

Ethical decision making in organizations: A self-regulation approach

Anne Joosten

Promotor: Prof. Dr. Alain Van Hiel

Copromotor: Prof. Dr. Marius van Dijke

Proefschrift ingediend tot het behalen van de academische graad van Doctor in de Psychologie

Universiteit Gent

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Dankwoord

"No man is an island"[1] en dat geldt voor mij dan ook niet anders. Ik ben vele mensen dankbaar voor hun hulp en steun tijdens de zes jaren van mijn doctoraat.

Allereerst een groot woord van dank aan mijn promotor. Alain, bedankt om mij zes jaar geleden als "Ollander"[2] welkom te heten. Zonder jou was dit doctoraat nooit geworden wat het nu is. In de afgelopen zes jaar heb ik je leren kennen als een vriendelijke doch licht cynische man, die er alles aan doet om zijn "poulains"[3] op het juiste pad te zetten. Bedankt voor je snelle en grondige feedback op mijn schrijfsels, maar ook voor de broodnodige vrolijke noot. Dank voor het verbeteren van mijn kennis over Vlaamse woorden en gezegden, politiek en mandarijnen. Marius, ook jij hebt een belangrijk aandeel gehad in de voltooiing van mijn doctoraat als mijn copromotor. Je stond altijd voor me klaar wanneer ik inhoudelijke of statistische vragen had. Ook jij voorzag mijn schrijfsels meer dan eens van grondig en eerlijk commentaar.

Ook een woord van dank aan de leden van mijn begeleidingscommissie, David De Cremer en Frederik Anseel. Bedankt voor alle tijd en moeite die jullie besteed hebben aan het lezen en verbeteren van de hoofdstukken van dit doctoraat. David, jij was het die me destijds voorstelde aan Alain en Marius. Bedankt hiervoor!

Verder ook een woord van dank aan alle collega's van de vakgroep Ontwikkelings-, Persoonlijkheids- en Sociale Psychologie. Het was/is fijn hier te werken. In het bijzonder wil ik de (oud)leden van de onderzoeksgroep Sociale Psychologie bedanken: Alain, Arne, Chris, Dries, Emma, Ilse, Janos, Jasper, Kristof, Lieven, Sven en Tessa. Bedankt voor alle fijne gesprekken, uitstapjes, etentjes en lab meetings (broodjes!). Een speciaal woord van dank aan mijn (voormalige) bureaugenoten. Arne en Ilse, bedankt voor het warme welkom, alle gesprekken en hulp. Chris, bedankt dat je zo waardig de plek van Ilse hebt overgenomen. Het was

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[1] John Donne, 1624

[2] Lees: Nederlander. NB Holland is een regio en voormalige provincie die gesitueerd is aan de westkust van Nederland (nu: Noord- en Zuid-Holland).

[3] Vertaling: pupillen

een genoegen om met jou een bureau te delen. Bedankt voor alle gesprekken, biertjes, roddels, muziekjes en het verbeteren van mijn kennis over kinderen. Het is bijna een wonder dat we nog iets gedaan kregen ;-) Ik hoop je nog vaak tegen te komen! Tessa, zonder jou zou ons bureau een stuk saaier zijn geweest. Jij ook bedankt voor alle gesprekken en gezelligheid. Ik hoop nog een tijdje van je gezelschap te kunnen genieten! Dries, bedankt voor het delen van je statistische kennis en voor alle nuttige (en onnuttige) weetjes. Het was en is gezellig een bureau met je te mogen delen. Andere bureau: You rock!

Familie en vrienden, bij jullie kon ik altijd terecht voor wat (Brabantse) gezelligheid. Bedankt voor alle steun en interesse in waar ik nou ook al weer precies mee bezig was. Wel, het resultaat ligt nu voor jullie. Een speciaal woord van dank aan ons pap, mam, Sara, Mart en Evi. Dankzij jullie voelde en voelt “ons thuis” altijd als thuis!

Lieve Michel. Jij bent mijn steun en toeverlaat. Bedankt dat je samen met mij het avontuur bent aangegaan. Op naar de toekomst! Hanna en Iris, wat is er mooier dan na een vermoeiende dag jullie lachende gezichtjes te zien. Jullie zijn mijn grootste trots!

Anne Joosten, mei 2016

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Chapter 1

General introduction

Numerous incidences of organizational scandals have recently emerged. Some of them elicited attention in the media worldwide. Examples of organizational misconduct include cases such as various accounting scandals (e.g., AIG, Tyco, WorldCom, Enron and Ahold), NSA's mass surveillance of citizens around the world, melamine-contaminated milk in China (300,000 victims), violation of building regulations which resulted in a building collapse in Bangladesh (1,100 deaths), GSK's bribery in China to spark medicine-sale, the European meat adulteration scandal, and banking scandals leading up to the worldwide financial crisis. All these examples clearly show that unethical business conduct is both widespread and invasive, with serious consequences for society and its members. It is thus clear that it is important that we understand why so many decision makers resort to unethical business practices.

As a result of this widespread corruption in businesses, research on ethical and unethical decision making in organizations has begun to receive the attention it deserves. Historically, research on business ethics has taken a normative (i.e., prescriptive) approach (Treviño & Weaver, 1994), which origins from philosophy and theology and focuses on how individuals and organizations should behave. This approach is based on the assumption of autonomy and responsibility and assumes that "ethical behavior is not a function of anything other than an individual's free choice" (Treviño & Weaver, 1994 p. 118). Interestingly, this approach also assumes that humans are rational moral beings. That is, people are aware of the ethical

aspects of the situation in which they are involved and they are therefore able to consciously decide to "do good" or to "do bad".

However, it has become increasingly clear that unethical business conduct can rarely be attributed to a few "bad apples" at the top. Instead, unethical behavior is widespread and decision makers at various organizational levels have been found to behave unethically. It thus seems that a substantial amount of unethical behavior in organizations is the result of a temporary lapse in the behavior of good people. Indeed, both common practice and research have shown that good people sometimes do bad things (Bersoff, 1999). To address this issue, a more empirical (i.e., descriptive) approach emerged in management and social sciences literatures that focus on *how* individuals and organizations behave rather than how they *should* behave (Treviño & Weaver, 1994). That is, this approach attempts to describe, explain, and/or predict ethical and unethical decision making in organizations by looking at how individuals make decisions when faced with ethical dilemmas. The present dissertation applies such an approach to improve our understanding of the antecedents of ethical and unethical decision making in organizations, and, more generally, of moral judgment and behavior by integrating recent work in the fields of self-regulation and morality.

A self-regulation approach to ethical and unethical decision making in organizations

Self-regulation enables people to inhibit, override, and/or refrain from acting upon their impulses and desires (Baumeister, Heatherton, & Tice, 1994; Mischel, 1974; Muraven & Baumeister, 2000; Tangney, Baumeister, & Boone, 2004). The human capacity for self-regulation is extremely adaptive and enables people to follow society's norms and rules (Baumeister, Vohs, & Tice, 2007; Mischel, 1974). In line with this, research has related successful self-regulation to numerous positive

outcomes such as success at work, increased concentration, an improved ability to cope with stress and problems, and even lower divorce rates. Conversely, self-regulation failure has been associated with depression and various behavioral problems such as aggression, the inability to manage finances, and theft (Hagger, Wood, Stiff, & Chatzisarantis, 2010; Muraven, Tice, & Baumeister, 1998; Tangney et al., 2004). It is thus clear that our capacity for self-regulation plays a highly important role in a many aspects of our lives.

Research on self-regulation failures suggests that self-regulation requires mental energy that is limited in its availability (e.g., Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998; Muraven et al., 1998) More specifically, all behaviors that require self-regulation draw from the same limited resource, which can become depleted with repeated use (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). When self-regulatory resources are depleted, performance on subsequent acts that require self-regulation may be impaired (Baumeister et al., 1998; Hagger et al., 2010). This state of diminished resources following exertion of self-regulation is usually referred to as ego depletion (Baumeister et al., 1998). In support of the idea that different acts of self-control draw on a limited and shared resource, research shows that various acts involving effective self-regulation (e.g., resisting tempting foods, suppressing emotions, performing counter-attitudinal behaviors) impair performance on a subsequent completely unrelated act that requires self-regulation (for an overview, see Hagger et al., 2010).

Importantly, the limited resource model of self-regulation may also have implications for our understanding of ethical and unethical behavior in organizations. Specifically, it has been argued that displaying ethical and avoiding unethical behavior requires self-regulation to override selfish impulses (DeWall, Baumeister, Gailliot, & Maner, 2008). In line with this idea, laboratory research has shown that after an act that required self-regulation, people are less willing to help

others (DeWall et al., 2008), are more likely to cheat (Gino, Schweitzer, Mead, & Ariely, 2011; Mead, Baumeister, Gino, Schweitzer, & Ariely, 2009), and more likely to act aggressively (DeWall, Baumeister, Stillman, & Gailliot, 2007). This finding may have important implications in the context of work organizations because unethical business behaviors such as revealing confidential company information with unauthorized others or theft of company property may pose serious problems for organizations. Similarly, ethical business conduct like voluntary helping one's supervisor and coworkers, speaking up to improve the way in which work is organized, and attempting to offer the best customer service all contribute to organizational effectiveness (N. P. Podsakoff, Whiting, Podsakoff, & Blume, 2009; P. M. Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Paine, & Bachrach, 2000). However, a variety of forces that are known to hamper and deplete self-regulation are omnipresent in work situations, such as the necessity to make many choices and decisions (Vohs et al., 2008), overly long working hours that lead to sleep deprivation (Barnes, Schaubroeck, Huth, & Ghumman, 2011; Christian & Ellis, 2011), and stress (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). In other words, a number of factors that seem inherent to organizational life may constrain ethical employee behavior and/or promote unethical employee behavior.

Research objectives and overview of the chapters

In the present dissertation we thus apply a self-regulation perspective to ethical and unethical decision making in organizations. In **Chapter 2** and **3**, we focus on the self-regulation of (un)ethical behavior and the role of individual differences in this process. In **Chapter 4**, we take a more moment-to-moment perspective on the self-regulation of (un)ethical behavior. Finally, in **Chapter 5**, we investigate the role of leader mistreatment in the regulation of (un)ethical behavior. In the latter chapter, rather than looking at the availability of self-regulatory

resources, we examine the interplay between people's personalities. We use multiple research methods to test our hypotheses: experiments conducted with students as well as multisource field studies in organizations. In the remainder of this introduction, we focus on the influence of individual differences, behavioral history, and the interplay between personalities on the self-regulation of ethical and unethical behavior in the workplace.

Self-regulation of (un)ethical behavior in the workplace and individual differences

As argued above, self-regulation enables people to bring their behavior in line with prevailing norms and rules. Importantly, depending upon individual differences, people are likely to feel a multitude of impulses and desires that may or may not oppose socially desirable behavior. In other words, instead of doing what they want, self-regulation enables people to follow the norms and rules of a society or an organization. Successful self-regulation thus suppresses individual differences in behavior whereas individual differences will emerge more strongly when people are depleted (Baumeister, Gailliot, DeWall, & Oaten, 2006). An individual differences variable particularly important for the emergence of ethical and unethical behavior is moral identity (Aquino & Reed, 2002).

Moral identity reflects the degree to which people consider being a moral person to be an important part of their self-concept (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Shao, Aquino, & Freeman, 2008). Moral identity has been conceptualized as a cognitive representation or schema of moral values, goals, traits, and behavioral scripts (Aquino, Freeman, Reed, Lim, & Felps, 2009; Shao et al., 2008). For people high in moral identity, this moral self-schema is more readily accessible and available for use than for people low in moral identity (Narvaez, Lapsley, Hagele, & Lasky, 2006; Shao et al., 2008). Moral values and ideals (such as being a good person, being helpful) are central to someone's self-concept for people high in moral identity

(Narvaez et al., 2006; Shao et al., 2008). When activated, moral identity should thus have a strong influence on one's cognition and behavior, as individuals have a strong tendency to maintain self-consistency (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Blasi, 1980).

In line with the idea that moral identity is an important source of motivation to behave in an ethical manner, previous studies have revealed a positive relationship between moral identity and moral behavior as reflected in self-reported volunteering (Aquino & Reed, 2002), ethical leader behavior (Mayer, Aquino, Greenbaum, & Kuenzi, 2012), an increased likelihood of making a donation (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Reed & Aquino, 2003), and charitable giving (Reynolds & Ceranic, 2007). Additionally, moral identity has been associated with decreased levels of immoral conduct, such as less lying in business negotiations (Shao et al., 2008), lowered aggression on the football field (Sage, Kavussanu, & Duda, 2006), and less antisocial behavior among adolescents (Barriga, Morrison, Liau, & Gibbs, 2001).

Important for the present purposes, moral identity may also facilitate the self-regulation of ethical behavior in situations that constrain the availability of self-regulatory resources (e.g., depletion). As argued above, people with a high moral identity have more readily accessible moral values than people with a low moral identity (Aquino et al., 2009). Over time, people with a high moral identity will thus more frequently implement ethical behavior, resulting in more internalized and automatic enactment of ethical behavior (Seeley & Gardner, 2003). For people high in moral identity this internalization of ethical behavior arguably implies that one's ethical behavior is less likely to draw on controlled cognitive processes that share resources with other controlled processes, and thus, may suffer less from regulatory depletion. In other words, because people high in moral identity are much more likely than people low in moral identity to have internalized the display of ethical behaviors, acting ethically may proceed in a more automatic manner that uses fewer controlled resources (see Bargh, 1994; Schneider & Chein, 2003; Shiffrin &

Schneider, 1977; Smith & Lerner, 1986). People with a high moral identity are thus likely to have their moral values more readily available, even in situations in which their self-regulatory resources are depleted.

In **Chapter 2**, we investigate the effect of ego depletion on unethical decision making behavior of leaders. In organizations, it is particularly important that leaders act in ethical ways, because they serve as role models for their employees (cf. Bandura, 1986). At the same time, however, leader have often busy and demanding work schedules (e.g., Ganster, 2005; Hambrick, Finkelstein, & Mooney, 2005; Mintzberg, 1973) which makes acting ethical not necessarily easy to implement. However, as argued above, moral identity may be an important boundary condition for this proposed effect of depletion on unethical leader behavior. In Chapter 2 we explicitly test this hypothesis by focusing on the role of moral identity as a variable that curbs the effects of ego depletion on unethical leader behaviors.

In **Chapter 3**, we tried to substantiate the findings of Chapter 2 in the context of ethical behavior (vs. unethical behavior in Chapter 2). Chapter 3 thus explicitly focuses on the interaction between moral identity and depletion in predicting *ethical* behaviors. Additionally, we argue that selfishness by showing antisocial behavior is inherently different from selfishness by refraining from prosocial behavior. We expect that people need power to feel that they can refrain from helping others. People in a position of power are more inclined to disregard others (Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003; Magee & Smith, 2013) and therefore more likely to deviate from prevailing norms (Briñol, Petty, Valle, Rucker, & Becerra, 2007). We thus expect that power is likely to be a facilitator of the selfish state resulting from the combination of depletion and low moral identity. In Chapter 3 we explicitly test this hypothesis by investigating the role of power in the interaction between moral identity and ego depletion.

Self-regulation of (un)ethical behavior in the workplace and behavioral history

Research on the influence of individual and situational variations in predicting ethical and unethical behavior does not shed much light on the development of (un)ethical behavior on a moment-to-moment basis. Research on moral self-regulation addresses this issue by investigating moment-to-moment balancing acts between ethical and unethical behavior in the context of one's recent behavioral history (Monin & Miller, 2001; Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006; Zhong, Liljenquist, & Cain, 2009). This research has revealed that self and self-regulation processes are important in determining ethical and unethical behavior (Aquino et al., 2009; Blasi, 1983; Sachdeva, Iliev, & Medin, 2009; Zhong et al., 2009).

Regretfully, this research has not yet resulted in an integrated model that informs us how self-related processes influence (un)ethical behavior. In fact, two distinct literatures seem to have developed independently. While both literatures rely on similar manipulations and measures of morality, they offer surprisingly opposite findings. On the one hand, a series of studies show that people with a salient self-concept as being a moral person display more prosocial behavior than people for whom this self-concept is not salient, or for whom an immoral self-concept is salient (e.g., Aquino et al., 2009; Blasi, 1983; Reed, Aquino, & Levy, 2007). Thus, this research suggests that when feeling moral (e.g., after helping your colleague in the morning), you are more likely to put in some overtime in the afternoon. This effect is usually explained in terms of consistency: people who view themselves as moral feel that they have to continue acting in a moral manner to avoid violating their sense of self and their integrity (Blasi, 1980).

On the other hand, a growing literature shows that people with a salient self-concept as an immoral person display more prosocial behavior than people for whom this self-concept is not salient, or people who view themselves as moral (e.g., Jordan, Mullen, & Murnighan, 2011; Monin & Miller, 2001; Sachdeva et al., 2009).

Thus, this research suggests, for instance, that after procrastinating at work in the morning, you are more likely to subsequently comply with a request to work overtime. Conversely, if you would have spent your morning helping your colleague, you might refuse to do overtime. This effect is usually explained in terms of compensation and licensing processes (Zhong et al., 2009): People who feel immoral attempt to "make up" for this by displaying moral behavior (Sachdeva et al., 2009), whereas people who view themselves as moral feel that they have built up a "surplus" of morality, allowing them to display less moral behavior without damaging their self-concept and self-presentation as a moral person.

In **Chapter 4**, we argue that moral consistency and compensation occur in a social context and that both processes reflect specific ways to deal with reputational concerns. Reputation (i.e., how one is seen by others, "others perceptions"; Carlson, Vazire, & Oltmanns, 2011) is one of the most valuable social assets that humans have and we go a long way to build and defend a positive reputation (Cheek & Briggs, 1982; De Cremer & Tyler, 2005; James, 1890). In Chapter 4 we argue that the crucial difference between consistency and compensation is that the first one implies a more proactive approach to reputation building and maintenance, whereas the latter forms a reactive, "damage control" response in social situations. In Chapter 4 we explicitly test this hypothesis by manipulating the extent to which people take a reactive versus proactive approach.

Self-regulation of (un)ethical behavior in the workplace and the interplay between personalities

Leader mistreatment may form an important predictor of (un)ethical behavior in the workplace (Bennett & Robinson, 2000; Robinson & Greenberg, 1998). One reason for this may be that leader mistreatment promotes self-regulation impairment (Tepper, 2000; Thau, Aquino, & Poortvliet, 2007). As argued above, self-regulation impairment hinders ethical behavior (DeWall et al., 2008), and

promotes unethical behavior (DeWall et al., 2007; Gino et al., 2011; Mead et al., 2009). Indeed, research shows that employees who feel abused are more likely to show unethical work behaviors because of self-regulation impairment (Thau & Mitchell, 2010). Thus, whether or not an employee is able to self-regulate (un)ethical behavior is likely to depend on how they are treated by their leader.

An important predictor of leader mistreatment is leader personality (Padilla, Hogan, & Kaiser, 2007; Tepper, 2007). Tepper (2007, p. 281) proposed that "supervisors who are high in neuroticism experience greater anger, frustration, and impulsiveness compared with their low-neuroticism counterparts (Costa and McCrae, 1992), and consequently, neuroticism should be positively related to abusive supervision." This excessive self-focus on aversive emotional states elicits a chronic tendency for individuals high in neuroticism to be responsive to social threats (e.g., Denissen & Penke, 2008; Matthews, 2004). That is, neuroticism involves insecurity about the self, making neurotic individuals scan their environment for possible sources of threat to their fragile self (Gray, 1991). Some indirect support for this theoretical assertion is provided by Hoobler and Hu (2013) showing that state negative affect – regarded as a theoretical proxy of neuroticism – is positively associated with leaders' abusive supervision. In sum, it is likely that neurotic leaders may show elevated levels of leader mistreatment, and as such, may increase unethical workplace behaviors of their employees.

In **Chapter 5**, we specifically consider the context in which leader mistreatment takes place. Trait activation theory (TAT; Tett & Burnett, 2003), proposes that activation of traits and their influence on behavior is contingent upon the availability of trait-relevant cues in the social context. Put differently, TAT argues that a situation may 'bring out' particular traits if a thematic connection exists between the situation and the individual's trait (Judge & Zapata, 2015). A most relevant aspect of the leader's social context are his or her employees. Arguably, the

process of leadership implies a dynamic relationship between leaders and employees (Dansereau, Graen, & Haga, 1975; Dulebohn, Bommer, Liden, Brouer, & Ferris, 2012; Hollander, 1985). As said before, individuals high in neuroticism are especially likely to be responsive to social threats (e.g., Denissen & Penke, 2008; Matthews, 2004). This also makes that neurotic individuals can act in ways that are socially disturbing by signaling social exclusion (e.g., Morse, Sauerberger, Todd, & Funder, 2015). Therefore, in Chapter 5, we hypothesize that employees low in neuroticism are likely to communicate social exclusion cues, which (in line with TAT) will activate the neuroticism trait of their leaders, as such reinforcing the link between leader neuroticism and abusive supervision. In particular, we investigated if employee neuroticism interacts with leader neuroticism in predicting abusive supervision and the downstream consequences this has for antisocial employee behavior. This interactive effect between leader and employee neuroticism provides first empirical evidence in favor of a trait matching approach to examine the role of personality in leadership (Judge & Long, 2012). Even more importantly, it also provides useful insights into the selection of the trait neuroticism to understand the phenomenon of unethical behavior in the workplace better.

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Chapter 2

Being ‘in control’ may make you lose control: The role of self-regulation in unethical leadership behavior

Abstract

In the present article, we argue that the constant pressure that leaders face may limit the willpower required to behave according to ethical norms and standards and may therefore lead to unethical behavior. Drawing upon the ego depletion and moral self-regulation literatures, we examined whether self-regulatory depletion that is contingent upon the moral identity of leaders may promote unethical leadership behavior. A laboratory experiment and a multisource field study revealed that regulatory resource depletion promotes unethical leader behaviors among leaders who are low in moral identity. No such effect was found among leaders with a high moral identity. This study extends our knowledge on why organizational leaders do not always conform to organizational goals. Specifically, we argue that the hectic and fragmented workdays of leaders may increase the likelihood that they violate ethical norms. This highlights the necessity to carefully schedule tasks that may have ethical implications. Similarly, organizations should be aware that overloading their managers with work may increase the likelihood of their leaders transgressing ethical norms.

This chapter is based on Joosten, A., van Dijke, M., Van Hiel, A., & De Cremer, D. (2014). Being ‘in control’ may make you lose control: The role of self-regulation in unethical leadership behavior. *Journal of Business Ethics, 121*(1), 1-14.

Introduction

One critical challenge that organizational leaders face is to remain focused on the display of ethical behavior during the course of their fragmented, hectic, and disorderly work days. In fact, the many ethical failures within organizations that have emerged in the media over the past decade, such as fraud and corruption, clearly highlight the need for organizational leaders to act in an ethical manner. Indeed, if leaders focus on behaving ethically, then they will serve as an important source of ethical guidance for their employees (Brown, Treviño, & Harrison, 2005; Walumbwa et al., 2011). Conversely, when leaders act unethically, employees will usually follow suit (Mayer, Kuenzi, Greenbaum, Bardes, & Salvador, 2009). Yet, acting in ethical ways is not necessarily easy for leaders because they often have busy and demanding work schedules. Leaders are responsible for a great variety of complex decisions and actions that range from multi-million dollar decisions to more trivial ones; thus, they constantly must decide which decisions are worthy of their attention and which are not (e.g., Ganster, 2005; Hambrick, Finkelstein, & Mooney, 2005; Mintzberg, 1973).

In the present paper, we argue that the constant pressure that organizational leaders face can limit the willpower that is required to act ethically. This lack of mental energy can potentially result in negative consequences, such as discriminating against employees based on gender or race, discussing confidential company information with unauthorized others, and theft of company property. Following the ego depletion literature, we argue that when leaders have to make multiple decisions and function in demanding situations, they are less likely to maintain the mental energy (i.e., cognitive resources) needed for other controlled, energy requiring processes (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000; Vohs et al., 2008). Furthermore, because ethical behaviors may depend on cognitive resources (Usoof-Thowfeek, Janoff-Bulman, & Tavernini, 2011), ego depletion (i.e., as resulting from

the hectic leader role) may increase the likelihood of leaders displaying unethical behavior.

We further postulate, however, that this proposed effect of ego depletion on unethical leader behavior may have boundary conditions. One important limit may be the extent to which people assign value and importance to morality. This variable is likely relevant because it may influence the amount of cognitive resources that leaders need to behave in an ethical manner. Specifically, moral identity refers to the extent to which people consider being a moral person as an important part of their self-definition (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Blasi, 1980). For those who define themselves in terms of morality, the display of ethical behavior will be more frequently implemented and, consequently, more internalized and automatic; as such, they will consume fewer cognitive resources and maintain their self-control (cf. Aquino, Freeman, Reed, Lim, & Felps, 2009; Aquino & Reed, 2002; Reynolds & Ceranic, 2007). One can therefore expect that leaders who are high in moral identity are less vulnerable than leaders low in moral identity to the effects of ego depletion on their display of ethical behaviors.

Ego depletion and self-control

Self-control refers to an individual's capacity to inhibit, override, or refrain from acting upon his/her impulses and desires (Baumeister, Heatherton, & Tice, 1994; Mischel, 1974; Muraven & Baumeister, 2000; Tangney, Baumeister, & Boone, 2004). Successful self-control has been linked to numerous positive outcomes such as success at school and at work, increased concentration, an improved ability to cope with stress, and even lower divorce rates. Self-control failure, on the other hand, has been linked to negative actions such as theft, assault, and aggression, and to various negative outcomes such as obesity, depression, and obsessive thoughts, (Hagger, Wood, Stiff, & Chatzisarantis, 2010; Muraven, Tice, &

Baumeister, 1998; Tangney et al., 2004). It is thus clear that self-control plays a highly important role in a many aspects of our lives.

Baumeister and colleagues (e.g., Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998; Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996; Baumeister, Vohs, & Tice, 2007; Muraven & Baumeister, 2000; Muraven et al., 1998) proposed a limited-strength model of self-control to explain self-control failures. The idea behind this model is that self-control requires mental energy that is limited in its availability (Baumeister et al., 1998; Muraven et al., 1998). More specifically, all acts of self-control, such as repressing habitual responses, draw from the same limited resource, which can become depleted with repeated use (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). Baumeister and colleagues compared self-control to a muscle, which requires strength and energy to exert force over a period of time (Hagger et al., 2010). Just as muscles get tired from exertion, self-control performance also deteriorates after repeated use (Baumeister et al., 2007).

The state of diminished resources following exertion of self-control is usually referred to as ego depletion (Baumeister et al., 1998). In support of the idea that different acts of self-control draw on a limited and shared resource, research shows that various acts of self-control (e.g., resisting tempting foods, suppressing emotions, performing counter-attitudinal behaviors) impair performance on a subsequent completely unrelated act that requires self-control (for an overview, see Hagger et al., 2010). Particularly important for the present purposes, research has shown that after an act of self-control, people are less willing to help others (DeWall, Baumeister, Gailliot, & Maner, 2008), are more likely to cheat (Gino, Schweitzer, Mead, & Ariely, 2011; Mead, Baumeister, Gino, Schweitzer, & Ariely, 2009), and more likely to act aggressively (DeWall, Baumeister, Stillman, & Gailliot, 2007).

Research has identified several causes of resource depletion, including lack of sleep (Barnes, Schaubroeck, Huth, & Ghumman, 2011), having to resist temptation (Baumeister et al., 1998; Vohs & Heatherton, 2000) , and stress (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). Interestingly, one prime determinant of ego depletion is having to make multiple choices and decisions (Vohs et al., 2008). As noted, most organizational leaders experience heavy workloads, and have to make numerous choices and decisions each day. These specific characteristics of the leadership role seem to form a source of resource depletion, which might make leaders especially prone to self-control failure.

Awareness of the ethical dimension of many complex business decisions is an active and attention-consuming process that requires cognitive resources (Usoof-Thowfeek et al., 2011). Moreover, resisting the temptation to act in unethical ways is also likely to draw on these resources; this temptation may be especially pronounced for leaders because of their position of power (see, e.g., Fiske, 1993; Georgesen & Harris, 1998; Rusbult & Van Lange, 2003). The assumption that ethical leadership draws from the same regulatory resources as the other aspects of the leadership role (e.g., decision-making, number of choices, high workload) thus leads us to expect that depletion of self-regulatory resources can lead to higher levels of unethical leadership behavior.

However, there may be important boundary conditions for the link between ego depletion and unethical leader behavior. Specifically, the extent to which people assign value and importance to morality is likely to influence the amount of cognitive resources that leaders need to behave in an ethical manner. That is, leaders who define themselves in terms of morality will require fewer cognitive resources to inhibit impulses and will be able to buffer the effects of ego depletion on their ethical behaviors (cf. Aquino et al., 2009; Aquino & Reed, 2002; Reynolds & Ceranic, 2007). We explicitly test this argument by focusing on the role of moral

identity as a variable that limits the effects of ego depletion on unethical leader behaviors.

Moral identity as a buffer

Moral identity reflects the importance of morality to one's self-concept (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Shao, Aquino, & Freeman, 2008). Moral identity is usually conceptualized as a cognitive representation or schema of moral values, goals, traits, and behavioral scripts (Aquino et al., 2009; Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004; Shao et al., 2008). For people high in moral identity, this moral self-schema is more readily accessible and available for use than for people low in moral identity. Moral values and ideals (such as being a good person, being helpful) are more central to someone's self-concept for people high in moral identity (Narvaez, Lapsley, Hagele, & Lasky, 2006; Shao et al., 2008). When activated, moral identity should influence one's cognition and behavior, as people have a strong tendency to maintain self-consistency (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Blasi, 1980, 1983).

