of Adelaide

Aesthetic Autonomy and the Expression of Freedom: a Pragmatist Reading of Adorno

Aesthetic Autonomy is usually associated with the thesis that there are ontological grounds for excusing the form and content of art from the norms and values that operate in other cultural domains of society. My objective is to discover what entitles one to this notion of aesthetic autonomy or what kind of epistemology it commits one to. Through an examination of relevant aspects of Herbert Marcuse, Theodor Adorno, Jurgen Habbermas and Robert Brandom, and a consideration of contemporary examples of visual art (installation art and street art), I suggest a pragmatist reading of aesthetic autonomy which reconciles it with anti-foundationalism (and the historical materialism of Adorno).

Dr. Mary Buck, University of New England

A Spatial Approach to Hearing Absolute Music

Hearing classical music in the Western diatonic tradition is commonly regarded as a subjective, emotional experience for listeners. Theorists suggest that hearing Western classical music foregrounds our emotions and expectations. Ordinarily, we have emotions concerning an object. In music, the title of a musical work may assist the listener in discerning the object the composer has in mind, such as Smetana's orchestral work, 'Die Moldau'. It is also suggested that the music arouses in the listener memories of past experiences of an emotion. The composer provides groups of tones, themes, and structures that lead the listener to organise and re-organise his perception that becomes familiar to him over the course of the music. Fugues are an example of this method of composition. My philosophical project is focussed upon the experience of hearing 'absolute' music in the Western diatonic tradition. Absolute music is solely instrumental music, without reference to a narrative or drama external to the assembly of tones. Usually there is no title that offers a reference for a listener's experience. As such, without a text or title to relate to, the listener is mistaken if he expects an emotional object in hearing absolute music. We may doubt that an experience of 'absolute' music is a requisite subject for a psychology of emotions and expectations. I will consider an alternative to a psychology of emotion. I affirm that ordering space is a valuable method of perceiving absolute music. I support this approach by showing that an experience of kinematic and geometric orderings of space external to the listener is intrinsic to the musical scale. I suggest that David Marr's study of the spatial parameters of vision in pursuit tracking enhances a spatial theory of musical perception.

Prof. Erik Anderson, Drew University

Sailing the Seas of Cheese

Cheesiness abounds in popular culture. Consider a

few obvious examples: Celine Dion's over the top big-tent Vegas act that sold out nightly for over three years from 2003-7; much of what appears on American Idol, the most popular show on American television; as well as just about anything by Barry Manilow, Pat Boone, Michael Bolton, and Kenny G, just to name a few. Other kinds of examples might include a pandering political speech, a gold chain on a hairy chest, the Rock and Roll McDonald's in Chicago, some Anne Geddes works, many Hallmark greeting cards, special effects in some movies, precious photos of cute little baby tigers wearing hats, and so on and so forth. It would be difficult to understand many aesthetic assessments in popular culture these days without a good grasp of the concepts of cheese, cheesy and cheesiness. Part of the reason is that the high art/low art distinction upon which aesthetic assessments in the modern tradition following Hume and Kant depend is not operative within contemporary popular culture. It would be a bit too strong to assert that there are no sets of "disproportionate pairs" of artworks at all to serve as standards by which to orient our aesthetic assessments. But this is precisely what makes the concept of cheesiness useful, and that is perhaps what explains its ubiquity. Cheesiness is relative, and the conditions of application of the term are subjective in just the right way to make it useful in a sea of relativity. My hope is that by shedding light on the nature of cheesiness, we will, indirectly, shed light on what it is for a work to be good art in contemporary popular culture.

Dr Ron Gallagher, Monash University

The Recognition Moment: The Cognitive Dynamics of Pictorial Recognition

The human visual system can identify the 'spatial envelope' of a scene, whether in a picture or real-life, in less than 100 milliseconds (one-tenth of a second). This is known as the 'gist view'. In this initial recognition moment we roughly categorize what is in view, identify a few objects and start the pictorial interpretation process. The

brain processes which are set in train in this moment are too fast and too complex to examine introspectively but recent breakthroughs in psychophysics and brain imaging technology have enabled researchers to dissect the recognition moment millisecond by millisecond. These techniques are providing insights into the cognitive dynamics which are in play in the first moment of looking at a picture. This recent research into 'gist views' and change-blindness eliminates the possibility that symbolism or resemblance is involved in the initial interpretation process and confirms a number of Flint Schier's hypotheses about the cognitive dynamics of pictorial recognition.

Dr Robert Sinnerbrink, Macquarie University

The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Film? On the Cognitivist-Analytic Turn i

In response to prevailing 'Continental' approaches to film theory, there has been a significant paradigm-shift since the mid 1990s in the philosophy of film. Here one could mention the so-called 'post-theory' movement (championed by David Bordwell and Noël Carroll), the rise of cognitivist film theory (Gregory Currie and Carl Plantinga, for example), and prominence of analytic aesthetics in film philosophy (Carroll, Berys Gaut, Paisley Livingstone, Murray Smith, Malcolm Turvey). Together, this cognitivist-analytic turn has resulted in a powerful research program that now increasingly dominates the theoretical analysis of film. Despite the theoretical interest of these approaches, I shall argue that much recent cognitivist-analytic philosophy of film falls foul of Arthur Danto's famous thesis on the "philosophical disenfranchisement of art". Many film philosophers repeat this philosophical disenfranchisement by arguing that film philosophy's primary task is to theoretically clarify problems of representation, belief, and perception in film; or to explain the reasoning processes underpinning film narrative interpretation; or to highlight the parallels between philosophical argumentation and varieties of cinematic presentation, and so on. By contrast, many recent styles of film-philosophy (Stanley Cavell and Stephen Mulhall) challenge the prevailing cognitivist-analytic paradigm and argue for an aesthetically richer way of thinking about the film-

philosophy relationship. What I shall call "romantic film-philosophy" questions the common tendency to privilege conceptual theorisation over cinematic aesthetics, and proposes that film should be regarded as engaging in a distinctively cinematic kind of thinking. I suggest that this romantic approach to film-philosophy—which takes film to be capable of the aesthetic disclosure of new aspects of experience—provides a salutary way of overcoming the philosophical disenfranchisement of cinema, and opens up a hermeneutically richer and more aesthetically sensitive way of philosophising on film.

Dr Laura D'Olimpio, The University of Western Australia

What Aestheticism is Really About.

Aestheticism denies that the ethical value of an artwork can be taken into consideration when judging the work's overall aesthetic value. Why is this question even of concern? It seems clear that at least sometimes the ethical component of a work of art can impact on its overall (aesthetic) value. The arguments about the aesthetic and ethical evaluation of artworks that are made on definitional and theoretical grounds only make sense when we examine the use and effect of artworks in society as people interact with them and are influenced and affected by these interactions. Some artworks are intended to produce an aesthetic effect and make a moral, social or political point, enhanced by the overall impact of the work. The autonomist, formalist and essentialist all object to such artworks or the use of art in this way as, they claim, the primary purpose of art is the aesthetic. Aestheticism should be viewed as largely a political or social or moral claim itself. Aestheticism seeks to liberate art and artists in order for them to be able to perform such roles (i.e social commentary) without risk of censure or condemnation precisely by arguing that art is only to be judged by its aesthetic element(s). By acknowledging this, we can conclude that ethical evaluations of art are appropriate and necessary when required by the artwork in question.

Applied Ethics

Ms Luara Ferracioli, Australian National University

Justice in Migration: A New Model

My paper focuses on a particular question regarding rules governing the movement of people across territorial borders. (1) Under what conditions should persons acquire a valid claim to exit permanently the states in which they reside? I argue that current rules governing the migration of people ought to be reshaped to facilitate the movement of those persons who are in what I call a "highly distressed" condition, and to ensure that the claims of persons who are in such a condition to enter a new political communities take precedence over claims of people that wish to migrate for other reasons. People are highly distressed when they lack access to minimally adequate opportunities to pursue a good life. I argue that people in a highly distressed condition have a right to exit their former political communities and enter into a second political community that can provide them with more adequate opportunities if the following three conditions are met: (1) Their distress is traceable to the institutional arrangements (or lack thereof) and social norms prevailing in the territories in which they currently reside; (2) Their distress is directly linked to the break up of what might be called the citizen-state relationship (coercion exercised on the individual by the state is now clearly illegitimate); and (3) there is no reasonable likelihood that the situation can be improved significantly in the short or medium term given prevailing social and political conditions.

Assistant Professor Chris Brown, National University of Singapore

What Tree Huggers and Animal Lovers Should Do For Meat Eaters

My aim is to describe and advocate a much neglected form of activism, one which should be of particular interest to anyone with serious, motivating concerns about the way we treat the environment and/or the way we treat (non-human) animals. I will start by evaluating the typical forms in terms of effectiveness, rather narrowly construed, and moral permissibility. Although several of these do fairly well on both

counts, I argue that not enough is being done. The problem is not simply that too few people are adequately motivated, but also that too few of the available approaches have been recognized. One additional approach reveals itself, however, once we fully appreciate the fact that many of the harms done to animals and the environment are effects of practices that bring products to the market. Conscientious consumption is an admirable response, but competing on the market with the industries that fuel the relevant practices is a much more effective way of diminishing the relevant harms. Using meat as an example, I will argue that, for many existing products, "green" and humane practices can produce alternatives which are more appealing, in all respects, even to consumers who do not care about the environment or animals. Non-profit organizations that make this their business could be uniquely effective, if run by the right people.

Ms Diane Yu-Yen Lan, CAPPE, Australian National University

Preventive Enhancement and the Doctrine of Double Effect

I define "preventive enhancement" as "prenatal genetic intervention on normal embryos which do not inherit any defective genes or disorders for prevention of diseases or disabilities." In this paper, I want to scrutinize the moral permissibility of preventive enhancement by introducing the doctrine of double effect (DDE). If the DDE is right and preventive enhancement satisfies four conditions of DDE, it is morally permissible for parents to enhance their future children via prenatal genetic intervention for the purpose of preventing diseases or disabilities. Even if the DDE is false or it could not apply to preventive enhancement, I still want to raise an argument by discussing the four conditions of DDE to demonstrate the moral permissibility of preventive enhancement.

Mr Craig Edwards, UWA

Reasons, autonomy and paternalism

Since the late 1970s, liberal philosophers have sought to establish moral limits on paternalism that apply even when that paternalism would successfully promote the person's overall interests. To this end, the seminal works on paternalism produced during the 1980s developed the 'autonomy account', at the heart of which is the claim that mentally competent persons have a moral right to inviolable personal autonomy. However, in recent decades even liberal philosophers have come to question whether a value-neutral autonomy has the kind of overriding moral worth that the demand for inviolable personal autonomy supposes. Superficially free choices may disguise an internalised oppression, or a learnt submissiveness, which stands at odds with the motivation for valuing autonomy. In this paper, I argue two claims. Firstly, that the autonomy account is incapable of grounding the superior breadth of rights against paternalism that its proponents seek. Secondly, that the liberal project on paternalism can be better pursued by rigorously examining the paternalists' claim that our choices are unreasonable. Rather than asking what business it is of others to interfere, we should ask 'What makes your value structure more reasonable than mine?'.

Dr Stephen Clarke, University of Oxford

Governance and the Yuck Factor

Steve Clarke and Rebecca Roache (Oxford) Throughout his election campaign, and in his inaugural address, President Barack Obama expressed an ambition to bridge the divide between predominantly conservative 'red states' and predominantly liberal 'blue states' (Haidt 2009; Loven 2008; Obama 2009), and to unite all Americans in a 'common purpose of remaking th[e] Nation for our new century' (Obama 2009). We consider the difficulty of meeting this objective given the prima facie evidence that conservatives and liberals not only hold very different moral views but also that the two respective groups think very differently about morality. We consider recent work in the psychology of morality which shows how moral judgments tend to change in response to changing social circumstances, such as the introduction of transformative technologies. We argue that governments can utilise these findings in order to plan changes in societies that will have the long term effect of reducing the gap between liberal and conservative moral thought. Some attempts to implement such a policy would be

condemned as unacceptably paternalistic. We argue, however, that such a policy can be conducted in a way that is consistent with Thaler and Sunstein's (2008) unobjectionable 'libertarian paternalism'.

Dr Simon Burgess, CQUniversity

Moral judgement in professional counselling: both legitimate and important

Many theorists and practitioners have stressed that counsellors should refrain from forming or expressing moral judgements about their clients. The idea gains intellectual sustenance from various sources, including 'Person-Centered Therapy' (sometimes known as 'client-centered therapy' or 'Rogerian psychotherapy'). It cannot be denied that such 'nonjudgementalism' makes counselling easier, and generally makes good business sense too. But there are also important questions to raise about its effectiveness, its effect on social norms, and its moral justifiability. In this paper I argue that there are certain cases in relation to which counsellors should form certain moral judgements of their clients and subtly encourage those clients to adopt those moral judgements as their own. I also discuss the idea of counsellors forming and explicitly expressing moral judgements in certain cases. While some of the cases raised involve criminal actions or habits, others do not. Some of the most philosophically intricate issues arise through consideration of clients who have developed their habits in households and social milieux that are exceptionally violent and dysfunctional. The complexity is due to the fact that such cases raise the issue of whether, to some extent, certain causal explanations of behaviour can excuse such behaviour, and if so, precisely how such excuses may influence the nature of any relevant moral judgements.

Dr Cynthia Townley, Macquarie University

Animals, Care and the Separation Argument

A widespread intuition grants humans a higher moral status than members of other species. While many would agree that we should treat human interests as more important than interests of non-humans, and that concern for humans legitimately trumps concern for non-human animals, it is difficult to identify the basis for such a claim. Without such a justification, the claims that humans are morally separate are vulnerable to the attack of 'speciesism.' This paper challenges an argument that there are special morally salient bonds of care and dependence that unite all and only humans to the exclusion of other animals. A care based strategy does not solve the separation problem.

Mr Nick Munn, CAPPE, University of Melbourne

Re-Envisaging Criminal Disenfranchisement.

Criminal Disenfranchisement as currently implemented in Liberal Democracies is fundamentally flawed. Problems exist both in the way in which criminal disenfranchisement is instantiated, and in the underlying theoretical justification of criminal disenfranchisement. I argue here that some degree of criminal disenfranchisement can be legitimate in a liberal democracy, and discuss the nature and extent of such legitimate disenfranchisement. I claim that disenfranchisement ought to be: conceived of as a component of punishment; tied to imprisonment; and triggered only in cases where a person is imprisoned for the length of an electoral cycle or greater. I present further restrictions on the use of disenfranchisement, designed to ensure that it is fairly and equitably applied when it is used. I then argue that, despite the theoretical legitimacy of criminal disenfranchisement within a liberal democratic framework, there are countervailing considerations that are able to render such disenfranchisement inappropriate. The most prominent of these, and the one I address in this presentation, is the disproportionate effect of criminal disenfranchisement policies on identifiable minority groups within society. Even in instances where the disenfranchisement of any individual is legitimate, the compound effect of disenfranchisement may result in unjustifiable bias in democratic procedures and outcomes. I suggest that considerations of these types are present in many, if not all, modern liberal democracies, and that as such, there are good reasons to restrict the application of criminal disenfranchisement beyond the theoretically acceptable level.

Ms Kylie Bourne, University of Wollongong

Crowds and Collective Moral Responsibility

This paper explains and defends the notion that collective moral responsibility can be ascribed to crowds. It examines the question of whether crowds can be the object of moral judgements such that they can bear ascriptions of praise and blame. In general, crowds have been overlooked in the philosophical debate regarding collective moral responsibility. Crowds have tended to be conceptualised atomistically such that intention, action and responsibility are not seen to exist at the level of the collective but are instead fully disaggregated to the individual crowd members. This paper examines May's (1987) account of the mob that stormed the Bastille and Held's (1970) account of a random collection of bystanders and uses then as starting points for the construction of a taxonomy of variety of crowds. This taxonomy then informs a model of how collective moral responsibility can be attributed to different types of crowds. The paper concludes by saying that some crowds do have a capacity to form a collective intention and then to direct action according to this intention. In such cases both the intention and the action may be legitimate objects of moral judgement.

A/Prof Justin Oakley, Monash University

Virtue ethics and conflicts of interest in physician-industry relationships

Relationships between doctors and the pharmaceutical industry are currently the focus of much ethical scrutiny. A significant area of concern has been the medical conflicts of interest created by the pervasive influence that pharmaceutical companies are known to have on the prescribing behaviour of many doctors. The wrongs of doctors prescribing medications on the basis of certain links with pharmaceutical companies can be analysed in terms of how such behaviour harms patients, or how it violates patients' rights. I argue that both of these approaches fail to identify what is essentially wrong with such behaviour in medical conflict of interest situations. The wrongs of doctors' prescribing behaviour being influenced by their links with pharmaceutical companies can be properly understood only in terms of the sorts of character considerations central to virtue ethics. I also extend familiar monopoly of expertise arguments in professional ethics by arguing that, in return for being granted a monopoly of expertise on the provision of key goods, doctors are obligated not only to behave in certain ways but also to have certain professional character-traits. Doctors therefore betray society not only when they act (or fail to act) in certain ways, but also when they fail to develop particular character-traits.

Mr Andrew Donnelly, University of Otago

Epistemic Uncertainty and Clinical Trials

It is often thought that there is an 'equipoise' or 'uncertainty' constraint on a clinician's offering a patient entry into a randomised controlled trial (RCT). In recent years there has been much discussion as to what this contraint might involve. Some writers maintain that equipoise exists where a clinician is indifferent as to whether one treatment offered in an RCT is superior to the others. Others suggest equipoise exists when the clinical community is in a state of collective uncertainty. I maintain that these accounts are hopeless because they make equipoise a matter of individual or group beliefs. Instead I advocate a replacement constraint of epistemic uncertainty. According to this constraint an RCT is only permissible when the best evidence available to the clinician is inconclusive as to whether one treatment is superior or inferior to the others being offered in the RCT.

Mr David Douglas, University of Queensland

The Social Disutility of Owning Software

Opponents of software ownership such as Richard M. Stallman and Eben Moglen argue that the social disutility such ownership causes is a sufficient justification for prohibiting it. This social disutility includes the social instability of disregarding laws and agreements that cover software use and distribution, inequality of software access, and the inability to help others by sharing software with

them. Here I consider these and other social disutility claims against withholding specific software rights from users, in particular, the rights to read the source code, duplicate, distribute, modify, imitate, and reuse portions of the software within new programs. I find that generally while withholding these rights from software users does cause some degree of social disutility, only the rights to duplicate, modify, decompile, and imitate cannot legitimately be withheld from users on this basis. The social disutility of withholding the rights to distribute the software, read its source code and reuse portions of the software in new programs is not sufficient to prohibit software owners withholding them from users. In most cases a compromise between the software owner and user can minimise the social disutility of withholding these particular rights from users.

Ms Philippa Smales, CAPPE Melbourne University

Rejecting the Economic Arguments for Sweatshops

In this paper, I discuss the two main economic arguments that are used to justify the violations of workers' human rights that occur in sweatshops. The first argument is that sweatshops provide benefits for workers and that workers freely choose to work in sweatshops, and therefore sweatshop labour can be justified. However, I argue that workers do not freely waive their rights or consent to the violation of their human rights. Furthermore, I show that interfering in the free market system by improving wages and standards will not restrict workers' freedom or remove the benefits of labour. The second argument concerns the supposed wider economic benefits of sweatshops for developing countries. This argument claims that improving wages and conditions will cause negative consequences for the economic growth in developing countries. I argue that ability of developing countries to grow and industrialise has changed in the modern economic climate, and that the trade-off of human rights for economic growth is not necessary for development. Therefore, the economic arguments cannot justify sweatshop labour and I will conclude by discussing the prevention of human rights violations in sweatshops.

Dr Mianna Lotz, Macquarie University

Procreative Evil

Attempts to explain the intuitive wrongfulness in alleged 'wrongful life' cases sometimes seek to do so by attributing harmful wrongdoing to the procreators in question. Such approaches identify the individual resulting child as having been, in some sense, personally culpably harmed by their coming into existence. In contrast, this paper gives an account of the relevance of procreative motivation for determining the morality of procreation in a class of cases not readily captured by an analysis of person-affecting harm. I begin by reviewing the main objection to the harm-based approach, arising out of Parfit's analysis of the non-identity problem and its implications for preconception cases. Most attempts to avoid the non-identity objection in these kinds of cases either take an impersonal harm approach, or draw on some version of a metaphysical modal counterpart theory to defend a person-affecting harm account. I propose and defend an alternative view, one that locates the assessment of procreative motivation within a consideration of the normative expectations of moral communities. The proposed account construes the wrongfulness in the considered cases as 'evil' rather than harm, and the type of evil in question as being of a 'non-grievance', welfare-connected, collective kind. Understanding the wrongfulness in this way offers a basis on which to explain the intuitive view that our procreative motivations do matter morally.

Dr Robert Sparrow, Monash University

A not-so-new eugenics: Harris and Savulescu on human enhancement

In Enhancing Evolution: The Ethical Case for Making Better People (2007), John Harris argues that a proper concern for the welfare of future human beings implies that we are morally obligated to pursue enhancements. Similarly, in "Procreative Beneficience: Why We Should Select The Best Children" (2001) and in a number of subsequent publications, Julian Savulescu has suggested that we are morally obligated to use genetic (and other) technologies to produce the

best children possible. In this paper I argue that if we do have such obligations then their implications are much more radical than either Harris or Savulescu admit. There is an uneasy tension in the work of these authors, between their consequentialism and their (apparent) libertarianism when it comes to the rights of individuals to use—or not use—enhancement technologies as they see fit. Only through a very particular and not especially plausible negotiation of the tension between their moral theory and their policy prescriptions can Harris and Savulescu obscure the fact that their philosophies have implications that most people would find profoundly unattractive.

Mr Sean Benedict McKenna, ACU National

Failing to be Moral

A preparedness to accept the failure of even highly significant projects in her life, due to their inconsistency with her moral outlook, is a defining characteristic of the serious moral agent. The moral position of an actor can be described, in part, by those points at which fidelity to her moral principles is capable of bringing about the failure of certain of her projects and endeavours. A moral agent cannot, with consistency, recognise an obligation to act in a way contrary to her moral position. For an action to be accepted as obligatory by a moral agent it must also be considered by that agent as morally permissible. Success in any project or endeavour is, for the serious moral agent, achievable only through morally permissible means. Therefore, a moral agent is obliged to accept the failure of those of her projects where success depends upon her acting in a way contrary to her moral position. The paper argues that the source of all of an agent's obligations can be traced back to her moral position. The paper will argue against the notion that obligations outside of the moral might conflict and compete as drivers of an agent's actions, considering in particular claims that the demands of public office or membership of a political community create obligations capable of overriding the moral agent's personal morality.

Asian and Comparative Philosophy

Mr James Stewart, University of Tasmania

Gambling with Belief in Early Buddhism

In the Appanakasutra of the PÄ li canon, Gotama Buddha advances an argument for warranted belief that is comparable to the wager advanced by Blaise Pascal in his Pensées. The purpose of the paper is to (1) provide a close analysis of the Buddhist Wager, (2) consider its comparability with Pascal's Wager, and (3) examine its plausibility within the wider context of the PÄ li canon. In this latter evaluative phase of the paper I claim that there are two serious difficulties with the Buddhist Wager: (a) that the move from "belief in an afterlife" to the conclusion that "one should believe in the dhamma" is not warranted, and (b) that the strategy of warranted belief using a considered gamble is not consistent with the Buddhist concept of saddhÄ (faith), a concept that entails not only a rational conviction but also a religious devotion. Belief by gambling might capture the first sense of saddhÄ but not the second. I close by positing that both difficulties resemble some of the classical objections that are advanced against Pascal's Wager.

Dr Sonam Thakchoe, University of Tasmania

Prāsaṅgika Epistemology: the Nature & Application of perception

The dominant view in Buddhist epistemology debate is that the theory of perception (pratyakṣa) in Indian Buddhism is one that exclusively belonged to the foundationalist systems. Even the current Buddhist scholarship presupposes that a Buddhist epistemologist must endorse either the theory of perception introduced by Dignāga-Dharmakīrti or the theory proposed in the Brahmanical systems by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṁsaka. This view, if it is correct, has two major problematic implications for the Prāsaṅgika philosophy of Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti: (i) to the extend one grants the application of perception in

the Prāsaṅgika, to that extend one must be an epistemological foundationalist since there would be no other alternative account to choose from; (ii) to the extend one rejects the foundationalist theory of perception in the Prāsaṅgika context, to that extent one must be admit oneself as a radical epistemological sceptic, wholly rejecting any application of perception in Madhyamaka. The former is problematic because it implies that Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti are simply inconsistent and contradictory as it presupposes the synthesis of the foundationalist epistemology and the anti-foundationalism metaphysics of the Prāsaṅgika. So far we have not seen any evidence being produced to show that these Prāsaṅgikas blend the two irreconcilable positions. The latter is also problematic because it reduces the Prāsaṅgikas into mere epistemological sceptics since it rules out the possibility of any alternative anti-foundationalist account of perception, and the Prāsaṅgika clearly reject the foundationalist account. In this paper, I will discuss in detail the problems of ascribing to the Prāsaṅgika system any foundationalist theory of perception. I will instead propose an alternative theory of perception based on the Prāsaṅgika's anti-foundationalist metaphysics, and will show that Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti's works provide us sufficient evidence to defend a typical Prāsaṅgika's account of perception which, I believe, complements with its core anti-foundationalism.

Environmental Philosophy

Mr Fabien Medvecky, University of Sydney

Uncertainty, Economic Growth and Discounting in Environmental Decisions

Discounting is an economic tool which determines the present values of future costs and benefits. As a key tool in inter-temporal decision making, discounting has received substantial interest, especially in regards to environmental decision making. Underlying discounting is the assumption that goods in the future are presently worth less than the same goods in the present, at least in economic terms. This assumption is commonly justified by an expectation of economic growth. Exponents of this view claim that as the economy grows, more goods are produced which theoretically leads to higher wages. Thus the price of goods relative to wages decreases. The decrease in the price of goods becomes a justification for the use of discounting. While this may be correct, the forthcoming levels of growth are, as they have always been, uncertain. Furthermore, the longer the decision, the greater this uncertainty will be. In this paper I will consider the extent to which an expectation of growth can be used as a justification for discounting in environmental decision making. This is especially pertinent given that environmental decisions often have a longer time frame than standard economic decisions, and with this longer time frame comes greater uncertainty. I will argue that the decision as to which discount rate to use should be approached using a decision-theoretic framework. If this is correct, then everything turns on the level of uncertainty under which we are operating: whether we view the decision about the appropriate discount rate as a decision under risk or a decision under ignorance.

Assoc Prof William Grey, University of Queensland

Climate change and obligations to the future

Climate change poses serious ethical, social, political and technical challenges. The science is complex and (like all complex science) uncertain, but because of the potential seriousness of the problem posed by global warming the task of making significant and far-reaching choices in a situation of uncertainty is both urgent and important. Our individuals and collective choices have potentially far-reaching implications for both non-humans and future generations. This paper will explore some of the central issues which arise in this complex debate, which include important concerns of environmental philosophy, such as obligations to the nonhuman world, and in applied ethics, such as issues of intergenerational equity and justice.