In line with the idea that moral identity is an important source of motivation to behave in an ethical manner, previous studies have revealed a positive relationship between moral identity and moral behavior as reflected in self-reported volunteering (Aquino & Reed, 2002), the actual likelihood of making a donation (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Reed & Aquino, 2003), and charitable giving (Reynolds & Ceranic, 2007). Additionally, moral identity has been associated with decreased levels of immoral conduct, such as lying in business negotiations (Shao et al., 2008), lowered aggression on the football field (Sage, Kavussanu, & Duda, 2006), and less antisocial behavior among adolescents (Barriga, Morrison, Liau, & Gibbs, 2001). Interestingly, recent research has suggested that moral identity also functions as an antecedent of ethical leader behavior (Mayer, Aquino, Greenbaum, & Kuenzi, 2012).

We argue that moral identity is also a relevant boundary condition for the effects of ego depletion on unethical leader behavior. As noted, moral identity is an important motivator of ethical behavior (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Blasi, 1980; Hardy & Carlo, 2005), and people with a high moral identity should thus be especially likely to expend extra effort to self-regulate their ethical behavior. Over time, people with a high moral identity will more frequently regulate their behavior (i.e., inhibit selfish impulses), resulting in more internalized and automatic enactment of ethical behavior (Seeley & Gardner, 2003). Consequently, for people high in moral identity this internalization of ethical behavior arguably implies that one's ethical behavior is less likely to draw on controlled cognitive processes that share resources with other controlled processes, and thus, may suffer less from regulatory depletion. In other words, because people high in moral identity are much more likely than people low in moral identity to have internalized the display of ethical and prosocial behaviors, acting ethically may proceed in a more automatic manner that uses fewer controlled resources (see Bargh, 1994; Schneider & Chein, 2003; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977; Smith & Lerner, 1986). Hence, in a state of resource depletion, a high moral identity will provide leaders with a buffer against the detrimental effects of ego depletion on their ethical behaviors.

Study overview

In the present research, we collected both experimental and (multisource) field data to cross-validate our findings. We did not opt for qualitative research, as we were particularly interested in testing specific hypotheses, for which quantitative research is most suitable. Furthermore, we chose to use established and validated measures. Moral identity was measured using Aquino and Reed's (2002) instrument (for an overview, see Shao et al., 2008). In Study 1 we manipulated depletion using a frequently used and effective depletion task (for an overview, see Hagger et al., 2010); in Study 2 we assessed depletion with a measure that has been successfully

used in prior research (Vohs et al., 2008). Unethical leader behavior was measured using Bennett and Robinson's (2000) often-used instrument that measures workplace deviance (for an overview, see Berry, Ones, & Sackett, 2007), which has shown good psychometric properties (Bennett & Robinson, 2000) and which has been adapted and validated for peer report (Stewart, Bing, Davison, Woehr, & McIntyre, 2009).

In our research, we thus investigate unethical behavior by focusing on the prevalence of deviant leader behaviors in the workplace. In line with the literature, we define workplace deviance as voluntary behavior that violates significant organizational norms and, as such, threatens the well-being of the organization and/or its members (Bennett & Robinson, 2000; Robinson & Bennett, 1995). Deviant behavior represents volitional behavior that occurs because people either lack the motivation to conform to organizational norms and standards, or because they become motivated to violate these norms and standards (Bennett & Robinson, 2000). Workplace deviance encompasses a diversity of behaviors varying from interpersonal deviance (i.e., acts that inflict harm on individuals) to organizational deviance (i.e., acts that are directed at the organization) which can vary in intensity and potential consequences (Robinson & Bennett, 1995), and as such, form a meaningful operationalization of unethical behavior. Example behaviors include humiliating coworkers, procrastinating on work, and falsifying receipts to receive more money than was spent on business expenses.

As argued above, we expect that unethical leadership behaviors may occur when leaders face regulatory resource constraints. We expect this because for many leaders, behaving ethically may not be an important part of their self-definition, and is thus insufficiently internalized. To test this idea, we include the leader's moral identity as a moderator of the effect of self-regulatory depletion on the unethical behavior of leaders. Specifically, we expect self-regulatory depletion to result in

unethical leadership behaviors particularly among leaders who are low, rather than high in moral identity.

We tested our hypothesis in two studies. Study 1 used a validated depletion task in a controlled laboratory setting which allows us to draw causal conclusions. Study 2 was a cross-sectional multisource study, for which we relied on leaders' self-ratings of their depletion and moral identity, while ratings about the leaders' ethical behavior were provided by their colleagues as well as by the leaders themselves. The field study permits us to generalize our findings to an organizational field setting in which leaders function in meaningful day-to-day situations. At the same time, the specific multisource design of this study minimizes concerns about the effects of potential common method variance and self-presentation (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003).

Study 1

Method

Participants and design. Seventy-eight undergraduate students (41 males and 37 females) with a mean age of 19.00 years (*SD* = 1.95) from a Dutch university participated in the study for partial course credit. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two experimental conditions: self-regulatory depletion or no depletion.

Experimental procedure. This study was conducted in two stages. The first stage consisted of participants responding via the internet to a bogus "leadership ability" questionnaire and to the moral identity measure. The second stage included the actual experimental tasks. Upon arrival at the laboratory (one day after they had responded to the internet questionnaires), participants were seated in separate cubicles that were each equipped with a personal computer. All communication took place via this computer. Participants were informed that they would work together

with two other participants on several tasks. They were led to believe that a computer network was established between them and the other group members via which they would collaborate.

All participants were then assigned to the leadership role. Instructions were taken from previous experiments that were designed to study unethical leadership behaviors (Maner & Mead, 2010). Participants were informed that the group assignment required one person to be the leader and the others to be the subordinates. All participants learned that they were assigned the group leader role based on their answers on the 'leadership ability' questionnaire that they completed in the first stage of the study (i.e., the day before the actual experiment). As the designated leader, they would thus be responsible for the functioning of their group. To check whether the participants understood this role assignment, we asked them which role they had to fulfill in the group assignment.

Participants then completed the regulatory depletion task (taken from Baumeister et al., 1998, Study 4). This task consists of two parts and has proven successful in the manipulation of ego depletion in a number of studies (Baumeister et al., 1998; DeWall, Baumeister, Mead, & Vohs, 2011; Fischer, Greitemeyer, & Frey, 2007; Moller, Deci, & Ryan, 2006; Wheeler, Briñol, & Hermann, 2007). The regulatory depletion task was presented as part of the group assignment. In the first part of the task, participants were instructed to indicate each instance of the letter *e* that they saw in a text (i.e., by clicking each *e* with the computer mouse). Participants received visual feedback whenever they clicked an *e* (i.e., a highlighted circle around the corresponding *e*) and were given five minutes to complete the task. This first phase was relatively easy and was used to establish a strong habitual response for scanning and indicating every *e*. In the second part of the task, participants either continued identifying the *e*'s using the same rule as before (i.e., the *no depletion* condition), or they were given the instruction to respond to each *e*,

except when the *e* was followed by a vowel or, when a vowel appeared two letters before the *e* (i.e., the *high depletion* condition). For participants in the high depletion condition, overriding the response to scan for and indicate every *e* would require more regulatory resources than for participants in the low depletion condition who did not need to override a habitual response. After completing this task, we measured the dependent variables and manipulation checks.

Manipulation checks. The effectiveness of the self-regulatory depletion manipulation was measured on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (*totally disagree*) to 7 (*totally agree*) using two items: "The second task was habit-breaking" (taken from DeWall et al., 2008) and "The second task was simple" (reversed item; taken from Balliet & Joireman, 2010).

Measures. In the first phase of the study (i.e., twenty-four hours before the experimental condition), we administered an online questionnaire that included demographic information questions, a measure of moral identity, and a bogus leadership scale that was administered to provide a justification for the role assignment.

We used Aquino and Reed´s (2002) instrument to measure the participants' moral identity, which has been used in several studies and has shown good psychometric properties (for an overview, see Shao et al., 2008). In line with our ideas, we relied on the internalization dimension of this instrument (i.e., the extent to which people find morality an important aspect of who they are) and disregarded the symbolization subscale (which measures the extent to which people want to appear as a moral person). Consistent with Aquino and Reed's (2002) procedure, the following instructions were given: "Listed below are some characteristics that might describe a person: Caring, compassionate, fair, friendly, generous, helpful, hardworking, honest, and kind. The person with these characteristics could be you or it could be someone else. For a moment, visualize in your mind the kind of person

who has these characteristics. Imagine how that person would think, feel, and act. When you have a clear image of what this person would be like, answer the following questions." Participants then answered the five internalization items on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (*totally disagree*) to 7 (*totally agree*). Sample items from this scale are: "It would make me feel good to be a person who has these characteristics" and "Having these characteristics is not really important to me" (reverse scored). The scale proved to be internally consistent (Cronbach's α = .71; *M* = 5.42, *SD* = 0.88).

We assessed leadership deviance as a dependent variable for which we used the interpersonal deviance subscale of the organizational deviance measure which was developed and validated by Bennett & Robinson (2000). Participants answered these 7 items on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (*not at all*) to 7 (*very much so*). We asked participants the extent to which they found the following behaviors in the current setting acceptable: "Say something hurtful to someone," "Make an ethnic, religious, or racial remark," "Curse at someone," "Play a mean prank on someone," "Act rudely toward someone," and "Publicly embarrass someone" (Cronbach's α = .82; *M* = 2.10, *SD* = 0.84).

Results

Comprehension and manipulation checks. All participants correctly indicated that they were assigned to the leader role. As expected, participants in the self-regulatory depletion condition rated the second task as more habit-breaking than those in the no depletion condition (*Ms* = 5.10 vs. 4.42, *SDs* = 1.27 vs. 1.34, respectively, $t(76) = -2.30$, $p < .05$). Furthermore, the second task was experienced as less simple in the self-regulatory depletion condition than in the no depletion condition (*Ms* = 4.48 vs. 3.47, *SDs* = 1.37 vs. 1.42, respectively, $t(76) = -3.17$, $p < .01$). As an additional test of the effectiveness of our manipulation, we regressed the manipulation checks on the main and interactive effects of the regulatory depletion

manipulation and participants moral identity. These analyses show that both the manipulation checks were significantly related to the regulatory depletion manipulation, while the main effect of moral identity and the interaction term remained insignificant.

Deviant leader behavior. To test our hypothesis, we conducted a hierarchical regression analysis in which leader deviance was predicted by the main effects of the regulatory depletion manipulation and participants' moral identity at Step 1. We added a two-way interaction between regulatory depletion manipulation and moral identity at Step 2. Following Aiken and West (1991), the interaction term was based on the mean-centered scores of moral identity and the effect-coded scores of regulatory depletion. Table 1 shows the regression results.

Table 1

Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Leader Deviance in Study 1

Variables	*B*	*SE B*	β	ΔR^2
Step 1				.03
Regulatory depletion (RD)	0.01	0.10	0.02	
Moral identity (MI)	-0.16	0.11	-0.17	
Step 2				.08*
Regulatory depletion (RD)	0.02	0.09	0.02	
Moral identity (MI)	-0.11	0.11	-0.12	
RD x MI	-0.27	0.11	-0.28*	

Note. Final model: $F(3, 74) = 2.94$, $p < .05$. *B* = unstandardized regression coefficient; β = standardized regression coefficient. For the regulatory depletion factor, -1 denotes no regulatory depletion manipulation, whereas 1 indicates regulatory depletion.

* $p \leq .05$.

Table 1 shows that the predicted two-way interaction was significant, β = -.27, $p < .05$. We conducted simple slope analyses to further examine this interaction (Aiken & West, 1991). Figure 1 shows that, in line with our hypothesis, regulatory depletion significantly increased deviant leader behavior among participants who are low in moral identity (one *SD* below the mean), β = .24, $p < .05$. However, among participants who are high in moral identity, regulatory depletion decreased deviant leader behavior; however, this effect was not significant, β = -.21, $p = .11$.



Figure 1. Deviant leader behavior as a function of regulatory depletion (RD) manipulation and moral identity (MI).

Supplemental analyses. To test the robustness of the OLS regression we conducted a Tobit regression (see Tobin, 1958), which was developed for variables with a lower (or upper) limit and a concentration of observations at this limiting value. Such distributions can result in the violation of OLS assumptions. Deviant leader behaviors are typically low-frequency phenomena that show such a cluster of observations at and just above the lower limit, thus making them strongly positively

skewed. A Tobit regression revealed results similar to the OLS regressions for the hypothesized interaction on leader deviance, $b = -.27$, $p < .05$.

Discussion

Study 1 provides supporting evidence for the hypothesized buffering role of moral identity in the effect of resource depletion on unethical leadership behavior. Regulatory depletion indeed increased unethical leadership behavior for leaders who are low in moral identity. In contrast, there was not such an increase in unethical leadership behavior for leaders with a high level of moral identity. These findings thus highlight the pivotal role of moral identity in preventing unethical leadership behaviors.

Study 2

Whereas Study 1 provided causal evidence for our proposed ideas, Study 2 was designed to generalize our findings to an organizational setting in which supervisors and employees function together in meaningful work situations. Instead of manipulating regulatory depletion, we measured supervisors' depletion in Study 2.

Method

Sample and procedure. The study participants included 100 organizational supervisors (30 line, 61 middle, and 9 senior/top managers) and their matched colleagues from a variety of Dutch organizations. For their participation, they received credit points they could trade in for certain gifts (i.e., a ticket for the movies). Of the focal supervisors, 70 were male and 30 were female, and their mean age was 44.73 years (SD = 9.91). Supervisors worked an average of 11.79 years (SD = 9.25) in their current organization and 5.97 years (SD = 5.69) in their current function. Twenty percent of the focal supervisors were employed in the public

sector, and 80 percent in the private sector. The matched group of colleagues included 60 males and 40 females, with a mean age of 41.84 years (*SD* = 10.52).

Measures. In Study 2, we used the same five-item internalization subscale of moral identity (Aquino & Reed, 2002) as in Study 1. To assess focal supervisors' levels of regulatory depletion, we asked the focal supervisors to indicate on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (*totally disagree*) to 5 (*totally agree*) how much they agreed or disagreed with the following statements: "I often feel as if I have low energy," and "I often feel as if things are taking a lot of effort" (taken from Vohs et al., 2008, Study 5).

We measured unethical leadership behavior using Bennett and Robinson's (2000) 19-item measure of organizational deviance on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (*not at all*) to 5 (*very much so*). This measure consists of an interpersonal and an organizational subscale, and it has shown good psychometric properties (Bennett & Robinson, 2000). The leaders completed the items as self-reports, while the items were adapted for peer report for their colleagues who rated how often the focal leader performed actions such as "Discussed confidential company information with an unauthorized person," "Falsified a receipt to get more money than spent on business expenses," and "Publicly embarrassed someone at work" (modified and validated by Stewart et al., 2009).

Results

Descriptive statistics and intercorrelations. Table 2 presents the means, standard deviations, internal consistencies, and intercorrelations of the study's variables.

Table 2

Descriptive Statistics and Intercorrelations of Study 2 Measures

Variable	*M*	*SD*	1	2	3	4
1. Regulatory depletion	2.54	0.95	(.89)			
2. Moral identity	5.34	0.81	.07	(.62)		
3. Leader deviance (OR)	1.47	0.52	.33**	-.22*	(.93)	
4. Leader deviance (CR)	1.60	0.81	.19	-.18	.61**	(.98)

Note. N = 100. Internal reliabilities (coefficient alphas) are provided in parentheses on the diagonal. OR = own ratings; CR = colleague ratings

* $p \leq .05$. ** $p \leq .01$.

Hypothesis test. We conducted a hierarchical regression analysis with self-reported unethical leader behaviors serving as the dependent variable. The age, gender, and tenure of leaders were entered as control variables in the first block of the regression. Regulatory depletion and moral identity were entered in the second block of the regression. We added a two-way interaction between regulatory depletion and moral identity in the third block of the regression. Following Aiken and West (1991), the interaction term was based on mean-centered scores of the independent variables. Table 3 shows the regression results for self-reported unethical leader behavior. For one respondent, self-ratings of deviance were missing, and thus, her information was disregarded in this analysis.

Table 3

Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Leader Deviance (Own Ratings) in Study 2

Variables	*B*	*SE B*	β	ΔR^2
Step 3				.06**
Age	-0.01	0.01	-0.21	
Gender	0.10	0.10	0.10	
Organization tenure	0.01	0.01	0.15	
Function tenure	0.00	0.01	0.02	
Regulatory depletion (RD)	0.18	0.05	0.33***	
Moral identity (MI)	-0.15	0.06	-0.24**	
RD x MI	-0.15	0.06	-0.25**	

Note. Final model: $F(7, 91) = 4.95$, $p < .001$. *B* = unstandardized regression coefficient; β = standardized regression coefficient.

* $p \leq .05$. ** $p \leq .01$. *** $p \leq .001$.

The predicted two-way interaction was significant, β = -.25, $p < .01$.We conducted simple slope analyses to further assess this interaction (Aiken & West, 1991). Figure 2 shows that among leaders who are low in moral identity (one *SD* below the mean), regulatory depletion and unethical leader behaviors are positively related, β = .55, $p < .001$. However, among leaders who are high in moral identity, the relationship between regulatory depletion and unethical leader behaviors was not significant, β = .10, $p = .40$.



Figure 2. Unethical leader behavior (self-ratings) as a function of regulatory depletion (RD) and moral identity (MI).

The regression analysis was then repeated with the colleague ratings of unethical leader behaviors as the dependent variable. As shown in Table 4, the predicted two-way interaction was significant, $\beta = -.33$, $p = .001$. We conducted simple slope analyses to further analyze this interaction (Aiken & West, 1991). Figure 3 shows that among leaders who are low in moral identity (one *SD* below the mean), regulatory depletion and the leaders' unethical behavior are positively related, $\beta = .52$, $p < .001$. Among leaders high in moral identity, however, the relationship between regulatory depletion and unethical leader behavior was not significant, $\beta = -.09$, $p = .46$.

Table 4

Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Leader Deviance (Colleague Indicated) in Study 2

Variables	*B*	*SE B*	β	ΔR^2
Step 3				.10***
Age	-0.03	0.01	-0.30**	
Gender	-0.07	0.16	-0.04	
Organization tenure	0.01	0.01	0.13	
Function tenure	-0.00	0.02	-0.02	
Regulatory depletion (RD)	0.19	0.08	0.22*	
Moral identity (MI)	-0.13	0.09	-0.13	
RD x MI	-0.32	0.09	-0.33***	

Note. Final model: $F(7, 92) = 4.36$, $p < .001$. *B* = unstandardized regression coefficient; β = standardized regression coefficient.

* $p \leq .05$. ** $p \leq .01$. *** $p \leq .001$.



Figure 3. Unethical leader behavior (colleague ratings) as a function of regulatory depletion (RD) and moral identity (MI).

Supplemental analyses. We conducted several additional analyses to further investigate the validity of our findings. First, as in Study 1, we conducted a Tobit regression (see Tobin, 1958). The Tobit regression produced results similar to the OLS regressions for the hypothesized interaction on leader deviance, b = -.15 and -.31, ps < .05, for self and observer ratings, respectively.

Second, there has been much discussion about the advantages and disadvantages of including control variables in organizational research. We thus decided to follow Spector and Brannick's (2011) suggestion by repeating our analyses without the control variables as predictors in the equations. These analyses led to similar conclusions to those presented previously. Most importantly, we found significant interactions with the self-ratings of leader deviance, β = -.26, p < .01, and with the colleague indicated ratings of leader deviance, β = -.34, p = .001.

Discussion

Consistent with our main hypothesis and with the results obtained in Study 1, we obtained corroborative evidence for the moderating effect of moral identity in the relationship between regulatory depletion and unethical leader behavior. This time, however, results were obtained in an actual organizational setting. These findings provide further evidence for the prediction that leaders who are high in moral identity do not need regulatory resources to refrain from unethical leadership, while leaders with a low moral identity do require these resources.

General Discussion

The aim of the present research was to investigate the effects of regulatory depletion and moral identity on deviant leadership behavior. We obtained corroborative evidence for our hypothesis. More specifically, we identified ego depletion as a variable that may make leaders act in norm-transgressing ways. Moreover, to further enhance our understanding of this relationship, we also focused

on moral identity as a possible boundary condition. Our results indicate that leaders with a low moral identity need self-regulatory resources to refrain from engaging in deviant leader behaviors, while for leaders who are high in moral identity behaving ethically is less reliant on these resources, and thus, not influenced by regulatory resource depletion. This interactive effect was shown across a laboratory experiment (Study 1) and a multisource field study (Study 2).

Theoretical Implications

Our results are the first to show that ego depletion can induce leaders to display a wide range of norm-transgressing behaviors that are as varied as embezzling company property, deferring work in order to be paid overtime, and humiliating one's coworker in public. Such behaviors contrast sharply with how organizations prefer to view the leadership role. Specifically, leaders often face hectic and fragmented workdays, but they are at the same time expected to cooperate, to serve the interests of the organization, and to direct followers towards organizational interests (e.g., Hollander, 1980; Maner & Mead, 2010; Tjosvold, 1984; Van Vugt, Hogan, & Kaiser, 2008; Yukl & Van Fleet, 1992). In fact, leadership is often defined as influencing followers to contribute to the collective and as coordinating collective interests (e.g., Hollander & Offermann, 1990; Van Vugt et al., 2008).

Research has documented a number of cases in which leaders do not conform to the ideal leadership role of cooperatively working towards the organization's goals but instead act in self-serving and norm-transgressing ways. This has been attributed to variables such as the instability of the leadership position (Maner & Mead, 2010) and to leaders' feelings of incompetence (Fast & Chen, 2009). Some scholars have even claimed that norm-transgressing behaviors are intrinsic to the leadership role (De Cremer, 2003; Van Dijk & De Cremer, 2006) because leaders feel entitled to obtain more outcomes than followers (De Cremer &

Van Dijk, 2005; Stouten, De Cremer, & Van Dijk, 2005). The present research identifies ego depletion as a variable that may make leaders act in norm-transgressing ways. Importantly, the nature of ego depletion sheds new light on (un)ethical leader behavior, because leaders need to be able to control their automatic drives towards self-servingness.

These findings are particularly important because leaders, by means of their behavior, serve as social models for their employees that influence follower cooperation and displays of ethical behavior. This process is usually understood in terms of social learning theory (Bandura, 1977, 1986), which holds that people learn behavior by observing and imitating others. According to Bandura (1986), people with high status who have the ability to control rewards may function as effective role models. Therefore, leaders are the most likely source of vicarious learning in an organizational setting. This makes leaders' conformity to ethical rules a particularly important aspect of the leadership role. In support of this idea, norm-transgressing leaders are known to decrease positive affect, trust, cooperation, and performance among their followers (De Cremer, 2006a, 2006b; Van Knippenberg & Van Knippenberg, 2005). In sum, the hectic and fragmented workdays that leaders typically face may increase the likelihood that they cross essential boundaries of their leadership role by displaying unethical behaviors, which consequently makes them less effective in motivating employees to act productively and cooperatively.

A second theoretical implication derives from the fact that Study 2 revealed that self-reports and colleague ratings of leader deviance show a highly similar pattern. Specifically, ego depleted leaders reported more deviant behaviors and they were rated more deviant by their coworkers (at least leaders who are low in moral identity). It thus seems that leaders are well aware of the specific and sometimes norm-transgressing actions they perform, even when they are depleted of cognitive resources. This, however, does not necessarily imply that leaders are also aware of

the ethical dimension of their actions. Leaders may, for instance, frame a specific action not in ethical terms but rather in purely economic terms (e.g., striving for a financial reward even if it comes at the expense of others; Tenbrunsel & Messick, 1999). In fact, it has been argued that the salience of the economic aspects of a situation may make the ethical dimension of the decision "fade" into the background; thus, leaders do not recognize their actions as unethical (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004). This idea suggests that ego depletion can lead to deviant leader actions ranging from discrimination to forgery because it hinders the identification of the ethical dimension of a decision, which is a necessary first step in conducting ethical behavior (Rest, 1986).

Our research also contributes to the literature on moral identity. To date, most research has focused on the antecedents and consequences of moral identity (for an overview, see Shao et al., 2008). Research that investigates precisely *when* moral identity may influence behavior remains relatively sparse. Thus far, scholars have looked at the interaction between moral identity and formalism (Reynolds & Ceranic, 2007), at the interaction between moral identity and ethical organization culture (Skarlicki, van Jaarsveld, & Walker, 2008), and at the interaction between internal and symbolic moral identity (Caldwell & Moberg, 2007). We add to this existing literature and illuminate how moral identity operates. In this context, it is interesting to note that while ego depletion hinders behavior that requires cognitive processing, it does not influence automatic processes (DeWall et al., 2008; Schmeichel, Vohs, & Baumeister, 2003). Our results thus suggest that moral identity influences moral behavior in a fairly automatic way, and it is not thwarted by other processes that require controlled processing.

Practical Implications

A first important practical implication of the present findings is that they suggest that characteristics of leaders' day-to-day activities can undermine their

ability to behave ethically and may actually make leaders more likely to act in norm transgressing ways. This is an important finding for managers to acknowledge because much of a leader's influence derives from being a role model, rather than from explicit attempts to influence followers (Brown et al., 2005; Walumbwa et al., 2011). Organizations should thus be aware that overloading their managers with decisions to take may come with the cost of an increased likelihood of leaders transgressing ethical norms. Nevertheless, managers should be similarly aware that whenever they are facing tasks that can have important (i.e., ethical) implications, their cognitive state can affect their behavior; thus, it is necessary to carefully schedule these tasks. Tasks that may have ethical implications should preferably be made after a period of rest because rest can replenish managers cognitive resources (Baumeister, Muraven, & Tice, 2000).

Our findings also convey a more optimistic message by indicating that not all leaders are prone to displaying norm-transgressing behaviors due to the effects of ego depletion. Specifically, leaders who are high in moral identity proved to be immune to the effects of ego depletion in promoting norm-transgressing behaviors. This finding is relevant from a practical perspective because although moral identity represents a rather stable individual characteristic, it might also be impacted by the situation. Research (Aquino et al., 2009; Reed, Aquino, & Levy, 2007) shows that it is possible to situationally increase the accessibility of moral identity. Combined with the present results, these prior findings have two promising implications for organizations. First, making moral identity accessible through situational interventions such as stimulating a clear ethical climate and ensuring that the organization's top management behaves in ethical ways (Martin & Cullen, 2006; Mayer et al., 2009; Mayer, Kuenzi, & Greenbaum, 2010) makes it more likely that leaders behave ethically. More importantly, this effect should also buffer the effects of ego depletion on leaders' norm transgressing behaviors. Second, and equally

important, situational interventions that make moral identity salient are likely to result in leaders being "trained" to act ethically. Such training may make ethical behaviors more automatic, thus rendering leaders immune to the effects of ego depletion on norm-transgressing behaviors.

Strengths and Limitations

A major strength of this article lies in the use of diverse methods to test our hypothesis. While the laboratory experiment conducted in Study 1 permits us to make causal inferences, Study 2 was a field study that allowed us to investigate whether the hypothesized effects emerged in an organizational setting.

We recognize, of course, that we did not include a situational manipulation of morality in the experiment. However, our reliance on a dispositional operationalization of moral identity is clearly in line with our ideas that moral identity as a dispositional variable is likely to lead to internalized moral behavior (i.e., these leaders are better trained to act ethically). Obviously, this is not the case with situational manipulations of morality in relatively short-lived experimental contexts. Yet, various studies show that a moral prime can stimulate morality and thus can induce individuals to behave more morally (Aquino et al., 2009; Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 2008; Reed et al., 2007). At the same time, it should be recognized that other research shows that situational manipulations of morality can lead to compensatory, rather than consistent, moral behavior. In other words, priming morality can also reduce the display of moral behaviors (Jordan, Mullen, & Murnighan, 2011; Sachdeva, Iliev, & Medin, 2009; Smeesters, Warlop, Van Avermaet, Corneille, & Yzerbyt, 2003; Zhong, Liljenquist, & Cain, 2009). Rather than trying to resolve this inconsistency in the literature, we relied on a dispositional measure of moral identity, which has proven to be a consistent predictor of moral behavior (for an overview, see Shao et al., 2008). Moreover, a dispositional measure of moral identity is more likely to tap into internalized moral values and, more

importantly, should be a stronger predictor of the prevalence of (internalized) moral actions.

Research on deviance has typically relied on self-reported behavioral measures (Berry et al., 2007). In line with this, we also relied on self-reported deviance in Study 1. However, we found the same consistent pattern in the multi-source field sample using observer measures of leaders' actual behaviors, which cross-validates the use of self-report in the experimental study. Additionally, the observer ratings of deviance in Study 2 yielded a pattern of results that was analogous to the self-reported ratings, which corroborates results of a recent meta-analysis on organizational deviance (Berry et al., 2007) showing high convergence between observer- and self-reported organizational deviance.

An additional limitation of this research that should be mentioned is the skewed gender distribution in Study 2. The majority of our respondents were male, reflecting the preponderance of males in an executive function. This skewed gender distribution may pose potential problems to the validity of our results. We addressed this issue by including gender as a control variable in Study 2, and found no effect of gender. Furthermore, excluding gender as a control variable did not alter our results in any way. It is in this respect relevant to note that a meta-analysis on workplace deviance showed that gender had only a very weak correlation with deviant behavior (Berry et al., 2007).

Directions for Future Research

One highly relevant avenue for future research might be to investigate our research questions in another cultural setting. For instance, the present research was conducted in the Netherlands, which is considered an individualistic culture (Schimmack, Oishi, & Diener, 2005). It might be interesting to conduct a similar study in a collectivistic culture. Many aspects of moral behavior are interpersonal in nature (Aquino et al., 2009; Kant, 1785/2005; Singer, 1981), and differences in

cultural orientation might therefore influence deviant leader behavior. In Japan, for example, expressing anger publicly is considered unseemly, while this is considered necessary (to avoid "boiling over" or "blowing up" at a later point) in the United States (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Even more directly relevant to the present research question, collectivist cultures place greater importance on acting in line with norms and expectations (Husted & Allen, 2008). Therefore, like our respondents high in moral identity, collectivist cultures should be more experienced in inhibiting their selfish impulses than individualists (Seeley & Gardner, 2003). As a result, leaders in collectivistic cultures might be less influenced by ego depletion and may refrain from deviant behavior when they are depleted.

A second avenue for future research lies in the specific type of norm transgressing behavior that is focused on as the outcome variable. In our research, we focused on unethical leader behaviors that harm the organization and/or its members. It could be interesting, however, to focus on different types of unethical leader behavior. For instance, prosocial rule breaking (Morrison, 2006; Umphress, Bingham, & Mitchell, 2010) represents norm-transgressing behavior that is intended to benefit the organization and/or its members. An example of this is violating organizational policies or procedures to solve a problem (Galperin, 2012). Arguably, this creates a tension between doing the morally right thing from a rule based (i.e., deontological) perspective and from an outcome based (i.e., utilistic) perspective.

Concluding Remarks

The hectic, fragmented nature of a typical day for organizational leaders makes them especially prone to resource depletion. Regretfully, depletion makes it more likely that organizational leaders display norm transgressing behaviors that conflict with their desired leadership role, which should focus on benefitting the organization and stimulating employees to strive towards these goals as well. We showed that leaders who are high in moral identity are less vulnerable to resource

depletion effects in their display of unethical behaviors, indicating that they need less controlled resources to act ethically. Leaders who are low in moral identity, however, need these cognitive resources to display ethical leader behaviors. This indicates that the nature of the leadership role can lead to unethical leader behaviors, as such highlighting the importance of internalizing the motivation to act in ethical ways in organizational settings.

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Chapter 3

Out of control!? How loss of self-control influences prosocial behavior: The role of power and moral values

Abstract

Lack of self-control has been suggested to facilitate norm-transgressing behaviors because of the operation of automatic selfish impulses. Previous research, however, has shown that people having a high moral identity may not show such selfish impulses when their self-control resources are depleted. In the present research, we extended this effect to prosocial behavior. Moreover, we investigated the role of power in the interaction between moral identity and self-control depletion. More specifically, we expected that power facilitates the externalization of internal states, which implies that for people who feel powerful, rather than powerless, depletion decreases prosocial behavior especially for those low in moral identity. A laboratory experiment and a multisource field study supported our predictions. The present finding that the interaction between self-control depletion and moral identity is contingent upon people's level of power suggests that power may enable people to refrain from helping behavior. Moreover, the findings suggest that if organizations want to improve prosocial behaviors, it may be effective to situationally induce moral values in their employees.

This chapter is based on Joosten, A., van Dijke, M., Van Hiel, A., & De Cremer, D. (2015). Out of control!? How loss of self-control influences prosocial behavior: The role of power and moral values. *PLoS ONE, 10*(5), online.

Introduction

Research suggests that in order to display prosocial and cooperative behaviors, people require active self-control to override their automatic selfish impulses (DeWall, Baumeister, Gailliot, & Maner, 2008). This suggestion may have important implications in the context of work organizations because prosocial employee behaviors like voluntary helping one's supervisor and coworkers, speaking up to improve the way in which work is organized, and attempting to offer the best customer service possible all play a significant role in effective organizational functioning (N. P. Podsakoff, Whiting, Podsakoff, & Blume, 2009; P. M. Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Paine, & Bachrach, 2000). However, a variety of forces that are known to hamper and deplete self-control are omnipresent in work situations, such as the necessity to make many choices and decisions (Vohs et al., 2008), overly long working hours that lead to sleep deprivation (Barnes, Schaubroeck, Huth, & Ghumman, 2011; Christian & Ellis, 2011), and stress (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). In other words, a number of factors that seem inherent to organizational life may constrain prosocial employee behavior, and therefore organizational effectiveness.

Yet, not everybody requires active self-control to display prosocial behavior. More specifically, people who have internalized moral values - as indexed by a high moral identity - may act in prosocial ways regardless of their level of self-control. This is an important theoretical idea because it presents a different perspective on the workings of automatic processes than most other studies, which usually assume that selfishness is automatically activated (e.g., Baumeister & Exline, 1999; Mead, Baumeister, Gino, Schweitzer, & Ariely, 2009; Shalvi, Eldar, & Bereby-Meyer, 2012). However, internalized moral values have been argued to facilitate the self-regulation of moral behavior (Muraven & Slessareva, 2003; Seeley & Gardner,

2003), which should explain why they can override automatic self-oriented processes.

Unfortunately, there is as yet little empirical evidence to substantiate these arguments in the context of prosocial behavior. The present research therefore focuses on the interaction between internalized moral values and self-control depletion in predicting voluntary prosocial behaviors. Research on negative and antisocial behaviors has shown that the combination of depletion and low moral identity increases antisocial behavior (Gino, Schweitzer, Mead, & Ariely, 2011; Joosten, Van Dijke, Van Hiel, & De Cremer, 2014). However, in the present paper we argue that selfishness by showing antisocial behavior is inherently different from selfishness by refraining from prosocial behavior. We argue that people need power to feel that they can refrain from helping others. People who feel powerful are more inclined to disregard others (Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003; Magee & Smith, 2013) and therefore more likely to deviate from prevailing norms (Briñol, Petty, Valle, Rucker, & Becerra, 2007). We thus expect that power is likely to be a facilitator of the selfish state resulting from the combination of depletion and low moral identity.

In the following sections, we will first develop our argument regarding the relevance of self-control for the display of voluntary prosocial behaviors and the role of internalized moral values in this process. We develop our reasoning using the influential strength model of self-control (see Hagger, Wood, Stiff, & Chatzisarantis, 2010 for an overview). Internalized moral values are analyzed in terms of theorizing on moral identity (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Hardy & Carlo, 2005; Shao, Aquino, & Freeman, 2008). Then, we will develop our argument regarding the critical moderating role of power in this process. This will result in a hypothesis regarding a three-way interaction effect of self-control, moral identity and employee power on voluntary prosocial behavior.

Theoretical Background

Self-Control, Depletion, and Prosocial Behavior

Self-control refers to an individual's ability to inhibit, override, or refrain from acting upon his/her impulses and desires (Baumeister, Heatherton, & Dianne, 1994; Mischel, 1974; Tangney, Baumeister, & Boone, 2004). The human capacity for self-control is extremely adaptive and enables people to follow society's norms and rules (Baumeister, Vohs, & Tice, 2007; Mischel, 1974). In line with this, research has shown that self-control failures may lead to various behavioral problems that can be harmful to people and to social collectives, such as depression, aggression, the inability to manage finances, and theft. Conversely, successful self-control has been linked to numerous positive outcomes such as success at work, increased concentration, and an improved ability to cope with stress and problems (see Hagger et al., 2010 for an overview).

Research on self-control failures suggests that the capacity for self-control is a limited resource, which, with repeated use, can become depleted (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998). When self-control resources are depleted, performance on subsequent acts that require self-control may be impaired (Baumeister et al., 1998; Hagger et al., 2010). Self-control failures are thus more likely to emerge when an individual performs multiple acts that require self-control without rest or replenishment (Baumeister et al., 1998; Muraven, Tice, & Baumeister, 1998).

Importantly, the limited resource model of self-control may also have implications for our understanding of prosocial behavior. Specifically, it has been argued that displaying prosocial behavior and avoiding antisocial behavior requires self-control to override selfish impulses (DeWall et al., 2008). Indirect support for this idea is found in laboratory research that focuses on antisocial behavior showing that after an initial act that required self-control, people were more likely to cheat

(Gino et al., 2011; Mead et al., 2009) and to act aggressively (DeWall, Baumeister, Stillman, & Gailliot, 2007). Research focusing on prosocial behavior, however, is scarce, if non-existent. We know of only one paper that addressed this issue but mostly in terms of prosocial intentions: DeWall and colleagues (2008) showed that depletion reduced participants' intention to help, but helping behavior was not included in the design. These findings suggest that people need self-control resources for prosocial behaviors to emerge. Interestingly, research suggests that having moral values (i.e., moral identity) facilitates the self-control of prosocial behavior (Aquino, Freeman, Reed, Lim, & Felps, 2009). That is, people with a high moral identity are more likely to have moral values readily accessible, even in situations that impair self-control. Below, we explicitly argue how moral identity may influence the self-regulation of prosocial behavior.

Moral Identity

Moral identity reflects the degree to which people consider being a moral person an important part of their self-concept (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Shao et al., 2008). Moral identity has been conceptualized as a cognitive representation or schema of moral values, goals, traits, and behavioral scripts (Aquino et al., 2009; Shao et al., 2008). For people high in moral identity, this moral self-schema is more readily accessible and available for use than for people low in moral identity (Narvaez, Lapsley, Hagele, & Lasky, 2006; Shao et al., 2008). When activated, moral identity should have a strong influence on one's cognition and behavior, as individuals have a strong tendency for self-consistency (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Blasi, 1980).

Consequently, moral identity is an important predictor of prosocial behavior (Hardy & Carlo, 2005) and has been associated with increased levels of self-reported volunteering (Aquino & Reed, 2002), ethical leader behavior (Mayer, Aquino, Greenbaum, & Kuenzi, 2012), an increased likelihood of making a donation (Aquino

& Reed, 2002; Reed & Aquino, 2003), and charitable giving (Reynolds & Ceranic, 2007). Additionally, moral identity has been linked to decreased levels of selfish behavior, such as less lying in business negotiations (Shao et al., 2008), lowered aggression on the football field (Sage, Kavussanu, & Duda, 2006), and less antisocial behavior among adolescents (Barriga, Morrison, Liau, & Gibbs, 2001).

Important for the present purposes, moral identity may also facilitate the self-regulation of prosocial behavior in situations that constrain the availability of self-regulatory resources (e.g., self-control depletion). As argued above, people with a high moral identity have more readily accessible moral values than people with a low moral identity (Aquino et al., 2009). Consequently, people with a high moral identity should be especially likely to expend extra effort to self-regulate their prosocial behaviors. Over time, people with a high moral identity will thus more frequently implement prosocial behavior, resulting in more internalized and automatic enactment of prosocial behavior (Seeley & Gardner, 2003). People with a high moral identity are thus likely to have their moral values more readily available, even in situations in which their self-control resources are depleted. We know of only two studies that offer some indirect support for this argument, but this support is offered in the realm of negative behavior. This research shows that depletion makes people low in moral identity more likely to show antisocial behavior, whereas this negative effect of depletion was absent among people high in moral identity (Gino et al., 2011; Joosten et al., 2014). In other words, the combination of depletion and a low level of moral identity represents a negative cocktail as evinced by the heightened levels of antisocial behavior.

However, findings obtained with negative behaviors cannot be straightforwardly extrapolated to (the non-display) of positive behavior. In philosophy, an important distinction is made between positive (i.e., do good for another) and negative duties (i.e., refraining from doing something morally bad;

Rawls, 1971). Importantly, Kant (1785/2005) argued that negative duties are more stringent than positive duties. In other words, refraining from negative behavior is considered more pressing than positive behavior, and therefore, negative behaviors are often regulated by state legislation (Nozick, 1974). Likewise, in organizations, refraining from antisocial and selfish behavior is regulated by formal sanction systems, whereas displaying prosocial behavior is often informal and more easy to implement because of its' social desirability. Admittedly, the display of prosocial behavior might sometimes be restrained by, for example, formal organizational rules and regulations (Morrison, 2006) or by the demands that are inherent in employees' primary tasks (Bell & Menguc, 2002). However, helping others is often considered to be rewarding and these behaviors 'feel good' (Rilling et al., 2002; Smith, Keating, & Stotland, 1989). These behaviors are already stimulated at a young age (Grusec, 1991). Moreover, such behaviors are 'the right thing to do' and as such affirm one's morality (see Batson, Kobrynowicz, Dinnerstein, Kampf, & Wilson, 1997). Thus, these behaviors are mostly regulated by informal norms rather than by explicit sanctioning systems.

Variations in the display of antisocial and prosocial behavior can thus not be expected to be symmetrical. As such, selfishness by showing antisocial behavior is inherently different from selfishness by refraining from prosocial behavior. One can thus not straightforwardly extrapolate the effects of factors that influence the display of negative and antisocial behaviors toward the non-display of positive and prosocial behaviors. Hence, it remains to be seen whether the interaction effect between moral identity and depletion on antisocial behavior generalizes to the display of prosocial behavior. As we argue below, it is likely that power is a facilitator of the selfish state resulting from the combination of low moral identity and depletion. In other words, it may be that people actually need power to feel that they can refrain from prosocial behavior.

Power as an Inhibitor of Prosocial Behavior

Power is typically defined as one's ability to administer and deny valuable resources or punishment to other people (e.g., Fiske, 1993; French & Raven, 1959; Keltner et al., 2003). Power is a central aspect of organizational contexts (DeCelles, DeRue, Margolis, & Ceranic, 2012; Magee & Galinsky, 2008), and as such, can have a substantial impact on the emergence of selfish behaviors. Specifically, power has often been viewed as a corruptive force, influencing people to behave in self-interested ways (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006; Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003; Keltner et al., 2003; Kipnis, 1972). A number of empirical studies have indeed suggested that people who experience power tend to focus on selfish impulses and subordinate the needs of others to their own desires (for overviews, see Keltner et al., 2003; Magee & Smith, 2013). Moreover, the experience of power makes people less likely to empathize with someone else (Galinsky, Magee, Inesi, & Gruenfeld, 2006; Van Kleef et al., 2008). People who experience power are also less influenced by others and less likely to conform to prevailing norms (Briñol et al., 2007). In sum, it seems that people who feel powerful are inclined to disregard others in their behavior.

More recent research, however, suggests that the relation between power and self-interested behavior may be more complex (Keltner et al., 2003). Rather than directly influencing behavior, power may instead amplify the behavioral expression of individual predispositions (Chen, Lee-Chai, & Bargh, 2001; DeCelles et al., 2012; Galinsky et al., 2003; Hoogervorst, De Cremer, Van Dijke, & Mayer, 2012). Wisse & Rus (2012), for example, found that people who experienced power displayed more antisocial behavior when they focused on their personal self than when they focused on their social self.

The finding that power magnifies inherent impulses is interesting in the context of moral identity and self-control depletion. Because the combination of a

low moral identity and self-control depletion has been reported to increase antisocial behavior and, as such, can be considered to represent a cocktail of selfishness, power should be expected to be a magnifying factor. As we argued before, it is not possible to simply translate results found in the realm of negative behavior to positive behavior, and it therefore remains to be shown whether the combination of low moral identity and depletion leads to lower levels of prosocial behavior, or if power is a necessary facilitator of this effect. We expect the latter to be true for two reasons. First, prosocial behavior is usually displayed in high quality relationships such as workplace relationships. Power, however, may actually undermine this prevalence of prosocial behavior in high quality relationships. More specifically, power leads to an objectification of others, which transforms workplace relationships in exchange relationships, as such undermining prosocial behavior (Chen et al., 2001). Second, while the display of positive behavior is enhanced by societal norms and education, high power undermines conformity (Briñol et al., 2007), and therefore less helping behavior can be expected. In other words, people high in power may feel that they are in a position where they can get away with less helping behavior.

For people high in moral identity, on the other hand, depletion does not influence their level of selfishness as research suggests that high moral identifiers have their moral values more readily accessible even in situations of self-control depletion (Gino et al., 2011; Joosten et al., 2014). Because prosocial behavior is easy to implement and generally sustained by societal and organizational norms, we expect that people high in moral identity act in line with these societal norms irrespective of their level of depletion. In the same vein, one could also reason that power, as a facilitator of individual predispositions, may increase the prosocial behavior of people high in moral identity. Indeed, there is some research that indicates that people high in power who focus on moral or prosocial values show

less antisocial behavior than those low in power (DeCelles et al., 2012; Wisse & Rus, 2012). Prosocial behavior is -unlike antisocial behavior- relatively easy to implement and sustained by societal and organizational norms. We expect that because of this high social acceptance of most prosocial behaviors, power will not lead to more prosocial behavior for high moral identifiers. That is, we expect that prosocial behavior is already part of the daily routine for people high in moral identity, and power is not likely to increase their helping behavior beyond this level.

Overview of Predictions and Studies

There is reason to believe that self-control depletion undermines the emergence of prosocial behaviors. However, internalized moral values in terms of a high moral identity facilitate the self-regulation of prosocial behavior, even in situations that impair self-regulation. In other words, depletion is likely to make people low in moral identity less prosocial, whereas depletion should have no effect on people high in moral identity. In the present research we expect that - contrary to the negative effects of depletion and low moral identity on antisocial behavior - power is a facilitator of the negative combination of depletion and low moral identity on prosocial behavior. It is likely that people may need power to feel that they can get away with refraining from prosocial behavior. Hence, we expected that power facilitates the interaction effect of depletion and moral identity on prosocial behavior. This leads to our Hypothesis, which implies a three-way interaction between depletion, moral identity and power. In particular, when power levels are high, a combination of depletion and low moral identity lead people to refrain from prosocial behavior, whereas no such an effect is expected when power levels are low. The present study's Hypothesis therefore states that:

The negative effect of depletion on prosocial behavior among people low in moral identity is restricted to people high, rather than low in power.

We tested this Hypothesis in two studies. Study 1 was a controlled laboratory experiment in which participants' power and level of depletion were manipulated. We measured the participant's level of moral identity independent from the experimental situation. The dependent variable in this study was the extent to which the participants helped another person who was in need.

The controlled setting in Study 1 makes it possible to draw causal conclusions, but it does not tell us much about the relevance of the processes that we set out to study in actual organizational contexts. Therefore, Study 2 was conducted in an organizational setting, using a multisource design. We asked employees of various organizations to indicate their level of depletion, their moral identity, and their power in the organization using well-established measures. To avoid potential common method and self-presentation biases (P. M. Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003) we asked a colleague to indicate the focal employee's level of prosocial behavior. We operationalized prosocial behavior as organizational citizenship behavior (OCB). OCB is an important and commonly used index of prosocial employee behavior because it describes various types of discretionary, extra-role behaviors that contribute to effective organizational functioning but that are not explicitly required (Organ, 1988).

Study 1

Method

Ethics statement. Ethics approval for Study 1 was formally waived by the ethical committee of the Faculty of Psychological and Educational Sciences (FPPW), Ghent University, as this research was performed in adherence with the ethical protocol of the university. All participants gave their formal, written consent, and were fully debriefed after the experiment. Participants participated voluntary

and they could quit the experiment at any time without negative consequences. All data was analyzed and stored anonymously.

Participants and design. Eighty-four undergraduate students[1] from a medium-sized Belgian university participated in this study. The average age of participants was 18.95 years (*SD* = 2.11), and 89.3 percent were women. The participants were recruited through an online sign-up system and received partial course credit for their participation. Participants were randomly assigned to one condition of a 2 (depletion versus no depletion) x 2 (high versus low power) between subjects design. Participants' moral identity was assessed prior to the experimental manipulations, creating an additional continuous between subjects variable.

Moral identity measure. Participants responded to an online questionnaire including demographic information and a measure of moral identity 24 hours before the actual experiment. We used Aquino and Reed´s (2002) instrument to measure participants' moral identity. Following Aquino and Reed (2002), and in line with our theoretical ideas, we relied on the Internalization dimension of this instrument (i.e., the extent to which people find morality an important aspect of who they are) and disregarded the Symbolization subscale (which measures the extent to which people want to appear as a moral person). The Internalization subscale has been proven to be the most stable and robust predictor of moral behavior (Aquino et al., 2009; Reynolds & Ceranic, 2007). In line with Aquino and Reed's (2002) procedure, the following instructions were given: "Listed below are some characteristics that might describe a person: Caring, Compassionate, Fair, Friendly, Generous, Helpful,

[1] Three respondents were not included in the analyses because they did not follow the instructions of the power manipulation. Inclusion of these three respondents in our analyses did not change any of the results. Most importantly, the predicted three-way interaction remained significant, $\beta = .29$, $p = .01$.

Hardworking, Honest, and Kind. The person with these characteristics could be you or it could be someone else. For a moment, visualize in your mind the kind of person who has these characteristics. Imagine how that person would think, feel, and act. When you have a clear image of what this person would be like, answer the following questions." Participants then responded to the five Internalization items on a 7-point scale. Sample items from this scale are: "It would make me feel good to be a person who has these characteristics" and "Having these characteristics is an important part of my sense of self" (1 = *totally disagree*; 7 = *totally agree*; Cronbach's α = .72; M = 6.18, SD = 0.60).

Experimental procedure. Upon arrival at the laboratory, participants were seated in separate cubicles, each equipped with a personal computer. All communication took place via this computer.

First, participants were introduced to the power manipulation, taken from Galinsky and colleagues (2003) that served to prime high versus low power. Participants were asked to recall a particular situation in their lives. Participants in the high power condition wrote about "a particular situation in which you had power over another individual or individuals". Participants in the low power condition wrote about "a particular situation in which someone else had power over you."

Following the power manipulation, participants responded to the manipulation checks using two items (adapted from Guinote, Weick, & Cai, 2012): "How powerful did you feel in the situation you recalled" and "How much power did someone else have over you in the situation you recalled" (reversed; 1 = *not at all*; 7 = *very much so*).

Participants then completed the depletion task (taken from Baumeister et al., 1998). This task has proven to be successful as a manipulation of self-control depletion in a number of studies (e.g., Baumeister et al., 1998; Fischer, Greitemeyer, & Frey, 2007; Wheeler, Briñol, & Hermann, 2007). In the first part, participants

were instructed to indicate each instance of the letter *e* in a text (i.e., by clicking each *e* with the computer mouse). Participants received visual feedback whenever they clicked an *e* (i.e., a highlighted circle around the corresponding *e*), and were given five minutes to complete the task. This first phase is relatively easy and is used to establish a strong habitual response for scanning and indicating every *e*. In the second part of the task, participants either continued indicating *e*'s using the same rule as before (*no depletion* condition), or they were given the instruction to indicate each *e*, except for the ones followed by a vowel, or those with a vowel preceding the *e* by two letters (*high depletion* condition). For participants in the high depletion condition, overriding the response of scanning for and indicating every *e* is known to require more regulatory resources than for participants in the low depletion condition (who did not need to override a habitual response).

The effectiveness of the self-control depletion manipulation was assessed using two items: "The second task was hard" (taken from Balliet & Joireman, 2010), and "The second task was habit-breaking" (1 = *not at all*; 7 = *very much so*; taken from DeWall et al., 2008).

Helping measure. After the experimental tasks, participants were told that there were several PhD students in need of participants for their experiments that lasted usually somewhere between 5 and 60 minutes. Participants were asked whether they would be willing to participate. We emphasized to the participants that it was not possible to reward them for their participation in these additional studies, and that they would be contacted by an experimenter to set a date and time that would suit them best. Then, participants indicated how much time they would help (i.e., number of donated minutes) or by indicating that they would not help (coded as 0 donated minutes; see e.g., Van Dijke, De Cremer, Brebels, & Van Quaquebeke, in press; Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006 for similar ways to measure prosocial behavior). Subsequently, participants were fully debriefed.

Results

Manipulation checks. A 2 (depletion versus no depletion) x 2 (high power versus low power) Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) showed that participants in the high power condition considered themselves more powerful in the recalled situation than participants in the low power condition (M = 4.81, SD = 1.40 vs. M = 2.14, SD = 1.00, respectively), $F(1, 80) = 99.24$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .55$. These participants also disagreed more with the statement that someone else had power over them than participants in the low power condition (M = 4.55, SD = 1.23 vs. M = 5.29, SD = 1.15, respectively), $F(1, 80) = 8.17$, $p = .01$, $\eta^2 = .09$. No other main or interaction effects were significant.

Additionally, two independent judges rated how powerful the participants were in the recalled situations on a 7-point scale (1 = *not at all powerful*; 7 = *very powerful*). The inter-rater reliability was high (Intraclass correlation coefficient [ICC] = .90) and ratings were averaged to assess the effectiveness of the power manipulation. A 2 (depletion versus no depletion) x 2 (high versus low power) ANOVA showed that participants in the high power condition were rated more powerful in the described situation than participants in the low power condition (M = 4.85, SD = 0.58 vs. M = 3.20, SD = 0.90, respectively), $F(1, 80) = 99.34$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .55$. No other main or interaction effects were significant.

A 2 (depletion versus no depletion) x 2 (high versus low power) ANOVA indicated that depleted participants rated the depletion task as harder than non-depleted participants (M = 4.88, SD = 1.33 vs. M = 3.60, SD = 1.50, respectively), $F(1, 80) = 17.62$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .18$. These participants also found the task more habit-breaking than non-depleted participants (M = 5.05, SD = 1.38 vs. M = 3.95, SD

= 1.46, respectively), $F(1, 80) = 12.40$, $p = .001$, $\eta^2 = .13$. No other main or interaction effects were significant.[2]

Helping behavior. Our measure of helping behavior (i.e., asking participants to donate their time for participation in additional studies) was positively skewed ($M = 21.31$, $SD = 16.79$). This resulted because a significant number of cases ($N = 16$) clustered at the lower limit (i.e., helping out for 0 minutes, to indicate that they did not want to display prosocial behavior). Skewed distributions can result in the violation of OLS assumptions. We therefore conducted a Tobit regression (see Tobin, 1958), which was specifically developed for variables with a lower (or upper) limit and a concentration of observations at this limiting value.

To test our hypothesis, we thus conducted a Tobit regression analysis[3] in which helping behavior was predicted by the depletion manipulation, moral identity, the power manipulation, all the two-way interactions among these three variables, and finally, the three-way interaction. Following Aiken and West (1991), the

[2] We also conducted regression analyses in which the manipulation checks were predicted by the depletion manipulation, power manipulation, participants' moral identity, and the corresponding interaction terms. These analyses produced similar results to those presented in the main text. Specifically, power increased how powerful participants felt, $\beta = .75$, $p < .001$, and decreased reported feelings of powerlessness, $\beta = -.30$, $p = .01$. Furthermore, participants in the high power condition were rated significantly more powerful than participants in the low power condition, $\beta = .83$, $p < .001$. Finally, depletion increased ratings of how hard, $\beta = .43$, $p < .001$, and habit-breaking the task was, $\beta = .35$, $p = .001$. In none of the analyses, other main or interaction effects were significant.

[3] We also conducted OLS regression analyses. These analyses produced similar results as the Tobit regression analyses. Most importantly, the predicted three-way interaction was significant, $\beta = .28$, $p = .02$.

interaction terms were based on the mean-centered scores of moral identity and effect coded scores of depletion and power.

Table 1 shows the results of the Tobit regression analysis. Of most importance, the predicted three-way interaction was significant, $\beta = .34$, $p = .004$. To analyze this interaction in more detail, we used simple slope analyses (Aiken & West, 1991). Figure 1a shows that, consistent with our predictions, among participants who were primed with high power, depletion significantly decreased helping behavior for those low in moral identity (one *SD* below the mean), $\beta = -.55$, $p = .02$, but not for those high in moral identity (one *SD* above the mean), $\beta = .21$, $p = .33$.

Yet, for participants who received the low power prime (see Figure 1b), depletion did not significantly influence helping behavior for those low in moral identity (one *SD* below the mean), $\beta = .35$, $p = .09$, or for those high in moral identity (one *SD* above the mean), $\beta = -.26$, $p = .24$.

Table 1

Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Helping in Study 1

Variables	*B*	*SE B*	β
Self-control depletion (SD)	-1.26	2.11	-.06
Moral identity (MI)	5.24	3.90	.15
Power (P)	-0.34	2.11	-.02
SD x MI	1.24	3.90	.04
SD x P	-2.14	2.11	-.11
MI x P	3.66	3.90	.11
SD x MI x P	11.55	3.92	.34**

Note. Final model: -2 log likelihood = -311.39, χ^2 (7) = 11.29, p = .13. B = unstandardized regression coefficient; β = standardized regression coefficient. For the self-control depletion manipulation, -1 denotes no self-control depletion; 1 denotes self-control depletion. For the power manipulation, -1 denotes low power; 1 denotes high power.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$.



Figure 1a. Helping as a function of self-control depletion and moral identity for participants in the high power condition.



Figure 1b. Helping as a function of self-control depletion and moral identity for participants in the low power condition.

Summary and Conclusion

The results of Study 1 show that, in line with theoretical predictions (Seeley & Gardner, 2003) and our Hypothesis, among participants who felt high in power, depletion reduced prosocial behaviors for those low (as opposed to high) in moral identity, whereas this interaction effect between depletion and moral identity did not occur for those who felt low in power.

Study 2

Study 1 provided causal evidence for our proposed ideas, but the setup limited us to the use of students as participants in a laboratory setting. Study 2 was designed to test our predictions in an organizational setting. Rather than priming power and manipulating depletion, we measured employees' sense of power in the organization and their level of depletion in addition to their moral identity. To avoid potential common method and self-presentation biases we asked colleagues of the respondents to rate the respondent's prosocial behavior (P. M. Podsakoff et al., 2003).

Method

Ethics statement. Ethics approval for Study 2 was formally waived by the ethical committee of the FPPW, Ghent University, as this research was performed in adherence with the ethical protocol of the university. We used a research agency to recruit our respondents, who gave their consent upon enrolling this research panel to use their data for research purposes. Moreover, a "double active opt-in" method was used, meaning that all respondents gave their consent by actively and voluntarily agreeing to take part in our research. Before starting the questionnaire, all respondents were provided with information on the purpose and the content of the research. Respondents were informed that all data would be analyzed and stored anonymously and that they could quit the questionnaire at any moment.

Sample and procedure. We recruited respondents via a Dutch research panel. We asked potential respondents to respond to our survey and also to invite a coworker to respond to some items. A total of 893 panel members agreed to fill out the questionnaire as focal employee and 94 of these focal employees also found a colleague willing to fill out the questionnaire. The focal employees (i.e., panel members) received credit points that would allow them to receive certain gifts (e.g., tickets for the movies). Colleagues participated in a lottery in which they could win an Ipad or one of five €20 gift certificates. Because we relied on colleague ratings of the focal employee's behavior, the number of respondents included in our analyses consisted of 94 employees and 94 matched colleagues.[4]

Of the focal employees, 55 were male and 39 were female. The mean age was 44.13 years (*SD* = 11.37). One percent had only lower education (primary school), 17% had high school only, 26% had followed up on this with vocational education, 36% had a bachelor's degree, and 20% had a master's degree. The focal

[4] Focal employees who could be included in the analyses (i.e., because they had a coworker who was also willing to participate) did not differ from focal employees who could not be included in the analyses with regard to their mean level on the demographic variables and focal predictors. There was one exception: focal employees who could be included worked longer in their current organization than focal employees who were not included. This is most likely because longer tenure increases the likelihood of developing social connections with colleagues. This should make it easier to find a coworker willing to participate.