Epistemology

Cei Maslen, Victoria University of Wellington

Flexible Contextualism and Empathy

Jason Stanley has argued persuasively for a view he calls Interest Relative Invariantism (IRI) as better at accounting for knowledge claims across contexts than the more familiar Contextualism about Knowledge. One case he examines in detail is a case in which someone in a high stakes situation employs a belief passed on from someone in a low stakes situation (for example, my mother gives me some information over the phone which unbeknownst to her I use to win a pub quiz.) Stanley does acknowledge that actual interests and apparent interests can depart in such cases, but I argue that he underestimates the importance of this observation, and also ignores the flexibility we have to empathize with others by adopting their practical viewpoints. I reanalyze Stanley's examples and develop a notion of indirect identification of standards to help the Contextualist about Knowledge.

Professor Jonathan Schaffer, Australian National University

Contrastive Knowledge Surveyed

The debate between contextualists and invariantists has been marked by various claims about what our intuitions are. Yet the claims that contextualists and subject-sensitive invariantists have made about our intuitions have not withstood empirical scrutiny. Repeated surveys have failed to show any effect of stakes or alternatives on ordinary knowledge ascriptions. Joshua Knobe and I have since found what may be the first empirical results which support contextualism. Specifically, we have found that manipulating the contrast in specific ways produces significant alterations in people's willingness to ascribe knowledge. This paper will survey the existing experimental philosophy literature on contextualism and invariantism, and discuss a range of new data that seems to favor the contextualist view.

Dr Jennifer Bleazby, St Leonards College

The Development of Imagination in Classroom Philosophical Inquiries

The imagination has traditionally been thought of as the antithesis of reason. As such, education, which has traditionally focused on the cultivation of reason, has devalued the imagination and encouraged children to transcend their imaginative natures. When the imagination has been considered important, it is has normally been thought of as a distinct form of creative thinking that compliments critical thinking. In this paper I will draw on the work of John Dewey to argue that imagination is actually integral to all thinking. Dewey describes thinking as the reconstruction of problematic experiences. Problematic experiences evoke imagination, because they compel us to imagine alternative possibilities, in which a fragmented, incomplete situation is a coherent, meaningful whole. Without the capacity to imagine problematic situations as other than they are, there would be no need for thinking because there would be no need, or means, for reconstructing experience. Thus, imagination enables us to interact with reality in a meaningful, transformative manner. I will then address how, in contrast to traditional pedagogies, Philosophy for Children (P4C) facilitates this Deweyian ideal of imagination. P4C's classroom community of inquiry involves the imaginative construction of alternative possibilities as a means to reconstructing philosophical problems. The communal nature of the classroom also facilitates imagination by exposing children to the alternative perspectives of others, which requires the use of the sympathetic imagination. Furthermore, I will explore how the imaginary, as well as the fantastical, can help children develop philosophical ability and understanding, especially in logic, critical thinking, metaphysics and ethics. Finally I will briefly address the importance of the teacher's imagination.

Dr David Coady, University of Tasmania

The epistemology of the Blogosphere

Blogging has changed the way in which people acquire knowledge and justify their beliefs. But are these changes good or bad? In particular, are we epistemically better off as a result of blogging, or is it the case, as Alvin Goldman has argued, that

the blogosphere's emergence as an alternative to the conventional media is "bad news for the epistemic prospects of the voting public"? Come along and find out.

Dr Brent Madison, The University of Notre Dame Australia

Combating Anti Anti-Luck Epistemology

One thing that nearly all epistemologists agree upon is that Gettier cases are decisive counterexamples to the tripartite analysis of knowledge; whatever else is true of knowledge, it is not merely belief which is both justified and true. They now agree that knowledge is not justified true belief because this is consistent with there being too much luck present in the cases, and that knowledge excludes such luck. This is to endorse what has become known as the 'anti-luck platitude'. But what if generations of philosophers have been mistaken about this, blinded at least partially by a deeply entrenched professional bias? There has been another, albeit minority, response to Gettier: to deny that the cases are counterexamples at all. Stephen Hetherington, a principal proponent of this view, advances what he calls the 'Knowing Luckily Proposal'. If correct, this radical and unorthodox position does not solve the Gettier problem; rather, it dissolves it. If Hetherington is correct, the Gettier problem is a pseudo-problem, and therefore not a problem after all. If correct, this would call for a major re-evaluation and re-orientation of post-Gettier analytic epistemology, since much of it assumes the anti-luck platitude both in elucidating the concept of knowledge, and in the application of such accounts to central philosophical problems. It is therefore imperative that the Knowing Luckily Proposal be considered and evaluated in detail. In this paper I critically assess the Knowing Luckily Proposal. I argue that while it draws our attention to certain important features of knowledge, ultimately it fails, and the anti-luck platitude emerges unscathed. Whatever else is true of knowledge, therefore, it is unlucky true belief. For a proposition to count as knowledge, we cannot arrive at its truth accidentally or for the wrong reason.

Dr Kennedy Matthew, University of Nottingham

Scepticism, Safety, Subjective Similarity

I develop a version of brain-in-a-vat scepticism which draws on the notion of epistemic safety. Safety is the idea that "If one knows, one could not easily have been wrong in a similar case" (Williamson, Knowledge and Its Limits, p. 147). Although many see safety as an anti-sceptical notion, we can convert it by articulating and defending a favorable similarity ordering of possible worlds. According to this ordering, all worlds in which one has the same perceptual experience as in the actual world are relevant to the question of whether one's perceptual belief amounts to knowledge. We can see this ordering as the expression of epistemic internalist intuitions; and we can develop opposition to it in epistemic externalist fashion. A naïve-realist perspective will also be considered. The paper does not attempt to defuse external-world scepticism, but rather to understand its persistence in terms of a clash of appealing intuitions about experiential subjectivity, and its epistemic role.

Dr Miri Albahari, University of Western Australia

Does the sense of self weaken knowledge that there is no self?

Anna is anxious about her talk on no-self. Gripping her sweaty palms she climbs the podium trembling so violently that she trips and breaks the power-point projector and has to give her talk on the fly... Suppose Anna's anxiety betrays a strong sense of self — of exactly the sort whose existence she denies. Is she harbouring inconsistent beliefs? And if Anna knows that there is no self, could her knowledge of that fact be made defective by such inconsistency? Conversely, could her knowledge of no-self be improved by losing the sense of self? It depends partly on whether the sense of self involves a belief — and of the right sort. It also depends on whether knowledge can vary in its quality. In this paper I discuss a number of points that arise in relation to this case, drawing on the parallel debate over whether one can be a consistent determinist while having a sense of libertarian freewill.

Dr. Michael Titelbaum, ANU/University of Wisconsin-Madison

Tell Me You Love Me: Bootstrapping, Internalism, and No-Lose Epistemology

Many epistemologists think there's something wrong with a theory of knowledge that allows bootstrapping (Vogel 2000), but it's not clear exactly what's wrong. One thing wrong with bootstrapping may be that it allows investigations with the possibility of increasing an agent's justification for a belief but no possibility of decreasing that justification. After fleshing out these thoughts, I'll show that a particular type of epistemic internalism prevents bootstrapping from creating such no-lose investigations.

Professor Michael Lynch, University of Connecticut

The Argument from Epistemic Disagreement

The Argument from Epistemic Disagreement Michael P. Lynch Epistemic disagreement is disagreement over epistemic principles. Deep epistemic disagreements are disagreements over fundamental principles — e.g. over whether a basic doxastic method, such as sense perception, is reliable. A hallmark of deep epistemic disagreement is that it is subject to epistemic circularity. The principles in question can't be justified except by appeal to themselves. In this paper, I argue that the fact that deep epistemic disagreement is subject to epistemic circularity means that we must be prepared to confront arguments like the following: 1. Deep epistemic disagreements are rationally irresolvable. 2. The best explanation for why deep epistemic disagreements are rationally irresolvable is that there are no objectively true fundamental epistemic principles. 3. If there are no objectively true fundamental epistemic principles, there are no objectively true derivative epistemic principles. 4. All epistemic principles are either fundamental or derivative. 5. Therefore, there are (probably) no objectively true epistemic principles. The argument parallels a familiar argument for moral anti-realism. That argument moves from the premise that deep moral disagreements are rationally irresolvable to the conclusion that there are no objectively true moral principles. As in the moral case, the argument from epistemic disagreement is important and worth taking seriously. But it is ultimately unsound. I will argue that the first premise of the argument is reasonable, but only when qualified in a certain respect. But once qualified in that respect, the second premise is false. Consequently the argument should be rejected.

Mr Leon Leontyev, ANU

Assertions in context without contextualism

DeRose and more recently Schaffer have put forward an argument for contextualism about knowledge attributions that relies on the following two claims: (1) that knowledge is the norm of assertion; and (2) that the epistemic propriety of assertion is sensitive to context. Claim (1), while not unchallenged, has been solidly defended by Williamson and others. Claim (2) is derived from the fact that we give different intuitive verdicts about the propriety of an assertion in a pair of cases where the only difference between the cases is the salience of an error possibility. In this paper I argue that the best explanation of the data that's used to established (2) is actually to adopt a norm of assertion other than the knowledge norm. If that's so, then claim (1) is undermined and contextualism about knowledge doesn't follow.

Ms Elizabeth Silver, The University of Melbourne

Peer disagreement and reliability

How should you react upon discovering that an epistemic peer disagrees with your conclusion? Recent answers to this question include 'split the difference between your opinions', 'stand your ground', and several positions in between those two extremes. However, most of these answers treat peer disagreement in isolation, creating the false impression that disagreement counts directly against your conclusion. I propose that the response to peer disagreement is just one instance of a general epistemic rule: you should always take your own unreliability into account when you decide how much confidence to place in your conclusion. Peer disagreement is a useful source of

information about your reliability in answering a particular question; it does not bear directly on your conclusion. Taking disagreement as evidence against your reliability implies you should "split the difference" (a.k.a. the Equal Weight View), but the implication only holds when certain assumptions are true. These assumptions include: a) there are only two possible answers to the question; b) your peer is exactly as reliable as yourself; c) you and she have access to, and affirm, the same set of relevant evidence; d) you have objective evidence about your own reliability; e) you have equally strong evidence about your peer's reliability; and f) your reasoning is independent of your peer's reasoning. In real, interesting cases of peer disagreement, those assumptions will almost always be violated. This helps explain the persistence of disagreement despite the appeal of the Equal Weight View. I attempt to outline how we should respond to disagreement when those assumptions are violated, including some cases where we are clearly not obliged to accord equal weight to our purported peer's opinion.

Mr Alexander Cox, University at Buffalo (SUNY)

Against Subject-Sensitive Invariantism

In their recent books, John Hawthorne and Jason Stanley each present a version of subject-sensitive invariantism (SSI). SSI is an epistemic thesis that claims that there is a single semantic value of 'knows'. It is distinguished from other invariantist theories by its claim that whether an instance of 'S knows p' is true or not depends in part upon the context and interests of the subject. SSI is opposed to contextualism, which claims that the semantic value of 'knows' varies across contexts. According to contextualism, the context and interests of the attributor determine which meaning of 'knows' applies. Whether an instance of 'S knows p' is true or not depends in part upon this semantic value. Hawthorne and Stanley each attempt to motivate subject-sensitive invariantism by applying it to an epistemic puzzle and arguing that it handles these

puzzles at least as well as, if not better than, contextualism does. In this paper, I introduce these epistemic puzzles—lottery cases and high/low stakes cases—and the contextualist and SSI solutions. After briefly motivating SSI over contextualism, I present three criticisms of SSI. First, I question whether the truth of knowledge ascriptions is sensitive to practical facts as SSI claims. Second, I argue that SSI is consistent with the claim that knowledge vacillates. That is, on this view it is easy for one to lose and regain knowledge simply by changing one's context or interests. Third, I argue that SSI has difficulty accounting for the ubiquity of third-person knowledge ascriptions. In particular, it faces a dilemma between claiming that most third-person knowledge ascriptions are inappropriate and claiming that many such ascriptions are only true as the result of luck. I conclude by briefly showing that contextualism is not susceptible to these charges.

Professor Huw Price, University of Sydney

One Boxer Rebellion

Evidential Decision Theory (EDT) and Causal Decision Theory (CDT) are usually regarded as incompatible views of rational decision. I argue that this is a mistake, and that supporters of EDT should be supporters of CDT, too. The real issue then concerns the order of priority between causation and rational decision, and here my compatibilist version of EDT has the better of the argument. Unless causation is understood in the way the compatibilist recommends, its link to rational decision remains mysterious.

European Philosophy

Mr Paul Fearne, LaTrobe

Heidegger, Being-in-the-world and Schizophrenia

This paper uses the work of Martin Heidegger to interpret the notion of schizophrenia. It uses concepts found in Being and Time to posit explanations that might help clarify some of the more difficult aspects of the condition. In particular, it looks at two concepts: 'Being-in-the-world' and 'Being-with'. It argues firstly that schizophrenia is a deficient mode of Being-in-the-

world. For Heidegger a person relates to the world in a number of distinct ways. One of these ways is to see objects as having uses for particular ends. The paper analyses the manner in which perceptions of objects in terms of their use (or 'ready-to-hand' perceptions as Heidegger characterises them) seem to be dysfunctional in schizophrenia. It also uses Heidegger's work on perceptions of 'significance' in the world to argue that such perceptions are heightened and distorted in schizophrenia. The paper then turns to look at how, in schizophrenia, a person's relation to the Other is rendered dysfunctional. We do this through a look at Heidegger's notion of 'Being-with'. For Heidegger, human beings are very much defined by their relations to other people. We see that in schizophrenia, the person can try and distance themselves from others, and their social functioning can become impaired. Through our analysis of these two important concepts of Heidegger's it is hoped that we may diminish some of the current opacity that surrounds schizophrenia.

Ingo Farin, School of Philosophy, University of Tasmania

Heidegger's Concept of Time

In recent years, Heidegger's concept of original temporality has been harshly critiqued, among others by Tugendhat and Blattner. In this paper I will briefly explore the historical landscape in which Heidegger developed the idea of original temporality (Husserl, Dilthey, Bergson, and Barth). I will then show that Heidegger's reading of Paul (GA 60) is crucial to understanding his concept of temporality. Although Heidegger later played down the eschatological dimension, it still informs his concept of original temporality in Being and Time. If we keep this context in mind, a viable and non-contradictory idea of original temporality can be formulated.

Mr James Burrowes, University of Auckland

Your Symbols are Finite: Cassirer, Heidegger and Lask and the Kantian Tradition

Heidegger and Cassirer, and their philosophical systems, were brought into direct confrontation at a debate in Davos, Switzerland in 1929. The debate was structured on their respective readings of Kant; the influence of these interpretations on their wider philosophy is telling. Both Heidegger and Cassirer were initially trained within the Neo-Kantian tradition and, more importantly, under its third phase. It was at this stage that the ontological issues arising from Lebensphilosophie were beginning to challenge the epistemological framework of transcendental logic at the basis of Neo-Kantianism. Emil Lask most clearly uncovered the contradictions within the Southwest School and integrated the concepts of Lebensphilosophie into a Kantian framework, thereby anticipating the final phase of Neo-Kantianism. In this paper I intend to compare the main elements of Heidegger's existential analytic of Dasein with Cassirer's conception of man as a Symbolic Animal and how these are inherent to their wider philosophical systems. Also, I will show how important Emil Lask's theory of Kantian logic is to our understanding of both Heidegger and Cassirer. In this respect, we will investigate the effect of Lebensphilosophie on Kantian thought and put into perspective the elements of Kantian philosophy which remain within Heidegger's thought. Specifically, we will look at each of these philosophers' interpretations of Intuition and Imagination and the ontological conditions of Logic, Mathematics and the Transcendental Aesthetic. I will argue that the correct interpretations will need to rest on a clarified notion of finitude. I will also argue that, in line with the likes of Theodore Kisiel and Steven Galt Crowell, comparing Lask and Heidegger provides fundamental insights into Heidegger's Philosophy, and will make further clarifications to the relationship between Cassirer and Lask and the strands of Neo-Kantianism that they each represent.

Mr James Garrett, University of Melbourne

Heidegger's Aristotle

Heidegger's method of destruction returns philosophical concepts back to their original experiences in order to show that the clear formal appearance of familiar basic concepts is radically misleading. Nowhere is the method of destruction employed in more detail and with higher stakes

than in Heidegger's reading of Aristotle. In this paper, I will first briefly outline the early Heidegger's basic critique of modern philosophy. Heidegger's critique amounts to the accusation that modern philosophy confuses formal logic with a general ontology. The bulk of the paper is devoted to unpacking Heidegger's project of recovering a different original sense of 'logic', which emerges in conjunction with his destructive readings of Aristotle. This original logic bears little resemblance with ordered realm of the Analytics, rather it remains transfixed with the problematic nature of Being. The question of the meaning of Being makes no sense until one recognises the radical limitations of formalisation that Heidegger exposes. Only when the conceptual superstructures of the history of philosophy are all undermined can the original challenges of original logic be understood.

Dr Ashley Woodward, The University of Melbourne

Deleuze and Nihilism

This paper critically examines Deleuze's treatment of the Nietzschean problem of nihilism. Of all the major figures in contemporary Continental thought, Deleuze is at once one of the most luminous, and practically a lone voice in suggesting that nihilism may successfully be overcome. Whether or not he is correct on this point is thus a commanding question in relation to our understanding of the issue. Many commentators on Nietzsche have argued that his project of overcoming nihilism is destined to failure because of the affinity between the problem of nihilism and the logic of negation. While Nietzsche wants an absolute affirmation of life, Spinoza's principle that "all determination is negation," as well as Hegel's dialectical conception of negation, suggest that affirmation free of negation is not possible. However, some commentators suggest that Deleuze successfully shows how overcoming nihilism is possible because his "logic of difference" allows for an affirmation which is not dialectically reappropriated by negation. This paper

argues that beyond such logical considerations, there are metaphysical and existential reasons why Deleuze's interpretation of nihilism fails to show that it can be overcome. For Deleuze, the overcoming of nihilism hinges not just on a logic of difference, but on a radical interpretation of Nietzsche's doctrine of eternal return as "selective being." I argue that the metaphysical and existential implications of this understanding of eternal return reinstates nihilism at the very point it is supposedly overcome. Moreover, I argue that there are attendant political dangers to Deleuze's position on nihilism.

Dr Simon Duffy, University of Sydney

Deleuze and Lautman's dialectics of mathematics

Albert Lautman, a philosopher of mathematics working in the late 1930's, outlined a 'critical' programme in mathematics that was intended to displace the previous foundational discussions that were occupied with the criticism of classical analysis. Against the logicist claim that the development of mathematics is dominated a priori by logic, Lautman proposes a 'metaphysics of logic,' and calls for the development of a 'philosophy of mathematical genesis' that retains a commitment to a form of Platonism. One of the tasks, indeed the challenges, that Lautman sets himself but never carried through with, was the task of deploying the mathematical philosophy that he developed in other domains. It is Deleuze who shows the most assiduity in his engagement with Lautman by taking up this challenge. The mathematical work that is drawn upon and that plays a significant role in Deleuze's philosophical project is that of Lautman. Indeed, the philosophical logic that Deleuze constructs as a part of his project of constructing a philosophy of difference is dialectical in the Lautmanian sense, although this requires qualification. The paper gives an account of the Lautmanian dialectic, of how it operates in Lautman's work, and of what Deleuze does to Lautman's dialectic when it is incorporated into his project of constructing a philosophy of difference.

Dr. Paolo Diego Bubbio, University of Sydney

Sacrifice in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit

In this paper I apply the post-Kantian revisionist interpretation of Hegel, and specifically the

recognition-theoretic approach, to the notion of sacrifice in the Phenomenology of Spirit. Firstly, I conduct a preliminary analysis by examining the general meaning of sacrifice as a form of determinate negation. Secondly, I focus on two phenomenological moments (the struggle between "faith" and "pure insight", and the cult) in order to answer the question, "Is a real (effective and unselfish) sacrifice possible?" Finally, I argue that sacrifice should be considered as a Darstellung, and I explain the twofold connection between sacrifice and recognition. I conclude that there is no sacrifice without recognition, and the process of recognition is intrinsically sacrificial.

Mr Tim Themi, Deakin University

Lacan, Nietzsche, Questions of Science

As evidenced by the reactions to psychoanalysis in Todd Dufresne's recent collection of interviews with critical Freud scholars, and the protests surrounding new UK Parliament proposals to regulate the various talking therapies — the status of the claims made by psychoanalysis, continues to be a contested affair. The problem arises when adherents of psychoanalysis take a hostile or superficial stance towards epistemic considerations, and when critics take accordingly a hostile or superficial stance towards psychoanalysis in return, but risk covering over that knowledge of the human condition can also arise, especially initially, in discourses other than those of the positive science. This paper explores two possibilities concerning the present discordance between psychoanalysis and science. First is whether the critical determination of psychoanalysis as a pseudo-science or religion imbued with false and harmful beliefs, shares a validating kinship with the epistemic criticisms that Nietzsche makes of Judeo-Christian beliefs in 'The Anti-Christ'. Second is whether the criticisms of psychoanalysis made from the perspectives of science, rather more typify Nietzsche's notion in the 'Genealogy of Morals', that the overvaluation of science carries on, in more contemporary form, the ascetic ideal of Judeo-Christianity. I

suggest there is value in considering both of the above possibilities, but that Lacan generally only focuses on the second when, in his 'Ethics' Seminar VII, and 'Other Side' Seminar XVII, he considers science's need to split off, or castrate itself, from many real aspects of our subjectivity or desire, in order to accede to its rational function. In this way I attempt to evaluate an interesting ambiguity in Lacan's position, which up until the mid 1960s, has the constructions of science more resembling than opposing those of paranoia; whereas by 1977, the elderly Lacan appears to determine psychoanalysis itself as "a delusion", seemingly because it is "not a science".

Experimental Philosophy

Associate Professor Eric Schwitzgebel, University of California at Riverside

The Moral Behavior of Ethicists

If philosophical moral reflection tends to improve moral behavior, one might expect that professional ethicists will, on average, behave morally better than non-ethicists. However, the moral behavior of ethicists has never been empirically studied. In this talk I will present results from three completed studies and (hopefully) one or more studies in progress. The three completed studies examine: (1.) the rates at which ethics books are missing from academic libraries compared to similar non-ethics philosophy books (with the primary analysis confined to relatively obscure books of the sort likely to be borrowed mostly by professors and advanced students in ethics); (2.) the voting rates of ethicists (including political philosophers as a subgroup) compared to other philosophers, political scientists, and the professoriate as a whole; and (3.) a survey of philosophers' opinions about the moral behavior of ethicists. The study currently under way for which I hope to have preliminary results in time for the AAP examines: (4.) the relationship between self-reported normative view and self-reported behavior on a number of measures such as vegetarianism and donating to charity.

Dr Jakob Hohwy, Monash University

The promiscuous self

Normally, we experience our first-person

perspective as belonging exclusively to our own body, and also that our perception of the world makes good sense from there. One might think, on the basis of this robust sense of bodily self-consciousness, that the relation between one's own body and one's first-person perspective is especially fundamental and inescapable. Some versions of embodiment theories of the mind seem to subscribe to that idea. However, though it is hard to conceive of escaping a first-person perspective altogether, there is nothing fundamental or inescapable about which body, if any, your first-person perspective belongs to. A little visuotactile disintegration is sufficient to show that the first-person perspective will occupy whatever location makes most sense, and that the bodily self-consciousness that this gives rise to in turn causes distorted perception and development of rather bizarre beliefs. We present preliminary data from a study on these effects and discuss their significance in terms of our understanding of embodiment and bodily self-consciousness.

Miss Emma Wright, University of Sydney

Should we be Error-Theorists about Happiness?

Attempts to define happiness are often unsatisfying. If, in anyone's account, happiness is too narrowly defined, then 'happiness' can easily become something that a great many of us would not care about having or getting. In this paper I argue that a good test for an adequate definition of happiness is a question of whether, on reflection, all rational people would care about having or getting happiness as so defined. If this is correct, however, it is also very possibly correct that error theory about happiness is true. According to the standard picture of psychology that we have inherited from Hume, there is no such thing that we are rationally obligated to pursue, because desires are not open to rational scrutiny. If we do not want error theory about happiness to be true, something has to give. Either the definitional requirement of happiness that it is worth pursuing in and of itself has to go, or Hume's standard picture

has to go. Which one should it be?

Ms Katinka Quintelier, Ghent University

Creationism and morality

In Tower of Babel, Robert Pennock wrote that "defenders of evolution would help their case immeasurably if they would [â€¦] reassure their audience that morality, purpose, and meaning are not lost by accepting the truth of evolution." We first consider the thesis that the creationists' movement exploits moral concerns to spread its ideas against the theory of evolution. We analyze their arguments and possible reasons why they are easily accepted. Creationists usually employ two contradictive strategies to expose the purported moral degradation that comes with accepting the theory of evolution. On the one hand they claim that evolutionary theory is immoral. On the other hand creationists think of evolutionary theory as amoral. Both objections come naturally in a monotheistic view. But we can find similar conclusions about the supposed moral aspects of evolution in non-religiously inspired discussions. Meanwhile, the creationism-evolution debate mainly focuses — understandably — on what constitutes good science. We consider the need for moral reassurance and analyze reassuring arguments from philosophers. Philosophers may stress that science does not prescribe and is therefore not immoral, but this reaction opens the door for the objection of amorality that evolution — as a naturalistic world view at least — supposedly endorses. We consider that the topic of morality and its relation to the acceptance of evolution may need more empirical research.

History of Philosophy

Professor Michael Williams, Johns Hopkins University

Demons Drunkards and Doppelgangers: the Originality of Descartes' Skepticism

The skeptical problem concerning our knowledge of the external world is original with Descartes. At the same time, the arguments of the First Meditation seem to draw on materials and strategies already familiar to the skeptics of classical antiquity. So what enables Descartes to formulate a new problem? Is he, for some reason,

willing to push ancient arguments farther? Or, superficial similarities notwithstanding, does he introduce new arguments? As for the problem itself, is it a discovery or an invention? According to me, Descartes introduces new arguments, thereby inventing a new problem. I defend this view by offering an account of the structure and content of Cartesian skepticism, paying special attention to the argument from dreams.

Mr. Andrew Shortridge, Cornell University

Varieties of Ancient Immoralism

This paper argues against the view that the ethical views of the Greek Sophists can be best categorized by attending to the assessments of nomos ('law' or 'convention') and phusis ('nature') made by different Sophists. Surveying the secondary literature, the scholarly consensus is that the Sophists contrasted law with nature. Guthrie, in his History of Greek Philosophy, gives clearest expression to the idea both that the Sophists held law and nature to be antithetical, and that they can be compared most fruitfully by attending to their different interpretations of this antithesis. Three Sophistic theories are then discussed. Accepting Kerferd's interpretation of Thrasymachus, it is argued that law and nature are not always antithetical to one another, since the law does not restrain the acquisitive nature of the ruler who makes the law. According to Glaucon's apparent restatement of Thrasymachus' argument, it seems that it is both natural to submit to law and just as natural to break the law. This is no antithesis. On Callicles' account of natural justice, it is unclear whether the equality of distribution which characterizes law is in fact genuinely beneficial to the many because of facts about their natures, or whether the many would attempt to get more, if only they could. Hence, it is unclear whether Callicles appeals to an antithesis of law with nature, or to one involving two radically different natures. In none of these three cases do we find a clear antithesis of nomos with phusis; hence, there is little point in structuring any comparative inquiry of Sophistic ethics by taking "the nomos-phusis antithesis" as a central organizing principle. The paper concludes with some tentative suggestions as to how Sophistic ethical theories might best be compared, if not by appeal to the supposed antithesis of law and nature.