In addition, we also tested whether the correlations between the study variables were significantly different between included and not included employees. The correlations between the study's variables (Bonferroni corrected) did not differ between the two groups of focal employees. These analyses give us little reason to think that selection biases impacted our results and conclusions.

employees worked on average for 12.83 years (*SD* = 10.80) in their current organization.

The matched group of colleagues included 47 males and 47 females. The mean age was 42.96 years (*SD* = 10.98). One percent had only lower education (primary school), 19% had high school only, 30% had followed up on this with vocational education, 43% had a bachelor's degree, and 7% had a master's degree. The colleagues worked on average for 10.72 years (*SD* = 9.27) in their current organization.

Measures. We measured moral identity using the same internalization subscale of the moral identity measure (Aquino & Reed, 2002) as in Study 1 (1 = *not at all*; 5 = *very much so*; Cronbach's α = .77; *M* = 4.02, *SD* = 0.70).

To assess focal employees' levels of depletion, we used the 2-item measure from Muraven and colleagues (1998). Focal employees indicated how much they agreed or disagreed with: "I often feel as if I have low energy," and "I often feel as if things are taking a lot of effort" (1 = *strongly disagree*; 5 = *strongly agree*; Cronbach's α = .72; *M* = 2.29, *SD* = 0.93).

Power of the focal employee was measured using the 8-item instrument developed by Anderson and Galinsky (2006; see Anderson, John, & Keltner, 2012, for extensive validation evidence). Focal employees responded to items such as "Even if I voice them, my views have little sway in the organization" (reverse scored), and "If I want to, I get to make the decisions in the organization" (1 = *strongly disagree*; 5 = *strongly agree;* Cronbach's α = .77; *M* = 3.51, *SD* = 0.89).

We operationalized prosocial behavior of the focal employee using the 19-item OCB measure of Moorman and Blakely (1995). To assess OCB, *colleagues* of the focal employees were asked to rate the focal employees on actions such as "voluntarily helps new employees settle into the job," "often motivates others to express their ideas and opinions", "performs his/her job duties with extra-special

care," and "actively promotes the organization's products and services to potential users" (1 = *strongly disagree;* 5 = *strongly agree;* Cronbach's α = .91; *M* = 3.87, *SD* = 0.52).

Results

Descriptive statistics and intercorrelations. Table 2 presents the means, standard deviations, and correlations between the Study 2 variables.

Hypothesis test. To test our hypothesis, we conducted a hierarchical regression analysis with colleague ratings of OCB serving as the dependent variable. Age, gender, tenure, and education level of the focal employees, and, age, gender, and education level of the colleagues were entered as control variables in the first step of the regression. Depletion, moral identity, and power were entered in the second step of the regression. The two-way interactions between depletion, moral identity, and power were entered in the third step of the regression. The three-way interaction was entered in the fourth step. Interaction terms were based on mean-centered scores of the independent variables (Aiken & West, 1991).

Table 2

Descriptive Statistics and Intercorrelations of Study 2 Measures

Variable	*M*	*SD*	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1. Self-control depletion	2.29	0.93	(.72)									
2. Moral identity	4.02	0.70	-.19	(.77)								
3. Power	3.51	0.77	-.23*	.30**	(.89)							
4. OCB (colleague rating)	3.87	0.52	-.19	.36**	.27**	(.91)						
5. Age (focal)	44.13	11.37	-.22*	-.15	-.03	-.04						
6. Gender (focal)	1.41	0.50	-.05	.13	.15	.20	.04					
7. Tenure (focal)	12.83	10.80	-.11	-.14	-.09	.01	.66**	-.03				
8. Education level (focal)	3.57	1.03	-.05	.25*	.18	.09	-.12	-.09	-.13			
9. Age (colleague)	42.96	10.98	-.12	-.17	.00	-.18	.32**	.06	.11	-.19		
10. Gender (colleague)	1.50	0.50	-.20	.29**	.14	.27**	-.12	.67**	-.13	.10	-.19	
11. Education level (colleague)	3.36	0.91	-.08	.27**	.31**	.07	-.04	-.15	.03	.64**	-.22*	.05

Note. N = 94. Internal reliabilities (coefficient alphas) are provided in parentheses on the diagonal. For gender, 1 denotes males, 2 denotes females.
* $p \leq .05$. ** $p \leq .01$.

Table 3 shows the results of the hierarchical regression analysis. Of most importance and in line with our Hypothesis, the predicted three-way interaction was significant, β = .24, *p* = .02. We used simple slope analyses (Aiken & West, 1991) to analyze this interaction further. Figure 2a shows that, among high power employees, depletion significantly decreased OCB for those low in moral identity (one *SD* below the mean), β = -.95, *p* < .001. However, for those high in moral identity (one *SD* above the mean) depletion did not decrease OCB, β = .17, *p* = .35.



Figure 2a. OCB rated by a coworker as a function of self-control depletion and moral identity for employees with high power.

Table 3

Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for OCB in Study 2

Variables	*Step 1*	*Step 2*	Step 3	Step 4
Age of focal employee	-.03	-.05	-.09	-.08
Gender of focal employee	.10	.09	.07	.07
Tenure of focal employee	.08	.12	.16	.15
Education level of focal employee	.06	.06	.07	.06
Age of colleague	-.14	-.16	-.12	-.10
Gender of colleague	.17	.07	.08	.11
Education level of colleague	.00	-.13	-.06	-.07
Self-control depletion (SD)		-.10	-.04	-.09
Moral identity (MI)		.26	.22*	.23*
Power		.19	.16	.15
SD x MI			.33**	.41***
SD x Power			-.29**	-.31**
MI x Power			-.03	.05
SD x MI x Power				.25*
R^2	.10	.23	.34	.38
R^2_{adj}	.03	.13	.23	.27
R^2_{change}	.10	.13**	.11**	.04*
F	1.35	2.42*	3.14**	3.45***

Note. Table presents Beta coefficients. For gender, -1 denotes males, 1 denotes females.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$.

Figure 2b shows that, for low power employees, depletion had no effect on OCB for those low in moral identity (one *SD* below the mean), β = .02, *p* = .89. Unexpectedly, depletion increased OCB for those high in moral identity (one *SD* above the mean), β = .41, *p* = .050. However, given the fact that the interaction between moral identity and self-control depletion was not significant among employees low in power, and given that we did not obtain this result in Study 1, the results of this analysis should be interpreted with caution.



Figure 2b. OCB rated by a coworker as a function of self-control depletion and moral identity for employees with low power.

Supplemental analyses. We followed Spector and Brannick's (2011) suggestion and repeated our analyses without the control variables as predictors in the equations. This analysis led to similar conclusions to those presented previously. Most importantly, the predicted three-way interaction was significant, β = .24, *p* = .02.

Summary and Conclusion

The results of Study 2 supported our prediction. We found the hypothesized interaction between moral identity and depletion for employees high in power, but not for employees low in power. More specifically, depletion reduces prosocial behaviors among employees low in moral identity if those employees feel high in power, but not if they feel low in power. The prosocial behavior of employees high in moral identity, on the other hand, was not influenced by depletion, whether they felt high in power or not. It thus seems that employees with a high moral identity have their moral values more readily accessible, even when their self-control resources are depleted and irrespective of their power level.

General Discussion

A laboratory experiment and a multisource field study consistently showed an interaction between depletion and moral identity for people high in power, but not for people low in power. In the following sections we discuss the implications and limitations of these findings.

Theoretical Implications

The obtained three way interaction between self-control depletion, moral identity and power has theoretical implications for each of the constituting factors of this third order effect. It enhances, first of all, our understanding of the role of self-regulation in the display of prosocial behavior. In fact, most previous studies focused on effects of depletion on subsequent task persistence or negative and antisocial behavior (DeWall et al., 2007; Gino et al., 2011; Stucke & Baumeister, 2006). To date, indirect evidence for the effect of depletion on prosocial behavior is offered only by DeWall and colleagues (2008) who showed that depletion decreases prosocial *intentions*. Hence, our research is (at least to our knowledge) the first to show that regulatory depletion has an effect on prosocial *behavior*. These findings

are important because our results indicate that especially people who feel powerful and are low in moral identity are likely to show less prosocial behavior as a result of regulatory depletion. At the same time, however, people high in power are likely to serve as a source of ethical guidance by means of social learning (Bandura, 1977, 1986). That is, if someone in power does not act in ethical ways, employees are likely to follow his or her lead (Mayer, Kuenzi, Greenbaum, Bardes, & Salvador, 2009).

Most importantly, the present findings offer corroborative evidence for the idea that the effect of situations that constrain cognitive capacity (e.g., self-control depletion) on prosocial behavior depends not only on one's level of moral identity, but also on one's sense of power. That is, self-control depletion leads to a decrease in prosocial behavior among people low in moral identity, but only when they feel powerful. Our reasoning for this is that prosocial behavior is fairly easy to implement because of its social desirability and it thus seems that people need power to feel that they can refrain from prosocial behavior. Research in the realm of antisocial behavior, however, has shown that the effect of self-control depletion on antisocial behavior depends solely on one's level of moral identity (Gino et al., 2011; Joosten et al., 2014). That is, depletion increases antisocial behavior among people low in moral identity, irrespective of their power level. The self-regulation of prosocial behavior, on the other hand, is dependent upon people's level of power. In other words, depletion reduces prosocial behavior among people low in moral identity, only if they experience power. Taking all these results together, it is clear that the display of prosocial intentions relies on processes that are qualitatively different from suppressing antisocial and selfish impulses (e.g., Lee & Allen, 2002).

The results of the present study also have implications for our understanding of what power tells us about the differences between not helping someone and hurting someone. In the introduction we argued that refraining from antisocial

behavior is considered as more pressing than prosocial behavior (Kant, 1785/2005). That is, antisocial behavior is usually regulated by formal sanctioning systems, which are known to make people focus on the exchange characteristics of a situation (Mulder, Van Dijk, De Cremer, & Wilke, 2006; TenBrunsel & Messick, 1999). Similarly, power is also likely to make people focus on the exchange characteristics of a situation, because people who experience power tend to objectify others (Chen et al., 2001). It thus seems that similar processes that underlie the emergence of antisocial behavior, also play a role in the behavior of people high in power. Prosocial behavior, on the other hand, is regulated more informally because of its social desirability. Prosocial behavior is generally sustained by social and organizational norms, and adherence to these norms is fairly easy. The present study thus indicates that power is needed to obtain the same results for prosocial behavior as for antisocial behavior (i.e., the negative effect of self-control depletion for people low in moral identity; see (Gino et al., 2011; Joosten et al., 2014).

Our findings are also informative for the study of moral identity. Among people high in moral identity, self-control depletion and power do not necessarily hamper the self-regulation of prosocial behavior. This finding suggests that, in line with Gino and colleagues (2011) and Joosten and colleagues (2014), people high in moral identity have their moral values accessible irrespective of their level of depletion.

Our research has also some implications that are relevant for the power literature. Past research has, on the one hand, often shown that power can make people more selfish (for overviews see Keltner et al., 2003; Magee & Smith, 2013). However, on the other hand, some studies suggest that this undermining effect on selfishness does not necessary result from having high power in itself (Galinsky et al., 2003; Keltner et al., 2003). As a solution to these diverging findings, it has been proposed that power in itself does not make people selfish but that it acts as a

catalyst in facilitating the behavioral expression of internal states (Galinsky, Magee, Gruenfeld, Whitson, & Liljenquist, 2008; Guinote et al., 2012). This indicates that power is not inherently corruptive, but rather a facilitator of the behavioral expression of internal states (in our case: the toxic cocktail of depletion and low moral identity). The present research adds to this literature, showing that the facilitating effect of power on internal states (i.e., low moral identity) is contingent upon third variables as well (i.e., self-control depletion).

Practical Implications

The present research also offers some practical implications for organizations. It seems to be the case that particularly employees who feel powerful are vulnerable to the effects of self-control depletion on prosocial behaviors. At the same time, it is especially important for employees high in power to behave in prosocial ways as they form an important source of vicarious learning (Bandura, 1986). For these employees, the negative effects of self-control depletion on prosocial behavior seem to apply particularly among those low in moral identity. Fortunately, research indicates that it is possible to situationally increase the accessibility of moral identity (Aquino et al., 2009; Reed, Aquino, & Levy, 2007). Combined with the present results, this entails a promising implication for organizations. Situational interventions aimed at stimulating moral identity are thus likely to make employees who feel high in power behave in prosocial ways. Such interventions can consist of the stimulation of a clear ethical climate. Moreover, social learning is enforced by ensuring that employees high in power act in moral ways, by which interventions aimed at increasing morality have positive implications for people low in power (Martin & Cullen, 2006; Mayer et al., 2009; Mayer, Kuenzi, & Greenbaum, 2010).

Another practical implication of the present findings is that on the one hand, high power makes employees particularly vulnerable to the effects of self-control

depletion on prosocial behaviors, while, on the other hand, power also comes with heavy workloads, and numerous choices and decisions each day. Importantly, high stress levels (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000), overly long working hours that may lead to sleep deprivation (Barnes et al., 2011; Christian & Ellis, 2011), and the necessity to make many choices and decisions (Vohs et al., 2008), all constitute factors that are known to lead to self-control depletion. Organizations should thus be aware that overloading their employees in this respect could also reduce the prevalence of prosocial behaviors, at least among employees with a low moral identity and a high sense of power. Similarly, employees who feel high in power should also be aware that their cognitive state could affect their own behavior.

One could assume from our results that employees who feel low in power are not vulnerable to the effects of self-control depletion on selfish behaviors. It is, however, important that organizations and employees realize that this only holds for the emergence of prosocial behaviors. That is, our findings indicate that for employees low in power, depletion does not reduce prosocial behaviors for those low in moral identity. There are, however, studies in the realm of negative behavior that show that self-control depletion makes people low in moral identity more likely to show antisocial behavior (Gino et al., 2011; Joosten et al., 2014). Even though these studies did not compare high and low power, the results from these studies should nevertheless be taken into consideration.

Strengths, Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research

A major strength of this article lies in the use of diverse methods to test our hypothesis. The laboratory experiment (Study 1) permits us to draw causal inferences with regard to the interactive effects of power, self-control depletion and moral identity on prosocial behavior. The subsequent multisource field study (Study 2) allowed us to investigate whether the hypothesized effects are also relevant in organizational settings. Furthermore, the multisource setting made it possible to

control for common method and self-presentation biases (P. M. Podsakoff et al., 2003).

A potential limitation is that the sample sizes in both Study 1 and Study 2 are relatively small and that this could potentially harm the validity of our results. We did, however, replicate the findings in an experimental setting (Study 1) and in a multisource field setting (Study 2), which reinforces the reliability and validity of our results. However, even though we believe that our results are valid and reliable, replications are necessary to further prove the validity of our findings.

In Study 2, we relied on colleague ratings of OCB. Our reliance on a single source to measure OCB may pose a threat to the validity of our findings, because of the discretionary nature of OCB (Allen, Barnard, Rush, & Russell, 2000). That is, OCB consists of many different behaviors, and it is not unlikely that the colleagues witnessed only part of these behaviors. It may thus be that our reliance on a single source measure does not fully capture the unique variance present in citizenship behaviors. Future research could address this possible shortcoming by measuring OCB via various sources (e.g., comparing self and other ratings, or by combining various other ratings).

Another strength of the present article is that self-control depletion was manipulated in Study 1, whereas it was measured in Study 2. Although it can be argued that the manipulation of self-control depletion represents a more dynamic representation of self-control depletion than the more trait oriented measure, similar results were obtained. This apparent consistency strengthens our beliefs that it is possible to capture self-control depletion with a trait oriented measure in the field. These results also corroborate previous research that combined self-control depletion manipulations and measures, which shows clear consistency between these two operationalizations of self-control depletion (Vohs et al., 2008; Joosten et al., 2014)

Readers could wonder whether there are situations in which power may increase the prosocial behavior of people high in moral identity. In our research we focused on informal, effortless helping behavior. As noted in the introduction, prosocial behavior might sometimes be restrained by organizational rules and regulations or by demands inherent in employees' primary tasks (Bell & Menguc, 2002; Morrison, 2006). In these cases, prosocial behavior is thus likely to be more effortful and less socially desirable, and may have as a result that high moral identifiers need power to act in line with their moral values.

Concluding Remarks

Research focusing on the social effects of depletion presents us with a rather cynical view of human nature. Lack of self-control results in selfishness (Baumeister & Exline, 1999; Mead et al., 2009; Shalvi et al., 2012), and is also likely to undermine the emergence of prosocial behaviors. Yet, other studies show that depletion makes only people low in moral identity more selfish, while no such an effect of depletion was obtained among high moral identifiers. We argued that one cannot simply extrapolate the effects of factors that influence the display of antisocial behavior to the non-display of prosocial behavior, and that one may need power to refrain from prosocial behavior. In line with this, we showed that the moderating role of moral identity on the effects of depletion is present among people high in power, and not among people low in power.

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Chapter 4

Feel good, do-good!? On consistency and compensation in moral self-regulation

Abstract

Studies in the behavioral ethics and moral psychology traditions have begun to reveal the important roles of self-related processes that underlie moral behavior. Unfortunately, this research has resulted in two distinct and opposing streams of findings that are usually referred to as moral consistency and moral compensation. Moral consistency research shows that a salient self-concept as a moral person promotes moral behavior. Conversely, moral compensation research reveals that a salient self-concept as an immoral person promotes moral behavior. The present study's aim was to integrate these two literatures. We argued that compensation forms a reactive, "damage control" response in social situations, whereas consistency derives from a more proactive approach to reputation building and maintenance. Two experiments supported this prediction in showing that cognitive depletion (i.e., resulting in a reactive approach) results in moral compensation whereas consistency results when cognitive resources are available (i.e., resulting in a proactive approach). Experiment 2 revealed that these processes originate from reputational (rather than moral) considerations by showing that they emerge only under conditions of accountability. It can thus be concluded that reputational concerns are important for both moral compensation and moral consistency processes, and that which of these two prevails depends on the perspective that people take: a reactive or a proactive approach.

This chapter is based on Joosten, A., van Dijke, M., Van Hiel, A., & De Cremer, D. (in press). Feel good, do-good!? On consistency and compensation in moral self-regulation. *Journal of Business Ethics, 123*(1), 71-84.

Introduction

Every day we encounter numerous work situations in which we have to decide between right and wrong. In the morning, when choosing a new supplier, a warehouse manager may decide to choose for the more expensive one that is guaranteed sweatshop free or she may go for the cheapest offer. In the afternoon, she may decide (somewhat more trivially) to put in some overtime to finish an important deadline or to enjoy a drink on a sunny terrace. Recently, researchers who are interested in behavioral ethics and moral psychology have started to study these moment-to-moment balancing acts between prosocial and self-interested behavior[1]. This research has revealed important roles for the self and self-regulation processes in shaping our moral behaviors (Aquino, Freeman, Reed, Lim, & Felps, 2009; Blasi, 1983; Sachdeva, Iliev, & Medin, 2009; Zhong, Liljenquist, & Cain, 2009).

Regretfully, this research has not yet resulted in an integrated model that informs us how self-related processes influence moral behavior. In fact, two distinct literatures seem to have developed independently. While both literatures rely on similar manipulations and measures of morality, they offer surprisingly opposite findings. On the one hand, a series of studies show that people with a salient self-concept as being a moral person display more prosocial behavior than people for whom this self-concept is not salient, or for whom an immoral self-concept is salient (e.g., Aquino et al., 2009; Blasi, 1983; Reed, Aquino, & Levy, 2007). Thus, this research suggests that when feeling moral (e.g., after helping your colleague in the morning), you are more likely to put in some overtime in the afternoon. This effect

[1] Morality requires people to forgo self-interested impulses and focus on the needs of others (Kant, 2005/1785; Aquino et al., 2009). In this paper we adopted a focus on prosocial behavior, which are actions intended to help other people. Helping behavior is considered an important exemplar of moral behavior (Haidt & Graham, 2007; Wilhelm & Bekkers, 2010). More specifically, more helping behavior implies less self-interest in our studies.

is usually explained in terms of consistency: people who view themselves as moral feel that they have to continue acting in a moral manner to avoid violating their sense of self and their integrity (Blasi, 1980).

On the other hand, a growing literature shows that people with a salient self-concept as an *im*moral person display more prosocial behavior than people for whom this self-concept is not salient or people who view themselves as moral (e.g., Jordan, Mullen, & Murnighan, 2011; Monin & Miller, 2001; Sachdeva et al., 2009). Thus, this research suggests, for instance, that after procrastinating at work in the morning, you are more likely to subsequently comply with a request to work overtime. Conversely, if you would have spent your morning helping your colleague, you might refuse to do overtime. This effect is usually explained in terms of compensation and licensing processes (Zhong et al., 2009): People who feel immoral attempt to "make up" for this by displaying moral behavior (Sachdeva et al., 2009) whereas people who view themselves as moral feel that they have built up a "surplus" of morality, allowing them to display less moral behavior without damaging their self-concept and self-presentation as a moral person.

We know of only one study that has addressed the intriguing inconsistency between these two sets of findings. Conway and Peetz (2012) showed that recalling a temporally distant action (e.g., behavior performed over 1 year ago) led to moral consistency, whereas recalling a recent action (e.g., behavior performed within the past week) led to moral compensation effects on prosocial intentions. They argued that this effect occurs because distant actions are conceptualized abstractly, in general terms as a schematic representation, whereas recent actions are conceptualized concretely, in specific terms as they occurred. When people think about (im)moral actions in abstract terms they will focus on the abstract moral values associated with these actions and act in line with them. Thinking about (im)moral actions in concrete terms might remind people about the moral

obligations that they already fulfilled, which causes people to feel licensed to act less moral (i.e., when thinking about moral behavior) or induces people to compensate through more moral behavior (i.e., when thinking about immoral behavior). Yet, when testing this proposition explicitly with prosocial behavior as the outcome variable, Conway and Peetz (2012) found evidence for moral compensation, but not for moral consistency.

Integrating Moral Consistency and Moral Compensation

In the present paper, we argue that moral consistency and compensation do not reflect mere abstract moral considerations. Instead, they occur in a social context and both processes reflect specific ways to deal with reputational concerns. Reputation (i.e., how one is seen by others, "others perceptions"; Carlson, Vazire, & Oltmanns, 2011) is one of the most valuable social assets that humans have and they go a long way to build and defend a positive reputation (Cheek & Briggs, 1982; De Cremer & Tyler, 2005; James, 1890). We argue that the crucial difference between consistency and compensation is that the former implies a proactive focus on maintaining and building a reputation, whereas the latter implies a reactive focus on reputation management. Proactivity refers to self-initiated and future oriented behavior whereas a reactive focus entails an orientation aimed at responding in the moment (Crant, 2000; Parker, Williams, & Turner, 2006).

It has been argued that acting consistent with one's self-concept and past behavior results from an active, long-term outlook on reputation building (Blasi, 1980, 1983; Reed et al., 2007). This argument is supported by research showing that consistency may form an important long-term reputational cue (Gabarro, 1978; Whitener, Brodt, Korsgaard, & Werner, 1998) that supports the continuous functioning and development of social relationships (Kramer, 1999). Proactivity induces people to focus on the long-term consequences of their behavior (Frese, Kring, Soose, & Zempel, 1996; Parker et al., 2006). Moreover, it enables people to

see the big picture and focus on higher order goals (Ainslie, 1975; Hofmann, Friese, & Strack, 2009; Parker, Bindl, & Strauss, 2010). A proactive focus will thus induce people to infer their moral personality from their moral self-concept, which promotes behavior in line with this inferred moral personality (Albarracín & Wyer, 2000; Blasi, 1983; Fishbach & Dhar, 2005). Summarizing, we argue that for moral consistency to occur, people who have a salient self-concept as a moral person assume from this self-concept that they are a moral person, and act accordingly to confirm and build their reputation as a moral person.

Research on moral compensation and licensing, on the other hand, reveals that compensation and licensing result from short-term fluctuations in moral self-worth (Khan & Dhar, 2007; Monin & Miller, 2001; Sachdeva et al., 2009). This suggest that moral compensatory behaviors are likely to be driven by reactive reputational considerations (Schnall, Haidt, Clore, & Jordan, 2008; Zhong et al., 2009), rather than proactive considerations with a long term outlook aimed at building and maintaining one's reputation. For moral compensation to occur, people have to feel that they need to be prosocial in order to defend their threatened reputation. This is likely to occur if people just did something bad (which gives them the feeling that they have to make up for their selfish behavior), or whenever behavior that is negative for their reputation is salient. Conversely, for moral licensing to occur, people should have the impression that the situation allows them to be selfish. This is very likely to occur if people just did something good (which provides them a free pass to be selfish), or whenever behavior positive for their reputation is salient. Arguably, reacting on one's moral self-concept by "damage control" (i.e., compensation) or by "slacking off" (i.e., licensing) is a rather short-term, reactive form of reputation management.

In sum, we expect that moral consistency and moral compensation both depend on reputational considerations. However, moral consistency arguably implies

a more proactive approach to reputation building and maintenance, whereas moral compensation forms a reactive, "damage control" response in social situations.

As an explicit test of our assumption that moral compensation and consistency both depend on reputational considerations, we investigated the role of accountability as a facilitator of both moral consistency and moral compensation processes. Accountability can be defined as people's expectations that they will be publicly held responsible for their actions (De Cremer & Van Dijk, 2009; Lerner & Tetlock, 1999). Accountability is known to increase self-critical awareness of one's judgment processes, out of concerns of the possible reputational consequences of one's behavior (Beu & Buckley, 2001; Lerner & Tetlock, 1999). Hence, if our argument holds that moral consistency and compensatory behavior are shaped by reputational concerns (i.e., concerns about how one is seen by others), we expect that both types of patterns should be found particularly when people are held accountable for their actions (i.e., when they have to explain their actions to others). If people are not held accountable for their actions, we expect no moral consistency (i.e., because proactive, long-term reputational concerns are less salient), and no moral compensation (i.e., because a reactive, short-term focus on "damage control" in reputation management is unnecessary).

The Present Studies

To test our predictions regarding the subtle processes that flow from people's dealings with reputational concerns, we conducted two laboratory experiments. In both studies, we manipulated whether participants had a salient self as a moral versus an immoral person relying on an established priming procedure that asks participants to describe and recall a situation in which they acted in a moral (versus immoral) manner (see e.g., Aquino et al., 2009; Sachdeva et al., 2009). This allowed us to capture moral consistency (i.e., high levels of prosocial behavior when a self-definition as moral is salient) as well as moral compensation (i.e., or high

levels of prosocial behavior when a self-definition as immoral is salient or low levels of prosocial behavior when a self-definition as moral is salient). Participants were led to believe that they worked together with others in a team on several tasks because this has been shown to induce reputational concerns (De Cremer & Bakker, 2003; Van Vugt & Hardy, 2010).

Scholars have identified a number of factors that make people take a reactive versus a proactive approach in their dealing with various challenges. Most importantly, reactive responses are more likely in situations that constrain cognitive capacity (Parker et al., 2006; Rusbult & Van Lange, 2003). Cognitive capacity refers to one's ability to "override or change one's inner responses, as well as to interrupt undesired behavioral tendencies (such as impulses) and refrain from acting on them" (Tangney, Baumeister, & Boone, 2004, p. 274). In the two experiments presented in this paper, we manipulated the extent to which people take a reactive versus proactive approach by relying on a common way to impair cognitive capacity, that is, by depleting cognitive resources (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998). People need cognitive resources to override short-term, reactive impulses in order to proactively pursue high standards and desirable long-term goals (Baumeister, 2002; Fishbach, Friedman, & Kruglanski, 2003; Hofmann et al., 2009; Muraven & Baumeister, 2000; Mischel, 1974). When people lack these resources, impulsive behavior that serves immediate, short-term impulses would predominate, and long-term considerations and goal-directed behavior would become impossible (Baumeister, 2005; Hagger, Wood, Stiff, & Chatzisarantis, 2010; Loewenstein, 1996).

Research indicates that people's cognitive capacity is a limited resource that can be impaired by depleting cognitive resources (Baumeister et al., 1998; Baumeister & Haetherton, 1996; Mischel, Shoda, Rodriguez, 1989; Fishbach et al., 2003). A state of cognitive depletion refers to "a temporary reduction in the self's

capacity or willingness to engage in volitional action (including controlling the environment, controlling the self, making choices, and initiating action) caused by prior exercise of volition" (Baumeister et al., 1998, p. 1253). Thus, cognitive depletion hinders the ability to take a proactive approach and strive for long-term goals and causes people to engage in behaviors that are driven by reactive, short-term considerations (DeWall, Baumeister, Gailliot, & Maner, 2008; Gino, Schweitzer, Mead, & Ariely, 2011). Conversely, non-depleted people should be relatively effective at taking a proactive approach (Morrison & Phelps, 1999; Parker et al., 2006). The principal aim of Experiment 1 was to test whether cognitive depletion (i.e., making people act in more reactive ways) results in moral compensation whereas sufficient cognitive resources (i.e., not being depleted, making people act in more proactive ways) result in moral consistency.

This focus on a proactive versus a reactive approach to deal with challenges by means of manipulating depletion is important as a test of our argument. However, in itself, it does not prove conclusively that it is particularly a proactive versus reactive approach towards *reputation* management. Therefore, in Experiment 2, we also wanted to provide an explicit and formal test of the idea that moral compensation and consistency result from reputational concerns (i.e., concerns about how one is seen by others). In order to do this, we included accountability as a factor in our design. Accountability refers to the degree to which one can be publicly held responsible for one's actions (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999) and it is known to induce people to act upon reputational concerns (Beu & Buckley, 2001; De Cremer & Van Dijk, 2009; Sedikes, Herbst, Hardin, & Dardis, 2002). Hence, reputational concerns should be particularly viable in situations where one is accountable for one's actions. Thus, if moral compensation and consistency indeed drive from reputational concerns, then moral compensation and consistency effects should be particularly pronounced in situations of high accountability. In situations of low accountability,

however, little evidence for compensation or consistency effects was expected, because reputational concerns should be less salient in these situations.