Professor Calvin Normore, McGill/UCLA

Matter, Spirits, and Extended Souls

Descartes claimed that matter is res extensa and that minds are unextended and without parts . A considerable medieval tradition including Ockham and Jean Buridan claimed that while human intellectual souls are unextended and hence spiritual , animal souls are extended substantial forms which nonetheless cannot not be identified with matter. Ralph Cudworth and Henry More claimed that both matter and spirits are extended. This paper attempts to chart some elements of the debate about the relations among extension, matter and spirit between the 14th century and the late 17th in an effort to determine what was at stake. One aim is to shed some light on what materialism might have been — and might be.

Dr Deborah Brown, University of Queensland

Descartes' Secular Biology: Functions without Final Causes

Recent debates about functions have been largely dominated by the question of whether functions are to be characterised etiologically or in causal terms, or whether both approaches are required to understand contemporary biological practices of classification and explanation. Interestingly, these debates have precursors in the early modern period. The teleological conception of function used by Aristotle and his followers relies explicitly on the assumption that functions make sense only in relation to the ends or purposes which they serve. Even though they typically rejected final causality in natural philosophy, Descartes and other mechanists frequently resorted to functional explanations, particularly when discussing the organization and behaviour of animals and plants. This raises the question of what they thought was essential to an organism's exhibiting functionality. An increasingly popular approach in Cartesian studies is to read a non-intentional teleology back into the corpus as the context in which references

to functions are to be understood. I am sceptical of the soundness of this strategy but do not think that Descartes is working with a purely causal notion of function either (as causal functions are generally understood nowadays). A tour of Descartes' fanciful account of embryogenesis reveals a commitment to a notion of function neither etiological nor causal but grounded rather in an understanding of the complex interdependence of the parts of organisms. One of the advantages of the Cartesian approach to functional explanation is that it offers some relief from what Dennis Des Chene calls the 'boundary problem' for mechanistic approaches in the life sciences of the seventeenth century, the problem of specifying what does and doesn't count as belonging within an organic system when many things, both internal and external, may contribute to fitness in some direct or indirect way.

Professor Moira Gatens, University of Sydney

Compelling Fictions: Spinoza and George Eliot

Spinoza understood religious accounts of the world to be fictional products of the imagination or knowledge of the first kind. Nevertheless, he thought, such knowledge can be useful in promoting sociability. This presentation will argue that Spinoza had an ambivalent attitude towards the imagination. George Eliot, who translated Spinoza's works and was influenced by his philosophy, believed that fictions of a certain kind could be genuinely edifying. What is the status of fiction for these thinkers? Are their views compatible?

Dr Karen Green, Monash University

Catharine Macaulay on Freedom of the Will (Karen Green and Shannon Weekes)

Very little attention has been paid to the philosophical position on the will developed by Catharine Macaulay in her Treatise on the Immutability of Moral Truth and her Letters on Education. An exception is a recent paper by Martina Reuter, 'Catharine Macaulay and Mary Wollstonecraft on the will.' Reuter argues that the position on the will that Macaulay develops corresponds to the position that has been called 'rational compatibilism.' In this paper we argue that, while this characterisation of Macaulay's position is not completely incorrect, it does not completely account for all the features of the 'moral necessity' that Macaulay identifies with freedom of the will. We attempt to clarify Macaulay's account of the nature of free will by locating it in relation to the eighteenth century debate on the will with which she is engaged, and briefly raise the question of whether her version of the doctrine of moral necessity is coherent.

Dr Martin Black, Boston University

The Socratic Turn in Plato's Phaedo, Parmenides, and Symposium

Recently, more studies of Plato have paid attention to the dialogue form as an aspect of his comprehensive intention. This procedure implies that rather than focus on Plato's ostensible development we need to account for Plato's depiction of Socrates' development or the "Socratic turn." This term denotes Socrates' criticism of "the inquiry into nature" and turn to an inquiry orientated by dialogue, the forms, and erÅ s. The "Socratic turn" is shown in three stages through Socrates' "intellectual autobiography" in the Phaedo, the "first part" of the Parmenides, and Socrates' instruction in erÅ s in the Symposium. The Phaedo passage shows Socrates' criticism of versions of materialism and teleology for abstracting from our incorrigible experience of the unity of things and from our experience that it is our opinions of what it is better to do that are "the true cause" of our actions. Socrates' hypothesis of the forms is intended to furnish the ground for his return of philosophy to its origins in the comprehensive horizon of opinion. Parmenides criticizes this hypothesis for effectively turning the unity or form of things into a thing, but also asserts that some such hypothesis is necessary for philosophy. Socrates' instruction in erÅ s in the Symposium is intended to vindicate the philosophical life against its poetic and political alternatives, by demonstrating that the forms are inherent in human experience, which experience we normally misunderstand. The interpretation of the stages of the Socratic turn provides a plausible basis for the mix of wisdom and ignorance Socrates claims

generally in the dialogues. It also shows Plato's concentration upon the problem of theory and practice: the broadest perspective on practical concerns is motivated by theoretical and not ethical demands.

Ms. Stephanie Lewis, Municipal Capital Management, LLC

Lewis and the Australians

This paper continues in the series of AAP presentations on the correspondence of David Lewis. The influence of Australian philosophers, (including many temporary ones) and Australian philosophy on David cannot be overstated. The title is a bit of a gimmick. The paper will discuss David's correspondence on a wide variety of topics. It will illustrate a number of interchanges, and I hope show that Australia and its philosophers had an enormous impact on the development of David's philosophical style as well as on his views. Topics discussed will include several of the great issues of metaphysics -- causation, mind and body, universals, and secondary qualities. In addition, some less-than-earth-shaking interchanges will be presented. The purpose of the paper is to illustrate the influence of Australians, and Australia, on David.

Meta-ethics

Ms. Jacklyn Cleofas, National University of Singapore

Fallible Omniscience: Wittgenstein's Argument Against Moral Naturalism

In "A Lecture on Ethics," Wittgenstein explicitly adopts some of Moore's ideas: "My subject, as you know is Ethics, and I will adopt the explanation of that term which Professor Moore has given in his book Principia Ethica." Despite this reference, Wittgenstein's and Moore's similar views on ethics have not been explored much. Darwall, Gibbard and Railton note that unlike Moore, Wittgenstein recognized that attributing moral goodness to something cannot be captured by a complete description of that thing in terms

of its natural properties because action-guidingness is semantically built into the former but not the latter. Nevertheless, nobody saw that Wittgenstein also presents an improved version of Moore's argument. This paper seeks not only to demonstrate that Wittgenstein's argument against moral naturalism is similar to Moore's well-known open question argument; it also argues that Wittgenstein's argument is better. This argument is based on the possibility that someone who knows all natural facts could fail to know whether something is morally good. Wittgenstein's argument anticipates and even improves on contemporary versions of Moore's argument by highlighting something that any metaethical theory has to account for: disparity between knowledge of the natural features of something and knowledge of that thing's moral worth. Unlike Moore, who tried to establish that moral properties are not natural by focusing on the semantic incongruity between being morally good and having some natural property, Wittgenstein uses the epistemic discrepancy between moral and natural knowledge to show that moral properties are either non-natural or non-existent.

Mr Benjamin Herscovitch, The University Of Sydney

John Rawls' Political Account Of Justice As Meta-Ethics

Arguably the most striking feature of John Rawls' thought post-Political Liberalism is the explicitly political account of justice advanced. At the heart of this political account of justice is the claim that what is just is a function of the overlapping consensus of normative commitments held by the relevant subjects. Whilst this inter-subjectivist account of justice has received a great deal of attention from political philosophers, it has been largely ignored by meta-ethicists. In this paper I will argue that Rawls' political account of justice yields a relativistic form of moral constructivism. Like the classical pragmatism of Williams James and John Dewey, which recommends that the notion of "truth" be reconceptualised and understood in terms of epistemic utility, Rawls' political account of justice terminates in a reconceptualisation of the notion of "moral truth". In particular, it entails that the truth of a moral truth-claim is relative to the overlapping consensus of normative commitments held by the relevant subjects. The crux of my unorthodox

interpretation of Rawls' thought is that the corollary of Rawls' political reconceptualisation of justice is a cognitivist, relativist and thoroughly anti-realist version of moral constructivism. Over the course of this paper I will respond to some of the most significant criticisms that might be made of my Rawlsian version of relativistic moral constructivism.

Dr. Richard Wei Tzu Hou, National Chung Cheng University, Taiwan

What Deflationism Can and Cannot Do to Expressivism

Traditional expressivism has two major theses: (M) metaphysically, there are no normative facts or properties; (S) semantically, normative sentences have no truth value, no truth condition, and no content (/meaning).This paper consists of two parts regarding what deflationism can and cannot do to expressivism respectively. The first part gives an analysis of the relation between (M) and (S) in terms of which how deflationism helps expressivism to get rid of the unnecessary burden of holding (S) is explained. Also analysed is some misconception of the relation between deflationism and (S).The second part addresses the issue raised by recently developed so-called creeping or sweeping minimalism, that deflationism is responsible for giving a deflationary way to know about normative facts and properties. It is shown that the above mistaken view results from some puzzling interpretation and application of the deflationary theory of reference. Deflationism cannot help argue for or against expressivism in any conceivable way.

Professor Michael Smith, Princeton University

Between Thick and Thin

Susan Hurley coined the term 'centralism' for the view that the general ethical concepts (ie the thin ones) right and ought are logically prior to and independent of the specific ethical concepts (ie the thick ones) such as just and unkind. Non-centralism, by contrast, is the view that there is no such priority or independence. My aims are three-fold: first, to identify a class of concepts that is in-between the specific and the general; second, to argue that the general ethical concepts are not logically prior to and independent of this in-between class; and third, to say a little about the relationship between the sort of non-centralism I thus favour and the kinds of non-centralism that are more commonly defended.

Mr David Plunkett, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

The Closure Argument Against Metaethical Nonnaturalism

In this paper, I give an argument against metaethical nonnaturalism that draws on Jaegwon Kim's so-called "closure argument" from the philosophy of mind. I start by considering the following three claims: 1) Any cause of a physical event is itself a physical event. Call this "the closure thesis". 2) Normative properties are not naturalistic properties and, hence, are not physical properties. Call this position "metaethical nonnaturalism". 3) Epistemic contact with normative facts can have causal upshot in terms of normative beliefs and hence human action. Call this the "explanatory role thesis". I argue that these three claims are inconsistent on the following grounds. Consider the event of an agent A forming a belief about what she should do. Insofar as we accept the explanatory role thesis, we are committed to holding that a) the content of this belief can be formed partly on the basis of epistemic contact with normative facts and b) that such a belief can help produce a human action. Assuming that human actions are physical events, then, according to the closure thesis, coming into epistemic contact with normative facts must itself be a physical event. Yet, given that nonnaturalistic properties by definition cannot be part of purely physical events, this is precisely what metaethical nonnaturalism denies. Therefore, the metaethical nonnaturalist must a) deny the closure thesis, one of the core tenets of modern physics and/or b) endorse an epiphenomenalism about normative judgment (i.e. reject the explanatory role thesis). I argue that these options are not only philosophically problematic but also run counter to the arguments that leading contemporary metaethical nonnaturalists such as Parfit, Scanlon, and Shafer-Landau themselves give in support of their view. I then consider and reject another possible response on behalf of non-naturalism:

namely, to reject the assumption that epistemic contact requires causal contact.

Dr. Richard Paul Hamilton, School of Philosophy and Theology University of Notre Dame Australia

Character, Complicity and Imagination in Vincent Amorim's Good (2008)

Amorim's film (based upon C.P. Taylor's stageplay) compellingly portrays the moral degeneration of Proust scholar, Jorg Halder (Viggo Mortensen) during the rise of the Nazis. A series of relatively trivial decisions leads him into collaboration with the regime, membership of the SS and finally active participation in the Final Solution. These decisions are mirrored in his personal life by his abandonment of his wife and children following an affair with a student. Both personal and political betrayal is involved in the breakdown of his longstanding relationship with his Jewish friend Morris. The power of the film stems from its utter psychological plausibility. No elaborate psychological or ideological explanation are needed to explain Halder's corruption. Vanity, ambition and conformism all play their part but the simplest and most convincing explanation is that Halder simply has a weak character. He is unable to respond appropriately to the seriousness of the decisions he is called upon to make. He fails to situate those decisions in a broader moral context and see their full significance. Above all, he lacks moral imagination. Recent allegedly empirically-grounded criticisms of Virtue Ethics appear to problematise such a judgment. According to the Situationalist critique, character is a fiction which masks the powerful influence of social setting on our decisions. Studies such as the Millgram and Stanford Prison experiments apparently establish that we are much more susceptible to external influence than our commonsense conceptions of character allow. If this interpretation is correct, then the most we can say about Halder is that he is Everyman. Such a conclusion ought to trouble us. In this paper therefore, I hope to respond to the Situationalist challenge in three ways. Firstly, I will argue that the notion of character is indispensible, especially when confronted

Mr Masafumi Matsumoto, Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, ANU

How to end a metaethical war between cognitivists and expressivists

One of the questions in metaethics is about how moral language works. There are two main contenders: cognitivism and expressivism. Some philosophers argue that cognitivism is the correct theory about moral language, while others argue that expressivism is the correct one. There is a battle between cognitivism and expressivism, in order to decide which position is the correct theory about moral language. But is this battle necessary? I think there is no need to decide which position is the correct theory about moral language; in my view, these positions are concerned with different projects and both of these projects are essential in accounting for how moral language works. My strategy is the following. Firstly, I will set up the scene by briefly explaining what cognitivism and expressivism are and over what the defenders of these positions are fighting against one another. Secondly, I will clarify what it means for cognitivism and expressivism to oppose to one another. I will use the framework of what I call the elimination question in order to analyse the situation. Also, I will draw a line between the strong version and the weak version of each position; this distinction will help us see what the battle between cognitivism and expressivism should be like. Finally, I will offer an argument for my view that there is no battle between cognitivism and expressivism over the elimination question. This argument comes with two simple premises. I will examine each premise in turn, and show how these premises lead us to the conclusion that there is no battle between cognitivism and expressivism over the elimination question.

Prof Jeanette Kennett, Macquarie University

Moral Reasoning in vitro and in vivo

Much of the recent research on moral judgment in the social and cognitive sciences focuses on subjects' responses to vignettes which impose a forced choice (approve/disapprove, appropriate/inappropriate) on them or which

present them with highly unusual or disgusting scenarios - for example various versions of the trolley problem or sex with animals. No doubt many useful things can be learned from such studies- such as the ways in which moral opinions co-vary with socio-economic status - but it is at least not clear that they shed as much light as is claimed on the cognitive processes involved in moral reasoning - and so on implications for meta-ethical debates - in part because they do not and perhaps cannot take account of the cross temporal aspects of moral reasoning in everyday life. Our moral choices have histories as well as consequences, and many of the most important moral decisions we make are not the work of a moment. I suggest some alternative interpretations of the responses derived from these studies and consider the implications for meta-ethics and moral cognition research.

Dr Josh Parsons, Otago University

Command and consequence

The "standard view" of imperatives found in prescriptivists such as R.M. Hare and J.J.C. Smart suffers from serious problems having to do with consequence relations between imperative and indicative sentences. I argue that these problems cannot be solved without abandoning the standard view, and suggest an alternative account of imperatives that will hopefully be friendly to prescriptivism.

Mr. David Mollica, The Australian National University

Disregarding Moral Considerations

Much moral philosophy has been concerned with developing arguments to convince the moral agent that he ought all-things-considered to act morally (or, at least, not immorally) even when he judges that a) he would benefit greatly from acting immorally, and b) the probability of his immoral acts being detected and punished is very low. Some of these arguments try to show that, despite appearances, it is not really in the agent's interest to act immorally. The agent's immoral acts might, for example, incur him

a significant emotional cost, diminish his sense of self, or impair his ability to participate fully in relationships based upon love or friendship. A related line of thought familiar from various religious traditions asserts that moral agents never really escape detection and punishment for their unrepented wrongdoings; rather, they find their punishment in a future existence. Other arguments are based on the claim that moral agents ought to be moral because at least some moral imperatives are justified — they are based on objective moral facts, capable of being reflectively endorsed by rational agents, required by the respect due to autonomous rational agents, and so on. Still others attempt to align the requirements of morality with those of practical rationality, so that the moral agent who acts immorally, even according to his own lights, is thereby practically irrational. Some of these arguments overlap somewhat. I argue that there are some possible moral agents for whom these arguments all fail to provide adequate reason to behave morally in circumstances in which they have judged both a) and b) and that, all-things-considered, these agents ought to act in accordance with their will. I conclude by discussing the possible psychological profile of such morality-immune moral agents and the question of whether their existence could be established empirically.

Ms. Alison Duncan Kerr, The Ohio State University

Emotions: Static vs. Dynamic Assessments

Emotions are not merely isolated events. An agent's emotion usually fits into a pattern of similar emotion types. I introduce a new account of emotion assessments that reflects the fact that emotions fit into these sorts of patterns. This account involves a distinction between an agent feeling a single emotion in a particular situation (static) and an agent feeling a pattern of similar emotions in similar situations (dynamic). Nearly all theories of emotions that specifically discuss assessments are concerned with the former only. This is a mistake—I argue that a theory of emotion assessments that aims to supply a sufficient understanding of emotional excellence (or well-functioning emotions) must be able to capture assessments of not merely singular emotional episodes, but also assessments of patterns of emotions. Dynamic assessments show how well one is using information about previous

emotional states in the regulation of one's future states, whereas mere static assessments do not yet reveal the extent to which one has control over one's emotions. It is only through the dynamic assessments that emotional excellence is truly revealed.

Dr Karen Jones, University of Melbourne

Guiding Action by Reasons

The clearest cases of guiding action by reasons have the following shape: the agent judges certain considerations to be reason-giving in a context, deliberates about where the weight of these reasons lies, decides what all-things-considered she should do and acts accordingly. At the other extreme, as apparent paradigms of failure to guide action by reasons, are Freudian cases where what is done is only later, and perhaps after prompting by a third party, reinterpreted as action rather than mere happening. Where, between these two extremes, are we are we to locate the divide between action guided by reasons and action that is not? I investigate a series of cases that suggest this distinction is harder to draw than might be supposed. I start from standard inverse akrasia cases where the agent non-accidentally acts as she has most reason to do because her emotional capacities allow her to track her reasons despite failings in her judgment. Here those of us with anti-intellectualist intuitions are tempted to say that the agent's action is guided by reasons. Inverse akrasia cases sometimes also involve "masked reasons," where the agent is mistaken about the consideration that she is responding to, thinking it is one thing when actually she is tracking something quite different. If we allow that standard inverse akrasia cases count as action guided by reasons, it seems we should allow that these do too. Now remove the "masking reason". If its presence was irrelevant to determining whether action was guided by reasons in the previous case, then removing it should make no difference. But remove the masking reason and you have a Freudian case. Where did we go wrong?

Dr Nicole Saunders, Deakin University

Critiquing Smith on Williams and internal reasons attributions

Michael Smith's a critique of Bernard Williams on internal reasons involves two important exegetical errors. I will clarify these errors and show how such clarification allows us to see how Williams can close the door on ambitious normative revisions to the set of plausible reasons-attributions one might make to the motivational set of an agent ignorant of some fact. Furthermore, this also allows us to better understand Williams's notion of a 'sound deliberative route' and gives us a new appreciation of Williams's position on internal reasons and lends added plausibility to his view that reasons attributions must be agent-relative.

Dr. Jennie Louise, University of Adelaide

The Good, the Bad and the Ugly: Normative Priority and the Value/Disvalue Distinction

These days many meta-ethicists have adopted the view that an object's having some evaluative property (e.g., being admirable) can be explained in terms of the existence of reasons for a pro-response (e.g., admiration) towards the object. Much attention has been given to defending this claim about the priority of the normative against the so-called "Wrong Kind of Reason" objection (which argues that such accounts cannot properly differentiate those reasons which entail evaluative facts from those which do not). However, there is another potential difficulty for normative-priority accounts, which has to date been inadequately explored: namely, how to differentiate pro-responses (which ground claims of value) from con-responses (which ground claims of disvalue). I argue that this issue does in fact pose a serious problem for advocates of the normative priority thesis — at least, in the form which most of its advocates wish to defend. I explore the idea that the phenomenon of emotional valence might be used to ground the value/disvalue distinction, and conclude that this is not as promising an avenue as it may seem.

Meta-philosophy

Dr Rachael Briggs, The University of Sydney

Decision Rules and Voting Rules

Evidential decision theory (henceforth EDT) and causal decision theory (henceforth CDT) both advise agents to maximize expected value. The two theories give different definitions of expected value, so their advice sometimes conflicts. In certain famous cases of conflict----medical Newcomb problems----CDT seems to get things right. In other cases of conflict, including some recent examples suggested by Andy Egan, EDT seems to get things right. Ratificationism looks like a promising way of combining the theories' insights, and refined ratificationist proposal by Ralph Wedgwood, which I call Benchmark Theory or BT, gets things right in both the medical Newcomb problems and the Egan examples. Unfortunately, there are other examples where both CDT and EDT get things right, while BT gets things wrong. It's no accident, I claim, that all three decision theories fail. Decision rules are analogous to voting rules, and the problematic examples have the structure of voting paradoxes. The upshot of voting paradoxes is that no voting rule can do everything we want. Likewise, the upshot of the decision theoretic paradoxes is that no decision rule can do everything we want in every situation. Luckily, the so-called `tickle defense' establishes that EDT, CDT, and BT will do everything we want in a wide range of situations.

Professor Paul Horwich, New York University

Can Philosophy be Theoretical?

Philosophers have traditionally been prone to engage in systematic, explanatory, theorization projects -- aiming to unearth, for example, the foundations of morality, or the principles of truth-making, or the semantics of natural language. The present paper will appraise Wittgenstein's notorious meta-philosophical dictum that such projects are misguided and that we should respond to philosophy's long-standing theoretical questions, not by attempting to answer them, but by exposing them as products of scientistic confusion.

Dr. Henry Jackman, York University

Two sorts of skepticism about intuition

There are two sorts of views that could be labeled "skepticism about intuitions". The first doubts that what philosophers refer to as their 'intuitions' when investigating knowledge, reference, justice and the like really are a reliable guide to their subject matter. Such skeptics could be characterized more specifically as a pessimist about intuitions, while those who think that appeals to intuitions in philosophy are justifiable can thus be characterized as optimists about intuitions. The second type of skepticism questions whether "intuition", really picks out an explanatorily useful epistemic kind in this area. The skepticism is not so much about the value of those judgments that we label "intuitions" in philosophy, but rather about whether that value can be explained in virtue of these judgments being intuitions. With this second type of skepticism in mind, we can (speaking very roughly) distinguish realists about intuitions, philosophers who think "intuitions" must share some substantial epistemically explanatory property, and nominalists about intuitions, who think that "intuition" is currently just a catch-all term for judgments that philosophers find themselves inclined to label as such. If one is inclined to be pessimistic about intuitions, nominalism might seem natural. However, this paper will, though a discussion of a number of problematic attempts to underwrite optimism from within a realist framework, argue that nominalism makes more sense for the optimist as well.

Dr Jack Reynolds, La Trobe

Transcendental Arguments: Analytic and Continental Philosophy

In this paper, I present a paper I have coauthored with James Chase (UTas) on transcendental arguments, which examines some of the various arguments for and against their use in philosophy, and argues that the methodological decision on whether or not they are viable is a significant factor in the 'divide'. We also examine the extent

to which the deployment of them has been important in certain philosophers coming to be labelled 'postanalytic', and in a corresponding shift in the citation rates of such philosophers in major analytic journals. Time permitting, it will also be suggested that their use (or otherwise) also helps to differentiate pragmatism (and perhaps feminism) into two camps that are roughly isomorphic with what we have come to call analytic and continental philosophy respectively.

Mr Raphael Fiorese, Monash University

Philosophy: Still Autonomous after All these Years

I review some recent challenges to the evidential use of intuition in philosophical theorizing and take issue with an argument put forward by Robert Cummins to the effect that "philosophical intuition is epistemologically useless". I then try to motivate a construal of the nature of the targets of philosophical intuition which, I argue, allows us to make good sense of the evidential appeal to intuition in philosophy. I conclude with a note on the autonomy of philosophy.

Metaphysics

John Fox, La Trobe University

Why the Case Against Propositions is Stronger Than You Thought

There is a well-known Quinean argument against ontologising "meanings" or "propositions", based roughly on the maxim "no entity without identity", i.e. that we should not countenance entities K unless we have applicable criteria for a being the same K as b. The gist of the argument is that the criteria to determine whether two sentences express the same proposition depend on criteria to determine their synonymy; that since we lack applicable criteria to determine this, we lack them for the identity of propositions; so we should not countenance them.

I argue that this is just the weaker horn of a dilemma. There is a maxim , which I call the nominalist policy, even more cogent than 'no entity without identity'. This spells out how under certain circumstances, even where we did have such criteria for identity, we should not countenance the entities. I show that in the case of propositions, such circumstances hold. So given both horns, the case against propositions is much stronger than is generally realised.

I do not in fact go to bat for the Quinean maxim. I consider the other horn functions quite well in unicorn fashion, and is sufficient for lethal impalement. It is also telling in many other contests; for instance, against sentences (understood as types rather than as tokens) and against types in general.

Mr Dan Marshall, ANU

A new problem for linguistic ersatzism

Linguistic ersatzers claim to enjoy the benefits of possible world talk without incurring the cost of being committed to the existence of concrete possible worlds. They claim to do this by interpreting their possible world talk as talk about surrogates of possible worlds (or surrogates of the entire pluriverse of possible worlds) rather than talk about possible worlds themselves. Typically, linguistic ersatzers hold that: i) possible world surrogates (or pluriverse surrogates) can be set-theoretically constructed out of individuals and properties;   ii) these surrogates can be used to analyze modal notions such as possibility, necessity and counterfactuality in terms of a single primitive modal notion; and   iii) individuals and properties only contingently exist.   I will provide a new argument that linguistic ersatzers cannot consistently hold i)-iii).

Dr Paul Kabay, University of Melbourne

You Just Can't Say No: On the Undeniability of Trivialism

Trivialism is universally considered to be an unacceptable view and so should be discarded - but I present reasons in this paper for rejecting this assessment. I argue that in order to deny a given view, one must assert an alternative view. But, as I argue, one cannot assert an alternative view to a conjunction by asserting one of its conjuncts. But given that trivialism is the view that

consists of the conjunction of all propositions, there are no alternative views to trivialism. Precisely because everything is part of the content of trivialism, one cannot deny it. But a position that one cannot deny shouldn't really be thought of as problematic, and so we should make our peace with trivialism and learn to live with it.

Dr Antony Eagle, University of Oxford

Location

Many philosophical debates—including those over persistence, mereology, and composition—are sensitive to issues about which regions of space and time are the locations of material objects. Yet the location relation itself has received perhaps less attention than it is due. Following some recent work by Josh Parsons, I develop a framework for discussing relations between regions and their occupants. I then describe three relations, each of which is a plausible candidate to be location. I argue that only one of these candidates is able to accommodate everything that is true of locations. This result has a number of applications; I discuss one, the currently popular topic of extended simples.

Emeritus Professor Graham Nerlich, University of Adelaide

How the Leibniz Shifts Backfire

Leibniz shifts, and Poincare "nocturnal doubling" arguments are routinely cited as shining illustrations of (i) the shaving power of Ockham's razor and the methodology of parsimony (ii) the ease with which one can fall into hoarding ontic garbage. The arguments misfire either because they make no sense outside Euclid or they don't yield the promised symmetry; this can be made obvious in simple 2 dimensional examples. The shifts backfire because they entail nothing at all unless some space and its geometry are specified. Leibniz's aim was to detach thing-thing from thing-space spatial relations. But the failure to yield any result without a geometry shows the reverse - the former obviously depend on the latter. So the shifts are weapons in the arsenal of realism not relationism.

Dr Markus Schrenk, Nottingham University, UK

Being Indisposed

To say that something x is soluble means, roughly, that "if you were to put it in water (Tx), it would dissolve (Mx)". To say that something is not soluble means, then, that "it is not the case that if you were to put it in water it would dissolve". However, in ordinary language it feels also natural to say something else, namely that something is not soluble just in case "it would not dissolve if you were to put it water". This paper investigates whether and when there is a difference between the external negation (EN) of a counterfactual associated with a dispositional predicate "not (if Tx then Mx)" and the internal negation (IN) of this counterfactual "(if Tx then not Mx)". I will claim that only for a limited (yet central) class of dispositions do (EN) and (IN) coincide. Yet, for the vast majority of cases, (IN) rather defines a further dispositional predicate, being indisposed, than to coincide with the (external) negation of being disposed. There is, however, still a logical/conceptual connection between the two: while, when something is not disposed, it still may or may not be indisposed (likewise, if it is not indisposed it may or may not be disposed), it can certainly not be disposed and indisposed at the same time.

Associate Professor Heather Dyke, University of Otago

The Trouble with Propositions

According to the standard view propositions are language-independent, mind-independent, atemporal, abstract entities, which are the primary bearers of truth and falsity. I argue that this standard view is a product of the philosophical tendency to conflate reality with language about reality that I call the representational fallacy. I think the standard view is false; there are no such things as propositions thus understood. Talk of propositions is just that: talk. It is a useful façon de parler which makes much of our talk about what we say go more smoothly, but it is a mistake to reify this talk. I then discuss examples of the sorts of disastrous consequences that can arise if we take talk of propositions ontologically seriously.

Professor Alexander Bird, University of Bristol (UK) and Monash University

Can Dispositions Have Intrinsic Finks and Antidotes?

One might suppose that dispositions cannot have intrinsic finks and antidotes (masks). For what would then be the difference between having a disposition that for intrinsic reasons does not yield its manifestation, and not having that disposition at all? If that is right, then standard answers to certain important problems fail, for example the dispositional accounts of rule following or of intentional action, which require intrinsic finks or antidotes to respond to standard objections. In this paper I examine whether the dismissal of intrinsic finks and antidotes just given stands up, and if not, what does make the difference between possessing such a disposition and not possessing it. I suggest that there is a difference, and that there can be intrinsic interference with a disposition when that interference does not originate in a design feature (artificial entities) or a natural function (natural entities).

Dr Richard Corry, University of Tasmania

Can Dispositional Essences Ground the Laws of Nature?

A dispositional property is a tendency, or potency, to manifest some characteristic behaviour in some appropriate context. The mainstream view in the 20th Century was that such properties are to be explained in terms of more fundamental non-dispositional properties, together with the laws of nature. In the last few decades, however, a rival view has become popular. According to the rival view, some properties are essentially dispositional in nature, and the laws of nature are to be explained in terms of these fundamental dispositions. Indeed the supposed ability of fundamental dispositions to ground natural laws is the strongest reason to believe that some fundamental properties have a dispositional essence. I am sympathetic to the dispositional essentialist position, but in this paper I point out a serious obstacle to the claim that the laws of nature can be grounded in dispositional essences.

Prof William Lycan, University of North Carolina

Metaphysics and the Paronymy of Names

Paronymy--ambiguity that is not sheer ambiguity-- is underdiscussed by philosophers of language. And hardly anyone has noticed that _proper names_ are paronymous: Different occurrences of a single name have slightly and subtly different referents. I invoke this fact to illuminate some issues in metaphysics: a puzzle about fictional characters; Jenny Saul's phenomenon of referential opacity in the absence of opacity-inducing operators; the relation between persons and bodies; personal identity through time; and death.

Prof Max Cresswell, Victoria University of Wellington

Are Contingent Facts a Myth?

In pp.78-80 of Real Time II, Hugh Mellor presents a 'truthmaker' version of McTaggart's argument, which is designed to establish that there are no tensed facts. In this paper I consider the modal analogue of this argument, and shew first that, while there is a sense in which untensed facts might be held to make utterances of tensed sentences true, in that same sense non contingent facts can make utterances of contingent sentences true. I then shew that, while there is a sense in which tensed facts can be held to be contradictory, in that same sense contingent facts are equally contradictory.

Mr. David Gawthorne, University of New England, Armidale

Representational Presentism and Monotheism

William Lane Craig uses what may be called representational actualism to explain facts about past and future events, and about the various relations between past, present and future individuals, in a presentist theory of time. Oaklander objects to Craig's approach with the claim that it falls prey to the very problem purported by presentists to be solved by presentism: McTaggart's argument against A-theories of time. It is first proposed to substitute

temporally extended possible worlds for Craig's tensed possible worlds in order to reinforce representational presentism. However, this approach fails to differentiate between competing possible candidates for the actual history of the universe unless a leaf is taken out of Bourne's book and it is hypothesised that there can only be one actual, temporally extended possible world. Even so, there is nothing about a temporally extended possible world that makes it a more authoritative representation of the way the history of the universe was than any other representation of the past, including human memory. The only privileged representation of the past is a necessarily realised representation of the past. As the will of God is a necessarily realised, representation of the past and future of the universe, reference to the will of God (or something like it) as a representation of universal history grounds all truths about the past, the future and the relations between times.

Prof. Graham Priest, University of Melbourne

Contradiction and the Structure of Unity

The paper addresses the problem of the one and the many, in the form: what makes something with parts one thing, and not just a congeries? Consideration of the situation concerning a unity drives one into contradiction. In the paper, I will harness the contradiction to provide a solution to the problem, employing an appropriate paraconsistent notion of identity.

Professor Mathias Frisch, University of Maryland

Causes, Counterfactuals, and Non-Locality

In order to motivate the thesis that there is no single concept of causation that can do justice to all of our core intuitions concerning that concept, Ned Hall has argued that there is a conflict between a counterfactual criterion of causation and the condition of causal locality. In this paper I show that Hall's worry arises for causal structures simpler than that of double prevention, to which Hall appeals. I then propose and defend two strategies that advocates of counterfactual accounts of causation can pursue to respond to Hall's challenge: a 'field-theoretic' account of property instantiation and the adoption of a counterfactual sufficient condition of causal action-at-a-distance in place of Hall's 'process' condition of non-locality. I conclude that Hall's argument against counterfactual accounts is unsuccessful.

Dr Sungho Choi, Kyung Hee University

What is a dispositional masker?

Manley and Wasserman put forward an apparently strong objection to the conditional analysis of dispositions and propose an alternative account of the link between dispositional ascriptions and counterfactual conditionals. But I will argue that their discussion rests on a fundamentally wrong understanding of the phenomenon of masking. The key idea is that they neglect a crucial difference between cases of masking where the disposition is manifested because the appropriate stimulus conditions are present but a masker prevents the manifestation, on the one hand, and other plain cases where the disposition is not manifested because the appropriate stimulus conditions are not present. To develop this idea with rigour and clarity, however, it will be necessary to look closely into the context-dependence of dispositional ascriptions and the incompleteness of dispositional predicates.

Mr Takeshi Sakon, Kyoto University, The Faculty of Letters, Philosophy, (JSPS Research Fellow)

Tensed-Property Presentism and Causality

Presentism in philosophy of time is the thesis that only the present exists: what is past no longer exists and future does not yet. One of problems for presentism is that, if both past and future do not exist as the present does, it seems hard to give an account of past and future truths. There are several possible responses to the problem, according to which theories of presentism vary. In this paper, I shall focus on Tensed-Property Presentism first offered by J. Bigelow (1996), and briefly describe the general idea. Next, I shall raise the question of what the difference between Tensed-Property Presentism and Four-Dimensionalism would amount to be. Following this, I shall point out that Four-Dimensionalist

account of the direction of causation involves difficulties whereas Tensed-Property Presentism faces no such problems. If my attempt succeeds, it will be shown not only that the idea of tensed properties can help presentism, but also that it has an advantage over Fourdimensionalism with respect to the direction of causation.

Mr. Jamin Asay, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

Truthmaker Gaps

In this paper, I take up the topic of truthmaker gaps: truths that are true in spite of having no truthmaker. David Armstrong has charged those who believe in truthmaker gaps with being dualists about truth, and further suggests that we might need to be minimalists about truth for any truth we take to be a truthmaker gap. I argue that Armstrong's charge relies upon some false assumptions about the nature of truthmaking. In particular, I argue that truthmaker theory does not by itself offer a theory of truth, and that truthmaker theory is perfectly consistent with minimalism about truth. Still, I believe that Armstrong's demand for a systematic account of truthmaker gaps has yet to be met, and I take this paper to be a first step toward offering a defensible metaphysics of truthmaker gaps.

Professor Daniel Nolan, University of Nottingham

Defining Metaphysical Indeterminacy

There have been a number of recent theories providing theories of metaphysical indeterminacy, or of particular varieties of metaphysical indeterminacy, especially metaphysical vagueness. We do not yet have a satisfactory definition of what it is that these rival theories are rival theories of. This paper discusses the project of providing such a definition. The paper discusses why it would be good to have such a definition; why definitions currently in the literature are not entirely satisfactory; and what features we should look for in a definition of this kind. Then steps are taken towards constructing a more satisfactory definition of metaphysical indeterminacy. The paper offers a candidate analysis of what it is for there to be metaphysical indeterminacy, and concludes with some outstanding problems for that analysis.

Dr. Edward Zalta, Stanford University

Possible Worlds, the Lewis Principle, and the Myth of a Large Ontology

Each conception of possible worlds is defined by the principles that govern them. The most fundamental principle of Lewis's conception of worlds, for example, says: (absolutely) every way a world might be is a way that some world is (On the Plurality of Worlds: 2, 71, 86). This "Lewis Principle" grounds any reasonable theory of possible worlds, including those based on a more abstract conception of them. I review how a representation of this principle can be derived in object theory, and then show that the axioms from which it is derived are true in tiny models. (The last fact is confirmed using tools of computational metaphysics.) So Lewis's *theoretical* principle (prior to application) doesn't require a large ontology. I then argue that the axioms used in the derivation of the Lewis Principle are logical in nature and are analytic, by analogy with other principles that we accept as logical and analytic. From this, one can argue that belief in possible worlds is more easily justified. We don't have to justify belief in worlds on a case-by-case basis; instead, we need only justify the Lewis Principle, and we can do so on the grounds that it is derivable from analytic truths.

Dr Neil McKinnon & Prof. John Bigelow, Monash University

Tensed Instantiation (Neil McKinnon and John Bigelow)

Elise has a son, so she is a mother. Since her son has been treading the Earth for some time now, it is also the case that she was a mother. Eternalists are able to treat both of these truths in the same way. Things stand differently with presentism. True enough, presentists are able to straightforwardly handle Elise's being a mother; Elise has the property of being a mother. Elise's having been a mother presents complications. Since presentists want to say that reality is exhausted by what is present, it seems that Elise's having been a mother must amount to her having

some property in the present. Unfortunately, that property cannot be plain motherhood. A standard enough move at this point is to say that Elise has the property of having been a mother. At this point, though, it is natural enough to wonder what the relationship is between the property of being a mother and this other property of having been a mother. For one thing, there is an intimate, but unexplained, relationship between a present-tensed property, and its past-tensed correlate. We think there is a preferable alternative. Presentists ought to stop thinking of *having been a mother* as being, fundamentally, a property that attaches to Elise. At base, presentists ought to think instead of the tenses as applying to instatiation. Thus, rather than having a single present-tensed instantiation tie, presentists should admit a past-tensed instantiation tie, and if there are future-tensed truths, a future-tensed tie should also be admitted.

Prof Stephen Mumford, University of Nottingham, UK

Powers and double prevention

Does A cause B merely if A prevents a preventer of B? In his last words on causation, David Lewis said that it does. Double prevention is causation for him because there is a counterfactual dependence involved when A prevents something that would have prevented B. There are a number of consequences of double prevention that suggest it ought not to be taken as a case of causation. It makes causation an extrinsic matter because whether B occurs is not dependent solely on its intrinsic features but also on what happens at other places and times. One of the alleged causes of the event is extrinsic to it. There is no continuous chain of events leading from the cause to its effect; indeed there is causation at a distance with nothing making a connecting bridge across the gap. Double prevention also involves causation by absence. The cause involves an absence of something — the absence of a prevention — and one might question whether absences are fit to be causal relata. Lewis accepts all these consequences as permissible in a theory of causation. I argue that they are not. Each of them is theoretically counterintuitive. Instead, a theory of causation is being developed that is based on an ontology of real dispositions where causation becomes the passing around of powers. It would be a consequence of such a view that double prevention cases are not cases of causation because no power is passed from A to B. An absence of prevention is taken as indicative of an absence of causation and one need not then accept that causation can be extrinsic, occur over a distance without a causal chain, or involve absences as relata.

Mr Matthew Hammerton, The University of Sydney

Fictionalism: a shopper's guide

Fictionalism is a position that attempts to explain how one can continue to make utterances in a region of discourse, such as mathematics or ethics, even if one does not believe the propositions expressed by such utterances. It is of particular interest in metaphysics where it has featured in a number of localized debates between realists and anti-realists. While a few fictionalist proposals are well known, many philosophers are not aware of the large variety of fictionalisms on offer. This paper attempts to rectify this by providing an overview of the different kinds of fictionalist positions. I suggest that there are four dimensions in which fictionalist proposals can vary and from these dimensions I derive 12 kinds of fictionalism. To support this, I offer examples of philosophical theses (both contemporary and historical) that appear to fall under each kind of fictionalism. Finally, I identify philosophical problems where a fictionalist analysis seems especially promising.

Ms. Angie Harris, University of Utah

One World is Not Enough: Two-Dimensionalism and Determinacy of Personal Identity

Is there a fact of the matter concerning the criteria of personal identity over time? If so, what is it? The two leading contenders are the same body and the same psychology, and the discussion surrounding the topic has largely been stuck in an either/or frame of mind. Recently, a number of philosophers have concluded that there is no fact to be found because the concept itself is indeterminate. In this paper I challenge this

conclusion focusing on Ted Sider's indeterminacy argument. Briefly, I claim contra Sider, determinacy is compatible with a multiple-candidate view. Secondly, I employ a two-dimensional semantic framework to analyze the concept. The two-dimensional analysis shows that the concept of personal identity is determinate. I consider one potentially fatal problem for the semantic view described above. Call this the argument from biological super-organisms. Finally, I sketch broad strokes for a hybrid view which reconciles the allegedly opposing views. In part, because of multiple use and eligibility conditions personal identity is precisely the kind of thing requiring multiple candidates while maintaining the ability to be determinate. I make use of Sider's own tools, influenced by Lewis, to cast doubt on his indeterminacy thesis as well as offer a positive account of 'person' coupled with the proposal that identity is a necessary relation. This more adequately captures the nature of persons in a way that illustrates the implausibility of the idea that personal identity is indeterminate.

Prof David Chalmers, Australian National University

Kaplan's Paradox and Epistemically Possible Worlds

Kaplan's paradox suggests that there is a possible world for every set of possible worlds, so that the possible worlds cannot comprise a set with a cardinality, and so that (arguably) there is something incoherent about the very notion of a possible world. Some (e.g. Lewis) have responded by denying the premise, holding that some apparent possibilities here are not possible. But this move is harder to maintain for those (like me) who think that there is a possible world for every epistemically possible scenario (one that cannot be ruled out a priori). And the problem arises in any case for the framework for epistemically possible worlds, or scenarios, which is central to epistemic two-dimensionalism among other applications. In this paper, I attempt to respond to Kaplan's paradox by developing a stratified system of epistemically possible worlds, with different sets of worlds corresponding to different cardinalities, and I argue that this system can do most of the work that we need possible worlds to do.

Dr Stephan Leuenberger, Australian National University / University of Glasgow

Logic for liberals about modality

Modal liberalism holds that everything is possible — with a few principled exceptions: roughly, those propositions that are ruled out by non-modal logic, broadly construed to include truths traditionally called `analytic', plus the uncontentious truth that what is necessary is true. It takes the slogan `there are no brute necessities' very seriously. But liberalism does not identify possibility with logical consistency. While it denies that there are any brute necessities, it allows that there could be — after all, nothing in non-modal logic rules out that there are brute necessities. Indeed, nothing in non-modal logic rules out fatalism, the view that the necessary coincides with the true. In this paper, I examine what modal logic a modal liberal can accept. A simple argument shows that the logic needs to provide the so-called "rule of disjunction": that if the disjunction of formulas `Lpi' is a theorem ($0 < i < n+1$), then at least one of pi is a theorem too (`L' is the necessity operator). Otherwise modal logic will dictate that ~pi, for some i, is impossible even though it is not ruled out by logic. The widely accepted logic S5 does not provide the rule of disjunction (for example, LMp v LM~p is a theorem even though neither Mp nor M~p is), and neither does KTB. Logicians have shown that there is a wide range of logics that do provide the rule, though, including KT, S4, and S4 with the addition of the McKinsey axiom M. I will suggest that among the normal modal logics, the liberal should only accept KT. However, she can adopt a non-normal logic that includes S4 and even M, provided she restricts the rule of necessitation in such a way that it does not apply to theorems derived with the help of

Mr. Graeme A. Forbes, Department of Philosophy, University of Sheffield

McTaggart's Dilemma

McTaggart famously claimed time is unreal on the grounds that the existence of more than one moment of time would involve a contradiction.

This argument has been used to set up a dilemma: philosophers have been asked to choose between a static view of time (according to which the sum-total of existence never changes) and Presentism (according to which the sum-total of existence consists solely of the present moment). This dilemma has been taken to show that Presentism is the only option for anyone who hopes to hold a dynamic view (i.e. a view on which the sum-total of existence does change). Though many, I among them, cannot identify the contradiction to which McTaggart refers, I argue that the only form the purported contradiction could take affects Presentism as much as any dynamic view of time. The purported contradiction, I claim, consists in different A-series being successively true of reality. If we replace these different A-series with different present moments, as the Presentist must, we do nothing to get rid of anything problematic in different A-series being true of reality. I reformulate McTaggart's argument in a way that doesn't appeal to any times other than successive present moments. I show, by contrasting Presentism with 'Parmenidean Presentism' that my reformulation of McTaggart's argument poses a problem for Presentism as serious as McTaggart's original argument ever posed for any view of time. The upshot is to deny to the Presentist any advantage they might have claimed over other dynamic theories of time in their response to McTaggart.

Dr Patrick Girard, University of Auckland

Defusing the conditional fallacy

The alethic antirealist analyses the notion of truth in terms of justifiability or rational acceptability. This commits the antirealist to define truth in terms of a counterfactual such as: Necessary, it is true that P just in case, if there were a suitably informed epistemic agent, she would believe that P. Planting, Rea, Wright and Brogaard and Salerno contend that this definition of truth entails a conditional fallacy. Briefly, it would commit the antirealist to believing that there is necessarily an epistemic agent. If this were

true, we would probably obtain a reductio of antirealism resting on a counterfactual analysis of truth. In this paper we aim to prove an impossibility claim: if a combinatorialist theory of possibility is assumed, no proof of the conditional fallacy is possible both either in classical modal logic or in intuitionistic modal logic enriched with formal resources for counterfactuals. Our conclusion is that the antirealist who opts for a combinatorialist theory of possibility does not fall afoul the conditional fallacy objection.

Mr Matthew Tugby, University of Nottingham

Varieties of Pandispositionalism

Roughly, pandispositionalism is the view that it is of the essence of all (natural) properties that they bestow dispositions or 'powers' upon their possessors. I begin by identifying three views which all appear to be pandispositionalist in spirit: dispositional monism (Mumford 2004, Bird 2007), the two-sided view (Martin 1993) and the identity view (Heil 2003, Martin 2008). I argue, however, that the identity view ultimately collapses into neutral monism, and so should not be regarded as a genuine form of pandispositionalism. I then outline what many take to be fatal objections to dispositional monism and the two-sided view, before sketching possible lines of defense. It is often argued that the picture presented by dispositional monism either contains a vicious regress (Lowe, 2006), or removes anything resembling substantial nature from the world (Heil, 2003). I suggest that if dispositional monism is cashed out in a certain way, then these worries lose their force. With respect to the two-sided view, it is often asked whether the 'categorical' and 'dispositional' sides of a property are contingently or necessarily related. If contingency is accepted, then the two-sided view arguably collapses into a form of property dualism (in which case it would no longer be a version of pandispositionalism), yet if necessity is accepted, we are left with what appears to be a brute, opaque necessity (Armstrong, 1997). In response, I suggest that if categoricity is understood in a certain way, one may be able to make putative categorical — dispositional necessity less opaque. I conclude, therefore, that neither dispositional monism nor the two-sided view should immediately be dismissed by those with inclinations towards pandispositionalism. In the end, the choice one

makes is likely to depend upon one's views on other philosophical issues, such as whether one holds there to be mental qualia.

Mr. Alexander Skiles, The University of Notre Dame

From Monism to Holism

Radically anti-pluralistic theses have made a comeback in contemporary metaphysics. The most widely discussed is priority monism, according to which, though there are many material objects, exactly one of them is fundamental: the maximal mereological fusion of them all, the world as a whole (cf. recent and forthcoming work by Ross Cameron, Jonathan Schaffer, Theodore Sider, and Kelly Trogdon). Traditionally, its proponents have been tempted by the still more radical thesis of relational holism: that every proper part of the world exists at least partially in virtue of the relations it bears to the remaining subworld objects. I argue that the more recent defenders of priority monism ought to follow course (for better or for worse).

Ms Tessa Jones, The University of Queensland

Comparing Constitution, Identity and Attributes on Cases of Replacement of Parts

Consider the Mona Lisa, the "greatest work of art" in history. The relation between the Mona Lisa and its parts (say, canvas and oil) remains a matter of debate. Some would have Leonardo's masterpiece identical to the matter which constitutes it. Others, such as Lynne Rudder Baker, would have it that relational properties (such as its place in the history of art) motivate thinking of the Mona Lisa as not identical to the matter which constitutes it and yet not distinct (separable) from the oil and canvas either (a material duplicate is a forgery). Thus the matter constitutes the masterpiece. A Spinozian notion of an attribute explains that the painting exists under differing attributes, thus allowing one thing (the painting) to be both the "greatest work of art in history" and a configuration of paint and oil without such deeper meaning. This paper compares different theories on test cases, such as whether the Mona Lisa in fact survived the addition of an oak frame and the watercolour touch up of the 1950s; whether, if the oil paint constituting the Mona Lisa was somehow separated from the canvas only to be laid back on it using a sophisticated paint by numbers, the painting would be the original; as well as cases beyond the standard problem of material constitution for objects, including that of roles. That is, how the case in which a role, such as Director of the Louvre, which can be instantiated by different individuals may illuminate our intuitions in other cases. If we prefer a theory which solves the widest range of cases, the case of roles may undermine constitution as a forerunning solution.

Ms. Reina Saijo, Hokkaido University

Naturalness and Eligibility

Naturalness and eligibility play important roles in David Lewis 's metaphysics. Naturalness is a metaphysical concept that applies to properties and relations. Lewis emphasizes that natural properties are the fundamental elements of the world, and that they are discoverable mainly by physics. On the other hand, eligibility is a metasemantic concept that applies to referents and interpretations. According to Lewis, these two concepts are interrelated. A set of objects is eligible as the extension of a predicate iff its members are things that share some natural property. Moreover, naturalness and eligibility are comparative. The more natural properties the things have, the more eligible referents they are, e.g. blueness is more eligible than grueness. A few questions, however, might well be raised about these concepts. How can we know whether a given property is natural or not? How can we tell when the referents of one term are more eligible than those of another term? In this paper, I will clarify Lewis 's concepts of naturalness and eligibility by examining these questions, and discuss what ontological basis that Lewis 's views has.

Mr Nigel Leary, University of Birmingham (UK)

Natural Kinds, Artifact Kinds and Anti-Essentialism

Natural kind essentialists claim that the world is organised objectively into a hierarchy of natural kinds, and that the mind-independent, intrinsic

essences of natural kinds demarcate them. On this view when we empirically investigate the world we are able to discover where nature is 'carved at the joints', and thus our classifications of the world capture fundamental facts of reality. In this paper I will defend two theses. In the first instance I will argue that the naturalness of natural kinds is redundant, and has been for some time following the synthesis of elements and compounds. Following LaPorte (2004) I will claim that what we really mean by 'natural' now is 'explanatory', and as such that the natural kinds are the explanatory kinds. However, I will also point out that what we know about synthesised natural kinds before they exist makes them, in many cases, remarkably similar to artifact kinds. The second thesis I will defend is John Dupré's (1995) pluralist ontology against Brian Ellis's (2001) six-category ontology. More specifically I will address the essentialist claims about the objectivity and intrinsicality of essences, and defend the view that although the properties of objects are themselves objective insofar as they exist independently of us, our classifications have a distinctly conventionalist flavour. My arguments will focus primarily on examples from chemistry, the mainstay of the contemporary essentialist. By challenging these key examples I hope to challenge the very cogency of natural kind essentialism.

Dr. Denis Robinson, University of Auckland

Metaphysical Questions and Contingency

The paper ruminates about metaphysical enquiry. An easy line of thought about metaphysics distinguishes metaphysical questions, answers to which are to be thought of as metaphysically necessary, from other questions — scientific questions, for instance — answers to which are to be thought of as merely contingent. This thought however conflicts with the fact that certain doctrines — for instance Humean Supervenience — seem to be contingently true at best, despite being debated in an a prioristic and metaphysical manner. I sketch an account of metaphysical concern with such cases, which I call "metaphysically local", and attempt to distinguish them from some more difficult kinds of case, involving questions appearing to have what I call "metaphysical generality". Some have suggested that such questions might also have contingent answers, but this can seem unpalatable. I discuss some of the issues raised by these debates.

Mr S.M.Hassan A.Shirazi, University of Brussels (Belgium)

A Truthmaker For Necessary Truths

In the course of his works on color, David Armstrong upholds the three following statements: i) Relation truthmaker: the property red and the property blue subsume under color in virtue of certain (internal) relation held between them, ii) Rigidity: the color terms 'red' and 'blue' are rigid terms, and iii)Physicalism: the property red, for instance, is identical with a certain type of molecular structure instantiated by the surface of a red object. On the side of critiques, almost all texts are concerned with rejecting his physicalism. However, even if his physicalism is well-established, I will argue that his approach suffers from a more fundamental problem: it is circular. To reveal this problem, I use Salmon's formalization of rigidity and a posteriori identity. Instead of denying his approach totally, my ambitious is to diagnose the problem from Armstrongian point of view. From this perspective, I see that it would be less costly to give up i. Moreover, there are also some independent reasons to drop i. For instance, it sounds more intuitive to maintain colorness of the property red apart from any (potential) relation that it might have with the property blue. In the place of i, I suggest a non-relation truthmaker: the symmetrical demonstration of physical properties which determine color properties. Due to the fact that 'red is a color' is a necessary truth, whatever is the truthmaker for falling red under color will be a truthmaker of a necessary truth as well. Therefore, my suggestion appoints to some helpful idea for notorious topic of 'truthmaker for necessary truths'.

Prof. Helen Beebee, University of Birmingham

Is there any evidence for libertarianism?