Experiment 1

Method

Participants and design. Seventy-two undergraduate students (62 females, 1 unreported; M_{age} = 18.62; *SD* = .87) participated in this experiment for course credit. They were randomly assigned to one condition of a 2 (salient self-concept: moral vs. immoral) x 2 (depletion: low vs. high) between-subjects design.

Procedure. We used a procedure designed by Maner and Mead (2010) to measure participants' moral behavior. Upon arrival at the laboratory, participants were seated in separate cubicles that were each equipped with a personal computer. This computer was used to collect the participants' responses and to present the information and stimulus materials to the participants. Participants were informed that they would work together with two other participants on several tasks. They were led to believe that a computer network was established between them and the other team members via which they would collaborate. This type of procedure is regularly used in social psychological (e.g., Cornelis, Van Hiel, & De Cremer, 2006) and organizational research (e.g., Maner & Mead, 2010; Overbeck & Park, 2006) to give participants the feeling that they cooperate in a team setting. Next, participants were informed that the team assignment required one person to be the leader and the others to be subordinates. In reality, all participants were assigned the team leader position, ostensibly based on their answers on a 'leadership ability' questionnaire they completed before the start of the experiment (see e.g., also Hoogervorst, De Cremer, Van Dijke, & Mayer, 2012; Maner & Mead, 2010; Overbeck & Park, 2006 for this leader assignment procedure). They were told that it was their task as a team leader to help the team perform optimally.

Then, to manipulate the moral self-concept, participants were randomly assigned to either the moral or the immoral condition. Participants in the moral condition read: "Please recall a time when you did something moral in the past." Participants in the immoral condition read: "Please recall a time when you did something immoral in the past." In the moral condition, participants described, for instance, situations in which they honestly gave money back that they found or when they opposed a racist group. In the immoral conditions, participants described, for instance, situations in which they were unfaithful to their partner, or when they stole something. Similar methods have been used in both moral compensation (Jordan et al., 2011; Mazar & Zhong, 2010; Sachdeva et al., 2009), and moral consistency studies (Aquino et al., 2009; Reed et al., 2007).

Subsequently, participants completed the cognitive depletion task (taken from Baumeister et al., 1998, Study 4). As noted, depleting participants' cognitive resources is a common way to impair cognitive capacity, which hinders the ability to focus on and strive for long-term goals and causes people to engage in behaviors that are driven by short-term considerations (DeWall et al., 2008; Gino et al., 2011). The cognitive depletion task consists of two parts. The first part is designed to form a strong habitual response by the participants. The second part taxes the cognitive resources of participants by overriding this habitual response (in the cognitive depletion condition) or by continuing the same habitual response (in the no depletion condition). Research on self-control indicates that people need cognitive resources (which could otherwise be used to take a proactive approach towards one's goals) to break a habitual response (Baumeister et al., 1998; Hagger et al., 2010). Thus, for participants in the depletion condition, overriding this habitual response is likely to require more cognitive resources than for participants in the no depletion condition who do not need to override this habitual response. This task has proven successful in manipulating cognitive depletion in a number of studies (see Hagger et al., 2010

for an overview). In the first part of the task, participants were instructed to indicate each instance of the letter e that they saw in a piece of text (i.e., by clicking each e with the computer mouse). Participants received visual feedback whenever they clicked an e (i.e., a highlighted circle around the corresponding e) and were given five minutes to complete the task. This first phase was relatively easy and was used to establish a strong habitual response for scanning and indicating every e. In the second part of the task, participants either continued identifying the e's using the same rule as before (i.e., the no depletion condition), or they were given the instruction to respond to each e, except when the e was followed by a vowel or, when a vowel appeared two letters before the e (i.e., the high depletion condition). After the depletion task, participants were asked to shortly recall the moral or immoral behavior they described earlier.

Then the group task started. This task was used to measure moral behavior (adapted from Maner & Mead, 2010). Participants learned that their team should provide as many correct solutions to a word puzzle as possible. The total number of correct responses would be summed and every correct solution would earn the team points. Participants were told to imagine that every point was worth €1, and that the final number of points would be divided equally among the team members. However, participants were told that there was also an individual bonus for the team member who earned the most points. Next, participants were told that they (as the leader) had the possibility to distribute clues among their team members that would facilitate solving the puzzle. Clues ranged in quality from 1 (*not very helpful*) to 7 (*very helpful*). Participants were given the following example: "We are looking for the word: memory. A level 1 clue would then be: "Ends with a Y." A level 7 clue would then be: "The ability to remember." Next, participants were asked to enter a single clue level (from 1 to 7) for their team members. This task thus allowed us to pit self-interest against prosocial behavior. On the one hand, it was the participant's

responsibility as a leader to maximize team performance, and giving the best clue possible to their team members would optimize team performance. However, giving a low quality clue would increase their own chances of winning the individual bonus. Participants thus faced a trade-off between doing the "right thing" for the team and focusing on their self-interest. After choosing a clue level, participants were debriefed and thanked for their participation.

Manipulation checks. We checked the effectiveness of the cognitive depletion manipulation with "The task was habit-breaking" (taken from DeWall et al., 2008) and "The task was simple" (reversed; taken from Balliet & Joireman, 2010) on a 7-point scale (1 = *totally disagree*; 7 = *totally agree*).

Two independent judges rated the morality of the recalled behaviors on a 7-point scale (1 = *immoral*; 7 = *moral*). The interrater reliability was high (Intraclass correlation coefficient [ICC] = .85) and ratings were averaged to assess the effectiveness of the moral self-concept manipulation.

Helping. The dependent variable was the clue level that the leader offered to the team (1 = *not very helpful*; 7 = *very helpful*).

Results

Manipulation checks. We tested the effectiveness of our manipulations using a 2 (salient self-concept: moral vs. immoral) x 2 (depletion: low vs. high) Analysis of Variance (ANOVA). The results show that, as expected, depleted participants found the depletion task more habit-breaking than non-depleted participants (M = 4.64, SD = 1.70 vs. M = 3.48, SD = 1.34, respectively; $F(1, 68)$ = 9.09, p = .004, η^2 = .12), and considered the task as less simple than non-depleted participants (M = 5.39, SD = .96 vs. M = 3.68, SD = 1.51, respectively; $F(1, 68)$ = 27.68, $p < .001$, η^2 = .29). No other main or interaction effects were significant.

Furthermore, participants in the moral recall condition described more moral behavior than participants in the immoral recall condition (M = 5.35, SD = 1.01 vs.

M = 2.55, *SD* = 1.12, respectively; $F(1, 68) = 111.47$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .58$). No other main or interaction effects were significant.

These analyses indicate that our manipulations of cognitive depletion (depleted versus not depleted) and salient self-concept (i.e., moral versus immoral) were effectively and orthogonally induced, allowing us to test our hypotheses regarding the effects of a moral versus an immoral self-concept upon helping behavior as a function of the level of cognitive depletion.

Helping. Means and standard deviations are presented in Table 1. A 2 (salient self-concept: moral vs. immoral) x 2 (depletion: low vs. high) ANOVA on participants' helping behavior showed no significant main effect of moral self-concept or cognitive depletion. However, the analysis did reveal a significant interaction between cognitive depletion and moral self-concept ($F(1, 68) = 8.80$, $p = .004$, $\eta^2 = .11$; see Figure 1). We conducted simple effects tests to further analyze this interaction. The results show that among non-depleted participants, a salient self-concept as a *moral* person resulted in more helping than an immoral self-concept. However, we found this difference to be only marginal significant ($F(1, 68) = 2.81$, $p = .098$, $\eta^2 = .04$). In contrast, among depleted participants, a salient self-concept as an *im*moral person led to more helping than a moral self-concept ($F(1, 68) = 6.03$, $p = .017$, $\eta^2 = .09$).

Table 1

Helping Behavior of Participants as a Function of Cognitive Depletion and Moral Recall Condition in Study 1

	Moral recall condition			
	Moral		Immoral	
Cognitive depletion condition	M	SD	M	SD
Depletion	3.59_a	1.46	5.00_b	1.27
No depletion	4.61_a	1.23	3.86_b	1.82

Note. Means with different subscripts within each row differ significantly from each other at $p < .05$, with the exception of the moral versus immoral comparison for the no depletion condition, where $p = .098$.



Figure 1. Helping as a function of cognitive depletion and moral recall condition in Study 1

The results above suggest that we found moral consistency and compensation, but they do not inform us about the valence of this behavior. To tentatively assess whether our conditions made participants more prosocial or more selfish than the neutral baseline, we ran some additional analyses (i.e., One-Sample *t*-Tests) in which we tested if our participants significantly deviated from the midpoint of our helping measure. These analyses reveal that non-depleted participants with a salient self-concept as a moral person helped significantly more than the neutral midpoint of our scale ($t(22) = 2.37$, $p = .027$), suggesting more prosocial behavior than the baseline. In contrast, non-depleted participants with a salient self-concept as an immoral person did not differ from this neutral midpoint ($t(20) = -0.36$, $p = .72$), indicating no decreases in prosocial behavior relative to the baseline. Furthermore, depleted participants with a salient self-concept as a moral person did not differ from the neutral midpoint of our scale ($t(16) = -1.16$, $p = .26$), indicating no decreases in prosocial behavior relative to the baseline. In contrast, depleted participants with a salient self-concept as an immoral person helped significantly more than the neutral midpoint of our scale ($t(10) = 2.62$, $p = .026$), indicating more prosocial behavior than the baseline.

Summary

Our findings support our predictions. Participants who were not depleted (i.e., allowing for a proactive, long-term focus on reputation building) showed moral consistency: those recalling moral behavior showed more helping behavior than those recalling immoral behavior. Conversely, participants who were depleted (i.e., making them act more reactively upon reputational concerns) showed moral compensation: those recalling immoral behavior showed more helping behavior than those recalling moral behavior.

The conclusions above do tell us when recalling moral behavior results in more helping than recalling immoral behavior and vice versa. They do not, however,

give us any information about whether we are looking at prosocial or at selfish behavior. Additional analyses show us that participants who were not depleted helped more when recalling moral behavior, but did not help less when recalling immoral behavior relative to the neutral baseline. Furthermore, participants who were depleted helped more when recalling immoral behavior, but did not help less when recalling moral behavior relative to this neutral baseline. This indicates that both a proactive (i.e., no depletion) and a reactive (i.e., depletion) focus are able to increase prosocial behavior for participants recalling moral and immoral behavior, respectively, but that they do not cause an increase in selfish behavior.

Experiment 2

Experiment 2 was conducted for two reasons. A first aim was to replicate the findings of Experiment 1. Our sample size in Experiment 1 was relatively small and could thus potentially have too much inherent variability, which may harm the validity of our findings. Experiment 1 showed that people are more likely to act consistent with their moral self-concept when sufficient cognitive capacity is available, whereas moral compensation prevails when cognitive capacity is limited. These findings support our line of reasoning that people can deal with reputation management in proactive but also in more reactive ways. Ego depletion is a well-established manipulation that makes people act in a more reactive (versus proactive) manner. Yet, showing that a reactive versus proactive approach explains compensation versus consistency does not provide prove that moral consistency and compensation are driven by *reputational* concerns. In Experiment 2, we wanted to provide an explicit test of the relevance of reputational considerations for the process that we set out to study. Therefore, in Experiment 2, we included accountability as a boundary condition. We expected that if moral consistency and compensatory behavior are indeed shaped by reputational concerns, the effect of cognitive

depletion (i.e., moral compensation) versus sufficiently available cognitive resources (i.e., moral consistency) should be found particularly when people are held accountable for their actions. When people are not accountable, reputational concerns do not matter much, leading us to expect little evidence for compensation and consistency in these conditions.

Including accountability as an additional moderator in our design also introduces a useful set of control conditions. We expect that unaccountable participants are not influenced by reputational concerns. That is, their anonymity will make it more likely that they will not worry about the potential consequences of their behavior for their reputation. As such, unaccountable participants provide us with a baseline of helping behavior (i.e., that is not influenced by any reputational concerns). This baseline then allows us to test whether consistency is driven particularly by people who want to act consistent with their salient moral self, or (also) by people who want to act consistent with their salient immoral self. For compensation processes, these baseline conditions allow us to test whether reactive people are likely to compensate for a lack of morality, and / or whether they are also likely to feel licensed to act in less moral ways whey they feel moral.

Because of our explicit focus on the role of accountability in Study 2, we changed one aspect of the procedure. As part of the procedure taken from Maner and Mead (2010), we assigned all our participants in Experiment 1 as team leaders who were responsible for the optimal performance of the team they were leading. Regretfully, research is unclear about how the leadership role relates to accountability. On the one hand, leaders are expected to focus on the collective interests and goals (Van Vugt, Hogan, & Kaiser, 2008), and research shows that they do so more than regular team members (Overbeck & Park, 2001, 2006), thus suggesting that accountability can be intrinsic to the leadership role. On the other hand, other research indicates that at least high power leaders need to be held

accountable in order to refrain from acting in self-serving ways (Rus, Van Knippenberg, & Wisse, 2012). Because of this unclear state of affairs regarding the relationship between leadership and accountability, we assigned all our participants in Experiment 2 to the role of regular team member without any reference to the team requiring a leader. This focus on regular team members also makes it possible to generalize our findings beyond the leadership role to people who function as part of social collectives in general.

Method

Participants and design. One-hundred and forty-nine undergraduate students (101 females; M_{age} = 19.72; *SD* = 2.52) participated in this study for course credit. They were randomly assigned to one condition of a 2 (salient self-concept: moral vs. immoral) x 2 (depletion: low vs. high) x 2 (accountability: low vs. high) between-subjects design.

Procedure. We slightly adapted the procedure used in Experiment 1, such that no reference was made to team leaders and all participants were in the role of regular team members. After completing the moral self-concept and depletion manipulations, participants learned that they were chosen to distribute a clue to their team, which would facilitate solving the puzzle. To manipulate accountability, we relied on a common accountability manipulation (De Cremer & Van Dijk, 2009; De Kwaadsteniet, Van Dijk, Wit, De Cremer, & De Rooij, 2007; Tetlock, Skitka, & Boettger, 1989). Participants learned that "the clue assignments are visible to both the experimenter and the other team members", or that "the clue assignments are anonymous, both the experimenter and your team members will not know which clue assignments you chose".

Manipulation checks. We checked the cognitive depletion manipulation with "The task was habit-breaking" (taken from DeWall et al., 2008) and "The task was difficult" (taken from Balliet & Joireman, 2010) on a 7-point scale (1 = *totally*

disagree; 7 = *totally agree*). To check the moral self-concept manipulation, two independent coders rated the recalled behaviors on a 7-point scale (1 = *immoral*; 7 = *moral*). Interrater reliability was high (ICC = .92) and ratings were averaged to form a measure of morality. Additionally, we asked participants how they considered the behavior they described on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 *(bad)* to 7 *(good)*.

Helping. We again used the clue level that participants offered to the team as an index of helping behavior (1 = *not very helpful*; 7 = *very helpful)*.

Results

Manipulation checks. We tested the effectiveness of our manipulations using a 2 (salient self-concept: moral vs. immoral) x 2 (depletion: low vs. high) x 2 (accountability: low vs. high) ANOVA. The results show that depleted participants judged the depletion task as more habit-breaking than participants in the no depletion condition (M = 4.94, SD = 1.48 vs. M = 3.95, SD = 1.64, respectively), $F(1, 141) = 12.67$, $p = .001$, $\eta^2 = .08$. Furthermore, depleted participants experienced greater difficulty than non-depleted participants (M = 4.74, SD = 1.71 vs. M = 3.70, SD = 1.51, respectively), $F(1, 141) = 13.54$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .09$. No other main or interaction effects were significant.

Participants described more moral behaviors in the moral recall condition than in the immoral recall condition (M = 5.60, SD = 0.46 vs. M = 2.55, SD = 0.67, respectively), $F(1, 141) = 1027.01$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .85$. Additionally, participants in the moral recall condition rated their own behavior as more 'good' than participants in the immoral recall condition (M = 6.18, SD = .75 vs. M = 2.53, SD = 1.11, respectively), $F(1, 141) = 528.54$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .77$. No other main or interaction effects were significant.

Helping. Means and standard deviations for each condition are presented in Table 2. A 2 (salient self-concept: moral vs. immoral) x 2 (depletion: low vs. high) x 2 (accountability: low vs. high) ANOVA on participants' helping behavior revealed

a significant main effect of accountability ($F(1, 141) = 5.64$, $p = .019$, $\eta^2 = .04$). Not surprisingly, accountable participants helped more than non-accountable participants ($M = 4.50$, $SD = 1.81$ vs. $M = 3.75$, $SD = 2.04$, respectively). More importantly, and analogous to Experiment 1, a significant interaction emerged between depletion and moral self-concept ($F(1, 141) = 5.20$, $p = .024$, $\eta^2 = .03$). This interaction was qualified by the predicted three-way interaction ($F(1, 141) = 4.02$, $p = .047$, $\eta^2 = .03$).

Table 2

Helping Behavior of Accountable and Non-Accountable Participants as a Function of Cognitive Depletion and Moral Recall Condition in Study 2

		Moral recall condition			
		Moral		Immoral	
	Cognitive depletion condition	M	SD	M	SD
Accountable condition	Depletion	3.63_a	1.82	5.36_b	1.69
	No depletion	5.00_a	1.97	4.00_b	1.16
Non-accountable condition	Depletion	3.56_a	2.23	3.71_a	2.26
	No depletion	3.85_a	2.01	3.83_a	1.81

Note. Means with different subscripts within each row differ significantly from each other at $p < .05$, with the exception of the moral versus immoral comparison for the no depletion condition, where $p = .086$.

For non-accountable participants, the interaction between depletion and moral self-concept was non-significant ($F(1, 79) = 0.04$, $p = .85$, $\eta^2 = .00$; see Figure 2). Simple effects tests showed that non-accountable participants with a moral self-concept did not help more or less than non-accountable participants with an immoral self-concept, whether they were depleted ($F(1, 79) = 0.06$, $p = .81$, $\eta^2 = .00$), or not ($F(1, 79) = 0.00$, $p = .98$, $\eta^2 = .00$). Moreover, One-Sample *t*-Tests showed that unaccountable participants did not show more or less prosocial behavior than the neutral midpoint of our helping scale. Neither for depleted participants, regardless of whether they had a moral or an immoral self-concept ($t(17) = -0.85$, $p = .41$ vs. $t(20) = -0.58$, $p = .57$, respectively), nor for non-depleted participants, regardless of whether they had a moral or an immoral self-concept ($t(19) = -0.33$, $p = .74$ vs. $t(23) = -0.45$, $p = .66$, respectively). This thus suggests that the midpoint of our scale forms a useful baseline for helping behavior.



Figure 2. Helping as a function of cognitive depletion and moral recall condition for accountable and non-accountable participants in Study 2

For accountable participants, the interaction between cognitive depletion and moral self-concept was significant ($F(1, 62) = 10.38$, $p = .002$, $\eta^2 = .14$; see Figure 2). Simple effect tests showed that for accountable participants who were not depleted, a *moral* self-concept led to more helping than an immoral self-concept. However, we found this difference to be only marginally significant ($F(1, 62) = 3.05$, $p = .086$, $\eta^2 = .05$). Moreover, One-sample *t*-Tests showed that accountable, non-depleted participants with a salient self-concept as a moral person helped significantly more than the neutral midpoint of our scale ($t(19) = 2.27$, $p = .035$), indicating more prosocial behavior than the baseline. In contrast, accountable, non-depleted participants with a salient self-concept as an immoral person did not differ from this neutral midpoint ($t(15) = 0.00$, $p = 1.00$), indicating no increase or decrease in prosocial behavior relative to the baseline.

In contrast, for accountable participants who were depleted, simple effects tests showed that an *im*moral self-concept led to more helping than a moral self-concept ($F(1, 62) = 7.68$, $p = .007$, $\eta^2 = .12$). Additional One-Sample *t*-Tests showed that accountable, depleted participants with a salient self-concept as a moral person did not differ from the neutral midpoint of our scale ($t(15) = -0.82$, $p = .42$), indicating no increase or decrease in prosocial behavior relative to the baseline. In contrast, accountable, depleted participants with a salient self-concept as an immoral person helped significantly more than the neutral midpoint of our scale ($t(13) = 3.00$, $p = .010$), indicating more prosocial behavior than the baseline.

These results indicate that our effects in the accountable condition are mainly driven by the moral condition for participants who are not depleted, and by the immoral condition for participants who are depleted. That is, for accountable participants who are not depleted, recalling moral behavior increases prosocial behavior relative to the baseline, but recalling immoral behavior does not decrease prosocial behavior. In contrast, for accountable participants who are depleted,

recalling moral behavior does not decrease prosocial behavior relative to the baseline, but recalling immoral behavior does increase prosocial behavior.

Summary

Our findings support our predictions. Like in Study 1, participants who were not depleted (i.e., taking a proactive approach) showed moral consistency: those recalling moral behavior showed more helping behavior than those recalling immoral behavior. Yet, this effect was only found among accountable participants. Non-depleted participants who were not accountable showed no moral consistency, indicating that the proactive approach that these participants displayed reflects reputational concerns. Depleted participants (i.e., taking a reactive approach) showed moral compensation: those recalling immoral behavior showed more helping behavior than those recalling moral behavior. Yet, again, this compensation effect was also restricted to accountable participants. This indicates that moral compensation also derives from reputational concerns, but this time of a reactive kind.

As expected, participants who were not accountable did not show moral consistency or compensation effects at all. In fact, their responses never significantly differed from the neutral scale midpoint. Accountable participants, on the other hand, showed more helping behavior than this neutral baseline in two conditions: when focusing on proactive, long-term reputational considerations (i.e., no depletion) and feeling moral (i.e., moral consistency), and when focusing on reactive, short-term reputational considerations (i.e., depletion) and feeling immoral (i.e., moral compensation). In the other two conditions, helping behavior did not differ from this baseline. Our results suggest that helping behavior does not decrease in any of our accountable conditions, which indicates that our participants do not get less prosocial (vs. the baseline in the unaccountable conditions). Thus we do not find any evidence for immoral consistency or moral licensing.

General Discussion

This research integrates two lines of research on moral self-regulation that have generated opposing findings, while relying on similar manipulations and measures of morality. On the one hand, people with a salient self-definition as a *moral* person have been shown to display more moral behavior than people for whom this self-concept is not salient or who view themselves as immoral (i.e., revealing consistency between the self-concept and behavior). On the other hand, research shows that people with a salient self-definition as an *im*moral person show more moral behavior than people for whom this self-concept is not salient or who view themselves as moral (i.e., revealing moral compensation and licensing). We tried to join these two literatures by focusing on which perspective people take: a proactive approach (i.e., in this case because they have sufficient cognitive resources at their disposal) or a more reactive approach (i.e., in this case because they were cognitively depleted). Furthermore, our results indicate that moral consistency and moral compensation processes only emerge under conditions of accountability. In the following sections, we discuss the implications and limitations of this research.

Theoretical and Practical Implications

Our results strongly suggest that whether consistency or compensation prevails is a function of the perspective that participants take: whether they take a reactive approach to reputation management or a more proactive approach. That is, we argued that moral compensation forms a reactive, "damage control" response in social situations, whereas moral consistency implies a more proactive approach to reputation building and maintenance. Furthermore, by including accountability as a boundary condition to this effect we provided support for an important assumption of our argument. To understand when moral compensation or, conversely, consistency will occur, it is important to realize that these effects are at least partly driven by reputational concerns, and not only by de-contextualized moral

considerations. Obviously, this finding is very different from earlier research that tried to integrate moral consistency and compensation by using construal level theory (Conway & Peetz, 2012). Construal level theory explains how the psychological distance of events can influence abstract and concrete thinking (Trope & Liberman, 2010). Distant events are conceptualized in an abstract way, whereas recent events are conceptualized concretely. We extent and improve this approach by showing that moral consistency and compensation do not reflect mere abstract moral considerations, but that they occur in a social context.

The claim that compensation and consistency should be considered as occurring in a social context is further strengthened by our results for the role of accountability that indicate that reputational considerations clearly play a role in both consistency and compensation processes. Importantly, both literatures have suggested that reputational concerns are relevant to the display of moral behavior (Miller & Effron, 2010; Reed et al., 2007). However, no earlier research has integrated moral consistency and moral compensation processes by focusing on differences in reputation management. Our results strongly suggest that moral compensation forms a reactive, "damage control" response in social situations, whereas moral consistency implies a more proactive approach to reputation building and maintenance. Moreover, our research suggests that people can deal with reputation management in proactive but also in more reactive ways.

Our research also provides a fresh perspective on how (lack of) self-control resources relates to selfishness. Prior work has often claimed that a lack of resources straightforwardly leads to selfishness (Baumeister & Exline, 1999; Mead, Baumeister, Gino, Schweitzer, & Ariely, 2009; Shalvi, Eldar, & Bereby-Meyer, 2012). Research supporting this idea shows that depletion can result in less moral behavior (DeWall et al, 2008) and more immoral behavior (DeWall, Baumeister, Stillman, & Gailliot, 2007; Gino et al, 2011; Mead et al, 2009). Yet, there is also

research showing that morality is not by definition effortful, but some types of morality are in fact driven by automatic processes (Greene, Morelli, Lowenberg, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2008). Hence, a lack of cognitive resources does not necessarily lead to immoral behavior. It has been shown, for instance, that depletion does not cause selfishness for people with internalized moral values (Gino et al., 2011), for people with a clear dispositional prosocial orientation (Balliet & Joireman, 2010), or for people who consumed a glucose drink (Gailliot et al., 2007). In fact, research by Zhong (2011) shows that deliberative decision making (comparable to a situation where people are not depleted) can lead to more unethical behavior than intuitive decision making (i.e., comparable to a situation where people lack resources). We argue that a lack of resources hinders the ability to take a proactive approach and thus to focus on and strive for long-term goals, causing people to engage in behaviors that are driven more by reactive strategies (DeWall et al., 2008; Gino et al., 2011). This reactive, short-term outlook may induce selfish behavior, because it implies a failure to see the long-term benefits of moral behavior. Yet, at the same time, our findings show that a short-term focus may also make people more moral, if they are focused on damage control (i.e., a direct response to a salient self-concept as an immoral person). Earlier research studying the effects of self-control on moral behavior often focused on variables that were not particularly relevant for damage control and reputation management (e.g., presumed undetectable cheating).

We used the term moral compensation to refer to the process by which people with a salient self-concept as an immoral person display more pro-social behavior than people with a salient self-concept as a moral person. However, this does not tell us whether our results are caused by moral compensation (i.e., people who feel immoral compensate by showing more moral behavior), by moral licensing (i.e., people who feel moral feel licensed to act less moral), or that perhaps both processes are involved. Most prior research remains silent about whether their

effects reflect compensation or licensing (see Sachdeva et al., 2009, for a noteworthy exception). Importantly, the accountability manipulation in Study 2, besides enabling us to test our idea that moral behavior rests on reputational concerns, provides us with a baseline condition of helping behavior. Our results indicate that accountable participants who feel moral and are not depleted, and those who feel immoral and are depleted are both more helpful than the baseline set by participants in the unaccountable conditions. Importantly, however, accountable participants who feel immoral and are not depleted, and those who feel moral and are depleted do not show less prosocial behavior (i.e., more selfish behavior) than this baseline. A possible reason for this is that consistently behaving selfish may be damaging to one's self-concept and reputation. Therefore, they level to some optimal, baseline level of moral behavior. Likewise, moral compensation is arguably sending a much more disturbing signal to one's reputational concerns (i.e., "I am such a bad person, I should make up") than moral licensing (i.e., "I am such a good person, maybe I can slack off now").

From a practical perspective, it is important to note that organizations often install procedures that make employees (and managers) more accountable in order to decrease immoral, selfish, or deviant behaviors (Beu & Buckley, 2001; Petrick & Quinn, 2001). Our findings of Study 2 connect well with this idea in showing a main effect of accountability on helping behavior. Moreover, in line with some prior work, our research also shows that accountability not simply makes people act in more desirable ways (i.e., leading to a main effect of accountability on moral behavior, such as the one that we also obtained), but also leads to a stronger focus on their own behavior and psychological processes (i.e., leading to the three-way interaction that we were primarily interested in in the present study). However, our results suggest that accountability only increases prosocial behavior dependent on the context. Moreover, in some cases, accountable people may be similarly helpful

as unaccountable people. Thus it is important that organizations realize that, in some situations, making employees more accountable may not be an effective strategy in reducing selfish behavior.

For organizations, it is important to note that strategies aimed at stimulating prosocial employee behavior (e.g., stimulating a clear ethical climate or ensuring that managers behave in ethical ways; Martin & Cullen, 2006; Mayer, Kuenzi, Greenbaum, Bardes, & Salvador, 2009; Mayer, Kuenzi, & Greenbaum, 2010) will not necessarily lead to more prosocial behavior. The present results suggest that when employees take a reactive approach to reputational concerns (e.g., while cognitively depleted), feeling moral may not be effective in promoting prosocial behavior. Importantly, various causes of cognitive depletion are omnipresent in organizations, such as decision-making (Vohs et al., 2008) and lack of sleep (Barnes, Schaubroeck, Huth, & Ghumman, 2011). It is thus important to make employees aware of this potential subversion. Furthermore, as research has shown that rest can replenish cognitive resources (Baumeister, Muraven, & Tice, 2000), strategies aimed at stimulating morality should preferably be implemented after a period of rest.