Libertarians claim not only that free will requires

that (at least some) decisions are metaphysically undetermined right up to the moment of choice, but that this condition is (at least sometimes) actually met — for example in what Robert Kane calles 'self-forming actions'. This paper concentrates on the second claim, and argues that there is, in fact, no evidence to support this empirical claim about the causal history of decision. Even if we grant that there is empirical evidence for indeterminism in general, this does not license the claim that all our decisions are indeterministically caused; and libertarians have no plausible story to tell about how we might have epistemic access to which of our decisions are indeterministically caused (and hence free) and which are not.

Dr Colin Shingleton, Swinburne University

Metaphysics of Interaction

The philosophical debate concerning the capacity of material object metaphysics to configure a secular ethics, an effective psychology or an existential aesthetics points to the need to rethink Anglophone philosophy's intellectual hegemony. New sciences like Biohermeneutics, biosemiotics, complexity theory, techniques for crisis management and endophysics which are tailored to problems beyond the scope of physicalist science require philosophical justification. Referring to Arran Gare's work on process metaphysics which prioritises events and processes ontologically, I shall use Wittgenstein and Heidegger to explore whether process philosophy is an ontological extension of material object metaphysics or whether it reaches beyond traditional metaphysics.

Dr. David Rathbone, PASI, University of Melbourne

On the intersubjectivity of topography in Malpas's Heidegger's Topology

In his Letter on Humanism Heidegger writes that "precisely through the characterization of something as 'a value', what is so valued is robbed of its worth." (Jeff Malpas Heidegger's Topology n.142

p.377). Space as a concept is generated out of place as an experience through a process of abstraction which, if misunderstood as an increase in ontological fidelity, inevitably perpetrates this same robbery. But if interpreted appropriately, phenomenology can reveal space as an actual experience of an "infinite given magnitude" (as Kant put it). The admission of this phenomenon is problematic for Heidegger's strict insistence upon finitude as the meaning of existence. However interpreting place as an essentially intersubjective phenomenon, the finitude of existence can remain essential, while the possibility of temporary transcendence into a realm of infinite consequence is not disallowed. While Heidegger's way of thinking sees intersubjectivity as essential to existence (i.e. if Dasein is always already Mitdasein, then dwelling means sharing), it also accesses transcendence through language, "the temple of Being". Finite existence is not incompatible with infinite consequence if the latter is accessible intersubjectively. The often misunderstood pertinence of etymology to this project will be clarified. Just as the person contriving to seek friends because they find out "mateship" is an "Australian Value" effectively prevents themselves from encountering the authentic joy of spontaneous friendship generated through shared experience, the contrived manufacture of a "place" on the ground of a mere space can only ever result in an ersatz experience of thinking. Drawing on both Theunissen's The Other and Mensch's Intersubjectivity and Transcendental Idealism, I aim to show the way in which Malpas in Heidegger's Topology indicates a direction which avoids the criticism leveled by Bourdieu in The Political Ontology of Martin Heidegger.

Dr Stuart Brock, Victoria University of Wellington

What Fictional Characters Could Not Be: The Creationist Fiction

In this paper I explain why creationism about fictional characters is an abject failure. It suffers from the same problem as theological creationism: the purported explanation is more mysterious than the data it seeks to explain. Unlike theological creationism, though, the phenomenon to be accounted for is not particularly mysterious in the first place. This uniquely philosophical variety of creationism does not explain why there is something rather than nothing, or why the

universe and elements within it have the appearance of design, or why some people have apparent experiences of a creator. Instead, creationism about fictional characters is put forward as the best explanation for why people occasionally say things that, if taken at face value, seem to entail that fictional characters exist and are created by their authors. One might wonder if taking the folk at their word in this way is appropriate, particularly when the same individuals deny these entailments when asked explicitly about them. One might already suspect that a better explanation, then, is that the folk are mistaken, or pretending, or speaking metaphorically, or speaking elliptically. I will not be exploring the merits of these alternative explanations, here, however. Instead I will attempt to show that when the details of creationism about fictional characters are filled in, the hypothesis becomes far more puzzling than the linguistic data it is used to explain. The basic idea is that no matter how the creationist identifies where, when and how fictional objects are created, the proposal conflicts with other strong intuitions we have about fictional characters.

Emeritus Professor Jack Smart, Monash University

From Physics to Metaphysics and Back Again

This paper will discuss a certain continuity between physics and metaphysics (and mention the curious reason for the appellation 'metaphysics'. It is not that metaphysics is the meta theory of physics.) It will explain the grain of truth in Rutherford's somewhat rude remark that science is physics plus stamp collecting.

Dr. Aidan Lyon, University of Sydney

Counterfactual--Probability

In this paper, I give an analysis of counterfactual-probability. I start with some examples of counterfactual-probability (the chaos game, population genetics models, and statistical mechanics) to motivate the analysis. I then argue that the best way to analyse counterfactual--probability is in

terms of a similarity relation over an ensemble of possibilities, and explore one way in which this can be done.

Dr Andy Egan, Rutgers University

Decision Theory for Time Travelers

Decision-making for time travelers isn't always straightforward. It's not obvious that what's good advice for the rest of us is good advice for time travelers. And what's good advice for time travelers depends on what the background metaphysics of time is like. I look at some options for how the metaphysics could be, and the consequences for how it's rational for time travelers to act. I also look at some related aesthetic issues about time travel fiction.

Normative Ethics

Dr Iwao Hirose, McGill University

Choosing what is rational

Here is a much-discussed (probably misleading) question on distributive justice in moral and political philosophy. John Rawls contends that self-interested individuals behind a veil of ignorance would "rationally" choose the maximin rule, whereas John Harsanyi and other proponents of utilitarianism contend that self-interested individuals in a similar hypothetical situation would "rationally" choose the maximization of average utilitarianism: who is correct? I will argue that there is no answer to this question. First, I consider what exactly Rawls and Harsanyi claimed, and elucidate the similarities and differences between Rawls's and Harsanyi's assumptions. Second, I will consider the recent literature of experimental economics concerning this question, and show that it is irrelevant. Third, I will argue that either of (1) or (2) is the case: (1) if the notion of rationality is understood in a minimal sense (i.e. the absence of inconsistencies), there is no answer because some basic properties that separate the maximin rule and average utilitarianism are not concerned with consistency requirements; (2) if the notion of rationality is more substantive than the absence of inconsistencies, the correct answer depends on our account of what rationality consists in, and therefore, the original question is about a disagreement concerning the notions of

rationality (but I will show that Rawls and Harsanyi agree to the basic notion of rationality).

Mr Dan Turton, Victoria University of Wellington

Defining Pleasure for Hedonism: Lessons from Science

A long-standing criticism of Benthamite Hedonistic Utilitarianism is that the pleasure it requires for its hedonic calculus does not exist. The criticism argues that the pleasures experienced from eating, sex, reading a good book, and contemplating the good life are so different that they are incommensurable. This inability to compare various pleasures entails that assessing the value lives or actions with hedonic calculus will be impossible in most cases. Despite some philosophers' recent attempts to avoid this criticism by redefining pleasure (e.g. Fred Feldman's Pleasure and the Good Life), there is still no widely accepted definition of pleasure that can unify the various 'pleasures' while remaining true to the everyday notion of pleasure. In this talk, recent findings in neuroscience are applied to this problem to argue for an account of pleasure that will satisfy scientists, classical hedonists and our general intuitions about pleasure.

Dr William Ransome, QUT

The Philosophy of Wellbeing: Aristotle to Sen and back again

Wellbeing has achieved talismanic status in several areas of social research and public policy, but what does it mean? A significant body of research and analysis concerning wellbeing has emerged across a number of research disciplines, yet the concept itself does not admit of any unified or consistent interdisciplinary interpretation. Social researchers and policymakers may look to philosophers for decisive definitional guidance, yet the nature of wellbeing has been sharply disputed throughout the Western philosophical tradition. Modern philosophical theories of wellbeing fall into three basic categories — 'hedonistic', 'desire', and 'objective list' approaches —

which mirror well-established doctrinal divisions between normative theories of utilitarian and deontological ethics. This paper briefly sketches a philosophical history of wellbeing, discusses the three broad competing contemporary specifications of wellbeing, and canvasses philosopher and economist Amartya Sen's hybrid freedom-based 'capabilities' approach. Sen's avowedly Aristotelian approach to the question of wellbeing nudges the contemporary philosophical discussion back towards its ancient Greek origins. This paper seeks to ground, strengthen and extend Sen's capabilities account of wellbeing by returning directly to its source — Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics — and especially to the central notions of human flourishing, practical wisdom and virtue.

Dr Toby Handfield, Monash University

The good in satisfying preferences

Supposing that there is some good in satisfying preferences, how do we compare the goodness of having no preference with the goodness of having a satisfied preference? I argue that the most plausible relationship is that these are incommensurate. I then show that this has some interesting implications for various problems in population ethics.

Mr. William Cunningham, University of New South Wales

The Quest for Unity in Ethics

The recent prevalence of discussions regarding moral dilemmas has served to emphasize what is a fundamental necessity in moral philosophy: theoretical and practical unity. There are several forms of moral dilemma, each arising out of an inconsistency inherent in a particular moral theory. Varying theories fall victim to varying forms of dilemma but most do face one or another. This theoretical vulnerability forces us to revise or reject our theories. If one is to escape this type of theoretical weakness it is necessary to hold to a theory that presents the moral life as a unified whole. Inasmuch as morality is both a theoretical and a practical endeavour, the adequate theory must both be theoretically coherent and able to unite personal and social beliefs and desires. In this paper I argue that there is one such theory that is capable of escaping moral dilemmas and providing the above type of unity. I present a teleological approach that draws on Aristotelian and Judeo-

Christian traditions. I argue that this theory is able to unite the obligations and desires of the individual and of rational beings as a whole, in such a way as to escape theoretical and practical inconsistency.

Mr Simon Roberts-Thomson, University of Arizona

Recognition Self-Respect and Equality

To have recognition self-respect is to recognise and respect a certain fact about oneself, namely that one has an intrinsic moral worth that is equal to the intrinsic moral worth possessed by every other person. An adequate theory of recognition self-respect must satisfy two criteria. First, it must provide us with an acceptable account of the conception of moral equality that is present within recognition self-respect. Second, it must be able to explain why self-respect is such an important personal good. In this paper, I examine two theories of recognition self-respect, namely those put forward by Thomas Hill and Catriona McKinnon, and argue that these fail to satisfy both criteria. I then present an interest-based account of the conception of moral equality present in recognition self-respect, and argue that this account is able to satisfy both of the above criteria.

Dr Caroline West, The University of Sydney

What Is This Thing Called Happiness?

What Is This Thing Called Happiness? The concept of happiness plays a central role in moral theory and in practical prudential deliberation. We generally think that happiness, whatever it is, is a good; something worth seeking for its own sake. But what, exactly, is the nature of this good? There are a variety of candidates available, ranging from hedonic states (such as pleasure) to local desire-satisfaction, life-satisfaction and/or flourishing of some broader kind. Which (if any) of these is happiness, and how should we decide?

Prof. Garrett Cullity, University of Adelaide

Loving the Bad

Loving the bad is bad, according to Brentano and Chisholm. They add that loving the good is good, hating the good is bad, and (with qualifications) hating the bad is good. However, these claims (even with the qualifications) are too crude to be true. Sometimes, loving the bad is good. There are some forms of loving the bad which we have reason to promote and celebrate. This paper offers a framework for understanding and explaining the differences between these cases. Its main focus is on understanding the way in which someone's enjoyment can provide us with reasons to promote it. Often, the fact that you will enjoy something is a reason for me to help you to get it. Brentano and Chisholm seem right that whether this is true depends on the object of your enjoyment. The fact that you will enjoy seeing someone suffer gives me no reason to procure that for you. However, their attempted explanation of this fails. It is not because malicious enjoyment is a case of loving the bad that I have no reason to promote it. So what explanation should we offer instead?

Dr Nin Kirkham, The University of Western Australia

Transcending our Biology: The Appeal to Nature in Virtue Ethics

Virtue ethicists generally agree that a virtue is a trait that a person needs to live a life characterised by eudaimonia (flourishing, happiness etc). However, this claim is compounded from two further interrelated claims; the first being that the virtues benefit the individual possessing them; and the second that the virtues make their possessor a good human being. While both these claims have invited criticism, the second, because it involves the controversial appeal to human nature, has given rise to disagreement over the viability of a modern version of virtue ethics. Many philosophers argue that the notion of an ethics founded upon an account of the essential features of human nature is inherently problematic. Humans, they argue, have in some sense 'transcended our biology', so an understanding of humans as a biological species is extraneous to ethical questions. In this paper, I examine and defend the appeal to nature, as a way to ground an

ethic of virtue, from some of the more common criticisms that are made against it. I ask whether there is any coherent sense in which we can say that humans have 'transcended our biology', and how we are best to understand the relevance of an account of 'human nature' to virtue ethics?

Dr Daniel Cohen, Charles Sturt University

The Puzzle of the Self-Torturer and Newcomb's Problem

Attached to your body is a shock generator with 1001 settings, ranging from no pain to excruciating agony. While you are barely able to distinguish adjacent settings, distant settings are easily distinguishable. Every day you are offered $10,000 in return for permanently raising the settings by 1. The puzzle is that while you will clearly be tempted, each day, to advance, you will nevertheless regret advancing beyond a certain point. So what should you do? Is there some point beyond which it is irrational to advance, despite the temptation, or are rational agents committed to advancing all the way to 1000? I will argue that we can better understand this puzzle by seeing an analogy with Newcomb's problem. According to causal decision theory you ought, every day, to advance, while according to evidential decision theory there is some point beyond which advancing is irrational.

Philosophy of Language

Prof Richard Holton, MIT

Facts, Factives and Contra-Factives

Frege begins his discussion of factives in 'On Sense and Reference' with an example of a purported contra-factive, i.e. a verb that entails the falsity of the complement sentence. But the verb he cites, 'wähnen', is now obsolete, and native speakers are sceptical about whether it really required the falsity of the complement sentence. Despite the profusion of factive verbs, there are no clear examples of contra-factive propositional attitude verbs in English, French or German. Where one would expect to find them one finds verbs that don't take sentential complements ('refute'; 'delude'; 'mistake'; 'hallucinate') or that don't require the falsity of the complement ('pretend'; 'wish'). One finds that one cannot even add negating prefixes to propositional attitude factives to obtain contra-factives, not even when the same prefixes can be affixed to related constructions taking NP-clauses. This paper attempts to give an explanation of why there are no contra-factives, and to use this to shed light on the behaviour of factives more generally. The suggestion is that factive propositional attitude verbs take facts, not propositions, as the referents of their complement sentences; and that as there are no contra-facts (merely false propositions), there can be no contra-factives. This claim is then used to help explain Timothy Williamson's observation that knowledge is the weakest stative propositional attitude factive.

Professor Meredith Williams, Johns Hopkins University

Master and Novice in the Later Wittgenstein

In the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein opens each major philosophical issue with a description of a child or a pupil learning, for the first time, language or arithmetic or sensation talk. This device is both methodologically important—a naturally occurring primitive language game that can be used in examination of philosophical theories and pictures—and explanatorily important. The master-novice relation is a window onto the nature of normativity, the kind of primitive normativity that underwrites our more sophisticated uses of language.

Mr. David Ripley, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

Against Structured Propositions

Linguists and philosophers of language commonly agree that sets of possible worlds cannot be propositions---they do not individuate finely enough. Proposed substitutes for possible worlds tend to fall into two camps: the circumstantialist and the structuralist. Circumstantialist views hold that possible worlds are not enough; impossible circumstances too must be acknowledged. Structuralist views make do with only possible

worlds by holding propositions to be internally structured; typically this structure is derived from sentential syntax. I'll argue that structuralist views face serious problems not shared by circumstantialist views, and that extant arguments against circumstantialist views miss their target.

Mr Stephan Kubicki, University of Melbourne

Propositions, Kaplanian semantics, new-wave relativism

Recent debates about semantic relativism have been conducted in terms of the theory developed by Kaplan in his "Demonstratives". This raises the question of what broader philosophical import this debate has for those who don't accept Kaplan's semantic theory. Some participants to the debate, such as Max Kolbel and Francois Recanati, have claimed that the debate is philosophically significant because it has consequences for traditional philosophical concerns about the nature of propositions. While I agree that that is what is at stake, I also believe that conducting the debate in terms of Kaplan's semantics obscures those concerns. More specifically, it's one thing to argue about the correct assignment of semantic values to some class of linguistic expressions, it's quite another to argue about the nature of what we assert, and what beliefs we express, when we utter sentences containing such expressions. In short, there's an important distinction between semantic values, which are part of the subject matter of linguistics, and propositions, which are part of the subject matter of philosophy of language. I can not argue for this claim in full generality here; instead I will refute interpretations of Kaplan which read him as identifying semantic values with propositions. My method is straightforward: I will note those places where what Kaplan writes suggests that he identifies semantic values with propositions; then I will develop a more sophisticated and accurate reading, according to which Kaplan does not identify semantic values with propositions. This will show, at least, that Kaplan's "Demonstratives" offers no support for

conducting debates about semantic relativism in terms of Kaplan's semantics. What is required is either a supplementary argument showing that Kaplan's semantic values can be identified with propositions, or a direct investigation into the nature of propositions. I hope to say more about these soon.

Mr Brian Rabern, Australian National University

Why double indexing?

In the 1960's theorists working in the science of language began applying the powerful tools of model-theory to the study of languages involving "context-dependence" or "indexicality" -- the phenomenon that the extension (or intension) of certain expressions depends on the context of use. Early theorists, e.g. Montague (1968), Scott (1970), and Lewis (1970), proposed that we simply expand the indices used for intensional languages (e.g. modal and tense logic) to include the relevant contextual coordinates. A model-theory that made use of these expanded indices was thought to afford a formal unified treatment of both intensionality and indexicality -- what Lewis later called "a happy coincidence". Several problems, however, were immediately presented and the model-theory used in the study of indexicality was succeeded by the now orthodox doubly-indexed semantics. A major motivation away from single index theory toward double-indexing was a dilemma presented by Kaplan (1977). I will rehearse Kaplan's dilemma and show that the single index theorist does not actually fall victim to this dilemma. Thus, the most commonly appealed to argument for double-indexing fails and, in fact, Kaplan's considerations provide no motivation toward a system of double indexing. This raises the question -- Why double-indexing? In the remainder of the paper I will present two further motivations for double-indexing. One due to Lewis (1980) via Cresswell (1973) and the other due to Kamp (1971). Since the various motivations for double-indexing are fundamentally different they provide us with different theoretical and philosophical import -- I will draw out a few morals for the study of indexical intensional languages.

Dr Conrad Asmus, University of Melbourne

Expression, truth and use in a trivial language.

"Doesn't triviality ensue? Isn't every sentence (therefore) both true and false? Yes." (Azzouni, Tracking Reason 2006, pg 101-102) Prima facia natural language appears inconsistent and tradition says that a contradiction entails any sentence. Most people take this as reason to either reject the inconsistency of natural language or to employ a paraconsistent logic. Jody Azzouni takes the road less trodden; he accepts the consequence that every sentence is true and false. Nonetheless, Azzouni argues, natural language remains useful for our purposes. In this presentation I will use Azzouni's position to throw further light on the connections between meaning, use and truth. I will argue that the very principles which Azzouni uses to rescue his position from absurdity should force him to recognise that the arguments leading to his position are mistaken.

Mr. Umut Karagoz, Middle East Technical University

On Metaphysical Status of "Language Game" in Later Wittgenstein

The purpose of this study is to present the metaphysical status of "language game" in later Wittgensteinian philosophy of language and to deal with the revolutionary role of "language-game" by means of Hintikka 's interpretation of later Wittgenstein. It is usual to divide Wittgenstein's work into the early and the later period. The early period is based upon the picture theory of meaning, according to which a sentence represents a state of affairs. On the other hand, the later period gives special emphasis on the actions of people and the role their linguistic activities. In the later work, Wittgenstein emphasizes everyday usage of language in "language-game" as social activities of ordering, advising, measuring, and counting and so on. These different "language-games" make up "form of life", "Language game" with other vital notions of later

Wittgenstein, as "form of life", "agreement" establishes language matrix. In his later period, Wittgenstein aims to bring back words from metaphysics to everyday usage. To sum up, the notion of "language-game" is conceptually/ontologically prior to its rules. In this sense, Wittgenstein forms "language-game" as a model for the other social activities of human beings. Furthermore, "language-game" is regarded as a bridge between language and reality.

Mr Paolo Santorio, MIT

Monsters and binding: redesigning the semantics for the de re

Orthodoxy in philosophy of language has it that indexicals and names are directly referential: this means that they are interpreted prior to other elements of the sentence, and hence cannot be bound. I argue that orthodoxy has it wrong. Pace Kaplan, all indexicals and names are systematically bound when they occur in the scope of a wide range of modal quantifiers. My argument is based on a puzzle involving indexicals and epistemic modals. After introducing the puzzle, I generalize it to names and link it to a more traditional puzzle in the semantics for belief. I show that both can be solved by treating epistemic modals and attitude verbs as two-dimensional quantifiers that bind the directly referential terms falling within their scope. On the resulting semantics, indexicals and names range over epistemic counterparts of the object they pick out in unembedded occurrences. My conclusion is that lack of `descriptive meaning' and non-bindability come apart. The semantics maintains the idea that the contents of names and indexicals are objects rather than intensions. But it does justice to the intuition that these terms, when embedded under certain modal quantifiers, are associated to a richer cognitive significance.

Dr. Joe Salerno, Saint Louis University

Embedded Epistemic Modals

Typical relativist arguments against contextualism about epistemic modals (specifically, about epistemic `Might') are primarily directed at a naive speaker-contextualism, which says unrestrictedly that the speaker's knowledge is always relevant to the content and truth-value of claims in which `Might' is embedded. However, the core contextualist thesis is that the speaker's context

determines whose knowledge makes the semantic contribution---and this knowledge may or may not be the speaker's. A hidden variable thesis will be defended. We will assume that the linguistic data is robust, and argue that this form of indexical contextualism fares better than relativism at explaining the data.

Mr Tama Coutts, The University of Melbourne

Mass Terms and Absolute Truth Definitions

Many philosophers, most obviously Donald Davidson, think that there is something philosophically significant about absolute truth definitions; that is to say truth definitions of the kind Tarski showed how to construct. Let us suppose so, and suppose so for Davidson's reasons; namely that the possibility of constructing such truth definitions, together with the argumentation he provides, give an insight into the nature of content and the structure of agency. It turns out that the argumentation requires one to be able to deal with recalcitrant stretches of natural languages. Davidson lists many such stretches. Of these I was unable to understand in what the recalcitrance of two consisted: claims involving probability and mass terms. In this paper I attempt to work out just what the problem is with mass terms, and insofar as this is a problem to solve it. The view that emerges is roughly like that of Terrence Parsons, involving a commitment to an ontology of (what Parsons calls) substances, although we shall see that his view is perhaps somewhat inadequate.

Dr. Kevin Scharp, The Ohio State University

Replacing Truth

Most contemporary approaches to the liar paradox are "traditional" in the sense that they reject one of the premises or inference rules that are used to derive the paradoxical conclusion. Over the years, however, several philosophers have developed an alternative to the traditional approaches; according to them, our very competence with the concept of truth leads us to accept that the reasoning used to derive the paradox is sound. That is, our conceptual competence leads us into inconsistency. I call this alternative the inconsistency approach to the liar. I develop a novel version of the inconsistency approach on which we replace our defective concept of truth with a team of concepts, ascending truth and descending truth, that do the work we require without giving rise to paradoxes. This approach requires two theories--a prescriptive theory that specifies the changes to our conceptual repertoire, and a descriptive theory that explains our defective concept of truth. It is essential that the descriptive theory depends on the prescriptive theory, and does not appeal to our defective concept of truth.

Mr Matt Sayball, Virginia Tech

What are Penumbral Connections?

When we consider the logic and semantics of vague languages, it is vital that we correctly account for relations that hold between vague terms. In this paper, I analyze Kit FIne's account of penumbral connections and argue that it loses sight of its intended target of analysis. I suggest a more refined characterization of penumbral connections and discuss the importance of getting penumbral connections right.

Mr. Rory Wood-Ingram, University of Melbourne

Laughing at Nothing

The serious approach to life calls for the systematic creation of meaning through reason and/or logic, intuition, belief, ideals, culture, superstition, i.e. anything which can be taken seriously. Humour turns this on its head, celebrating idiocy and foolishness. A part of humour is directly related to a reduction in understanding, an annihilation of meaning. Kant's idea, "Laughter is an affection arising from the sudden transformation of a strained expectation into nothing," underlines this thought. This reduction in understanding is why an analysis of humour inevitably kills the joke and fails to identify the humour, even as it explains the joke. The idea of the annihilation of meaning offers an original and important breakthrough in the philosophy of humour. I argue that whilst the causes and mechanisms of humour are so varied as to defy any unifying theory of humour, the effect of humour is profound and enlightening. This

effect, the annihilation of meaning, involves a complete negation of serious meaning. It entails an utter denial of the values and ethical constraints of society and even the willful rejection of reality, in order to impose a silly and contemptible meaning. The end point of the annihilation of meaning is a blankness and clarity of the mind, such that we can no longer confer sense on anything and the world appears to us freed from discursive meaning. This is a transient state, however, as meaning quickly reasserts itself, but the process of constructing and annihilating meaning is in itself greatly rewarding and contributes towards our own enlightenment. In this light I examine humour as an anti-rational force.

Dr Mark Jago, Macquarie University

Propositions

Propositions play a variety of theoretical roles in philosophy: the bearers of truth; what an utterance expresses; what one says when one says something; the objects of belief; contents; and meanings. I'll focus on the first three of these roles. First, I will argue that propositions qua bearers of truth cannot be sets of possible worlds. Next, I'll argue that propositions qua what is expressed by an utterance (or by a sentence in a context) cannot be structured tuples of semantic values, as they are on the Russellian picture of propositions. I'll then construct an attractive picture of propositions as sets of possible and certain impossible worlds, where those impossible worlds are subject to certain logical closure principles. Finally, I'll suggest that this account of propositions might have something to say about the perplexing question of the conditions under which two speakers say the same thing.

Mr Peter Fritz, Australian National University / University of Konstanz

Higher-Order Vagueness and Degrees of Truth

Degree-theoretic accounts of vagueness using fuzzy logics avoid a sharp boundary between the objects to which a vague predicate applies and the objects to which it doesn't by using the real numbers between 0 and 1 as truth-values. For example, stating that a borderline case for the predicate "bald" is bald is said to receive some intermediate truth-value. However, they thereby draw a sharp boundary between the men for which "This man is bald." receives truth-value 1 and the ones for which it doesn't. This is a version of the argument by higher-order vagueness against a degree-theoretic account. The argument is mostly taken to show that the metalanguage in which the truth-value assignments are performed must be vague as well. As this reasoning can be iterated indefinitely, it is claimed that such a degree-theoretic treatment of "bald" must provide an infinite hierarchy of metalanguages each of which is provided with a multi-valued semantics, which is considered undesirable. Agreeing with this sentiment, I will show that such a hierarchy is not required if we enable the object language to ascribe truth-values to its own sentences. I will explain why this doesn't remove the need for the metalanguage to be vague, and consider two objections against vague metalanguages. I will counter these objections by making explicit the role of formal languages in explaining the phenomenon of vagueness. I will especially consider in which respects the metalanguage must be vague, and how real numbers and truth-values in natural languages relate.

Philosophy of Literature

Dr Tom Martin, Rhodes University, South Africa

The indifference of the world and the desire for transcendence in 'The Man Who Wasn't There'

I employ resources from Sartre's Nausea, Being and Nothingness, and Existentialism and Humanism to provide a reading of the Coen brothers' film *The Man Who Wasn't There* that seeks to account for the film's recurrent tropes of hair growth, dry cleaning, and flying saucers. While I do not claim that the film exemplifies Sartrean philosophy, I do claim that it shares several concerns with Sartre and that it is on these grounds that reading Sartre alongside *The Man Who Wasn't There* can be a fruitful and worthwhile exercise. This paper is an exercise in both philosophy of film and philosophical film

criticism, and is part of a larger collaborative project on Existentialism and Contemporary Cinema.

Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics

Dr Sam Butchart, Monash University

Why we need a theory of mathematical explanation

Explanation and justification in mathematics are intimately connected, in much the same way as they are in the physical sciences. Understanding mathematical explanation is therefore vital to the project of providing an adequate epistemology of mathematics - an account of the ways in which mathematics is justified. In this paper I will discuss the relevance of an account of mathematical explanation to a wide variety of problems in the epistemology of mathematics. In particular, I argue that understanding the concept of mathematical explanation is crucial to issues such as the the status of indispensability arguments, the justification of axioms, the role of non-deductive evidence in mathematics and the nature of proof.

Dr Hartley Slater, UWA

A perfect language?

In recent Logic, languages without indexicals have been widely studied, since they have been thought to be more 'perfect' than our normal language. This paper shows the error in this line of thought as well as providing a plausible account of why it has been so attractive to its adherents. The possibility of a language without indexicals has been important, as well, to recent theorists about Truth, such as Tarski; and its attraction is shown to be a large part of the motivation for later developments in this view of Truth, made by Priest. By considering languages containing indexicals instead, it is shown that it is the removal of them that has created many of the major problems that have arisen within this semantic tradition. Furthermore, one

consequence of Gödel's First Incompleteness Theorem is that indexicality is inescapable in languages of sufficient complexity.

Dr Anne Newstead, UNSW

Knowing the Infinite

'The finite mind cannot grasp the infinite'. Mathematical knowledge provides a material refutation of this claim. Some mathematical statements involve quantification over infinitely many objects. Some mathematical statements refer to infinitely complex structures. On our view, with a nod to Quine, a grasp of the truth of these claims involves an ontological commitment to the existence of infinitely many objects. We do not shirk from our ontological commitment to infinities, but seek to understand how the mind can grasp the truth conditions for statements about infinities. Rationalist and empiricist proposals for explaining the feat are examined. Ultimately we side with the rationalist proposal that the mind's understanding of the infinite does not come about through sense-perception or imagination, but relies on the intellect and its powers of conception. We demonstrate connections between the historic rationalist proposal and contemporary cognitive science work on this topic.

Dr John Howes, Learningguild

Hypothetical inferabilty: a tradition revealed and extended

Concerning the strict kind of hypothetical statement suitable for use in deductive arguments, there has been a tradition of interpretation, almost unrecognized even by its members, in which such a statement, whether open, remote or counterfactual, has (rightly) been regarded as an assertion of what may be called hypothetical inferability. The statement asserts that in the hypothetical case in which it is true that p, it would, because p (and often in a given context), be no less certainly true that q. Moreover, a strict statement of the form 'Either –p or q' is explained as equivalent to the strict 'If p then q': each is richer than '–p v q'. This tradition may (apart from Mill) be called an Oxbridge one. I begin with Whately of Oxford, and go on to Mill, and then to Ramsey and Moore of Cambridge. We return to Oxford for Ryle, Strawson and the Kneales, and include Australia's Gasking (Cambridge) and

Armstrong (Oxford). A major reason why this tradition has been less influential so far than the truth-functionalist one is that it has not yet been known to include any form of representation of deductive arguments for testing. The "orthodox" truth-functionalist treatment is notorious for the paradoxes that occur because in it 'p . −q' is used '−(if p then q)' is in fact equivalent to−to negate 'If p then q'. "There is no hypothetical-inferability bar against the conjunction 'p . −q'", which asserts much less than does 'p . −q', and can be abbreviated to '−hib (p . −q)'. A reliable method of testing (with a conversational counterpart) is set out, using 'hib' and '−hib' before bracketed conjunctions. Quine and his followers have been willing to treat ordinary language, to the great detriment of logic, in an unashamedly "procrustean" way.

MA Michael von Boguslawski, University of Helsinki

Erik Stenius on Defining Logical Antinomies

Erik Stenius (1911-1990) was professor of philosophy at the Helsinki university 1963-1974 and before that at Åbo Akademi 1954-1963. His early work concentrates on logic and the consistency of formal systems. Among his tutors, we find David Hilbert's assistant Paul Bernays. This paper presents an overview of the method Stenius employs in his dissertation "Das Problem der Logische Antinomien" (1949) aiming to solve Russell's paradox, Grelling's antinomy, and the Löwenheim-Skolem paradox, among others. Stenius wishes to solve the antinomies within the natural language in which they arise. The central part of the method consists in placing strict requirements on the definitions of concepts used in logic. According to his view, paradoxes arise through faults in the definitions of the concepts involved. Thus, when these faults are isolated and corrected the paradoxes are removed. Stenius suggests some additional concepts for axiomatic set theory in order for his method to be efficiently applicable.

Dr Kenny Easwaran, Australian National University

The Tarski-Gödel Thesis

A distinction is standardly drawn between so-called "structural" axioms (those that define a type of mathematical structure, like a group, or a field) and "foundational axioms (those like PA or ZFC that characterize some pre-existing structure). However, some mathematicians with structuralist sympathies deny that there is such a distinction, and assimilate all axioms to the "structural" type. In this talk, I will consider Gödel's Completeness Theorem and show that its standard interpretation depends on a non-mathematical thesis parallel to the Church-Turing thesis in computability theory. Consideration of this thesis shows that the type of structuralist view mentioned above is untenable, since it suggests that any consistent system is equally good, but says that there is no fact of the matter about whether certain systems are consistent.

Dr. Greg Restall, University of Melbourne

Why the paradoxes of self reference are even more difficult than we thought

I present a form of the paradoxes of self reference which avoids the use of negation and other logical connectives. This means that we cannot simply 'change the logic' to sidestep the paradox: debates about truth-value gaps or truth-value gluts are beside the point. In this talk I will spell out the paradox, explain what is going on, and draw out some lessons for philosophy of logic and language.

Dr Lionel Shapiro, University of Sydney and University of Connecticut

Deflating Logical Consequence

Deflationists about truth argue that an appreciation of the expressive role of 'true' undercuts the demand for a metaphysically substantial account of the property of truth. Corresponding claims have been made concerning reference and satisfaction. By contrast, deflationism about logical consequence appears not to have been explored. In this paper, I formulate a deflationism about consequence, one I suggest shares the motivation and attractions claimed for deflationism about truth. I then offer several explanations for why deflationism about

consequence has not been pursued, and argue that they do not point to good objections. Finally, I consider the ramifications of deflating logical consequence for logic. Many have argued that a language containing a deflationary truth predicate faces restrictions on its logic stemming from the Liar paradox. I examine the conditions the Curry paradox places on the logic of a language that is additionally capable of expressing a deflationary consequence predicate, and criticize recent arguments by Hartry Field and Jc Beall which would show that these conditions cannot be met.

Dr Robbie Williams, University of Leeds

Degree supervaluationism and logical revisionism

Simple supervaluationism says that a sentence S is determinate/true iff it is true at all sharpenings. Degree supervaluationism says that a sentence S is determinate/true to degree k, if it is true on d% of the sharpenings. With proportions of sharpenings to play with, there are numerous ways to define logical consequence. In a single-conclusion language without determinacy operators, these are all match classical logic. But with degreed-determinacy operators in the language, they come apart. One of the most natural and promising turns out to violate principles like Cut and a version of conjunction introduction. I argue that this isn't such a bad thing, given a certain understanding of what logic is for. Though the discussion mainly focuses on the logic of indeterminacy, the formal machinery is similar to Adams "Probabilistic logic", and similar revisionary issues arise when we add probability operators to his language.

Dr Jc Beall, University of Connecticut

Truth, necessity, and abnormal worlds

A theory of truth answers both `nature' and `logic' questions. On the former front, questions concern the `nature', if any, of truth. On the latter front, questions---with truth-theoretic paradoxes in the forefront---concern the logic of `true'. In /Spandrels of Truth/ (Oxford, 2009), I answer the former question along deflationary lines, and the latter question along `dialetheic' lines. In short: `true' is a see-through device introduced for expressive purposes; and liar-like sentences are spandrels of the device that give us true sentences with true negations. A suitable paraconsistent logic (in the B-ish vicinity) keeps us from absurdity; and a suitable (i.e., suitably deflationary) philosophy of truth keeps us from grimacing at contradictions. Work is not done after answering both the `nature' and `logic' questions. Room must be made for other philosophically important notions. One such notion is alethic modality, and in particular /alethic necessity/ (and, derivatively, possibility). This is particularly pressing in light of the worlds-involving---and, in particular, /abnormal/-worlds-involving---formal semantics of the underlying (B-vicinity) logic of the target truth theory (-ies). My task, in this talk, is to add a plausible (say, S5-ish) necessity operator to the target truth theory (-ies). While the solution is relatively straightforward, there are a few surprising obstacles along the way. This talk records some of the difficulties and advances a solution.

Professor Mark Colyvan, University of Sydney

A Ricci Curvature Tensor By Any Other Name

A common view of mathematics is that it is "the language of science". Although intended as a compliment, this slogan seriously understates the role mathematics plays in science. I will start by saying a little about what is right about the slogan. Thinking of mathematics as a language is useful in appreciating the significance of, and the difficulties encountered in arriving at, a good notational system. Good notation is far from trivial. The development of differential geometry, for example, with its Ricci curvature tensors and the like, is intimately connected with the notation employed. Next, I turn to what is wrong about the slogan. Thinking of mathematics as a mere language is to ignore the role of mathematics as an explanatory tool. I will look at the recent work on mathematical explanation and argue that there are genuinely mathematical explanations of empirical facts and, moreover, the transparency of some of these explanations is dependent upon the

mathematical notation used. While a Ricci curvature tensor represented via different notation would still be a Ricci curvature tensor, it may not live up to its full potential and deliver the kinds of explanations it is capable of.

Dr Patrick Greenough, University of St Andrews

Truthmaker Gluts

Some species of indeterminacy give rise to some kind of gap, while other species of indeterminacy give rise to some kind of glut. In this talk I outline a novel "truthmaker glut" model of indeterminacy which is the dual of the truthmaker gap model of indeterminacy defended in Sorensen (2001) and Greenough (2008). This glutty model preserves both classical logic and classical semantics and represents a proposition <p> to be (glutty) indeterminate in truth-value just in case <p> has one and only one truth-value and the state of affairs that p/not-p both obtain. Various applications of this theory of indeterminacy are explored (including the liar paradox, incoherent stipulations, incoherent fictions, and the open future). I also set forth a *truthmaking* glut theory of indeterminacy which is embedded in a more plausible theory of the relationship between truth and being. Finally, I (i) address the worry that (classical) truthmaker gluts are unacceptably queer and (ii) show within the model how one might make sense of the distinction between representational and metaphysical indeterminacy.

Mr Ryan Young, The Australian National University

A Short Guide to Solving the Liar Paradox

Despite considerable philosophical and logical attention, there remains no generally accepted solution to the Liar Paradox. This paper will motivate and present a new formal approach to the Liar Paradox which resolves the problems and has a number of remarkable and highly attractive properties. The most important of these are that the approach can be implemented consistently in any formal logic (including classical logic);

and it allows a semantically closed formal truth definition. This new approach will be motivated by a careful examination of the properties of the Liar Paradox, and crucially, an examination of the compatibility of orthodox Model Theoretic Semantics with a consistent, semantically closed formal truth definition. Since it can be shown that the key principles of orthodox model theory are incompatible with a consistent, semantically closed formal truth definition, an intuitive modification to our understanding of formal semantics will be presented. This modification can then be used as the basis of a new and very promising solution to the Liar Paradox.

Ms Rebecca Hosking-Young, University of Leipzig

Philosophical Intuitions and Multiple-Consequence Relations

Deep philosophical intuitions about the nature of Truth, Falsity, Vagueness and Consistency (among others) have often driven the development of Many-Valued Logics. However, such logics have rarely satisfied their philosophical motivation, and fail to accurately represent intuitions as intended. A recent development in logic by Shramko & Wansing suggests a method by which the intuitions behind Many-Valued Logic might be better represented. Namely, they offer a system that features two Consequence relations — one preserving Truth, the other Falsity. From this, a novel way of treating Falsity as False rather than merely Not-True can be generated, allowing us to formally express a key philosophical intuition. This intuition, and the philosophical grounding and potential of multiple-consequence logic will be explored.

Dr. Adriane Rini, Massey University

Aristotle's Mathematical Cyclists

Quine objected to Aristotelian essentialism and he objected to modal logic generally. Quine is unable to make sense of a view he attributes to Aristotle — that properties can apply by necessity to things independently of how they are described. Aristotle scholars have considered ways Aristotle might answer Quine's objections to essentialism. They are on the whole concerned with metaphysical issues, and this paper looks briefly at some of this recent literature. It also looks at examples from Aristotle which make Quine's point about

mathematical cyclists. The paper then shows that Aristotle, qua modal logician, is aware of Quine's problems.

Prof. Alan Hájek, Australian National University

A Poisoned Dart for Conditionals

An infinitely thin dart is thrown randomly at a representation of the [0, 1] interval of the real line. Here are two propositions concerning its landing point: A: The dart lands in [0, ½]. B: If the dart lands anywhere in [½ , 1], then it lands exactly on ½, the left-hand edge. Obviously one should assign probability ½ to A. And I will offer arguments, which I find compelling, that A entails B, and that one should assign probability 0 to B. But something has apparently gone badly wrong—for probability cannot decrease through entailment. I submit that we have a paradox. I will canvas some possible responses. My intuitions recoil at each of them.

Philosophy of Mind

Dr. Susanna Schellenberg, ANU

Ontological Minimalism about Phenomenology

I develop a view of the common factor between subjectively indistinguishable perceptions and hallucinations that avoids analyzing experiences as involving awareness relations to abstract entities, sense-data, or any other peculiar entities. The main thesis is that hallucinating subjects employ concepts (or analogous nonconceptual structures), namely the very same concepts that in a subjectively indistinguishable perceptual experience are employed as a consequence of being related to external, mind-independent objects or property-instances. Since a hallucinating subject is not related to any such objects or property-instances, the concepts she employs remain unsaturated. I argue that the phenomenology of hallucinations and perceptions can be identified with employing concepts and analogous nonconceptual structures. By doing so, I defend a minimalist view of the

phenomenology of experience that (1) satisfies the Aristotelian principle according to which the existence of any type depends on its tokens and (2) amounts to a naturalized view of the phenomenology of experience.

Professor Declan Smithies, ANU/Ohio State

Do Zombies Have Beliefs?

Zombies have no phenomenally conscious states, but beliefs are not phenomenally conscious states. So, do zombies have beliefs? I argue that beliefs are individuated by their relations to phenomenal consciousness and hence that zombies do not have beliefs. The argument relies on a thesis about the epistemic role of consciousness and a thesis about the epistemic individuation of belief. I go on to explore the consequences of this argument for functionalist theories of belief. Here, I distinguish between causal and normative versions of functionalism and I argue that belief is individuated by its normative role, rather than its causal role, in reasoning.

Mr. Clement K. S. Huang, National University of Singapore

Is phenomenal fission possible?

Phenomenal continuity accounts claim that an earlier person survives as a later person if and only if the stream of consciousness of the former is phenomenally connected with the latter's stream of consciousness. I will be examining the question of whether such an account of personal identity can allow for personal fission. I argue that it is impossible for a stream of consciousness to divide into two streams of consciousness, i.e. impossible to undergo fission. This is because two persons cannot share a single experiential state, and for phenomenal fission to be possible, it has to be the case that the two resulting persons can do so. If this argument is right, then given a phenomenal continuity account, a person cannot undergo fission and survive as two or more persons. This may not be such a bad consequence for the phenomenal continuity account however, and I want to suggest that this is so because the notion of personal fission is hard to make sense of anyway.

Assistant Professor Carrie Figdor, University of Iowa

What is a Piece of Mind?

A fundamental assumption of cognitive science is that the mind is divisible. This assumption grounds the search for mechanistic explanation of mental phenomena. I argue that cognitive scientists have not yet articulated adequate criteria for individuating mental individuals or identified mental part-whole relations. As a result, current talk of mental components and mental structures, and of mechanistic explanations of mind, are either merely metaphorical or empirically empty.

Dr. Berit Brogaard, University of Missouri

Some Kind of Seeing

I offer a simple argument against the thesis that natural kind properties sometimes occur in the phenomenal content of visual experience which rests on reflections on what the phenomenal content of an experience is.   I then respond to three arguments aimed at establishing that natural kind properties do occur in the phenomenal content of experience: the argument from phenomenal difference, the argument from mandatory seeing, and the argument from associative agnosia. Finally, I offer criteria for when a natural kind property is visually detectable and use these criteria to formulate a new argument for the thesis that natural kind properties sometimes occur in the non-phenomenal content of visual experience.

Mr Sho Yamaguchi, Kyoto University, Graduate School of Human and Environmental Studies

Jackson's Knowledge Argument and Representationalism

Currently, one of the most important issues in the discussion on Frank Jackson's knowledge argument is whether or not representationalism blocks this anti-physicalist argument. Representationalism is the view which implies that the nature of sensory experiences is exhausted by their representational properties. Jackson argues that we can defend physicalism against the knowledge argument if (and only if) we accept representationalism. But several authors disagree with this viewpoint. For example, John Bigelow and Robert Pargetter claim that representationalism might be false and that their old-property/new-mode theory is more promising. Torin Alter suggests that representationalism does not invalidate the knowledge argument because the issues of whether representationalism is true and whether the argument is sound are irrelevant.   The aim of this presentation is to point out the advantages of representationalism and to argue that this view offers good resources to deal with the knowledge argument. I would like to get rid of the intuitive reluctance to accept representationalism.

Dr Edoardo Zamuner, La Trobe University

Visual Perception of Emotions

Some philosophers think that perception is a perfectly good source of knowledge about other people's mental states. In particular, they think it is possible to know that others have emotions by perceiving that they have emotions. In this view, there is such a thing as perceiving that someone has an emotion. Does this mean that we cannot perceive emotions themselves, but only that people have emotions? Although only a few philosophers explicitly argue for this view, most are likely to say that it's not at all clear what it means to say that we see emotions. On the other hand, those who think that we do see emotions hardly provide any positive argument for their view and confine themselves to explaining why some philosophers deny that we see emotions. In this paper, I provide a positive argument for the view that we see emotions. I develop my approach by running two separate but interdependent arguments. The first shows that facial expressions of emotions are patterns of changes that carry information about the emotions that produce them. The second shows that the visual system functions to extract the information that expressions carry. I develop this argument by drawing on empirical data from psychology and brain studies. The conjunction of the two arguments provides an explanation of what it means to say that we see emotions.

Dr Barry Maund, University of W.A.

A Defence of A Projectivist Theory of Perceptual Experience

The idea of Projectivism is that we experience objects in the world as having certain properties which they do not have _ properties which are qualities internal to our own experience. The idea goes back at least as far as David Hume, playing a central role in his theory of morality and causality. My interest with the theory is in its application to perceptual experience in general. Specifically, I wish to defend a version of Projectivism, understood as a theory of perceptual experience. Projectivism, as a theory of perceptual experience, assumes that perceptual experiences have two sorts of features; intentional features_ they represent the world as being a certain way _ and non-intentional, subjective features. The sense in which the theory is 'projectivist' is that the subjective qualities play two sorts of role: (i) they are intrinsic qualities (either of subjective, phenomenal items, or of experiences, themselves) which are presented in experience; (ii) they form part of the representational content carried by the experience. Projectivism, in the form that I shall defend, is primarily concerned with a fundamental type of representational content, one that is sometimes called "non-conceptual content", but which I shall argue, is better thought of as "practical content", content which is related to one's abilities to act. This form of content stands in contrast to a more sophisticated conceptual content, which the experiences also carry. I shall argue for two claims: (i) that the more sophisticated conceptual content is 'mixed', containing theoretical and practical components; (ii) that projectivism provides an account that makes good sense of both forms of content that perceptual experiences carry, and is not subject to the "obvious" criticisms standardly levelled at the theory.

Dr Colin Cheyne, University of Otago

Emotion, Fiction and Rationality

Our emotional responses to fiction, in particular our responses to fictional characters, apparently gives rise to a paradox. We emotionally respond to fictional characters that we do not believe to exist, although rational emotional responses to objects presuppose belief in the existence of those objects. I argue that when we bring together recent work in evolutionary psychology, naturalised epistemology and cognitive science, we see that such responses are not surprising and nor are they irrational. We have both the capacity to hold contradictory beliefs and to respond emotionally when reasoning hypothetically and contemplating imaginary scenarios. These capacities, properly deployed, are useful and rational. We cannot avoid their coming into play when we consume fiction, and thank goodness for that.

Dr Simon Beck, University of KwaZulu-Natal

Misunderstanding Ourselves

Marya Schechtman has argued that contemporary attempts to save Locke's account of personal identity suffer the same faults that are to be found in Locke. To avoid these problems, she advocates giving up the mainstream Psychological View and adopting a narrative account like her "Self-Understanding" View, which has the further virtue of maintaining important insights from Locke. My paper argues that it is misleading to understand the Psychological View as sharing Locke's commitments and that (partly as a result) Schechtman has not isolated a problem that needs fixing or a reason for going narrative. It further argues that the Self-Understanding view is a great deal more at odds with Locke's view than Schechtman cares to acknowledge.

Mr. Nir Fresco, UNSW

Dynamicism and its relation to connectionism and classical computationalism

This paper deals with the question: what is the interrelationship between dynamicism, classical computationalism and connectionism on the cognitive map? Three answers are examined in this paper:

1. A narrow conception of dynamicism - dynamicism is contrasted with classical computationalism and is a superset of connectionism.

2. A broad conception of dynamicism - connectionism is a subclass of dynamicism and overlaps with classical computationalism.

3. A complementary view of dynamicism - dynamicism, connectionism and classical computationalism are complementary.

Some researchers, who support the first answer, have suggested in the last two decades that classical computationalism and connectionism should be abandoned in favour of dynamicism. In this paper, I examine their presuppositions about computation and representation. The second answer is a connectionist attempt to address criticisms of radical dynamicists and advance connectionism as a plausible dynamical cognitive model. The last answer is a reconciliation of all three approaches with some aspects of cognition best viewed as computational, some as connectionist and others as dynamical. I argue that having a clear distinction between analogue and digital computation will further elucidate the debate at hand and facilitate a unified view of cognitive science.

Dr William Fish, Massey University

Pure Hallucination

Recently, some disjunctivists have claimed that hallucinations count as such in virtue of meeting the "negative epistemic criterion" of being unknowably not a veridical perception. M.G.F. Martin, the originator of this view, claims that meeting this criterion also suffices for a state to qualify as sensory. Others claim that this explains why hallucinations seem sensory when they are not. In a recent paper, AD Smith takes issue with Martin and argues that Martin's criterion fails to distinguish between states, such as hallucinations, that are truly sensory, and other experiences - dreams, mental imagery, experiences under hypnotic suggestion, and so on - that may nonetheless meet the negative epistemic criterion. In arguing his case, Smith allows that the problematic non-sensory cases may qualify as "experiences", may "seem sensory to their subject", and may even be such that

"there is something it is like to have" them. In the only positive characterisation of these "sensory" states that Smith offers, he tells us that "a [pure] hallucination is the sort of state that could in principle be induced in a subject by stimulating a sense-organ in precisely the way it is stimulated when a subject sees something" (184). This claim, however, raises all sorts of interesting questions: If the possibility of non-sensory states that seem sensory is accepted, what underlying assumptions could lead to Smith's claim that replication of sense-organ stimulation will yield a truly sensory state as opposed to a state that merely seems sensory? Should these assumptions be accepted? Precisely what is meant by an experience's being "sensory" when that notion is divorced from such things as there being something it is like to have that experience? In this paper, I will discuss these questions in the light of empirical evidence from various sources.

Mr Johan Gersel, Copenhagen University

McKinsey's Dilemma and Reasoning from Memory – an analogous solution

McKinsey has presented the following dilemma for externalism of content. He suggests we look at the following argument.   a) I am thinking that water is wet b) If I am thinking that water is wet, then water exists or has existed in my external environment c) Water exists or has existed in my external environment Our knowledge of A is based on privileged access to our own mental states. Knowledge of B follows from conceptual considerations regarding the external individuation of the concept of WATER. A and B seem to be known a priori and C follows by modus ponens, so we seem to have a priori knowledge of what is clearly an empirical proposition.   Traditional solutions to McKinsey's Dilemma either deny externalism of content, argue that either A or B is empirically known, or question the transmission of warrant by the involved modus ponens. I suggest that by applying the Kantian distinction between the a priori and the pure a priori to the dilemma a potential dissolution is available that doesn't involve any of the strategies above. When viewed in light of this Kantian distinction, McKinsey-style reasoning seems to be in relevant ways analogous to reasoning to existential conclusions based on memory. In light of this, if one's theory of externalism mimics the epistemic qualities that render reasoning from memory (relatively)

unproblematic, one is able to solve the dilemma without surrendering any of the core intuitions driving the dilemma. The downside is that our options as to what forms of externalism we can adopt are severely restricted, if such an externalism must mimic said epistemic qualities of memory states. Nevertheless if one is independently drawn to such a form of externalism or thoroughly troubled by the traditional solutions to McKinsey's dilemma, the present solution will be of interest.

Ms Mette Kristine Hansen, University of Bergen(Visiting student at ANU)

The Phenomenology of Intentionality

Traditionally, conscious mental states have been divided into two broad categories; intentional mental states and purely phenomenal states, or qualia. Propositional attitudes like thoughts, beliefs and desires have been regarded as clearly intentional whereas sensations have been seen as non-intentional and purely phenomenal (Visual experiences have by some philosophers been seen as hybrids since such states appears to have both propositional content and phenomenal character). Representationalist and intentionalist theories of consciousness break with the tradition and claim that all mental states are intentional states. Recently, it has been argued that conscious thoughts, believes and desires have phenomenal character(Siewert 1998, Horgan & Tienson 2003, Lycan 2008). This idea too challenges the traditional separatist view. The view has, however, been considered as controversial even by philosophers who defend intentionalist/representationalist theories of consciousness(e.g. Tye 2000). In this paper I address some of the complications that arise from this, and argue that if cognitive phenomenalism is true it provides us with an argument in favour intentionalism.

Dr Christopher Mole, University College Dublin, Ireland

Attending and Referring

There is a close relationship between attending to a thing and being acquainted with it, and between acquaintance with a thing and the possibility of demonstratively referring to it. Some philosophers have hoped that these close relations can be put to explanatory work, but it is not obvious in which direction the explanations should proceed. The project that Bertrand Russell assayed in his abandoned 1913 manuscript, Theory of Knowledge, takes acquaintance to be an explanatory primitive, and attempts to build a theory of attention and reference on that basis. The project of John Campbell's 2002 book, Reference and Consciousness attempts a somewhat similar explanatory project, starting from psychological theories of attention and using these to provide an explanation of reference. I shall be examining some reasons for thinking that this project has its explanatory priorities backwards, and so that it cannot be carried through.