Strengths, Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research

We realize that the external validity of our findings need to be further established, because we tested our predictions in a single laboratory context and relied on priming procedures and cognitive depletion tasks to manipulate the salience of people's self-views and their proactive versus reactive approach in dealing with reputational concerns. Our primary aim was to make a first attempt to arrive at a theoretical integration of two streams of behavioral ethics research, which should improve our understanding of the processes that shape ethical behavior. However, different methods (e.g., field research) have to be employed to assess the robustness and broader implications of our findings (Ellemers, 2013). Consequently, a possible avenue for future research lies in combining different research methods

and employing different ways to manipulate (or measure) a proactive versus reactive approach to reputational concerns. It is interesting to note that studies have shown that cognitive depletion in a work context can result in more deviant behaviors among employees (e.g., Barnes et al., 2011). Furthermore, research also clearly indicates that people's salient self-concept regarding their morality influences their behavior in organizational contexts (see Shao, Aquino, & Freeman, 2008 for an overview).

In this respect it is also important to note that the sample sizes in both Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 are relatively small and that this could potentially harm the validity of our results. We did however replicate the findings of Experiment 1 in Experiment 2, which reinforces the reliability and validity of our results. However, even though we believe that our results are valid and reliable, replications in different settings are necessary to further prove the validity of our findings.

We relied on a well-established regulatory depletion manipulation as a way to stimulate people to take a reactive versus proactive approach to reputation management. Our reliance on this manipulation should not be taken as a suggestion that in prior research that revealed moral compensation or licensing effects participants were always ego depleted. Regulatory depletion is just one way to make participants take a reactive approach and it is likely that other elements of the procedure of a study can induce such a focus. Furthermore, there are also stable individual differences between people in the extent to which they are able to take a more proactive approach to reputation management (Rusbult & Van Lange, 2003). Future research should test explicitly for the relevance of various individual and situational factors that induce a proactive versus reactive approach in understanding consistency and compensation effects in moral decision making and action.

Future research may also focus on potential mediating variables that explain in greater detail the emergence of moral consistency and moral compensation. In this research, we decided to take a moderator approach because we were particularly interested in testing the idea that reputational concerns explain why people compensate or are consistent with their moral values. A moderator approach (i.e., focusing on theoretically relevant boundary conditions to an effect) is just as valid as a mediator approach (i.e., focusing on theoretically relevant intervening variables of an effect) to study processes underlying an effect (see e.g., Spencer, Zanna, & Fong, 2005). A promising avenue for future research would be to focus on the type of reputational concerns (i.e., proactive, long-term versus reactive) as a possible underlying process that plays a role in the emergence of both moral consistency and moral compensation.

One limitation of this research that should be mentioned is the skewed gender distribution in our samples. The majority of our participants were female, which may pose potential problems to the validity of our results. Common belief is that women are less selfish than men (Balliet, Macfarlan, & Van Vugt, 2011; Eckel & Grossman, 1998). Since our task was designed to foster helping behavior among team members, it could be that the specific characteristics in our task favored female helping. However, we expect that a general tendency for women to help does not affect the validity of our conclusions. That is, we expect no gender differences in moral consistency or moral compensation. Thus, a general tendency to help does not explain variations in helping behavior among people with a salient self-concept as a moral or immoral person. It is in this respect noteworthy that (to our knowledge) previous studies investigating moral consistency or moral compensation with more balanced samples in terms of gender did not report gender effects.

A final relevant issue to be discussed here is that the results of both Study 1 and Study 2 suggest that compensation effects are more robust and easier to detect

than consistency effects. One reason for this may be found in our procedure. The teams in our study were newly formed which might curb long-term reputation management concerns. Yet, this focus does not limit generalizations that can be inferred from the present research, because many encounters in economic and business settings are with people with whom we have weak, rather than strong relationships (Granovetter, 1995; Kim, Dirks, Cooper, & Ferrin, 2006) In fact, in line with our findings, it has been noted that a proactive, long-term focus to reputation management may be present in newly formed relationships (Kim et al., 2006; Meyerson, Weick, & Kramer, 1996). However, future research should address whether consistency effects are stronger and easier to detect in longer functioning groups and teams.

Concluding Remarks

The present research integrates two seemingly opposing literatures. Research on moral compensation shows that people with a salient self-concept as an immoral person show more prosocial behavior than people with a salient self-concept as a moral person. Conversely, research on moral consistency indicates that people with a salient self-concept as a moral person show more prosocial behavior than people with a salient self-concept as an immoral person. We integrate these two literatures by focusing on differences in reputation management. Our results strongly suggest that moral compensation forms a reactive, "damage control" response in social situations, whereas moral consistency implies a more proactive approach to reputation building and maintenance. It thus seems that reputational concerns are important for both moral compensation and moral consistency processes, and that which of these two prevails depends on the perspective that people take: a reactive or a proactive approach.

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Chapter 5

Insecurity breeds negativity: Synergetic effects of employee and leader neuroticism on abusive supervision and antisocial work behavior

Abstract

Relying on trait activation theory (Tett & Burnett, 2003) we investigated whether particularly higher (vs. lower) neurotic leaders respond with abusive supervision to social exclusion cues communicated by higher (vs. lower) neurotic employees. As a consequence, we also expected leader neuroticism and employee neuroticism to interactively predict elevated levels of antisocial employee behavior, via the mediating mechanism of abusive supervision. Our predictions were supported across two studies. In an experiment (Study 1) we first showed that higher (vs. lower) neurotic employees signal more social exclusion cues to their leader. In a multi-source field study (Study 2), we then revealed support for our full model including the effects on abusive supervision and antisocial employee behavior. Our research provides the first theoretically grounded and empirically verified introduction of neuroticism in the abusive supervision literature.

This chapter is based on Joosten, A., van Dijke, M., De Cremer, D., Bostyn, D. H., & Van Hiel, A. Insecurity breeds negativity: Synergetic effects of employee and leader neuroticism on abusive supervision and antisocial work behavior. *Manuscript submitted for publication.*

Introduction

Some of the most aversive experiences of organization members emerge when their leader ignores, humiliates, or intimidates them (e.g., Bies & Tripp, 1998). Abusive supervision is defined as "subordinates' perceptions of the extent to which supervisors engage in the sustained display of hostile verbal and nonverbal behaviors, excluding physical contact" (Tepper, 2000, p. 178). Its emergence presents a potent challenge to organizations. No less than 13.6 percent of U.S. employees are confronted with an abusive leader (Schat, Frone, & Kelloway, 2006), and abusive supervision is associated with decreased employee well-being and performance, and increased antisocial behaviors (see Martinko, Harvey, Brees, & Mackey, 2013; Tepper, 2007, for overviews).

To date, most research has examined consequences of abusive supervision. However, more recent studies have also started to zoom in on its antecedents (Martinko et al., 2013). The latter studies operationalized these antecedents as characteristics of the social context, including the mistreatment that leaders themselves experience from their own superiors (Aryee, Chen, Sun, & Debrah, 2007; Hoobler & Hu, 2013), and the influence of underperforming or deviant subordinates (Liang et al., in press; Tepper, Moss, & Duffy, 2011). Importantly, this research trend as such signals that leader characteristics as antecedents of abusive leadership have been largely ignored so far. Leadership constitutes a dynamic interaction between characteristics of the leader and his/her social context (i.e., employees; van Knippenberg & Hogg, 2003). Therefore, the next step to take to increase our understanding of why (and thus also when) leaders display abusive supervision, is to study characteristics of the leader in interaction with employee characteristics.

In line with suggestions of Judge and Long (2012), we apply a characteristic matching approach in which we examine the situation where a specific trait of the

leader coincides with a relevant trait of the employee. Specifically, we address the question how *neuroticism* of both the leader and of the employee interactively shape abusive supervision. And, we test if this interactive effect has more distal downstream consequences for antisocial employee behavior. To study these questions we rely on trait activation theory (TAT; Tett & Burnett, 2003). Neuroticism is associated with social insecurity and ego-fragility, encompassing an excessive self-focus on aversive emotional states like anxiety (e.g., Judge, Erez, Bono, & Thoresen, 2003). This elicits a chronic tendency for individuals higher (vs. lower) in neuroticism to be responsive to social threats (e.g., Denissen & Penke, 2008; Matthews, 2004). Also, it makes that neurotic individuals can act in ways that are socially disturbing by signaling social exclusion (e.g., Morse, Sauerberger, Todd, & Funder, 2015). Therefore, we predict that higher (vs. lower) neurotic employees communicate social exclusion cues, and that higher (vs. lower) neurotic leaders are particularly likely to respond by displaying abusive supervision. This should, in turn, have downstream consequences for antisocial employee behavior (see Figure 1 for a visual representation of our model).



Figure 1. Proposed model of the relationship between leader neuroticism, abusive supervision, and antisocial employee behavior. LR indicates that the variable was reported by leaders; ER indicates that the variable was reported by employees.

Our research makes three contributions. First, of the fundamental dimensions of the influential Five-Factor Model of personality (Costa & McCrae, 1992), theoretical accounts have suggested that neuroticism may be an important antecedent of abusive supervision (Tepper, 2007). Despite this interesting assertion, to date only one paper – that we are aware of – has looked at the role of leader neuroticism in relationship to abusive leadership (Courtright, Gardner, Smith, McCormick, & Colbert, in press). This study included leader neuroticism as control variable and revealed inconclusive evidence regarding the relationship between leader neuroticism and abusive supervision. For this reason, we test in a more direct and theoretically meaningful way – by adopting a trait activation lens – whether and in what way neuroticism relates to abusive supervision. Second, we decided to have the leader's trait match the trait of the employee to arrive at a better understanding of how abusive supervision emerges and results in antisocial employee behavior. As far as we know, no study to date has included neuroticism of one party as a moderator variable for the effects of neuroticism of another party. This trait matching approach is also helpful to investigate more accurately the processes underlying the leader-employee interaction. Indeed, our research contributes to the abusive supervision literature by showing that employees higher in neuroticism radiate social exclusion cues, which activates leaders higher (vs. lower) in neuroticism to display abusive leadership. By showing that neurotic employees are socially excluding others and that neurotic leaders are more concerned and responsive to such social approval cues we provide first evidence that social exclusion and neuroticism in leadership situations are related in two unique ways. A third contribution of our research is that it integrates the earlier research approach on abusive supervision which focuses on the consequences of abusive supervision with the more recent approach focusing on the antecedents of this leadership type. Our research is thus the first – at least to our knowledge – to provide a more complete picture of how abusive supervision

emerges and in turn affects the antisocial work behavior of the employee.

Leader Neuroticism and Abusive Supervision

Tepper (2007, p. 281) proposed that "supervisors who are high in neuroticism experience greater anger, frustration, and impulsiveness compared with their low-neuroticism counterparts (Costa and McCrae, 1992), and consequently, neuroticism should be positively related to abusive supervision." Some indirect support for this theoretical assertion is provided by Hoobler and Hu (2013) showing that state negative affect – regarded as a theoretical proxy of neuroticism – is positively associated with leaders' abusive supervision. One important reason to expect a positive relationship between leader neuroticism and abusive supervision is that individuals scoring higher on neuroticism show an increased sensitivity to social threats (Matthews, 2004). Neuroticism involves insecurity about the self, making higher (vs. lower) neurotic individuals scan their environment for possible sources of threat to their fragile self (Gray, 1991).

Important to our line of reasoning is that the self of leaders is very much defined in social ways (in relationship to their employees; van Knippenberg & Hogg, 2003) and therefore neurotic leaders should be especially sensitive to the experience of negative emotions when not being socially valued (Denissen & Penke, 2008; Leary & Springer, 2001). Neurotic leaders can thus be expected to be sensitive to exclusion cues in their relationship with employees. All of this should translate in the display of abusive supervision. Indeed, for humans, violations of their social standing lead to reciprocity in kind, as demonstrated by research that social exclusion cues have a strong and direct effect on displays of aggressive behavior (Buckley, Winkel, & Leary, 2004; Leary & Springer, 2001; Twenge, Baumeister, Tice, & Stucke, 2001); an act that has been linked to the emergence of abusive leadership (Liang et al, in press).

In line with the above, we therefore need to examine carefully how the

context of the leader activates concerns about social exclusion, which subsequently may facilitate the emergence of abusive supervision. An important context-specific variable is the trait of the employee the leader interacts with. This approach is consistent with TAT tenets (Tett & Brunett, 2003), highlighting the role of situational cues (in our case employee neuroticism) in activating the impact of leader traits (in our case leader neuroticism) on abusive supervision.

Trait Activation, Employee Neuroticism, and Abusive Supervision

According to TAT (Tett & Burnett, 2003), activation of traits and their influence on behavior is contingent upon the availability of trait-relevant cues in the social context. Put differently, TAT proposes that a situation may 'bring out' particular traits if a thematic connection exists between the situation and the individual's trait (Judge & Zapata, 2015). Interesting to the present research is that Tett and Burnett (2003, p. 502) noted that "a situation is relevant to a trait if it is thematically connected by the provision of cues … which … indicate a person's standing on the trait." As mentioned earlier, neurotic leaders are responsive and vigilant to information relevant to their social standing and acceptance and a meaningful context that communicates such social cues concerns their employees (van Knippenberg & Hogg, 2003). We thus argue that employees and their corresponding traits can be considered diagnostic cues to assess signals of social exclusion. Why?

Because of their experienced insecurity, higher (versus lower) scoring neurotics will scan their environment for ego threats, but this process reflects a rather superficial interest in others as it primarily aims to bolster and protect the insecure self. Employees higher (versus lower) in neuroticism will therefore be too self-centered to show genuine interest in other people. Some research provides indirect evidence for this argument. Higher (vs. lower) neuroticism has, for example, been related to a number of poor social outcomes, like relationship dissatisfaction

(Finn, Mitte, & Neyer, 2013), a lack of closeness (Berry & Hansen, 1996), and less concern with others (Van Hiel, Mervielde, & De Fruyt, 2006), and particularly relevant to the present purposes, the display of less positive behavior in social interactions (Morse et al., 2015) and interpersonal withdrawal (Ormel et al., 2013). This argument leads to the following hypothesis:

> *Higher (vs. lower) neurotic employees communicate cues of social exclusion* (H1).

Further developing this argument, we postulate that a higher (vs. lower) neurotic employee represents a situation that is thematically connected in light of social exclusion cues to leader neuroticism, which, in line with TAT's tenets, will activate the neuroticism trait of leaders. For this reason, we suggest that leader's level of neuroticism will predict the display of abusive supervision when employees are higher (vs lower) in neuroticism:

> *Leader and employee neuroticism interact to predict abusive supervision such that the positive relationship between leader neuroticism and abusive supervision is stronger when employee neuroticism is higher (vs. lower)* (H2).

Furthermore, we argue that the social exclusion cues communicated by higher (vs. lower) neurotic employees underlie the interactive effect predicted in H2 as those cues are particularly likely to trigger the sensitive threat-monitoring system of neurotic leaders (Denissen & Penke, 2008). Higher (vs. lower) neurotic individuals are particularly sensitive to exclusion (Downey & Feldman, 1996; Downey, Feldman, & Ayduk, 2000), and those with higher levels of neuroticism are more likely to feel anxious when they become concerned about social acceptance

(Leary & Kowalski, 1993). Interestingly, Denissen and Penke (2008) provided direct evidence for the argument that neuroticism refers to "differences in … activation … when faced with cues of social exclusion" (p. 1285). In line with these insights, we hypothesize the following:

> *Employees' social exclusion cues explain the moderating role of employee neuroticism in the relationship between leader neuroticism and abusive supervision. As such, leader neuroticism and social exclusion cues will interact to predict abusive supervision such that the positive relationship between leader neuroticism and abusive supervision is stronger when social exclusion cues are higher (vs. lower)* (H3).

As we noted earlier, we aim to show not only how abusive supervision emerges but also how, in turn, it reveals negative consequences. Prior research has indicated that the display of abusive supervision leads to negative employee behaviors, most notably deviant and antisocial actions (Martinko et al., 2013; Tepper et al., 2009; Tepper, Henle, Lambert, Giacalone, & Duffy, 2008). Antisocial work behavior encompasses a diversity of behaviors that violate organizational norms and can harm an organization and/or its members (Robinson & O'Leary-Kelly, 1998). This relationship between abusive supervision and antisocial employee behavior suggests, in line with our prior hypotheses, that the leader neuroticism interaction with employee's cues of social exclusion should indirectly predict antisocial work behavior via the mechanism of abusive supervision.

Higher (vs. lower) leader neuroticism is positively related to antisocial employee behavior via the mediating mechanism of abusive supervision. However, this effect will be a function of employee's cues of social exclusion because stronger

cues of employee's social exclusion will strengthen the path from leader neuroticism to abusive supervision (H4).

Study 1

Our argument about the role of employee neuroticism strengthening the effect of leader neuroticism on abusive supervision assumes that neurotic employees represent cues of social exclusion (H1). We designed Study 1 as a direct test of this core assumption.

Method

Sample. We recruited 102 U.S. participants via Amazon Mechanical Turk and paid them $0.50. We introduced the study as being about ''work and behavior'. Inclusion criteria stated that participants be employed in an organization (i.e., not self-employed) and have a supervisory role. Based on criteria explained below (see: Attention checks), we excluded 19 participants from the analyses. Including these participants in the analyses did not alter the direction or significance of any of the results reported below. Of the 83 remaining participants, 51 were male and 32 were female. The mean age was 37.5 years (*SD* = 12.6). Participants worked on average for 8.0 years (*SD* = 6.1) in their current organization and for 5.7 years (*SD* = 5.7) in their current job.

Design and procedure. We assigned participants on a random basis to one of two levels of the employee neuroticism factor (high vs. low). We asked participants to carefully read a personality profile, taking one of their employees in mind who fitted best this description. We based these personality profiles upon the items of the Neuroticism scale of the NEO Five Factor Inventory. Our descriptions thus represent core elements of neuroticism (Costa & McCrae, 1992). Participants in the high (*low*) neurotic employee condition read the following description: "He or she is (*not*) easily stressed out and (*not*) easily discouraged. You can tell that he or

she does not (*does*) feel good about him/herself and that he/she sees the future in dark (*bright*) colors. Furthermore, he/she cannot (*can*) tolerate a lot and does (*not*) often react overly sensitively." Next, we assessed manipulation and attention checks, and social exclusion cues.

Attention checks. To check for random responding we included two items, taken from Jones and Paulhus (2014). We excluded participants who did not agree with "I breathe oxygen each day" or who did not disagree with "I was born in Pago-Pago" (N = 19) from our analyses.

Manipulation check. Responses for all our measures were indicated on a 5-point scale (1 = *strongly disagree*; 5 = *strongly agree*). We assessed whether leaders considered their employee neurotic with the 4-item Neuroticism scale of the Mini-IPIP (a brief version of the International Personality Item Pool), developed and validated by Donnellan et al. (2006). The IPIP has been used successfully for other-ratings in past research (e.g., Kluemper, McLarty, & Bing, 2015). Leaders indicated, for instance, if their employee "has frequent mood swings" and "is relaxed most of the time" (reverse-coded) (α = .90).

Social exclusion cues. We measured the employee's cues of social exclusion using Leary et al.'s (1995) 3-item exclusion scale, which we adapted to leader-employee relationships; "this employee avoids or rejects me", "I cannot turn to this employee in times of need", and "this employee does not accept me" (α = .78).

Results and Conclusion

An independent samples t-test indicated that leaders in the low neurotic employee condition perceived their employee as less neurotic, M = 2.11, SD = 0.80, than leaders in the high neurotic employee condition, M = 3.81, SD = 0.72, $t(81)$ = -10.08, $p < .001$.

In support of our H1, an independent samples t-test showed that a lower

neurotic employee signaled less social exclusion cues, $M = 1.86$, $SD = 0.75$, than a higher neurotic employee, $M = 2.68$, $SD = 0.75$, $t(81) = -5.03$, $p < .001$.

Study 2

The aim of Study 2 was to test the full model depicted in Figure 1 in a multi-source field study. As in Study 1, we tested if higher (vs. lower) neurotic employees signal stronger cues of social exclusion (H1). Furthermore, we tested if higher (vs. lower) leader neuroticism predicts heightened abusive supervision particularly when the employee is also higher in neuroticism (H2), and whether the moderating role of employee neuroticism is explained by employee's cues of social exclusion (H3). Finally, we tested if leader neuroticism, via the mechanism of abusive supervision, predicts antisocial employee behavior as a function of social exclusion cues (H4).

Method

Sample and procedure. We recruited participants using a professional Dutch research agency: Flycatcher, established by Maastricht University. The Flycatcher panel has the ISO-26362 certification for access panels (i.e., it meets the qualitative ISO requirements for social scientific research, market research, or opinion polls) and consists of approximately 16,000 Dutch citizens. We recruited members who had a supervisory position. Using panel data has been shown to be a reliable way to collect data in other organizational research (e.g., Tepper et al., 2009). For their participation, panel members received credit points that would allow them to receive certain gifts (e.g., tickets for the movies). Before starting the questionnaire, participants were asked to invite one of their direct subordinates to participate in this research. Subordinates could win one of ten gift certificates (worth €20).

We took various steps to ensure that the correct sources completed the surveys. When introducing the study, we emphasized the importance of truthfulness in the scientific process. We told respondents that it was essential for the supervisor

and the subordinate to fill out the correct surveys. Further, the research agency compared the email addresses of the supervisors and subordinates to ensure that the questionnaires were completed by the correct sources. We found no irregularities in the responses. This resulted in a total of 151 leader-employee dyads. To ensure anonymity, email addresses were never matched to the answers of respondents.

Of the leaders, 108 were male and 43 were female. The mean age was 42.6 years (*SD* = 11.3). Leaders worked on average for 12.3 years (*SD* = 10.0) in their current organization and for 7.8 years (*SD* = 6.7) in their current job.

The matched group of employees included 92 males and 59 females. The mean age was 36.9 years (*SD* = 10.6). Employees worked on average for 7.9 years (*SD* = 7.5) in their current organization and for 5.9 years (*SD* = 6.1) in their current job.

Measures. We assessed *leader neuroticism* and *employee neuroticism* with the authorized Dutch translation (Hoekstra, Ormel, & De Fruyt, 1996) of the 12-item Neuroticism scale of the NEO Five Factor Inventory (NEO-FFI), developed and validated by Costa and McCrae (1992; 1 = *strongly disagree*; 5 = *strongly agree*).

We measured *social exclusion cues* with the same 3-item exclusion scale as in Study 1, including "I avoid or reject my supervisor", "My supervisor cannot turn to me in times of need" and "I do not accept my supervisor" (1 = *strongly disagree*; 5 = *strongly agree*).

We measured *abusive supervision* using Tepper's (2000) 15-item abusive supervision scale. Employees indicated how often their leader engaged in behaviors such as "ridicules me" and "doesn't give me credit for jobs requiring a lot of effort" (1 = *never*; 5 = *very often*).

We measured *antisocial employee behavior* using Robinson and O'Leary-Kelly's (1998) 9-item antisocial work behavior measure. To avoid problems associated with self-reports, such as common method variance and social desirability

bias, scholars have called for the use of other-reported antisocial behavior (see Berry, Carpenter, & Barratt, 2012). Therefore, we adapted items for peer report. Leaders rated how often the employee performed actions such as "griped with coworkers" and "deliberately bent or broke (a) rule(s)" (1 = *never*; 5 = *very often*).

Results

Table 1 presents means, standard deviations, intercorrelations, and reliabilities for the study variables.

Table 1

Descriptive Statistics and Intercorrelations for Study 2

Variable	*M*	*SD*	1	2	3	4	5
1. Leader neuroticism (LR)	2.11	0.69	(.87)				
2. Employee neuroticism (ER)	2.31	0.66	.70**	(.87)			
3. Social exclusion cues (ER)	1.92	0.85	.53**	.54**	(.78)		
4. Abusive supervision (ER)	1.58	0.74	.63**	.59**	.64**	(.97)	
5. Antisocial employee behavior (LR)	1.90	0.77	.64**	.57**	.57**	.69**	(.92)

Note. N = 151. Internal reliabilities (Cronbach α) are provided in parentheses on the diagonal. LR = leader rated, ER = employee rated. ** $p < .01$.

Measurement model. Before testing our hypotheses, we conducted confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) to test our measurement model. We estimated a model with five latent factors (leader neuroticism, employee neuroticism, social exclusion cues of the employee, abusive supervision, and employees' antisocial work behavior) using LISREL (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 2004). The five-factor model showed a good fit to the data: $\chi 2$ (1214) = 2471.90, $p < .001$; *CFI* = .97; *RMSEA* = .07; *SRMR* = .06. A single factor model showed a clearly inferior fit to the data: $\chi 2$

(1224) = 3443.63, $p < .001$; *CFI* = .95; *RMSEA* = .13; *SRMR* = .09. In sum, the CFAs support the validity of our specified measurement model.

Hypotheses testing. We tested our model depicted in Figure 1with maximum likelihood estimation using R (R Core Team, 2015). This approach allows for a formal test of the full model, rather than testing each hypothesis individually. We mean centered all predictor variables prior to analyses (Aiken & West, 1991). Standard errors for the indirect effect (H4) were obtained through a bias-corrected and accelerated bootstrap procedure using 1,000 bootstrap samples. Table 2 presents the results.[1]

First, as in Study 1 and in support of H1, employee neuroticism significantly predicted social exclusion cues (Table 2, first column). Second, in support of H2, we found a significant Leader Neuroticism × Employee Neuroticism interaction (see Table 2, second column, and also Figure 2). In support of H2, simple slope analyses (Aiken & West, 1991) revealed that leader neuroticism was positively associated with abusive supervision among employees higher in neuroticism (one *SD* above the mean; $b = .45$, $p < .001$), but not among employees lower in neuroticism (one *SD* below the mean; $b = .06$, $p = .42$).

Third, to understand the process that explains why leader neuroticism predicts abusive supervision particularly when employees are higher (vs. lower) in neuroticism (H2), and building on the finding that employee neuroticism significantly predicts social exclusion cues (H1), we tested H3. In support of H3, the

[1] The low means of abusive supervision and antisocial employee behavior in our Study 2 are consistent with those found in previous research (cf. Tepper, 2000; Tepper et al., 2008). To check if potential violations of normality would pose a problem for our conclusions, we tested our model using maximum likelihood estimation along with a bias corrected and accelerated bootstrap procedure (1,000 bootstrap samples) to obtain the standard errors for each of the effects. This approach not only allowed for a formal test of the full model, but has the additional benefit that all reported statistical tests do not rely on a distributional assumption and are thus robust against potential violations of normality. The results of this more conservative approach mirrored those presented in the main text.

Leader Neuroticism × Social Exclusion Cues interaction was significant (b = .28, p < .001; Table 2, third column) when controlling for the Leader Neuroticism × Employee Neuroticism interaction. Simple slopes analyses revealed that leader neuroticism was positively associated with abusive supervision when employees signaled more social exclusion cues (one *SD* above the mean; b = .36, p < .001), but not when employees signaled less social exclusion cues (one *SD* below the mean; b = .04, p = .54). When we included the moderating effect of social exclusion cues, the Leader Neuroticism × Employee Neuroticism interaction was reduced to non-significance (Table 2, second and third column), suggesting that the moderating effect of employee neuroticism is explained by the social exclusion cues that higher (vs. lower) neurotic employees signal. As an additional explicit test of H3 we estimated another model in which we constrained the size of the moderating effect of employee neuroticism to be zero. A model comparison test of this constrained model versus one in which we freely estimate the strength of this moderating effect revealed that the constrained model did not lead to a significantly worse fit (χ^2 (1) = 1.81, p = 0.179), confirming that the addition of the moderating effect of social exclusion cues renders the former redundant.

Finally, we used the moderated path analysis procedures recommended by Edwards and Lambert (2007) to test H4. In line with this hypothesis, we found an indirect effect of the Leader Neuroticism × Social Exclusion Cues interaction on antisocial employee behavior via abusive supervision (b = .14, p = .002, 95% CI [.05, .22]). Thus, the positive relationship between leader neuroticism and antisocial employee behavior through the mediating mechanism of abusive supervision was stronger when employees signaled stronger (vs. weaker) social exclusion cues. Furthermore, we probed this moderation of an indirect effect by investigating the conditional indirect effect of leader neuroticism on antisocial employee behavior. Leader Neuroticism was positively associated with antisocial employee behavior

when employees signaled more social exclusion cues (one *SD* above the mean; b = .18, p < .001), but was not significantly associated with antisocial employee behavior when employees refrained from signaling exclusion cues (one *SD* below the mean; b = .02; p = .58).



Figure 2. Abusive supervision as a function of leader neuroticism (+/- 1SD) and employee neuroticism.

Table 2

Regression Results for Study 2

	Dependent variable			
	Social exclusion cues	Abusive supervision	Abusive supervision	Antisocial employee behavior
Variable	*B (SE)*	*B (SE)*	*B (SE)*	*B (SE)*
Leader neuroticism (LN)	**.70 (.09)*** **	.37 (.09)***	.29 (.08)***	.38 (.08)***
Employee neuroticism (EN)		.38 (.09)***	.20 (.09)*	
LN x EN		**.43 (.09)*** **	**.13 (.10)**	
Abusive supervision				.50 (.07)***
Social exclusion cues (EXC)			.27 (.05)***	
EN x EXC			**.28 (.08)*** **	

Note. The effects depicted in the second column were retrieved while testing a reduced form of our model (i.e., without exclusion cues of the employee). The effects depicted in the first, third, and fourth column were retrieved while testing the model depicted in Figure 1. Values in bold are relevant to tests of hypotheses.

* $p < .05$, *** $p < .001$

General Discussion

We adopted a trait matching approach to examine antecedents of abusive leadership by focusing on the interactive process of leader and employee neuroticism. In line with TAT's (Tett & Burnett, 2003) tenets our results revealed that leader neuroticism predicted abusive supervision, but only when employees scored higher (vs. lower) on neuroticism. The role of employee neuroticism in moderating the relationship between leader neuroticism and abusive supervision was explained by social exclusion cues communicated by higher (vs. lower) neurotic employees. Finally, our findings showed that leader neuroticism predicted antisocial work behavior via the mediating mechanism of abusive leadership, but only when employees signaled strong cues of social exclusion (i.e., higher scoring neurotic employees). Below, we discuss the implications and limitations of these findings.