Dr Peter Slezak, University of New South Wales

Content Externalism and Intuition

A decade ago, Egan (1999) described externalism regarding mental content as "clearly in the ascendancy" while "Individualism seems passÃ©." Segal (2000) remarked that "Putnam's Twin Earth example has become a sort of paradigm in the philosophies of language and mind" and Farkas (2003) describes externalism as "almost an orthodoxy." Fodor (1987a) has noted that the Twin-Earth Problem "isn't a problem; it's just a handful of intuitions together with a commentary on some immediate implications of accepting them" (1987a, 208). However, Fodor doesn't question or analyse the intuitions themselves. In support of the dissident internalist position, I take up the matter of intuitions mentioned by Farkas (2003b) and also by Boghossian (1998) as being at the heart of externalism. Farkas characterizes this "deeply rooted" intuition as "baffling" and a "vexatious problem" that "poses a serious challenge for any attempts to give an internalist analysis" of the familiar thought experiments such as Putnam's (1975) Twin Earth scenario. I focus attention directly on theorists' "intuitive responses to a certain kind of thought-experiment" that "appear to leave them little choice" (Boghossian, 1998, 273). The internalist or individualist accounts can be strengthened if this compelling intuition can be given a diagnosis in the way that one might

show that the Müller-Lyer illusion is deceptive in spite of its subjective force. That is, the externalist position may be undermined by attending to its aetiology and demonstrating how the intuition arises from explicable mechanisms. Instead of defending internalism directly I ask: If internalism is true, why does it seem to be so implausible? Or, conversely, if externalism is false, why does it seem so convincing to so many smart philosophers?

Mr Wilson Cooper, Macquarie University

Can Functional Reduction Close the Explanatory Gap?

Reductively explaining the mental in terms of the physical has been an enterprise attracting scant support recently. However, Jaegwon Kim has argued that this is because of a flaw in the most prominent method of reduction employed to date. Bridge law reduction seeks laws that connect higher-level descriptions with lower-level descriptions to allow a derivation of the higher-level laws from lower-level laws. The main criticism Kim makes against bridge law reduction is that the bridge laws cannot reductively explain the higher-level property, since the correlation itself needs an explanation. In order to explain why a lower-level property is correlated with a higher-level property, such explanations need to respect a constraint that the explanatory premises contained in the deductive nomological argument do not refer to the property being explained, or to any other properties at that higher-level or above. Abiding by this constraint results in explanatory ascent and thus the closure of explanatory gaps. Kim argues that functional reduction can deliver explanatory ascent, and thus close explanatory gaps by functionally defining higher-level properties, like pain, in terms of their causal roles. Since definitions are not explanatory premises in a D-N explanation, if the defined causal role is found at a lower level, say neurophysiology, as a law about a neural state then we have an explanation of why pain defined by causal role C is correlated with neural state N. N satisfies causal role C

and pain is nothing more than having causal role C. In this paper, I argue that Kim's method of functional reduction is unsuccessful in closing explanatory gaps between the non-reducible and the physical because of two assumptions that beg the question against opponents of reductive physicalism: the Principle of Physical Causal Closure and Causation as Generation.

Mr. Simon van Rysewyk, School of Philosophy, University of Tasmania

Is there a pain face?

This paper addresses the consequences of pain facial expression in humans as an epiphenomenon to a gross behavioural defensive response to pain. On this view, facial activity is part of a global effort of writhing and tensing which function to protect the body and remove the pain stimulus (Pankseep & Pasqualini, 2002; Salzen, 2002). Clenching one's teeth, for example, may contribute to the suppressive functions of contortions and tensing elsewhere in the body by diverting attention away from the pain sensation (Frijda, 2002). But, unlike limb and bodily movements, pain facial expression can only minimally protect during injury, for example, narrowing or closing the eye openings to protect them. We propose instead that pain facial expression cannot remove pain stimuli other than through obtaining interventions from others. Facial displays of pain signal danger to usually instigate empathy and provision of care, and provide a dynamic, embodied representation of pain (Craig & Badali, 2002). The face is an interlocutor between the self and the world, and it is central in the sense of self (Cole, 2001). In human interactions, caregivers situate themselves so as to be able to attend to the ongoing patterns of feelings and thoughts revealed in the face. The object of empathy is not the squirming body, but the person whose body it is (Wittgenstein, 1958). The view that facial expression is constitutive of global homeostatic processes therefore neglects essential communicative functions of the face in pain.

Mr Raamy Majeed, Sydney University

Refutations of Revelation & Experiential Eliminativism

The doctrine of revelation (which has nothing to do with religious revelation!) states that by having an experience, we know the essence of that

experience. This is one of the possible interpretations of what qualophiles might mean by identifying the quale of an experience. Physicalists are motivated to deny revelation because the essences we supposedly come to know in experience don't seem to be physical properties. They don't seem to be relational properties that we can characterize causally by the empirical sciences. In this paper, I argue that while physicalists are motivated to reject revelation in order to avoid a commitment to property dualism, denying revelation across the board leads to an eliminativist account of experience. As a consequence, I set out to determine whether the dichotomy between revelation and experiential eliminativism can be resolved by having a modest version of revelation.

Mr Ole Koksvik, The Australian National University

What Do Minimal-Pair Arguments Show?

Some recent attention has been paid to the question of whether there is cognitive phenomenology; whether there is something it is like to think. Two broad types of argumentative strategies for a positive answer stand out. One, pursued in great detail by David Pitt (2004), is an inference to the best explanation: we need to postulate the phenomenology in order to explain other (non-phenomenal) facts. The other, embraced by (among others) Pitt, Charles Siewert (1998) and Horgan and Tienson (2002), is what one might call argument by minimal pairs, where two situations are contrasted. The aim is to elicit the response that being in one situation would be phenomenologically different from being in the other, and that this must be because there is a phenomenology of cognition. In this paper I focus on the the latter type of strategy. I discuss what it would take for the argument to work, raise some doubts about whether this is attained, and suggest a less demanding--though still interesting--conclusion, for which I try to show that the argument is successful.

Mr Koji Ota, Kyoto University, JSPS

Cartesian Materialism in Neural Studies of Consciousness

While neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) have been increasingly explored, we are now confronted with the clash of two major theories. According to the first of these theories, functionally specialized perceptual modules have conscious contents and the local neural activity that implements them is the NCC. The second theory insists that globally accessible contents are conscious and that the global neural activity that implements such accessibility is the NCC. From the viewpoint of the local theory, global neural activity merely constitutes a cognitive mechanism operating on the contents which are already conscious. In contrast, the global theory argues that local neural activity can unconsciously work, and that some extra mechanism is needed in order to make their contents conscious, which would be implemented by global neural activity. I will show how both of these theories presuppose a particular metaphysical doctrine ——namely, one version of Cartesian Materialism—— which claims that there must be a boundary dividing conscious and unconscious contents within the brain. They can be precisely mapped onto two hypotheses that presuppose Cartesian Materialism which were described and criticized by Daniel Dennett. I argue that the apparent tension between these two theories disappears if we adopt a conception of gradual consciousness. Furthermore, I will show that it is indeed possible to measure and theorize about such an aspect of consciousness.

Ms Zoe Drayson, University of Bristol (Visiting Student, ANU)

Representation-hungriness: food for thought

Since the decline of behaviorist psychology in the 1950s, the cognitivist movement has dominated the sciences of the mind with its assumption that mental processes involve representations: content-bearing internal structures which function to stand in for aspects of the environment. In recent years, however, the need for internal representations has been questioned by various research programs in robotics, artificial intelligence, psychology, and philosophy. While these non-representational programs have experienced some success in attempting to explain basic sensory-motor aspects

of behavior, there is a class of cases which proves much more difficult for them to explain. These are the cases of so-called 'representation hungry' behavior, which seem resistant to a non-representational explanation (Fodor 1986, Clark and Toribio 1994). Recently, however, Ramsey (2007) has claimed that much of the alleged commitment to representations in cognitive science is unwarranted, because the states which are claimed to be playing a representational role are in fact performing a different function. Ramsey argues that this is the case in 'representation hungry' scenarios: he thinks that while the behavior in question requires explanation in terms of internal states, these internal states are mere causal mediators which do not stand in for aspects of the environment and therefore should not be interpreted as representations. In this paper, I argue that Ramsey's non-representational account of 'representation hungry' scenarios fails to explain certain important aspects of the behavior involved. I claim that we have good reason to think that these cases are almost inexplicable without a commitment to representational states, and I argue that, moreover, this conclusion follows as a consequence of Ramsey's own views about representational explanations.

Mrs Neralie Wise, Macquarie University

Delusions: Two Philosophical Approaches

There are two fundamentally different approaches to the study of delusions, the analytic and the phenomenological. In this presentation I will discuss the difference between the two and the strengths and weaknesses of each. My conclusion is that each approach could benefit from incorporating aspects of the other.

Gabriel Rabin, UCLA / ANU RSSS

Physicalism and the Idealization of A Priori Entailment

Both physicalists and dualists alike can, and many do, accept some version of an a priori entailment principle. Such a principle says, roughly, that if F is a complete fundamental description of the world, and F entails P, then F→P is knowable a priori. Some version of an a priori entailment principle is a crucial premise in both the zombie and the knowledge arguments against physicalism. In this paper, I examine the motivations for endorsing the principle and argue that appropriately formulating the principle in light of these motivations significantly reduces its ability to play the requisite role in both the zombie and the knowledge arguments, thus undermining those arguments. I close by offering a decision-theoretic procedure for deciding between physicalism and dualism. I argue that the weight of considerations favors physicalism.

Philosophy of Religion

Dr. John Lamont, Catholic Institute of Sydney

Versions of Molinism

The paper compares the Molinism of i€- Thomas P. Flint and Alvin Plantinga i€- with that of Molina himself. These versions of Molinism prove to be different in philosophically significant ways, in both object and content. The object of Flint's Molinism is to preserve both libertarian freedom and divine providence. Plantinga's object is to show that the existence of evil is not logically incompatible with the existence of God. Molina's object is to give an account of grace and predestination in response to Protestants. Flint's version of Molinism is a faithful development of Molina's view, but its clarification of the implications of Molinism brings out problems with that view. Plantinga's version of Molinism, unlike Flint's, differs significantly from Molina's. Plantinga holds transworld depravity to be possible, but Molina does not. This difference is explained by a fundamental disagreement over the nature of good and evil. Plantinga has an accounting conception of these attributes, while Molina has a teleological conception of them. These two conceptions produce the different approaches to the problem of evil found in Molina and Plantinga, approaches that are characteristic of traditional vs. modern conceptions of the problem of evil. The distinction between these conceptions is important, but is not currently discussed.

Associate Professor Cecilia Wee, National University of Singapore

Descartes' Ontological Proof of God's Existence

This paper seeks to contribute to the extant discussion on the ontological proof of God's existence in Descartes's Fifth Meditation by examining an aspect of the proof that has thus far been neglected — viz., the ontology that underpins the proof. Focusing on this ontology will contribute to a better understanding of the nature of the claims made in the proof. Again, attention to the Cartesian meditator's developing metaphysical views in the Third and Fourth Meditation will make clear why this proof could only have been put forward in the Fifth Meditation (and not, as with the other proofs of God's existence, in the Third Meditation).

Dr Russell Blackford, Monash University

NOMA No More

Attempts are sometimes made to take the sting out of the science/religion debate by invoking the idea of Non-Overlapping Magisteria ("NOMA") or similar ideas. If we accept NOMA, science and religion do not overlap but are complementary. Science asks questions about the the workings of the natural world, while religion asks questions about how we should live, find a sense of meaning in our lives, and so on. Sometimes this is portrayed as a difference between "how" and "why" questions or between "is" and "ought" questions. However, the distinctions on which NOMA and similar ideas depend are, at best, simplistic and dubious. NOMA is probably a false account of the distinction between science and religion, and is, at the least, highly controversial. Although it may have some political value as a way of smoothing passionate disagreements, it is an inadequate solution to the perennial conflict between religion and science.

Dr. Tamas Pataki, University of Melbourne

Religion and mental illness

In a recent book 'Against Religion' I argued that some kinds of religious belief or constitution, particularly but not exclusively at the fundamentalist end of the Abrahamic spectrum, are akin to mental illness. In this paper I clarify and elaborate the main threads of the argument.

Mr. Guncel Onkal, Middle East Technical University

The Fundamentals of Philosophizing God in the Argument from Design

In recent years there is an increasing interest in the argument from design. This interest stems from the current discussions on the struggle between Darwinians and Intelligent Design supporters. William Paley's Natural Theology (1802) performed to change the classical path of proofs and the arguments for the existence of God. The method of Paley is a breaking point since it is based on the collection of the facts of biology, physics and paleontology for the sake of proving the existence of a metaphysically given concept namely God. By that, Paley used empiricism and biological science in order to solve the problems of metaphysics and religion. Design, order and contrivance are considered as the inseparable characteristics of nature and intelligence in his explanations. The aim of this paper is to examine philosophical value of the Paley's argument from design. Some of the main questions can be addressed as such: Is Paley's argument from design only an inference to the best explanation or a weak analogy according to Humean criticism? Can Paley's arguments have more explanatory power on nature comparing to Darwinian natural selection? What sort of scientific attitudes are hidden beyond the Natural Theology and Intelligent Design Theory? Can Intelligent Design still be defensible, and why? What sort of ideological and philosophical implications can be found in argument from design? What do contemporary ID theoreticians (especially Dembski and Behe) suggest and which religious values do they serve for? What is the philosophical status of new God concept as Intelligent Designer? Can be a design conceivable without a designer?

Philosophy of Science

Dr Jeremy Butterfield, Trinity College, University of Cambridge, UK

On Discerning Quantum Particles

In several papers, Saunders, Muller and Seevinck have recently argued that quantum particles---both bosons and fermions---obey the principle of the identity of indiscernibles (contrary to most previous authors). Their position depends on two key ideas. (1): Two objects can be discerned without differing in their intrinsic properties, or in their relations to yet other objects, merely by a symmetric irreflexive relation between them. (This idea goes back to Hilbert, Bernays and Quine.) (2): Appropriate symmetric irreflexive relations can be found in the formalism of quantum theory. This paper assesses their position: in part developing it, and in part criticizing it---and so allowing objects, in particular quantum particles, to be merely numerically distinct. (This is joint work with Adam Caulton, of Cambridge.)

Dr. Marshall Abrams, University of Alabama at Birmingham

Borrowing Laplacean Children's Toys: On the Utility of Largely Unknowable Models

Using examples from evolutionary biology, I discuss ways in which it is useful to assume the existence of what I'll call "ideal models", hypothetical models which can reasonably be thought to exist in principle, but which are too complex for analysis, or simulation, or empirical testing, or even formulation. I'll argue that reference to such ideal models can and does play a useful role in science, and that ideal models, if they do exist, may often be literally true of systems in the world. I'll also argue that the notion of an ideal model can help us understand the relationship between commonplace models: Commonplace models approximate an ideal model, which is literally true of the world.

Dr Grzegorz Bugajak, Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski University in Warsaw and Medical University of Lodz

On the types of observability and a 'criterion' of existence

Old definitions of materiality, formulated in various philosophical schools, were usually given in the form of a list of properties, which all material objects, and only such objects, should share. It can be shown that in the light of now well-established concepts in physics, nearly none of these properties can be rightly attributed to all material objects. What seems to be left from these lists is an epistemological property of 'being observable', or 'observability'. What is material has to be — in a wide sense — observable. But what does it mean to be observable? For example, atoms are not observable in the same sense as are tennis balls. Or are they? When the notion of 'atom' appeared in modern chemistry some 200 years ago it was just a conventional 'invention' which made it possible to explain certain phenomenological laws. Subsequent development in physics proved it to be a very useful notion indeed. But were atoms observable in the times of Dalton or Rutherford? Until fairly recently, when nanotechnology enabled us to manipulate single atoms, their observability was certainly of a different kind than the observability of more 'common' physical objects. Other entities of contemporary physics, quarks, are not, and — according to quantum chromodynamics — will never be subject to similar manipulations. However, being material, they have to be observable, and if so, it would be yet another type of observability. One of the profound questions in the philosophy of nature is the following: under what conditions it is justified to say that some objects, to which certain theoretical scientific notions [seem to] refer, really exist? Perhaps, given the above example, one possible answer, a possible criterion of existence is this: "to exist" means "to be observable", but in a special way: to be subject to manipulation.

Ms Sharon Ford, University of Queensland

New Essentialism and the Swinburne Regress

The New Essentialism advocated by Brian Ellis proposes that dispositional and categorical properties both exist at the fundamental level. The two are combined such that fundamental categorical properties—termed 'categorical dimensions' or 'fundamental structural properties'—fulfill a causal role in constraining the effects of causal powers. In this paper I argue for why, at the fundamental level, these dimensions should, instead, be considered powerful. First, in terms of their identity, the causal role required of categorical dimensions is inseparable from what the dimensions are, weakening the claim for their being quiddistic. Second, the laws of action and reaction are descriptions or specifications of how the categorical dimensions change with respect to the causal processes. These laws are deemed to be necessary. However, necessary laws, characterised as descriptions of their relata, seem to entail irreducible dispositionality. Ellis's assertion that structure is categorical is partly driven by the Swinburne Regress argument, which calls for the effects of causal processes to be directly observable at some point; and which claims that categorical properties are required for this to occur. However, as Ellis notes, categorical dimensions can only be observed in virtue of perceiving a pattern of distributed causal powers. This implies that categorical properties must be either perceived indirectly or inferred from the way things behave. Thus, arguments for fundamental structure given in terms of categorical properties fail to discharge the Swinburne Regress. Alternately, contra the Swinburne Regress, a pure-power account may explain the manifestly qualitative world without resorting to fundamental categoricity. I demonstrate this by describing a possible world in which, together with a higher-order topology, light-like processes are the fundamental entities. Both these fundamentals can be comfortably viewed as powerful rather than categorical, giving rise to the fermions of which the ostensibly qualitative world is built.

Dr James Justus, University of Sydney and Florida State University

The Status of the Fact-Value Distinction in the Teleological Sciences

Ethical values play an important role in sciences endeavoring to solve environmental problems. Unlike descriptive sciences—which are principally concerned with discovering, describing, and explaining phenomena—environmental sciences pursue more immediate goals, such as providing scientific bases for the preservation of biodiversity and natural resources. What distinguishes sciences of this kind from descriptive science is their emphasis on achieving objectives humans consider valuable. They can be labeled 'teleological' for this reason. Recent analyses have suggested teleological sciences are value-laden in a strong sense: attempts to demarcate the function of facts and values within them are misguided and obscure rather than illuminate their structure. In fact, the claim that values inextricably permeate teleological sciences has recently been taken to challenge the view that a "gap" exists between facts and values, the gap commonly taken to explain why, for example, determining what agents should do is distinct from studying what they actually do and why they do it. Examination of teleological sciences such as conservation biology and restoration ecology shows these claims are overstated. Teleological sciences are better conceptualized as having a conditional form where stipulated goals reflecting ethical values set much of their general structure and methodologies, but in which this influence can be demarcated from the factual status of claims made within them. The conditional nature of teleological sciences makes this demarcation possible, and helps clarify the function of values in science in general.

Mr Adrian Currie, Victoria University of Wellington

Towards a Cladistics of Analogy

Sometimes in Biology, particularly in cases where we wish to reconstruct past species, we rely on data from a range of other species — a set of inferential tools called 'the comparative method.' It has been suggested that in using analogous cases (cases where similarity of biological traits is due to

independent evolution as opposed to descent) to construct retrodictive models of species we ought to constrain our area of interest using either homologies (restriction to clades) or parallel cases (restriction to developmental resources). I will examine the motivations behind this and consider whether a different approach that relies on classifying animals by trait, rather than by descent, might have use in the comparative method.

Dr Greg Bamford, The University of Queensland

Design and Designing

Design may seem to have acquired a new found significance in philosophy with the recent interest in, on the one hand, intelligent design, and on the other, in natural design or design in nature, allied with the ongoing interest in function. Thinking about the world as exhibiting design features, however, with or without the services of a designer to thank for those features, hasn't led to much thought about what it is to design something. Attention has focussed largely on artifacts, the objects of design, probably because 'the artifact model' is at the heart of each of these concerns. Intelligent design and natural design are analogies with design as a human activity or practice, so what are the philosophically interesting or relevant features of this activity, of designing, that cutting to the chase might have given us to overlook? I consider what it is to design something, like the Sydney Opera House or a paperweight that appears to be nothing more than a found object. And I sketch some features of how design is that I think we need to recognize or account for, set against intuitions about good knives, makeshift crowbars, scary stuffed bears, and god-like designers.

Professor Rob Wilson, University of Alberta

Is Kinship an Ethnocentric Projection from the West to the Rest?

This paper re-explores the question of whether kinship is, as David Schneider famously argued, an ethnocentric projection made by Western anthropologists onto their native subjects and the cultures that they study. It does so with an eye to advancing contemporary discussions of three general issues in cultural anthropology and the philosophy of the social sciences: the future direction of kinship studies, given it's recent revival; resistance to scientistic, reductionist, or biocentric views in the humanities and social sciences in general and in the study of kinship in particular; and the narrative understanding of large-scale changes in kinship studies over the past 40-50 years. A discussion of Schneider's own views of the ethnocentric projection thesis clarifies why a reconsideration of that thesis is of relevance to these three issues of ongoing concern. The paper will be located against the backdrop of a larger project, Kinship and Sociality, that I have been working on over the last few years.

Mr Kelvin McQueen, ANU (RSSS)

Has Quantum Entanglement Falsified Microphysicalism?

Physicalism is a weltanschauung that attempts to unify all of nature under one category: 'the physical'. It is advocated by those who want to say that the mind is nothing special - the mind is just another 'physical' phenomenon - like everything else - and it won't be long before we have a complete physical theory of the mind. However, spelling out what it is to be physical, in a way that makes physicalism both theoretically significant, and not obviously false, is quite challenging. Microphysicalism: the view that to be physical, is to be determined, or necessitated by, fundamental microscopic particles (and their interactions); is, as far as I can tell, the only real response to the challenge. However, many philosophers have recently argued that microphysicalism is logically inconsistent with quantum mechanics: physicalism is falsified by the holism & non-locality constitutive of so-called 'entangled states' (for example, two entangled particles can be two feet apart, yet neither particle on its own has a definite position). I will attempt a response on behalf of the microphysicalist, by making a few tweaks in the microphysicalist doctrine.

Ms Kelly Roe, Australian National University

Kinds of Kinds

Theorists often distinguish between natural kinds, varieties of non-natural kinds such as social, institutional, artifactual, and arbitrary classes or nominal kinds. While there is debate over what properties a kind must have in order to deserve the term 'natural' I will not take up this issue here. Instead, I will focus on the different kinds of features that characterize the different kinds of kinds (quite apart from what we choose to call them). I'll offer a non-essentialist continuum between essentialism on the one hand and nominalism on the other. Different kinds of kinds can be thought of as lying on different points on the continuum according to the features they exemplify. Once this framework is set up we can turn to the issue of what kinds of kinds there might be in bio-medicine and psychiatry. Getting clearer on what kinds of kinds there are in these fields will have implications for the development of adequate classification/s.

Miss Kirsten Walsh, University of Melbourne

Is There A New Demarcation Problem?

The original demarcation problem is to distinguish between science and non-science. Philosophers of science have worked on this problem for a long time, and yet they have failed to agree on a criterion. Should we continue to hope for a consensus solution? Larry Laudan draws a more skeptical conclusion. In 'The Demise of the Demarcation Problem', he claims that it is a pseudo-problem, which we ought to replace with a better alternative. This 'new demarcation problem' is to distinguish between well-confirmed and ill-confirmed theories. Laudan argues that we only want to know which theories we should believe, and we should believe theories iff they are well-confirmed. But, says Laudan, not all scientific theories are well-confirmed — and conversely, not all well-confirmed theories are scientific. Therefore, we don't want to know which theories are scientific; we only want to know which theories are well-confirmed. I find Laudan's argument unconvincing. I present reasons for thinking that we shouldn't focus on theories to the exclusion of all other aspects of knowledge, or on well-confirmedness to the exclusion of all other epistemic virtues. We want to know more than what to believe. Moreover, even when we want to know what to believe, it turns out that being well-confirmed is closely related to being scientific. So Laudan's new demarcation problem is not really independent of the original, and therefore not a viable replacement.

Mr Nicholas Evans, CAPPE, Australian National University

The Importance of Scientific Communicators

As scientific advancement continues to generate controversial and potentially dangerous technologies, there will be those who argue for a more socially aware practice of science. In this paper, I present an argument for the fostering of what I will call the "Scientific Communicator," that is, individuals whose role it is to mediate between scientific enterprise and other fields of endeavor. Science Communicators are often seen in education circles, but I believe there is a special role to be served by such individuals in a wider context. Science communicators are not only valuable in teaching the public about science (scientific literacy), but also in helping communicate the effects of scientific research and synthesise this knowledge with other fields to make important policy decisions. Without these individuals, the technologies which necessitate policy change may be misunderstood, and we run the risk of creating more problems for ourselves. In particular, I am interested in the roles of individuals such as Leo Szilard (whom I will be using as a case study) in influencing not only the progression of scientific understanding, but also the societal role of science through the early to mid 20th century. Through this paper, I will highlight some current issues in which such individuals may help, and conclude with some statements as to how such efforts to foster such individual's developments may be hindered in the modern world.

Mr Erik Nyberg, University of Melbourne

Duplicate Paths

Causal Bayesian networks are graphs that show which variables causally influence others, and they are proving useful in both Science and Philosophy. One outstanding problem, however, is how to measure the causal influence of C on E via one causal path, when there are other causal paths between them. This question makes intuitive sense, but can it always be answered? We consider two possible approaches in which the other paths are 'blocked' by specifying probability distributions for some variables: through either observation or intervention. But both these approaches have serious shortcomings. We advocate a third, more ontologically radical approach: the path of interest should be duplicated, leaving the other paths unblocked. We can then measure how much an intervention upon the duplicate C affects the duplicate E. This has a plausible theoretical interpretation, conserves accepted results, and can be extended routinely to the complex cases that other methods cannot handle.

Mr. Peter Takacs, Florida State University (Philosophy & HPS)

Can Biological Fitness Be Etiologically Inert and Explanatorily Efficacious?

Mohan Matthen and André Ariew (2002), Dennis Walsh, Tim Lewens, and André Ariew (2002), André Ariew and Richard Lewontin (2004), and André Ariew and Zachary Ernst (2006) have recently argued that the propensity interpretation of biological fitness is fundamentally flawed because it commits one to a conception of natural selection as a causally efficacious mechanism or "independent dynamical force" when it is nothing other than an emergent statistical trend instantiated by underlying subpopulation-level causal processes. This cadre of authors suggests that the propensity interpretation of fitness and its corresponding conception of natural selection as a dynamical force allegedly (1)

fails to explain why present populations exhibit the particular frequency distributions for genotypes and phenotypes that they do, (2) cannot realize the necessary independence condition for component causation required by a statistical relevance model for explanation, and (3) gives no guidance whatsoever as to how natural selection would affect the net force of combined evolutionary factors were it somehow distinguishable as an independent evolutionary force. In this paper, I defend the propensity interpretation of fitness and the dynamical conception of natural selection against these contentions on the grounds that there is as of yet no cogent argument which compels us to deny the causal efficacy of selection. Moreover, I argue that the success of predictive modeling in population biology, e.g., Lande-Arnold multiple regression analysis, lends further credence to a conception of fitness as a causally efficacious property.

Prof. Christopher Eliot, Hofstra University and University of Sydney

Do ecological communities need to exist?

At least two motivations push philosophy of ecology to figure out what communities and ecosystems are and whether they exist, and if so how and in what sense. First, communities and ecosystems have been increasingly appealing as units for conservation or preservation. Second, scientific realism has traditionally tied a discipline's success to the existence of its theoretical entities, unobservable ones, and this standard applies awkwardly to ecology, if at all. In this paper (ignoring ecosystems per se) I respond to the recent analyses of ecological communities offered by Sterelny, Odenbaugh, and Shrader-Frechette/McCoy, focusing on the question of whether communities need to exist to fulfill the demands created by the above motivations.

Mr Ali Akbar Navabi, Centre for Time

Knowledge, Influence, and the Third Factor

In Time and Chance, David Albert connects the temporal asymmetry of influence to the temporal asymmetry of knowledge by arguing that in the initial disequilibrium of the world there lies the ultimate justification for record-based knowledge of the past. I explicate, in this paper, the puzzle of the epistemic temporal asymmetry of the world. To set the stage for the exposition of Albert's

thesis, I highlight the philosophical significance of the problem of justification of record-based knowledge of the past and attempt to see if Albert's thesis is amenable to any philosophical rigour. With Mathias Frisch, I interpret Albert's thesis as bifurcating into a necessity claim and a sufficiency claim. I contend, drawing on the Boltzmann-Schuetz Cosmological Hypothesis, that the necessity claim is arguably false, but whether the sufficiency claim is true remains an open question. I suggest, furthermore, that if the sufficiency claim could be systematically defended, then the initial disequilibrium state of the world could be considered as the third factor which underpins both the epistemic temporal asymmetry and the asymmetry of influence, statistically characterised. In the light of this third-factor proposal, the connection of the epistemic temporal asymmetry and the temporal asymmetry of influence embodied in Albert's thesis is shown to be a spurious one, hence leading to a systematic refutation of the thesis.

Dr. Gerald Doppelt, UC San Diego

How to Be a Scientific Realist

This paper seeks to develop a more defensible case for scientific realism. I argue against two standard assumptions of realists: (1) that realism is confirmed if it provides the best explanation of theories' predictive success and (2) that the realist claim that successful theories are true, by itself, provide the best explanation of their success. On the positive side, I argue that the confirmation of realism requires that it provides an explanation of theories' explanatory success, not just predictive success. I then show how realism can explain theories' explanatory success. I propose a richer realist model for explaining theories' success, which includes an account of their epistemic virtues (e.g. simplicity and unification) and standards of success. This realist model is further confirmed; it can explain the success of theories in gaining adherents. Finally, I argue that my version of inference to the best explanation realism provides a plausible rebuttal of the pessimistic meta-induction from the many past successful-but-false

theories to the likelihood that our best current theories are likewise false. On my model, the realist can explain the success of past falsified theories without assuming that they or any components of them were true. My model of realism explains the success of best current theories in meeting the highest standards of confirmation by embracing the scientific realist claim that they meet the highest standards; they are true or approximately true. This version of scientific realism defeats the pessimistic meta-induction by establishing that there is a crucial difference between the success of predecessor theories and the success of our best current theories. My argument involves the realist in trumping the pessimistic inductive inference by favoring realist inference to the best explanation. Thus, scientific realism for our best current theories is confirmed by inference to the best explanation.

Dr Philip Catton, University of Canterbury

Relationship, symbol, science

In the human use of symbolic forms just as in the human adventure of an interpersonal relationship, there is an open-texturedness, an incapability of any individual to be in total control, and a potentiality for returns well beyond or well below what parties purposed at the outset the symbol or the relationship to produce. Whether a symbolism that persons use, or the interpersonal relationships to which those persons are assimilated, truly contribute to flourishing, depends upon continual creative endeavour to which multiple persons contribute and of which no individual person is all that fully in control. We might be pressed into thinking of the one set of creative demands epistemically and of the other morally, but the connection between the two is nevertheless complete. In this paper I explore KantÂ¹s understanding of these points and address in this light the possibility of science.

Dr Ben Jeffares, Victoria University of Wellington

Composite Models and the Historical Sciences

We expect the sciences to provide us with insights into the way the world works. Its 'product' is representations— models, of regularities that can then be re-deployed to make predictions, and explain the world. The product of the historical

sciences —historical geology, archaeology, evolutionary biology and so forth— is historiographies: narratives of the past. This paper examines narratives and outlines how they utilise regularities. It does so by integrating David Hull's (1975) view of narratives with recent work on scientific models. I argue that we can understand historical narratives as composite models.

Dr Jessica Pfeifer, University of Maryland, Baltimore County

Fitness, the Environment, and Between Generation Variance

Fitness is always relative to an environment. I develop an account of which features of the environment are relevant for fitness and how these environmental features ought to be factored in to determine fitness values. I use this account to resolve a problem raised by Gillespie for the propensity account's use of the expected number of offspring to define fitness. In particular, I argue that, given the account of the environment developed in this paper, between generation variance does not create a problem for the propensity account of fitness. Thus, we might not need to revise our metaphysical understanding of fitness, in contrast to what a number of philosophers have recently argued.

Mr Ali Akbar Navabi, Centre for Time, University of Sydney

Knowledge, Influence, and the Third Factor

In *Time and Chance*, David Albert connects the temporal asymmetry of influence to the temporal asymmetry of knowledge by arguing that in the initial disequilibrium of the world there lies the ultimate justification for record-based knowledge of the past. I explicate, in this paper, the puzzle of the epistemic temporal asymmetry of the world. To set the stage for the exposition of Albert's thesis, I highlight the philosophical significance of the problem of justification of record-based knowledge of the past and attempt to see if Albert's thesis is amenable to any philosophical rigour. With Mathias Frisch, I interpret Albert's thesis as bifurcating into a necessity claim and a

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Political Philosophy

Dr. Paula Keating, UNSW

The idea of the reasonable in John Rawls' Political Philosophy

What is the status of the reasonable in Rawls' mature account of Political Liberalism? Rawls' corrections to his political philosophy seem to end in a flurry of the reasonable as qualifying adjective. Hence he writes of reasonable comprehensive doctrines, a reasonable overlapping consensus, a reasonable pluralism, a reasonable political conception of justice, and even more speculatively, reasonable hope. Is the idea of the reasonable created as a type of reflective equilibrium? Is it the one and the same as public reason? Or are we to still understand it as in the sense of the reasonable person? This paper will attempt to interpret an understanding of Rawls' idea of the reasonable for his own political philosophy and hopefully then how this idea may, as a part of practical political philosophy, work in a live society.

Ms Suzy Killmister, University of Melbourne

Jusitifying Group Rights

The rights claims that groups make with regard to language are highly varied, and pull in seemingly incongruous directions. While some groups demand official status for their language, others focus on the need for translations in key social services. While some request bi-lingual education,

others attempt to restrict the spread of alternative languages within their territory. Which of these rights claims are legitimate, and how do they interrelate? I explore these questions by first positing a general model for understanding group rights claims, and then demonstrating how the various strands of language rights claims map onto it.

Mr Hugh Breakey, University of Queensland

Two Concepts of Property: Ownership of Things. Property in Activities.

All current theoretical understandings of the concept 'property' are flawed, and all for the same reason. They are flawed because they hold that property is (at least in the limit case) a determinate ethico-political relation to some thing. Such ownership-of-things is, indeed, one of the two important senses of the concept 'property'. But there is another sense, conceptually and normatively distinct: property-in-activities. In this sense the concept 'property' describes a determinate ethico-political relation to some activity — a relation that may (but equally may not) subsequently effect a wide variety of relations to some thing. In such cases the relation with the activity is essential, fixed and primary, and the ensuing relations with tangible or intangible things are contingent, variable and derivative. Appreciation of property-in-activities illuminates much of the substance of communal, intellectual and resource property rights as well as the more obvious cases of customary, recreation, riparian, hunting and easement property rights. Further, it allows us increased understanding of important philosophical applications of the concept 'property': ranging from Locke's property in life and labour to recent analyses of the hacker ethos. And historically, property-in-activities bridges the conceptual gap between the 'propriety' that was a perennial normative concern up to the seventeenth century and the full-blown ownership-of-things that had achieved dominance by the end of the eighteenth. I argue that while intuitive, legal and philosophical use of property-in-activities remains widespread, serious misunderstandings and flawed policy arise

from interpreting such use as referring to ownership-of-things.

Dr David Lea, American University of Sharjah

A Freedom based defense of the implementation of Private ownership rights in the

Third world or so called developing countries frequently utilize informal systems of ownership which tend to be communally based, and in the case of land, unregistered. The Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto's argues that property rights in the developing world are the principal obstacle to prosperity and participation in the wealth generating activities of the global economic market. However, the thrust of de Soto's argument basically rests on the issue of economic efficiency, which is to say integration into the economic market with its global reach can only be efficiently achieved through the adoption of a system of formalized principles of private ownership. This form of ownership has been critiqued from a number of aspects. One author mentions three critiques, the "anti-commodification critique", which alleges the commodification of the natural environment, the "critique of expropriation", which points to the closing off of the commons, and the " productive organization critique", which associates private ownership with the implementation of hierarchical relations of production. The issue, which this paper addresses, is whether these critiques can be answered in part through reference to Sen's analysis of the relation between modern ownership and freedom. Amartya Sen believes that the relation between freedom and market mechanisms needs exploration and especially the links between welfare achievements and freedom achievements, as the successes and failures of economic markets have tended to be judged entirely by achievements of individual welfare (for example, in terms of utility based Pareto optimality).

Ms. Joanne Lau, RSSS, Australian National University

Political Obligation and the Civil Dead

There seems to be a general conception that the members of any given democratic population should be treated equally. We tend to address this in terms of the obligations of political obligations

and benefits that are distributed amongst the polity. Additionally, it is assumed that there is some sort of rough balance between the benefits distributed by the state and the obligations that individuals have towards that state. However, there are several — some well-documented — cases where this is not so. In particular, there are clearly identifiable groups that are not endowed with the same benefits as others. If this is so, why should people who are paying the same costs be under the same political obligations, if they are not receiving the same benefits? I propose a method by which we can resurrect Hart's theory of fair play to take into account the particular disparities in the distribution of political benefit. In particular, I explore the assumption of a balance in the amount of benefits and obligations we receive and how this relates to game theory, the particular predicaments of the disenfranchised citizen and the non-enfranchised foreign national and the availability of alternate benefit schemes. Finally, I consider the notions of fairness and enfranchisement across different classes of individuals before offering some potential remedies to address the disparity in political benefit whilst maintaining a theory of fairness.

Mr Macintosh Stewart, University of Otago

Rawls and Future Generations

John Rawls' theory has a problem in dealing with future generations. How do we account for obligations of justice we have towards those who will come after us? I discuss Rawls's solution to this problem from A Theory of Justice, and argue that it fails. Instead, I will claim that there is actually no problem of justice here at all. Justice simply is not the sort of thing that takes place between non-contemporaries. Rawls would have done better to acknowledge the problem as being outside the scope of his project, as he does for several other significant ethical problems.

Mr Jan-Willem Burgers, ANU (RSSS)

A Reason for Weighted Probabilistic Allocation

Probabilistic allocation is frequently defended as being the best mechanism for allocating goods in some contexts. Those who advertise the virtues of this practice, however, almost exclusively tend to extol equiprobabilistic allocation. Rarely are the virtues of weighted probabilistic allocation discussed. Are there any virtues to the lat-ter, and, if so, what are they? This paper investigates the virtues of weighted probabilistic allocation from the perspective of one important general justification for probabilistic allocation: its (net) positive behavioural effects. Specifically, I address the following question: do behavioural effects as a reason for probabilistic allocation ever warrant weighted as opposed to equiprobabilistic allocation? I believe there are two necessary conditions for behavioral effects to do so: 1) the probabilistic allocation must be primarily in-tended to address the possible disadvantageous behavioural responses of potential re-cipients, as resulting from their predictive capacities; and 2) the recipients must vary in the amount of 'harm' they can potentially cause through their behaviour. The paper proceeds in three parts. In Part I, I briefly attempt to justify the claim that, from the argument for probabilistic allocation due to (net) positive behav-ioural effects, weighted probabilistic allocation is only warranted if the purpose is to address the predictive opportunities of the potential recipients. In Part II, I attempt to illustrate how weighted probabilistic allocation can address these with my case of a Tax Authority's Monitoring Policy. I first lay out the ideal conditions for weighted probabilistic allocation, and then speculate on the actual importance of this under more realistic empirical conditions. Although this case shows well why weighted probabilistic allocation should, in principle, be an important consideration, I contend in Part III that this case is rare and we should not often expect the right conditions for weighting to arise in practice.

Prof Paul Patton, UNSW

Postcolonial political liberalism: Rawls and the legitimacy of colonial States

Political Liberalism appears well suited to determining the conditions of democratic government in a society established by

colonization. Not only does it not presuppose agreement on any particular comprehensive moral view, but its point of departure is the fact of 'conflicting and even incommensurable religious, philosophical and moral doctrines.' It offers a clear principle of democratic legitimacy after the fact of colonization, namely when political power is exercised in accordance with a constitution the governing principles of which would now be accepted by all reasonable parties. At the same time, there are reasons to suppose that Rawls's ideal theory cannot simply be applied to the case of colonial societies. After considering these objections and arguing that Political Liberalism leaves it open to apply the criterion of legitimacy to societies established by colonisation, this paper asks what this might tell us about the conditions under which a postcolonial government would be legitimate and whether the present Australian constitution meets these conditions.

Ms Sibel Kibar, Middle East Technical University

Searching for Materialist Grounds of Justice

The concept of justice has been built on divine grounds. Justice was thought as an expectation from a divine judge even the legal laws and decisions were measured with reference to the natural law until the 19th century, the death of God was declared. However, neither God nor the natural law has a binding force on today's notion of justice. A foundation lying under the concept of justice is still needed today in order to come to a mutual understanding and an agreement, I believe. This foundation must be a materialistic (earthly) one in a way that mirrors our age. To a certain extent, I oppose anti-foundationalist approaches. I do not totally admit that the law is nothing but the order of the legal authority or the system as claimed by the legal positivists. I agree with that justice, laws, and moral concepts are partly the result of the legal system, but they have also social and historical bases, which look like more permanent than the legal ones. Those unwritten bases are not fixed, either. But they represent the existing conditions of the society at that time. So in this sense, they construct reality from the existing conditions. And with a reference to that reality, we build our moral, juridical and legal concepts. This attitude seems contradictory with the foundationalist standpoints as well. Although I defend the importance of revealing or building foundations, I do not advocate fixed grounds. The duality between foundationalism and anti-foundationalism can be surpassed by another duality between realism and anti-realism. Speaking of unstable foundations is related with an understanding of unstable reality. This does not mean that there is no reality; there is a constructed reality within its robust conditions. Thus, my aim is to reveal those conditions that justice can be grounded on.

Mr Moises Vaca Paniagua, University College London

The Concept of Justice, Constructivism, and Political Liberalism

It is by no means clear that the late Rawls is a constructivist about principles of justice. In, fact, there seems to be abundant evidence to the contrary in his Political Liberalism. This has been recently obscured by G.A. Cohen's (Rescuing Justice and Equality, HUP, 2008, ch. 7) critique to Rawls concept of justice. In light of such a critique we need to distinguish the following dichotomies: (1) a concept of impure justice vs a concept of pure justice; (2) a constitutive view of the correctness of principles vs an indicative view of the correctness of principles; and (3) a comprehensive conception of justice vs a political conception of justice. These dichotomies are logically independent. Whatever position we take regarding each of them does not imply taking a specific position regarding the others. I will argue, first, that G.A. Cohen is mistaken in thinking that his critique of Ralws's definition of the concept of justice is a critique of constructivism. Second, following Sharon Street ("Constructivism about Reasons", Oxford Studies of Metaethics, III), I will argue that only views stating that the correctness of normative principles is constituted by their being the result of a specified procedure must be considered constructivist views (and views stating that being the result of a procedure indicates correctness must not). Third, I will argue against Street's claim that even when for Rawls's political liberalism the standard of correctness of principles

of justice is not truth but reasonableness, justice-as-fairness still expresses a constructivist view. I hold that justice-as-fairness, in order to serve the purposes of political liberalism, is better interpreted as not making the claim that reasonableness of the principles of justice is constituted by their being the result of the original position.

Mr. Cavit Hacihamdioglu, Australian National University, Philosophy

David Miller, Global Justice and Duties to Non-Nationals

David Miller makes a distinction between duties of distributive justice towards co-nationals and those towards non-nationals. The recipients of the first type of duty, he claims, are morally more significant because of co-nationals' moral and political association with each other. It is each nation's own responsibility to address issues of (social) justice 'primarily' within its own jurisdiction. This is because, Miller derives practical principles of justice from modes of human interaction taking place within family, community and nation, the latter having the broadest scope of human association and primary moral relevance. The duty of global justice (i.e. duties to distant needy) has a weaker moral weight, having only secondary moral importance. Wealthy nations, nevertheless, have a minimal duty of global justice to address inequalities and injustices in poor nations to ensure standards of i) basic human rights and ii) fair terms of international cooperation. However, Miller denies universalist claims that the duty of equal consideration or distributive equality applies globally because there is i) no single/universal concept of justice and ii) no single global community to apply such universalistic claims. In order to critically appraise Miller's arguments on duties to co-nationals, they need to be weighed against cosmopolitan/universalist positions that demand global equality in discharging duties of distributive global justice. I suggest a middle way position between the ethical priority and significance of our duties towards co-nationals (Miller's partialism) and the equal duties toward all humans (Singer's impartialism). In doing so, I hope to answer possible objections to both approaches. That is, while Singer's impartialist view is morally over-demanding, Miller's partialist duty is morally under-demanding. I propose that we need a more qualified approach in forming our duties of justice that gives balanced weight to the duties we have towards co-nationals and non-nationals.

Mr. Andy Lamey, University of Western Australia

A Liberal Theory of Asylum

Hannah Arendt argued that refugees pose a major problem for liberalism. Most liberal theorists endorse the idea of human rights. At the same time, liberalism takes the existence of sovereign states for granted. When large numbers of people petition a liberal state for asylum, Arendt argued, these two commitments will come into conflict. An unwavering respect for human rights would mean that no refugee is ever turned away. Being sovereign, however, allows states to control their borders. States supposedly committed to human rights will thus often violate the rights of refugees by denying them entry. In this presentation I attempt to defend liberalism from Arendt's criticism by outlining a rights-based model of asylum that is enforceable by sovereign states. Central to my argument is a distinction between the place where a person is recognized as a rights-bearing agent, and the potentially different place where he or she exercises those rights.

Mr Eray Yaganak, Middle East Technical University

Human Nature and Politics in Hobbes

The central question of political philosophy concerns the nature of the authority of the state. The concept of such authority generates a philosophical puzzlement: on the one hand it seems to involve a power to override the will of the individual citizen, while on the other hand its existence seems in a certain sense to depend on the wills of the individuals who are subject to it. The relationship between power which means sovereignty and will in a political context is the main debatable problem of any political body. One of the preeminent figures in the history of political thought Hobbes deals with the problem of human nature in order to explain a political body. My claim is that his liberalist politics depends on his

account of human nature. That is, while defining what human nature is, he tries to legitimate his political and economical understandings in accordance with human nature. He describes the human being in two different ways. One is the description of man who lives in the state of nature and the other is that of a civil person or a citizen who lives in a society. In the state of nature, "natural man is a man considered as if he were simply an animal, not modified in any way by education or discipline." Every man has a right to all things. However, this freedom is also the cause of war between men. Since the human's desires are determined by his natural instincts, and since there is no social or ethical limitation, men act without considering others. "Men having equal rights to same things are bound to be in competition for them, and this leads to war." Therefore, "every man is a potential enemy of every other."

Associate Professor Stan van Hooft, Deakin University

Political Patriotism

As evidenced by the reactions to Martha Nussbaum's famous essay of 1996, patriotism is a contested notion in moral debate. This paper explores the suggestion made by Stephen Nathanson that patriotism might be understood as "love of one's country", and suggests that this phrase is misleading. It suggests that patriotism, like love, is not rational, and it fails to distinguish two kinds of object for that love: one's cultural community and one's political community. Accordingly, this phrase can lead to a kind of nationalism which involves chauvinism and militarism and that is, therefore, morally objectionable. The problem arises from ambiguities in the notion of "country" which is said to be the object of such love. Moreover, "love" is not the appropriate term for a relationship whose central psychological function is that of establishing an individual's identity as a citizen. I suggest that the proper mode of attachment involved in patriotism is identification with one's political community, and that the proper object of a patriot's allegiance is the political community thought of without the emotional, nationalistic and moralistic connotations that often accompany the concept of community. The "political patriotism" that arises from such an attitude is sceptical of the "national interest" and does not accept that our moral responsibilities to others stop at national borders. In this way political patriotism is consistent with a cosmopolitan stance towards human rights and global justice.

SOCIAL EVENTS

Opening Reception

Sunday, 5 July 2009 (8.30 - 10.00 pm)

Foyer, Economics and Commerce Building (Building 148), University of Melbourne

See Univeristy of Melbourne campus map (p. 6)

Conference Dinner

Buffet

Wednesday, 8 July 2009 (8.00 - 11.00 pm)

Mesh, Crown Promenade Hotel, 8 Whiteman Street, Southbank 3006

Telephone: 1800 776 612

Menu

| **Seafood**	Smoked chicken	**Bread**
Tasmania oyster	Make your own salad	Multi-grain roll
Tasmania mussel	Grilled red pepper	White dinner roll
King prawn	Grilled pumpkin	Olive bread
Fresh Water Crab	**Hot Dishes**	Rye bread
Teppanyaki	Pumpkin soup	Plain naan
Beef skewer	Vegetable tom yum soup	Garlic naan
Kangaroo	Indian chickpea curry	**Cheese & Nuts**
Blue eye cod	Garlic potato	Blue stilton
Roast	Steamed broccoli	Cheddar
Lamb	Chicken cacciatore	Brie
Mixed vegetables	Bass fillets	Mixed dried fruits
Cold Dishes	Spinach cannelloni	Walnuts
Bean salad	Steamed vegetarian dumpling	Water crackers
Pasta salad	Coconut rice	**Desserts**
Tabouleh	Steamed basmati rice	Dark chocolate fountain
Smoked ocean trout		Pistachio mini cake

Fresh cut fruits	Meringue tartlets	**Drinks**
Dark chocolate dome	Lemon & lime cake	2 glasses of house wine/beer/fruit juice
Strawberry mouse dome	Mango cheese cake	
Fruit flan	Hot apple pudding with custard	Tea, coffee, still water
Real fruit sauces	Selection of Ice-creams	

Getting there

- Take any tram going from Melbourne University (Stop 1) along Swanston St towards the city centre

- Alight at Federation Square / Flinders St Station (Tram stop no. 13).

- Keep heading in the same direction and cross the bridge.

- Once across the bridge, turn RIGHT. You will find yourself near the Arts Centre complex.

- Take the stairs or ramp down to the promenade level (there are three levels you need the intermediate one).

- Walk along the river until you get to Queensbridge St (this will take you roughly 10 minutes).

- Turn LEFT. In front of you, you will see the Crown Casino complex and the light sign "Crown" indicating the main entrance to the casino.

- "Mesh" is in the Crown Promenade Hotel building which is on Whiteman St, directly opposite the main entrance of the casino. (If you find it difficult to locate the restaurant, you can approach the concierge staff at the casino entrance and they will be able to show you where to go).

University of Melbourne to *Mesh*, Crown Promenade Hotel

Farewell Lunch

Friday, 10 July 2009 (1.30 - 3.00 pm)

East Imperial, 323 Rathdowne St, Carlton 3053 VIC

Telephone: 9347 3322

Menu

Premium Chinese Tea

Wasabi Prawn, Green Spinach Dumpling

Scallop Dumpling, Stuffed Eggplant

King Prawn Dumpling, Vegetarian Dumpling

Crab Meat & Prawn Dumpling, Shanghai Little

Dragon Bun, Chicken Sticky Rice

Egg Custard Tart

History of Yum Cha

Originally a Cantonese custom, the Chinese tradition of *yum cha* literally means "drinking tea". The kind of food served at yum cha is *dim sum*, which literally means "touch the heart" or "order to your heart's content". The tradition of yum cha dates back to the tenth century and the beginning of the Sung dynasty. Both street vendors in the huge city market and established tea houses served dim sum. Tea houses became very popular in Southern China during the Sung dynasty and a large tea house could boast of more than 1,000 dim sum varieties. Dim sum is usually served during the day from mid morning to mid afternoon.

Getting there

- From the University, follow Swanston St until you come to Faraday St.

- Turn onto Faraday St and keep going until you come to Rathdowne St.

- Turn RIGHT.

- The restaurant is on your right at the corner of Moton Place and Rathdowne St.

OTHER USEFUL INFORMATION

Doctors

University of Melbourne Health Service

138-146 Cardigan Street, Carlton, VIC 3053

Tel: (03) 8344 6904 or (03) 8344 6905

Opening hours: 8.45am - 5:00pm Monday to Friday

QV Medical Centre

Corner Swanston Street & Londsdale Street

Melbourne VIC 3000, Australia

Tel: (03) 9662 2256

Pharmacies

University of Melbourne Pharmacy

Ground Floor, Student Union Building (Bldg. 130)

Tel: (+61 3) 8344 6965

Pulse Pharmacy

279 Lygon St

Carlton VIC 3053

Tel: (03) 9349 1067

Pickford Pharmacy

177-179 Elgin St

Carlton, VIC 3053

Tel: (03) 9347 2505

ATMs

Commonwealth Bank, University of Melbourne

The bank is on the north side of the Architecture Building (133), directly east of Union House, across the plaza. Other ATM machines are located near Union House and on Lygon Street.

Post office

University of Melbourne Post Office

South side of the Architecture Building (133), ddirectly east of Union House, across the plaza.

Photocopying

Photocopying facilities are available in the **Baillieu Library** (Building 177, just south of Economics & Commerce the main conference locale).

Internet

E1 Networks Internet Cafe

62 Pelham Street

Carlton, VIC 3053

Hours: Monday - Thursday: 10am - 5pm.

Saturday: 10am - 5pm   (Prior booking needed).

Tel: (03) 9077 0927

Internet access is available if you are

staying at **Ormond College**.

There are also several internet cafés on Lygon Street.

Cafés

Student Union Food Court
There are lots of quick lunch options in Union House, the student union (Building 130), just North of Old Arts.

Animal Orchestra

163 Grattan Street

Carlton 3053 VIC

There are also lots of nice cafés on Lygon street.

Pubs

Prince Alfred Hotel

191 Grattan St

Carlton VIC 3053

The Clyde

Cnr. Elgin St. & Cardigan St.

Carlton VIC 3053

The Corkman

160 Leicester St (cnr Pelham St)

Carlton VIC 3053

University House, the staff club, offers members of the faculty clubs of other universities temporary membership. Temporary membership is free, but for licensing purposes you need to register at the entrance desk or contact their membership director Michele Caneva (mcaneva@unimelb.edu.au).

University House is located just North of the conference venue, along Professors' Walk in building 112.

Restaurants

There is a wide variety of restaurants on Lygon street, within walking distance of the University of Melbourne; Italian, Chinese, Thai, Malaysian, Indian ...