Theoretical Contributions

Our research contributes to the abusive supervision literature in several ways. First, prior research has predominantly focused on examining consequences of abusive supervision, and more recent research started to look at the role that leader's own supervisor and employees can play in the emergence of this leadership behavior (Liang et al., in press; Tepper et al., 2011). Our present research complements and goes beyond these studies by looking at both the role of employee and leader characteristics as antecedents of abusive supervision. This is a step required to capture better the dynamics of abusive supervision, particularly so because leadership is regarded as a meaningful relationship between both leader and employee (van Knippenberg & Hogg, 2003). We focused on the trait of neuroticism, which in a theoretical account by Tepper (2007) was proposed to be positively related to abusive behavior of leaders. In testing this idea, we relied on TAT (Tett & Burnett, 2003) to predict that it will be the level of neuroticism of the employee that acts as a source of leader trait activation. Because of its clear thematic connection

between the context variable employee neuroticism and leader neuroticism, our results suggest that employee neuroticism serves as a context-variable activating the workings and influence of leader neuroticism, revealing the emergence of abusive leadership.

This interactive effect between leader and employee neuroticism provides first empirical evidence in favor of a trait matching approach to examine the role of personality in leadership (Judge & Long, 2012). Even more importantly, it also provides useful insights into the selection of the trait neuroticism to understand the phenomenon of abusive leadership better. Indeed, the role of neuroticism in abusive supervision can at first sight be considered as counterintuitive. In fact, neuroticism tends to produce problematic behaviors targeted at the self, not toward others (Costa & McCrae, 1992). The few studies that looked at leader personality as predictor of abusive supervision focused on traits like Machiavellianism (Kiazad, Restubog, Zagenczyk, Kiewitz, & Tang, 2010) and trait anger (Kant, Skogstad, Torsheim, & Einarsen, 2013), thus focusing on traits that have interpersonal implications and could be regarded 'bully-type' personalities (Paulhus & Williams, 2002). The 'bully-type' personality has indeed been shown to predict a host of antisocial behaviors in daily life, such as interpersonal offensiveness and hostility (e.g., Lynam et al., 2011), manipulation and callousness (see Furnham, Richards, & Paulhus, 2013), and the exploitation of others (Decuyper, De Pauw, De Fruyt, De Bolle, & De Clercq, 2009).

The fact that neuroticism does predict abusive supervision suggests that this trait also has interpersonal consequences. Employee neuroticism was found to activate leader neuroticism by signaling social exclusion cues to the leader. Neurotic individuals are vigilant towards social threats and as such turn out to be responsive to situations where they do not feel valued (Denissen & Penke, 2008). Such experience of social exclusion hurts higher neurotic individuals and puts them in distress (Downey et al., 2000; Leary & Springer, 2001). As our results show, this

motivated the display of abusive leadership. In fact, our analyses revealed that the signal of social exclusion by neurotic employees explained the interactive effect between leader and employee neuroticism in directly predicting abusive leadership and indirectly antisocial employee behavior. As such, our findings (a) provide evidence that neuroticism can reveal negative effects not only to the self but also to others, and (b) responds to claims that research should examine more carefully how traits exactly relate to leader behavior (Zaccaro, 2012).

Furthermore, by testing both direct and indirect effects in the same study, we provided a more complete picture of how abusive supervision emerges and in turn affects antisocial employee behavior. This approach reveals that the employee at the same time can act as a crucial input for abusive supervision to emerge and be at the receiving end of this negative type of leadership. This finding makes clear that abusive leadership is a social consequence based on the input of both employee and leader and therefore needs higher-level supervision to prevent such negative leadership actions. This conclusion corresponds well with suggestions of Tepper et al. (2006) who argued, based on the victimization literature (Einarsen, 2000), that ultimately the responsibility for preventing abusive leadership lies primarily with the organization.

Finally, as our research zoomed in on the social dynamics of leader and employee, and how they influence leadership behavior and ultimately work behavior of employees, our findings are also relevant to the literature regarding the role of personality on team performance (Monynihan & Peterson, 2001). It has, for instance, been studied how average levels of personality traits within a team influence team outcomes (e.g., Bradley, Klotz, Postlethwaite, & Brown, 2013). Yet, while these approaches are informative about which (combination of) traits predict group performance, one critique is that the processes underlying these particular trait interactions are lost when using those approaches (Monynihan & Peterson, 2001).

Our approach carries the potential to study more precisely the processes involved when looking at the interactive effect of leader and team member's traits.

Practical Implications

One potential practical implication is that leaders higher in neuroticism do not have to be necessarily detrimental for organizations (at least not in terms of displaying abusive supervision), as long as they do not work together with other neurotics. However, neuroticism is a personality characteristic that is commonly found in non-clinical populations (Costa & McCrae, 1992). Therefore, neurotic leaders are likely to encounter neurotic employees. Given that organizations often consider the personality of employees in personnel selection (Morgeson et al., 2007), it would be advisable to be aware of the possible negative consequences of hiring neurotic leaders.

Furthermore, our results show that leaders higher (vs. lower) in neuroticism respond with abusive supervision to neurotic employees because such employees signal cues of social exclusion. Organizations thus have to monitor situations in which such leaders feel excluded, as this is likely to make them respond with abusive supervision. Most importantly perhaps, leaders as well as employees should be made aware that both parties play their respective role in the emergence of abusive supervision and antisocial employee behavior.

Strengths, Limitations, and Future Research

A potential strength of the present research is our use of two different methods across employees from the U.S. (Study 1) and the Netherlands (Study 2). Making use of constructive replications (Lykken, 1968), we provided direct evidence to show that neurotic employees signal social exclusion cues in Study 1, whereas in Study 2, we collected field data from multiple sources (i.e., leaders and employees) to provide ecological validity for this claim, but also to test our overall model. The use of such a multi-source setting made it possible to control for

common method and self-presentation biases (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003).

A potential limitation for future research to address is that the cross-sectional design of our research makes it impossible to draw causal conclusions from our results. However, it should be noted that personality traits are relatively stable across the life span, making reversed causation less likely. For example, there is a clear consensus in the literature that personality is an antecedent of antisocial workplace behaviors and not vice versa (Berry, Ones, & Sackett, 2007). Furthermore, although we used employees from the U.S. (Study 1) and the Netherlands (Study 2), both countries are nevertheless individualistic cultures that are low in power distance (Schimmack, Oishi, & Diener, 2005). Abusive supervision research has hardly taken on a cross-cultural perspective (Martinko et al., 2013; for an exception see Lian, Ferris, & Brown, 2012). As one's cultural upbringing shapes responses to emotional experiences (such as exclusion), future research is advised to test our hypotheses also in collectivistic and high power distance cultures.

While our research illustrated the roles of leader and employee neuroticism in predicting abusive supervision (as inspired by Tepper, 2007), we do not suggest that no other traits may be worth considering. Aggression prone personality types such as machiavellianism, narcissism, and psychopathy (Paulhus & Williams, 2002) are relevant to explore, particularly in light of our findings underscoring the role of social exclusion (see its relationship with aggression; Twenge et al., 2001). We advocate making use of our proposed trait matching technique to create a meaningful context to examine, for example, how supervisor machiavellianism interacts with employee machiavellianism; as such also going beyond existing research on supervisor machiavellianism and abusive supervision (Kiazad et al., 2010).

Finally, we focused on employee neuroticism as a context signaling cues of

social exclusion that activate the workings of leader neuroticism. Future research should examine other conditions in which leaders being criticized or rejected may lead to abusive supervision. This suggestion is backed up by Judge and Zapata's (2015) finding that neuroticism is most detrimental to work performance in situations that require social skills and in situations in which one needs to interact with unpleasant or angry people.

Conclusion

Abusive supervision presents an important challenge to organizations, inviting scholars to understand antecedents of this leadership style to prevent its emergence and subsequent negative consequences for employees. We hope that our use of a trait matching approach combined with a broader view on both the antecedents and consequences of abusive leadership will stimulate future research to understand more deeply the dynamic nature of this leadership style.

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Chapter 6

Research overview and general discussion

The aim of the present dissertation was to provide a better understanding of the antecedents of ethical and unethical decision making in organizations. In order to reach this aim, we adopted a self-regulation perspective to (un)ethical behavior. In four empirical chapters, we looked into various concepts relating to the self-regulation of (un)ethical behavior: the availability of self-regulatory resources and individual differences (more specifically: moral identity), behavioral history and moment-to-moment ethical decision making, and finally, leader mistreatment and the interplay between leader and employee personality, respectively. This general discussion provides an overview of the main findings presented in the empirical chapters of this dissertation. Furthermore, we will discuss the theoretical implications of the present findings and some promising avenues for future research. Finally, we will conclude with some practical implications.

Self-regulation of (un)ethical behavior in the workplace and individual differences

In Chapter 2, we investigated how the availability of self-regulatory resources influences unethical leadership behaviors. More specifically, we expected that the depletion of self-regulatory resources may lead to higher levels of unethical leadership behavior. We also argued that moral identity is likely to be a relevant boundary condition for this effect. Moral identity is an important motivator of ethical behavior (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Blasi, 1980; Hardy & Carlo, 2005), and this variable may thus influence the amount of cognitive resources that people need in order to behave in an ethical manner. People with a high moral identity more frequently regulate their behavior (i.e., inhibit selfish impulses), resulting in more internalized and automatic

enactment of ethical behavior (Seeley & Gardner, 2003); and as such, they can be expected to consume fewer cognitive resources to maintain their self-control (cf. Aquino, Freeman, Reed, Lim, & Felps, 2009; Aquino & Reed, 2002; Reynolds & Ceranic, 2007). One can therefore expect that people with a high moral identity are less vulnerable than people low in moral identity to the effects of regulatory depletion on their display of unethical leadership behaviors.

We found evidence for our hypothesis in an experimental and a multisource field study. In the experimental study, we manipulated participants' level of regulatory depletion. The results showed that regulatory depletion increased unethical leadership behaviors for participants low in moral identity, whereas for participants high in moral identity, there was no such an increase. To be able to generalize our findings to an organizational setting, we also conducted a multisource field study. This multisource setting made it possible to assess leaders' level of regulatory depletion and moral identity directly from the leaders themselves, whereas ratings about the leaders' unethical behavior were provided by their colleagues as well as by the leaders themselves. Similarly to the experimental study, we found evidence for the moderating effect of moral identity in the relationship between regulatory depletion and unethical leader behavior. These findings suggest that leaders with a low moral identity need self-regulatory resources to refrain from engaging in unethical leader behaviors, while for leaders who are high in moral identity behaving ethically is less reliant on these resources, and thus, not influenced by regulatory resource depletion.

In Chapter 3, we focused on the effects of regulatory depletion and moral identity in predicting ethical behavior (vs. unethical behavior in Chapter 2). We argued that selfishness by showing unethical behavior is inherently different from selfishness by refraining from ethical behavior. We hypothesized that people need power to feel that they can refrain from being ethical, because people in a position of power are more likely to deviate from prevailing norms (Briñol, Petty, Valle, Rucker, & Becerra, 2007).

We therefore expected that power is likely to be a facilitator of the selfish state resulting from the combination of depletion and low moral identity.

We conducted two studies to test our hypothesis. An experimental study in which we manipulated regulatory depletion and power, and a multisource field study where we assessed regulatory depletion, moral identity, and power directly from the respondents, whereas we asked coworkers of the focal respondents to indicate ethical behavior of the focal employee. Both studies showed the hypothesized interaction between moral identity and depletion for employees high in power, but not for employees low in power. It thus seems that employees with a high moral identity have their moral values more readily accessible, even when their regulatory resources are depleted and irrespective of their power level. Moreover, our results show that social power enables employees to refrain from ethical behavior.

The findings of Chapter 2 and 3 thus show that people with a high moral identity are less prone to the effects of self-regulatory depletion on unethical and ethical behaviors in the workplace. It thus seems that people with a high moral identity are more effective in self-regulating their behavior than people with a low moral identity.

Self-regulation of (un)ethical behavior in the workplace and behavioral history

In Chapter 4, we investigated how people make moral decisions on a moment-to-moment basis. Moral self-regulation investigates this issue by focusing on moment-to-moment balancing acts between ethical and unethical behavior in the context of one's behavioral history (Monin & Miller, 2001; Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006; Zhong, Liljenquist, & Cain, 2009). This research highlights the importance of self-regulation processes in examining ethical and unethical behavior, but presents us with diverging findings. On the one hand, research has shown that someone who feels moral (vs. immoral) is more likely to show ethical (vs. unethical) behavior (a process labelled as moral consistency). On the other hand, however, research has shown that someone who feels moral (vs. immoral) is more likely to show unethical (vs. ethical) behavior (a

process labelled as moral compensation). In Chapter 4, we try to consolidate these findings by arguing that both moral consistency and moral compensation reflect specific ways to deal with reputational concerns. More specifically, we argue that the crucial difference between moral consistency and moral compensation is that the first one implies a more proactive approach to reputation building and maintenance, whereas the latter forms a reactive, "damage control" response in social situations.

We conducted two experimental studies to test this hypothesis. In both studies, we manipulated whether participants felt moral versus immoral by relying on an established priming procedure that asks participants to describe and recall a situation in which they acted in a moral (versus immoral) manner (see e.g., Aquino et al., 2009; Sachdeva, Iliev, & Medin, 2009). To induce reputational concerns, all participants were led to believe that they worked together with others in a team. Finally, as research has indicated that reactive (vs. proactive) responses are more likely in situations that constrain cognitive capacity (Parker, Williams, & Turner, 2006; Rusbult & Van Lange, 2003), we relied on a common way to impair cognitive capacity. That is, we manipulated participants' cognitive resources by administering a task which depletes (versus not depletes) participants' cognitive resources. The first experiment showed that participants who were not depleted (i.e., allowing for a proactive, long-term focus on reputation building) showed moral consistency, whereas participants who were depleted (i.e., making them act more reactively upon reputational concerns) showed moral compensation.

In the second experiment, we did not only replicate the results of the first experiment, but we also provided an explicit test for the relevance of reputational concerns in moral consistency and moral compensation by focusing on accountability as a boundary condition. We expected that if moral consistency and compensatory behavior are indeed shaped by reputational concerns, these processes should be particularly found when people are held accountable for their actions (i.e., the degree to

which one can be publicly held responsible for one's actions). The results were in line with our hypotheses, participants who were not depleted (i.e., taking a proactive approach) showed moral consistency, whereas depleted participants (i.e., taking a reactive approach) showed moral compensation. Yet, these effects were only found among accountable participants. Participants who were not accountable showed no moral consistency, nor moral compensation. These results thus indicates that both moral consistency and moral compensation derive from reputational concerns.

Self-regulation of (un)ethical behavior in the workplace and the interplay between personalities

In Chapter 5, we investigated the role of leader mistreatment in predicting unethical behavior. We argued that leaders with a neurotic personality are especially likely to show elevated levels of leader mistreatment, and thus, increase unethical behaviors of their employees. In this chapter, we specifically considered the context in which leader mistreatment takes place. In line with trait activation theory (TAT; Tett & Burnett, 2003), we argued that the activation of leaders' neuroticism is contingent upon the availability of trait-relevant cues in the social context, and employees' personality is a most relevant aspect of a leaders' social context. We further argue that neurotic employees are likely to signal social exclusion cues (e.g., Morse, Sauerberger, Todd, & Funder, 2015) and that especially leaders high in neuroticism are responsive to this kind of social threat (e.g., Denissen & Penke, 2008; Matthews, 2004). It is thus likely that leaders' neurotic personality is activated by the exclusion cues of neurotic employees. We therefore hypothesized that employee neuroticism interacts with leader neuroticism in predicting abusive supervision and that this has downstream consequences for unethical workplace behavior.

To investigate our hypotheses we conducted two studies, an experimental study in which we showed that higher (vs. lower) neurotic employees signal more social exclusion cues to their leader, and a multisource field study in which we

recruited leader-employee dyads. Both leaders and employees indicated their level of neuroticism, but whereas the leader rated the unethical behavior of the employee, employees rated the level of exclusion cues which they signalled and the level of leader mistreatment. In this second study, we found support for our full model. That is, leader neuroticism and employee neuroticism interacted to predict leader mistreatment, and this effect was explained by the social exclusion cues of neurotic employees. Furthermore, as a result of this leader mistreatment, we found elevated levels of unethical employee behaviour.

General Discussion

Theoretical implications

This dissertation provides some new insights in the literature of ethical and unethical decision making in organizations. It enhances, for example, our understanding of the role of self-regulation in the display of ethical and unethical behavior. In fact, previous research mainly investigated the effects of self-regulatory depletion in laboratory settings. To our knowledge, our findings are among the first to show that regulatory depletion can induce people to show less ethical and more unethical behaviors in an organizational setting (Chapter 2 and 3). The present dissertation thus suggests that self-regulation facilitates the emergence of ethical and hinders the prevalence of unethical behaviors in organizations.

A second implication of this dissertation for the literature on self-regulation and (un)ethical behavior is that regulatory depletion does not necessarily imply selfishness. Prior work has often claimed that a lack of regulatory resources automatically leads to selfishness (Baumeister & Exline, 1999; Mead, Baumeister, Gino, Schweitzer, & Ariely, 2009; Shalvi, Eldar, & Bereby-Meyer, 2012). Research supporting this idea shows that depletion can result in less ethical behavior and more unethical behavior (DeWall, Baumeister, Gailliot, & Maner, 2008; DeWall,

Baumeister, Stillman, & Gailliot, 2007; Gino, Schweitzer, Mead, & Ariely, 2011; Mead et al, 2009). Yet, there is also research showing that being ethical is not by definition effortful, and some types of morality are in fact driven by automatic processes (Greene, Morelli, Lowenberg, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2008). Hence, a lack of regulatory resources does not necessarily lead to selfish behavior. Similarly, our research shows that depletion does not cause selfishness for people high in moral identity (Chapter 2 and 3). Moreover, Chapter 4 indicates that a lack of regulatory resources may also induce people to be more moral, if they are focused on damage control.

This dissertation also contributes to our knowledge of the role of individual differences in the self-regulation of (un)ethical behavior. We focused on moral identity, a variable particularly important for the emergence of ethical and unethical behaviors (Aquino & Reed, 2002). Our results show that moral identity facilitates the self-regulation of (un)ethical behavior. More specifically, Chapter 2 and 3 show that among people high in moral identity, regulatory depletion does not necessarily hamper the self-regulation of (un)ethical behavior. Our findings thus suggest that people high in moral identity have their moral values readily accessible irrespective of their level of depletion. People low in moral identity, on the other hand, are more likely to show unethical behavior. This thus indicates that successful self-regulation suppresses individual differences between people high and low in moral identity, whereas these differences emerge more strongly when people are depleted.

This dissertation also sheds light on the self-regulation processes that seem to be involved in (un)ethical behavior on a moment-to-moment basis. The findings of Chapter 4 indicate that moral compensation and moral consistency occur in a social context and that reputational considerations thus play an important role in these processes. Even though both literatures suggest that reputational concerns are relevant for the display of (un)ethical behavior (Miller & Effron, 2010; Reed, Aquino, & Levy, 2007), the present dissertation is the first to integrate the moral compensation and

consistency literatures by focusing on differences in reputation management. More specifically, our findings suggest that moral compensation forms a reactive, "damage control" response in social situations, whereas moral consistency implies a more proactive approach to reputation building and maintenance.

A final contribution of this dissertation is to the self-regulation of (un)ethical behavior and the interplay between personalities. Leaders may have a profound role in the emergence of unethical behavior in the workplace by means of their own misbehavior (Bennett & Robinson, 2000; Robinson & Greenberg, 1998). Most research solely focuses on the influence of leader personality on behavior and neglects the fact that people are imbedded in relational networks. The present dissertation addresses this issue by showing that the personality of other people may also form an important context factor. More specifically, Chapter 5 shows that leaders high in neuroticism show more abusive leader behaviors, particularly when their employees score also high on neuroticism, and that, as a result of abusive supervision, the employees show higher levels of deviant behavior. Our results thus show that it is important to consider the interplay between the personality of the actor and the personality of 'another'.

Limitations and suggestions for future research

In the present dissertation we employed various research methods to test the role of self-regulation on ethical and unethical behavior in organizational settings. The experimental research employed in the present dissertation allowed us to test our predictions in a controlled laboratory setting and gives us a clear indication of the causal relationships of our findings. Furthermore, the present dissertation combines this experimental research with multisource field research, which improves the robustness and the implications that can be derived from our findings (Ellemers, 2013). However, in an ideal situation, additional longitudinal research would have been employed to shed a light on the direction of the relationships investigated in this dissertation. In other words, we cannot be sure that our findings are unidirectional in nature and not

bidirectional. Future research could thus even further establish the validity and generalizability of our findings by employing a longitudinal research design.

This dissertation adopted a multisource method to investigate ethical and unethical behavior in organizations That means that we relied on own ratings and on colleague or leader ratings to test the role of self-regulation on (un)ethical behavior. While this enhances the validity of our findings because such a method avoids potential common method and self-presentation biases (P. M. Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003), it may also pose a threat to the validity of our findings, because we often relied on a single 'other' (i.e., colleague or leader) source to measure (un)ethical behavior. Ethical and unethical behaviors consists of many different behaviors and it is not unlikely that a single 'other' witnessed only part of these behaviors. It may thus be, that our reliance on a single source measure does not fully capture the unique variance present in (un)ethical behavior. Future research could adopt a 360 degrees approach in which various colleagues of the focal employee are used to indicate the prevalence of (un)ethical behavior. However, in Chapter 2 we combined self and other ratings of unethical behavior and found no differences between those two sources.

Practical implications

A first important practical implication of the present dissertation is that it suggests that self-regulation failures may pose serious problems to organizations. Chapter 2 and 3 show that self-regulation depletion both hinders ethical behavior and promotes unethical behavior in organizations. At the same time, however, various causes of self-regulatory depletion are omnipresent in organizations, such as the necessity to make many choices and decisions (Vohs et al., 2008), overly long working hours that may lead to sleep deprivation (Barnes, Schaubroeck, Huth, & Ghumman, 2011; Christian & Ellis, 2011), and high stress levels (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). In other words, a number of factors that seem inherent to organizational life may constrain ethical and promote unethical behavior of organizational members. It is thus

important that organizations are aware of these factors that may lead to regulatory depletion and try to eliminate them as much as possible.

The previous implication is especially relevant for leaders as they are a likely source of vicarious learning (Bandura, 1986). It is thus particularly important for leaders to act in an ethical manner. Indeed, if leaders focus on behaving ethically, then they will serve as an important source of ethical guidance for their employees (Brown, Treviño, & Harrison, 2005; Walumbwa et al., 2011). Conversely, when leaders act unethically, employees will usually follow suit (Mayer, Kuenzi, Greenbaum, Bardes, & Salvador, 2009). Yet, leader have busy and demanding work schedules and acting in ethical ways is not necessarily easy for them (e.g., Ganster, 2005; Hambrick, Finkelstein, & Mooney, 2005; Mintzberg, 1973). Organizations should thus be aware that overloading their leaders with decisions to take may come with the cost of an increased likelihood of leaders transgressing ethical norms. Nevertheless, leaders should be similarly aware that whenever they are facing tasks that can have important (i.e., ethical) implications, their cognitive state can affect their behavior; thus, it is necessary to carefully schedule these tasks. Tasks that may have ethical implications should preferably be made after a period of rest because rest can replenish leaders regulatory resources (Baumeister, Muraven, & Tice, 2000).

This dissertation also conveys a more optimistic message by indicating that not all employees are equally prone to the effects of self-regulatory depletion on (un)ethical behaviors. Chapter 2 and 3 showed that employees who are high in moral identity proved to be immune to the effects of self-regulatory depletion on (un)ethical behavior. This finding is possibly relevant for organizations because there is some research that indicates that it is possible to situationally increase the accessibility of moral identity (Aquino et al., 2009; Reed et al., 2007). Combined with the present results, this entails a promising implication for organizations. Making moral identity accessible through situational interventions such as stimulating a clear ethical climate and ensuring that the

organization's top management behaves in ethical ways (Martin & Cullen, 2006; Mayer et al., 2009; Mayer, Kuenzi, & Greenbaum, 2010) makes it more likely that employees behave ethically. More importantly, this effect should also buffer the effects of regulatory depletion on unethical behavior. Moreover, these interventions seems to be especially important for leaders, because of the behavior of leaders can influence that of their employees (cf. Chapter 5). That is, interventions aimed at increasing morality at higher levels in the organization can have positive implications at lower hierarchical levels (Martin & Cullen, 2006; Mayer et al., 2009; Mayer et al., 2010).

Chapter 4, however, indicates that strategies aimed at stimulating ethical employee behavior are not necessarily effective. More specifically, the findings of Chapter 4 show that when employees are focused on a reactive approach to reputation management (which is likely to occur when they are experiencing regulatory depletion), feeling moral may not be effective in promoting ethical behavior. As we already explained before, various causes of regulatory depletion are omnipresent in organizational contexts and it is thus important that organizations are aware of this potential subversion.

A final suggestion for organizations comes from the findings in Chapter 5. From the results it can be inferred that neurotic leaders are not necessarily detrimental for organizations (at least not in terms of displaying abusive supervision), as long as they do not work together with other neurotics. However, neuroticism is a personality characteristic that is commonly found in non-clinical populations (Costa & McCrae, 1992). Therefore, neurotic leaders are likely to encounter neurotic employees. Given that organizations often consider the personality of their (future) employees in personnel selection (Guion & Gottier, 1965; Morgeson et al., 2007; Tett, Jackson, & Rothstein, 1991), it would be advisable to be aware of the possible negative consequences of hiring neurotic leaders.

Conclusion

The present dissertation contributes to the literature on ethical and unethical organizational behavior by adopting a self-regulation perspective. Our findings indicate that regulatory depletion hinders ethical behavior and promotes unethical behavior in an organizational context. This dissertation enhanced our understanding of the importance of individual differences (i.e., moral identity), one's behavioral history, and leader mistreatment for the self-regulation of (un)ethical behavior.

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Nederlandstalige samenvatting

Ethische besluitvorming in organisaties: een zelfregulatie benadering

Inleiding

In de afgelopen jaren zijn er in de wereldwijde media verschillende voorbeelden van onethisch gedrag van bedrijven verschenen, zoals de diverse accountancy schandalen (denk hierbij aan AIG, Tycom WorldCom, Enron en Ahold), het afluisterschandaal van de NSA, de met melamine besmette melk in China (300.000 slachtoffers), de overtreding van de bouwvoorschriften bij een fabriek in Bangladesh (1100 doden), GSK's omkoping van dokters in China om zo meer medicijnen te verkopen, het Europese vleesschandaal en de diverse bankschandalen die mede geleid hebben tot de wereldwijde financiële crisis. Al deze voorbeelden maken duidelijk dat onethisch gedrag van organisaties zowel wijdverbreid als invasief is, en enorme gevolgen voor onze samenleving kent. Het moge dus duidelijk zijn dat het belangrijk is dat we begrijpen waarom onethisch gedrag in organisaties zo veelvoorkomend is.

Als gevolg van de wijdverbreide corruptie die bij organisaties speelt begint het onderzoek naar ethisch en onethisch bedrijfsgedrag de aandacht te krijgen die het verdient. Voorheen nam het onderzoek naar de bedrijfsethiek een normatief perspectief aan die zijn grondslag vindt in de filosofie en theologie (Treviño & Weaver, 1994). Deze benadering richt zich op hoe mensen en organisaties zich

zouden *moeten* gedragen. Het normatieve perspectief is gebaseerd op de autonomie en verantwoordelijkheid van mensen en heeft de aanname dat ethisch en onethisch gedrag voortvloeien uit de vrije keuze van een individu (Treviño & Weaver, 1994). Interessant genoeg gaat deze benadering er ook vanuit dat mensen rationele morele wezens zijn. Met andere woorden, mensen zouden zich bewust zijn van de ethische aspecten van een situatie en ze zouden daardoor bewust kiezen om zich "goed" of "slecht" te gedragen.

Het wordt echter steeds duidelijker dat onethisch gedrag in en van organisaties slechts voor een heel klein deel kan worden toegeschreven aan een paar rotte appels aan de top. Sterker nog, onethisch gedrag is wijdverbreid en op elk niveau in de hiërarchische structuur komt onethisch gedrag voor. Het lijkt dus eerder zo te zijn dat het merendeel van onethisch gedragingen toe te schrijven is aan een tijdelijke beoordelingsfout van goede mensen. En inderdaad, de voorbeelden hiervan zijn legio en ook onderzoek heeft laten zien dat goede mensen soms slechte dingen doen (Bersoff, 1999). Mede hierdoor is een meer empirisch (i.e., beschrijvend) perspectief in de bedrijfsethiek ontstaan die voortkomt uit de management- en sociale wetenschappen. De empirische benadering richt zich op hoe individuen en organisaties zich daadwerkelijk gedragen in plaats van op hoe zij zich zouden moeten gedragen (Treviño & Weaver, 1994). Met andere woorden, deze benadering probeert ethisch en onethisch gedrag te beschrijven, uit te leggen, en/of te voorspellen door te bestuderen hoe individuen in organisaties beslissingen nemen wanneer zij voor een ethisch dilemma staan. Deze dissertatie past een dergelijke benadering toe om zo ons begrip van de oorzaken van ethisch en onethisch gedrag in organisaties te verbeteren door het combineren van recente bevindingen in de zelfregulatie en ethiek.

Huidig doctoraatsonderzoek

Ethische en onethische besluitvorming in organisaties: de invloed van zelfregulatie

Zelfregulatie stelt mensen in staat om hun impulsen en verlangens te onderdrukken en hiervan af te zien wanneer dat nodig is (Baumeister, Heatherton, & Tice, 1994; Mischel, 1974; Muraven & Baumeister, 2000; Tangney, Baumeister, & Boone, 2004). Het zelfregulerend vermogen van mensen is ontzettend adaptief en zorgt ervoor dat mensen zich kunnen gedragen volgens de normen en regels van de samenleving (Baumeister, Vohs, & Tice, 2007; Mischel, 1974). Dit zien we ook terug in onderzoek dat laat zien dat een goede zelfregulatie samenhangt met diverse positieve uitkomsten zoals succes op het werk, verbeterde concentratie, beter kunnen omgaan met stress en problemen en zelfs met lagere scheidingscijfers. Tegengesteld hieraan zien we dan weer dat een slechte zelfregulatie samenhangt met depressie en diverse gedragsproblemen zoals agressie, het niet kunnen omgaan met geld en diefstal (Hagger, Wood, Stiff, & Chatzisarantis, 2010; Muraven, Tice, & Baumeister, 1998; Tangney et al., 2004). Het moge dus duidelijk zijn dat het zelfregulerend vermogen een belangrijke rol speelt in allerlei aspecten van ons leven.

Onderzoek naar het falen van het zelfregulerend vermogen suggereert dat de cognitieve energie die voor effectieve zelfregulatie nodig is niet onbeperkt beschikbaar is (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998; Muraven et al., 1998). Meer specifiek, alle gedragingen die zelfregulatie verbruiken nemen deze energie op uit één en dezelfde beperkte bron, die dus uitgeput kan raken bij herhaaldelijk gebruik (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). Wanneer het zelfregulerend vermogen uitgeput is dan kan dat negatieve consequenties hebben voor ons gedrag (Baumeister et al., 1998; Hagger et al., 2010). Deze toestand, waarin het zelfregulerende vermogen verminderd is door een eerder gedrag dat om zelfregulatie

vroeg, wordt meestal omschreven als cognitieve uitputting (Baumeister et al., 1998). Onderzoek naar cognitieve uitputting toont aan dat na een gedrag dat om zelfregulatie vraagt (bijvoorbeeld het niet toegeven aan ongezonde verlangens, zoals het eten van chocolade of snoep, het onderdrukken van emoties of iets tegen je zin in doen) het zelfregulerend vermogen vermindert. Wat dan vervolgens consequenties heeft voor onze prestaties op andere taken die om zelfregulatie vragen (voor een overzicht zie Hagger et al., 2010).

Het idee dat zelfregulatie gelimiteerd is kan ook van belang zijn voor ons begrip van ethisch en onethisch gedrag van individuen in organisaties. Het is namelijk aannemelijk dat we zelfregulatie nodig hebben voor het vertonen van ethisch gedrag en het vermijden van onethisch gedrag (DeWall, Baumeister, Gailliot, & Maner, 2008). In overeenstemming hiermee heeft onderzoek laten zien dat na een gedraging die om zelfregulatie vraagt mensen minder geneigd zijn om andere mensen te helpen (DeWall et al., 2008), eerder vals spelen (Gino, Schweitzer, Mead, & Ariely, 2011; Mead, Baumeister, Gino, Schweitzer, & Ariely, 2009) en zich eerder agressief gedragen (DeWall, Baumeister, Stillman, & Gailliot, 2007). Het is waarschijnlijk dat deze bevindingen ook consequenties hebben voor organisaties. Onethisch gedrag, zoals het lekken van geheime bedrijfsinformatie of de diefstal van bedrijfseigendommen, kan namelijk voor serieuze problemen zorgen. Ethisch gedrag, zoals het aankaarten van lastige problemen en het helpen van leidinggevenden, collega's en klanten, zorgt dan weer voor een betere effectiviteit van de organisatie (N. P. Podsakoff, Whiting, Podsakoff, & Blume, 2009; P. M. Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Paine, & Bachrach, 2000). Echter, diverse factoren die leiden tot uitputting van het zelfregulerend vermogen zijn alomtegenwoordig in de dagelijkse werkomgeving, zoals de noodzaak om veel beslissingen te nemen (Vohs et al., 2008), het maken van veel overuren die kunnen leiden tot een slaapgebrek (Barnes, Schaubroeck, Huth, & Ghumman, 2011; Christian & Ellis, 2011) en stress

(Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). Anders gezegd, een aantal zaken die inherent zijn aan de organisatorische context kunnen ethisch gedrag verminderen en/of onethisch gedrag bevorderen.

Onderzoeksdoelstellingen en overzicht van de bevindingen

Het huidig doctoraat gaat dieper in op de oorzaken van ethisch en onethisch gedrag in organisaties en kijkt daarvoor naar de invloed van zelfregulatie. In vier empirische hoofdstukken bestudeerden we verschillende concepten die gerelateerd aan de zelfregulatie van (on)ethisch gedrag. In **Hoofdstuk 2 en 3** onderzochten we de invloed van cognitieve uitputting en individuele verschillen op de zelfregulatie van (on)ethisch gedrag. In **Hoofdstuk 4** keken we naar de zelfregulatie van (on)ethisch gedrag van moment tot moment. Dit wil zeggen, naar de invloed van eerdere (on)ethische beslissingen op huidige ethische beslissingen. Ten slotte bestudeerden we in **Hoofdstuk 5** het effect van misdragingen van leidinggevenden op de zelfregulatie van (on)ethisch gedrag. In dit laatste hoofdstuk keken we niet zozeer naar de invloed van het al dan niet beschikbaar zijn van zelfregulerende vermogens, maar onderzochten we het samenspel van de persoonlijkheden van leidinggevenden en hun werknemers. Om onze voorspellingen te testten gebruikten we diverse onderzoeksmethoden: experimenten met studenten en veldstudies in bedrijven waar we gegevens verzamelden van verschillende bronnen.

De zelfregulatie van (on)ethisch gedrag in de werkcontext en de rol van individuele verschillen

In **Hoofdstuk 2** onderzochten we hoe het al dan niet beschikbaar zijn van het zelfregulerend vermogen onethisch gedrag van leidinggevenden beïnvloedt. Meer specifiek verwachtten we dat cognitieve uitputting zou leiden tot meer onethisch gedrag van leidinggevenden. Daarnaast beargumenteerden we dat morele identiteit een relevante variabele is voor dit effect. We weten dat morele identiteit een belangrijke motivator van ethisch gedrag is (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Blasi, 1980;

Hardy & Carlo, 2005), en deze variabele kan dus een effect hebben op hoeveel zelfregulerende vermogens mensen nodig hebben om zich ethisch te gedragen. Mensen met een hoge morele identiteit zullen namelijk vaker hun gedrag reguleren (i.e., zelfzuchtige impulsen onderdrukken), wat ethisch gedrag meer geïnternaliseerd en automatisch maakt (Seeley & Gardner, 2003); en zodoende hebben zij minder zelfregulerende vermogens nodig om zich ethisch te gedragen (cf. Aquino, Freeman, Reed, Lim, & Felps, 2009; Aquino & Reed, 2002; Reynolds & Ceranic, 2007). Het is dus aannemelijk dat mensen met een hoge morele identiteit minder vatbaar zijn voor de effecten van cognitieve uitputting op (on)ethisch gedrag dan mensen met een lage morele identiteit.

Onze verwachtingen werden bevestigd in twee studies: een experiment en een veldonderzoek waarin we meerdere bronnen raadpleegden. In de experimentele studie manipuleerden we het al dan niet beschikbaar zijn van zelfregulerende vermogens bij de deelnemers. Uit de resultaten bleek dat wanneer het zelfregulerende vermogen uitgeput was, er meer onethisch leiderschapsgedrag was onder deelnemers met een lage morele identiteit. Daarentegen was er voor deelnemers met een hoge morele identiteit geen toename in onethisch leiderschapsgedrag bij cognitieve uitputting. Om onze resultaten ook naar een organisatorische context te kunnen generaliseren, voerden we ook nog een veldonderzoek uit. Doordat we in dit onderzoek gebruik maakten van verschillende soorten bronnen konden we het zelfregulerend vermogen en de morele identiteit van de leidinggevenden aan henzelf vragen, terwijl we het onethisch gedrag van de leidinggevenden zowel aan henzelf als aan hun collega konden vragen. Net zoals bij het experimenteel onderzoek vonden we bewijs voor de modererende rol van morele identiteit op de relatie tussen cognitieve uitputting en onethisch leiderschapsgedrag. Deze bevindingen suggereren dat leidinggevenden met een lage morele identiteit zelfregulerende vermogens nodig hebben om af te zien van onethisch

leiderschapsgedrag, terwijl voor leiders met een hoge morele identiteit ethisch gedrag minder afhangt van de beschikbaarheid van zelfregulerende vermogens.

In **Hoofdstuk 3** keken we naar de rol van cognitieve uitputting en morele identiteit in het voorspellen van ethisch gedrag (versus onethisch gedrag in Hoofdstuk 2). We beargumenteerden dat zelfzuchtigheid door *on*ethisch gedrag te vertonen iets heel anders is dan zelfzuchtigheid door het niet vertonen van ethisch gedrag. We voorspelden dat mensen macht nodig hebben om het idee te hebben dat ze het zich kunnen veroorloven om af te zien van ethisch gedrag (zoals helpen). Mensen in een machtspositie zijn namelijk meer geneigd om af te wijken van de geldende normen (Briñol, Petty, Valle, Rucker, & Becerra, 2007). Zoals eerder al beargumenteerd leidt de combinatie van een lage morele identiteit en cognitieve uitputting tot zelfzuchtigheid. In Hoofdstuk 3 verwachtten we dat macht deze zelfzuchtigheid bevordert.

We voerden twee studies uit om onze voorspellingen te testen. Een experimentele studie waarin we cognitieve uitputting en macht manipuleerden; en een veldstudie met meerdere bronnen waarin we cognitieve uitputting, morele identiteit en macht direct bij de respondenten maten, terwijl we collega's van de respondenten vroegen naar het ethisch gedrag van de respondenten. In beide studies vonden we de voorspelde interactie tussen morele identiteit en cognitieve uitputting bij mensen met macht, maar niet bij mensen met een lage machtpositie. Het lijkt er dus op dat mensen met een hoge morele identiteit hun morele waarden beter beschikbaar hebben, zelfs wanneer hun zelfregulerende vermogens uitgeput zijn, onafhankelijk van hun machtspositie. Daarnaast laten onze resultaten ook zien dat sociale macht mensen in staat stelt om af te zien van ethisch gedrag.

Samenvattend kunnen we stellen dat de resultaten van Hoofdstuk 2 en 3 laten zien dat mensen met een hoge morele identiteit minder vatbaar zijn voor de effecten van cognitieve uitputting op onethisch en ethisch gedrag in de werkcontext.

Het lijkt er op dat mensen met een hoge morele identiteit meer effectief zijn in het reguleren van hun gedrag dan mensen met een lage morele identiteit.

De zelfregulatie van (on)ethisch gedrag in de werkcontext en de rol van gedragsgeschiedenis

In **Hoofdstuk 4** bestudeerden we hoe mensen morele beslissingen nemen van moment tot moment, een proces dat ook wel wordt omschreven als morele zelfregulatie. Morele zelfregulatie onderzoekt hoe mensen keuzes maken tussen ethisch en onethisch gedrag door te kijken naar hun gedragsgeschiedenis (Monin & Miller, 2001; Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006; Zhong, Liljenquist, & Cain, 2009). Hoewel dit onderzoek laat zien dat zelfregulatie processen belangrijk zijn bij het onderzoek naar ethisch en onethisch gedrag, geeft het ons ook uiteenlopende resultaten. Aan de ene kant is er onderzoek dat laat zien dat iemand die zich moreel (vs. immoreel) voelt eerder ethisch (vs. onethisch) gedrag laat zien (een proces dat we morele consistentie noemen). Aan de andere kant is er onderzoek dat laat zien dat iemand die zich moreel (vs. immoreel) voelt eerder onethisch (vs. ethisch) gedrag laat zien (een proces dat we morele compensatie noemen). In Hoofdstuk 3 trachtten we om deze uiteenlopende resultaten samen te brengen. We deden dit door te beargumenteren dat morele consistentie en morele compensatie beide specifieke manieren zijn om met reputatiezorgen om te gaan. We verwachtten dat morele consistentie een meer proactieve manier van reputatiemanagement is, terwijl morele compensatie eerder een reactieve, "damage control" respons is in sociale situaties.

We voerden twee experimentele studies uit om onze hypothese te testen. Hierbij manipuleerden we of deelnemers zich moreel versus immoreel voelden. Hiervoor gebruikten we een algemeen gangbare manipulatie waarbij aan deelnemers wordt gevraagd om een situatie te beschrijven waarin ze zich op een morele (versus immorele) manier gedroegen (zie bijvoorbeeld Aquino et al., 2009; Sachdeva, Iliev, & Medin, 2009). Om reputatiezorgen teweeg te brengen, zorgden we ervoor dat alle

deelnemers geloofden dat ze samen met anderen in een team werkten. Onderzoek heeft aangetoond dat een reactieve (versus proactieve) respons vaker optreedt in situaties waarin cognitieve vermogens beperkt worden (Parker, Williams, & Turner, 2006; Rusbult & Van Lange, 2003). Dus, om een reactieve (of proactieve) respons van deelnemers te ontlokken, manipuleerden we de mate waarin deelnemers cognitieve vermogens beschikbaar hadden door een taak te gebruiken die al dan niet zorgt voor cognitieve uitputting. Het eerste experiment toonde aan dat deelnemers die niet cognitief uitgeput waren (i.e., wat dus een proactieve, lange-termijn oriëntatie op reputatiemanagement mogelijk maakt) morele consistentie lieten zien, terwijl deelnemers die cognitief uitgeput waren (i.e., wat dus voor een meer reactieve oriëntatie op reputatiemanagement zorgt) morele compensatie lieten zien.

In het tweede experiment wilden we deze resultaten niet alleen repliceren, we wilden ook meer expliciet testen in hoeverre reputatiezorgen meespelen bij morele consistentie en compensatie. Daarom varieerden we in hoeverre deelnemers verantwoordelijk waren voor hun acties. We verwachtten dat als reputatiezorgen inderdaad verantwoordelijk zijn voor het optreden van morele consistentie en morele compensatie, deze ook voornamelijk gevonden zouden moeten worden wanneer mensen verantwoordelijk worden gehouden voor hun daden. De resultaten waren in lijn met onze verwachtingen, deelnemers die niet cognitief uitgeput waren (i.e., en dus een proactieve oriëntatie hadden) lieten morele consistentie zien, terwijl deelnemers die cognitief uitgeput waren (i.e., en dus een reactieve oriëntatie hadden) morele compensatie lieten zien. Deze resultaten vonden we alleen wanneer deelnemers verantwoordelijk voor hun daden waren. Deelnemers die geen verantwoording voor hun daden hoefden af te leggen lieten noch morele consistentie, noch morele compensatie zien. Uit deze resultaten blijkt dus dat zowel morele consistentie als morele compensatie optreden door reputatiezorgen.

De zelfregulatie van (on)ethisch gedrag in de werkcontext en het samenspel tussen persoonlijkheden

In **Hoofdstuk 5** onderzochten we de rol die een slechte behandeling van een leidinggevende heeft op het optreden van onethisch gedrag. We beargumenteerden dat leiders met een neurotische persoonlijkheid hun werknemers eerder slecht behandelen, waardoor deze werknemers eerder geneigd zijn om zich meer onethisch te gedragen. In dit hoofdstuk kijken we meer specifiek naar de context waarin slechte behandeling van een leidinggevende zich voordoet. In overeenstemming met de trekken activatie theorie (TAT; Tett & Burnett, 2003), beargumenteerden we dat de activatie van de neurotische persoonlijkheidstrek van leiders afhankelijk is van de aanwezigheid van trek-relevante wenken in de sociale context. Natuurlijk is de persoonlijkheid van werknemers een relevant aspect in de sociale context van leidinggevenden. We stelden dat werknemers met een neurotische persoonlijkheid meer sociale exclusie wenken laten zien (e.g., Morse, Sauerberger, Todd, & Funder, 2015) en dat juist leidinggevenden met een neurotische persoonlijkheid gevoeliger zijn voor deze vorm van sociale dreiging (e.g., Denissen & Penke, 2008; Matthews, 2004). Dus het is waarschijnlijk dat de neurotische persoonlijkheid van leidinggevenden wordt geactiveerd door de exclusie wenken van neurotische werknemers. We verwachtten dus dat de neurotische persoonlijkheid van werknemers interageert met de neurotische persoonlijkheid van leidinggevenden in het voorspellen van slechte behandeling van een leidinggevenden en dus van het onethisch gedrag van werknemers. Met andere woorden, de link tussen leider neuroticisme en de slechte behandeling van die leider wordt versterkt wanneer de werknemer ook een neurotische persoonlijkheid heeft. En dit heeft dan weer negatieve consequenties voor het onethisch gedrag van werknemers.

Om onze hypothesen te toetsen voerden we twee studies uit: een experimentele studie waarin we aantoonden dat werknemers met een neurotische

persoonlijkheid meer sociale exclusie wenken laten zien aan hun leidinggevende; en een veldstudie waarin we setjes van leidinggevende en werknemer benaderden. Zowel leidinggevenden als werknemers gaven hun niveau van neuroticisme aan, maar de leidinggevende beoordeelde het onethisch gedrag van de werknemer, terwijl werknemers beoordeelden in welke mate hun leidinggevende hen slecht behandelde en in welke mate zij zelf sociale exclusie wenken lieten zien. In deze tweede studie vonden we ondersteuning voor ons volledige model. Dat wil zeggen, we vonden dat leidinggevenden die hoog scoorden op neuroticisme eerder hun werknemer slecht behandelden, vooral wanneer deze werknemer ook hoog scoorde op neuroticisme, een effect dat verklaard werd door de sociale exclusie wenken van werknemers met een neurotische persoonlijkheid. Deze slechte behandeling van leidinggevenden had op zijn beurt dan weer tot gevolg dat de werknemers zich eerder onethisch gedroegen.

Conclusie

Deze dissertatie draagt bij aan de literatuur over ethisch en onethisch gedrag in een organisatie context door te kijken naar de invloed van zelfregulatie. Onze bevindingen tonen aan dat cognitieve uitputting ethisch gedrag belet en onethisch gedrag bevordert in een organisatorische context. Deze dissertatie verbetert onze kennis van het belang van individuele verschillen (morele identiteit), gedragsgeschiedenis en slechte behandeling van een leidinggevende voor de zelfregulatie van (on)ethisch gedrag.

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negative emotionality. In R. M. Stelmack (Ed.), *On the psychobiology of personality: Essays in honor of Marvin Zuckerman* (pp. 249-266). New York, NY: Elsevier Science.

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Appendix

Data Storage Fact Sheets

In this appendix, data storage fact sheets for each study appearing in this dissertation are included.

% Data Storage Fact Sheet Chapter 2, Study 1

% Name/identifier study: Leader self-regulation
% Author: Anne Joosten
% Date: 16/07/2015

1. Contact details
==========

1a. Main researcher

- name: Anne Joosten
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium
- e-mail: anne.joosten@ugent.be

1b. Responsible Staff Member (ZAP)

- name: Alain Van Hiel
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium
- e-mail: alain.vanhiel@ugent.be

If a response is not received when using the above contact details, please send an email to data.pp@ugent.be or contact Data Management, Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences, Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium.

2. Information about the datasets to which this sheet applies

==========

* Reference of the publication in which the datasets are reported:

DOI 10.1007/s10551-013-1686-2

* Which datasets in that publication does this sheet apply to?:

Study 1

3. Information about the files that have been stored

==========

3a. Raw data

---

* Have the raw data been stored by the main researcher? [x] YES / [ ] NO

If NO, please justify:

* On which platform are the raw data stored?

- [x] researcher PC
- [x] research group file server
- [ ] other (specify): ...

* Who has direct access to the raw data (i.e., without intervention of another person)?

- [x] main researcher
- [x] responsible ZAP

- [x] all members of the research group
- [ ] all members of UGent
- [ ] other (specify): ...

3b. Other files

---

* Which other files have been stored?
- [x] file(s) describing the transition from raw data to reported results. Specify: described in detail in SPSS syntax file on my pc/fileserver
- [x] file(s) containing processed data. Specify: SPSS datafile ready for analyses is stored on my pc/fileserver
- [x] file(s) containing analyses. Specify: specified in SPSS syntax file on my pc/fileserver
- [x] files(s) containing information about informed consent. Specify: a blank copy is saved on my PC
- [ ] a file specifying legal and ethical provisions
- [ ] file(s) that describe the content of the stored files and how this content should be interpreted. Specify: ...
- [ ] other files. Specify: ...

* On which platform are these other files stored?
- [x] individual PC
- [x] research group file server
- [ ] other: ...

* Who has direct access to these other files (i.e., without intervention of another person)?
- [x] main researcher
- [x] responsible ZAP
- [x] all members of the research group
- [ ] all members of UGent
- [ ] other (specify): ...

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% Data Storage Fact Sheet Chapter 2, Study 2

% Name/identifier study: Leader self-regulation
% Author: Anne Joosten
% Date: 16/07/2015

1. Contact details
==========

1a. Main researcher

- name: Anne Joosten
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium
- e-mail: anne.joosten@ugent.be

1b. Responsible Staff Member (ZAP)

- name: Alain Van Hiel
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- e-mail: alain.vanhiel@ugent.be

1c. Copromotor (collected the raw data)

- name: Marius van Dijke (Rotterdam School of Management)
- address: Burgemeester Oudlaan 50, 3062 PA Rotterdam, The Netherlands
- e-mail: mvandijke@rsm.nl

If a response is not received when using the above contact details, please send an email to data.pp@ugent.be or contact Data Management, Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences, Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium.

2. Information about the datasets to which this sheet applies

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* Reference of the publication in which the datasets are reported:

DOI 10.1007/s10551-013-1686-2

* Which datasets in that publication does this sheet apply to?:

Study 2

3. Information about the files that have been stored

==========

3a. Raw data

---

* Have the raw data been stored by the main researcher? [x] YES / [ ] NO

If NO, please justify:

* On which platform are the raw data stored?

- [x] researcher PC
- [x] research group file server

- [x] other (specify): the raw data were collected and owned by a third party (copromotor)

* Who has direct access to the raw data (i.e., without intervention of another person)?
- [x] main researcher
- [x] responsible ZAP
- [x] all members of the research group
- [ ] all members of UGent
- [x] other (specify): the raw data were collected and owned by a third party (copromotor)

3b. Other files
---

* Which other files have been stored?
- [x] file(s) describing the transition from raw data to reported results. Specify: described in detail in SPSS syntax file on my pc/fileserver
- [x] file(s) containing processed data. Specify: SPSS datafile ready for analyses is stored on my pc/fileserver
- [x] file(s) containing analyses. Specify: specified in SPSS syntax file on my pc/fileserver
- [ ] files(s) containing information about informed consent
- [ ] a file specifying legal and ethical provisions
- [ ] file(s) that describe the content of the stored files and how this content should be interpreted. Specify: ...

- [ ] other files. Specify: ...

* On which platform are these other files stored?
- [x] individual PC
- [x] research group file server
- [ ] other: ...

* Who has direct access to these other files (i.e., without intervention of another person)?
- [x] main researcher
- [x] responsible ZAP
- [x] all members of the research group
- [ ] all members of UGent
- [ ] other (specify): ...

4. Reproduction
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* Have the results been reproduced independently?: [ ] YES / [x] NO

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- name:
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% Data Storage Fact Sheet Chapter 3, Study 1

% Name/identifier study: Power, self-control, and moral identity
% Author: Anne Joosten
% Date: 12/05/2016

1. Contact details
==========

1a. Main researcher

- name: Anne Joosten
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1b. Responsible Staff Member (ZAP)

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If a response is not received when using the above contact details, please send an email to data.pp@ugent.be or contact Data Management, Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences, Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium.

2. Information about the datasets to which this sheet applies

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* Reference of the publication in which the datasets are reported:

DOI 10.1371/journal.pone.0126377

* Which datasets in that publication does this sheet apply to?:

Study 1

3. Information about the files that have been stored

==========

3a. Raw data

---

* Have the raw data been stored by the main researcher? [x] YES / [ ] NO

If NO, please justify:

* On which platform are the raw data stored?

- [x] researcher PC
- [x] research group file server
- [ ] other (specify): ...

* Who has direct access to the raw data (i.e., without intervention of another person)?

- [x] main researcher
- [x] responsible ZAP

- [x] all members of the research group
- [ ] all members of UGent
- [ ] other (specify): ...

3b. Other files

---

* Which other files have been stored?
- [x] file(s) describing the transition from raw data to reported results. Specify: described in detail in SPSS syntax file on my pc/fileserver
- [x] file(s) containing processed data. Specify: SPSS datafile ready for analyses is stored on my pc/fileserver
- [x] file(s) containing analyses. Specify: specified in SPSS syntax file on my pc/fileserver
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- [ ] file(s) that describe the content of the stored files and how this content should be interpreted. Specify: ...
- [ ] other files. Specify: ...

* On which platform are these other files stored?
- [x] individual PC
- [x] research group file server
- [ ] other: ...

* Who has direct access to these other files (i.e., without intervention of another person)?
  - [x] main researcher
  - [x] responsible ZAP
  - [x] all members of the research group
  - [ ] all members of UGent
  - [ ] other (specify): ...

4. Reproduction

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* Have the results been reproduced independently?: [ ] YES / [x] NO

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% Data Storage Fact Sheet Chapter 3, Study 2

% Name/identifier study: Power, self-control, and moral identity
% Author: Anne Joosten
% Date: 12/05/2016

1. Contact details
==========

1a. Main researcher

- name: Anne Joosten
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium
- e-mail: anne.joosten@ugent.be

1b. Responsible Staff Member (ZAP)

- name: Alain Van Hiel
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- e-mail: alain.vanhiel@ugent.be

If a response is not received when using the above contact details, please send an email to data.pp@ugent.be or contact Data Management, Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences, Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium.

2. Information about the datasets to which this sheet applies

==========

* Reference of the publication in which the datasets are reported:

DOI 10.1371/journal.pone.0126377

* Which datasets in that publication does this sheet apply to?:

Study 2

3. Information about the files that have been stored

==========

3a. Raw data

---

* Have the raw data been stored by the main researcher? [x] YES / [ ] NO

If NO, please justify:

* On which platform are the raw data stored?

- [x] researcher PC
- [x] research group file server
- [x] other (specify): data were collected in collaboration with several other researchers

* Who has direct access to the raw data (i.e., without intervention of another person)?

- [x] main researcher

- [x] responsible ZAP
- [x] all members of the research group
- [ ] all members of UGent
- [x] other (specify): data were collected in collaboration with several other researchers

3b. Other files

---

* Which other files have been stored?
- [x] file(s) describing the transition from raw data to reported results. Specify: described in detail in SPSS syntax file on my pc/fileserver
- [x] file(s) containing processed data. Specify: SPSS datafile ready for analyses is stored on my pc/fileserver
- [x] file(s) containing analyses. Specify: specified in SPSS syntax file on my pc/fileserver
- [ ] files(s) containing information about informed consent
- [ ] a file specifying legal and ethical provisions
- [ ] file(s) that describe the content of the stored files and how this content should be interpreted. Specify: ...
- [ ] other files. Specify: ...

* On which platform are these other files stored?
- [x] individual PC
- [x] research group file server

- [ ] other: ...

* Who has direct access to these other files (i.e., without intervention of another person)?
- [x] main researcher
- [x] responsible ZAP
- [x] all members of the research group
- [ ] all members of UGent
- [ ] other (specify): ...

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% Data Storage Fact Sheet Chapter 4, Study 1

% Name/identifier study: Moral consistency and compensation
% Author: Anne Joosten
% Date: 12/05/2016

1. Contact details
==========

1a. Main researcher

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- e-mail: anne.joosten@ugent.be

1b. Responsible Staff Member (ZAP)

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- e-mail: alain.vanhiel@ugent.be

If a response is not received when using the above contact details, please send an email to data.pp@ugent.be or contact Data Management, Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences, Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium.

2. Information about the datasets to which this sheet applies

==========

* Reference of the publication in which the datasets are reported:

DOI 10.1007/s10551-013-1794-z

* Which datasets in that publication does this sheet apply to?:

Study 1

3. Information about the files that have been stored

==========

3a. Raw data

---

* Have the raw data been stored by the main researcher? [x] YES / [ ] NO

If NO, please justify:

* On which platform are the raw data stored?

- [x] researcher PC
- [x] research group file server
- [ ] other (specify): ...

* Who has direct access to the raw data (i.e., without intervention of another person)?

- [x] main researcher
- [x] responsible ZAP

- [x] all members of the research group
- [ ] all members of UGent
- [ ] other (specify): ...

3b. Other files

---

* Which other files have been stored?
- [x] file(s) describing the transition from raw data to reported results. Specify: described in detail in SPSS syntax file on my pc/fileserver
- [x] file(s) containing processed data. Specify: SPSS datafile ready for analyses is stored on my pc/fileserver
- [x] file(s) containing analyses. Specify: specified in SPSS syntax file on my pc/fileserver
- [x] files(s) containing information about informed consent. Specify: a blank copy is saved on my PC
- [ ] a file specifying legal and ethical provisions
- [ ] file(s) that describe the content of the stored files and how this content should be interpreted. Specify: ...
- [ ] other files. Specify: ...

* On which platform are these other files stored?
- [x] individual PC
- [x] research group file server
- [ ] other: ...

* Who has direct access to these other files (i.e., without intervention of another person)?
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  - [x] responsible ZAP
  - [x] all members of the research group
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% Data Storage Fact Sheet Chapter 4, Study 2

% Name/identifier study: Moral consistency and compensation
% Author: Anne Joosten
% Date: 12/05/2016

1. Contact details
==========

1a. Main researcher

- name: Anne Joosten
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium
- e-mail: anne.joosten@ugent.be

1b. Responsible Staff Member (ZAP)

- name: Alain Van Hiel
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium
- e-mail: alain.vanhiel@ugent.be

If a response is not received when using the above contact details, please send an email to data.pp@ugent.be or contact Data Management, Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences, Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium.

2. Information about the datasets to which this sheet applies

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* Reference of the publication in which the datasets are reported:

DOI 10.1007/s10551-013-1794-z

* Which datasets in that publication does this sheet apply to?:

Study 2

3. Information about the files that have been stored

==========

3a. Raw data

---

* Have the raw data been stored by the main researcher? [x] YES / [ ] NO

If NO, please justify:

* On which platform are the raw data stored?

- [x] researcher PC
- [x] research group file server
- [ ] other (specify): ...

* Who has direct access to the raw data (i.e., without intervention of another person)?

- [x] main researcher
- [x] responsible ZAP

- [x] all members of the research group
- [ ] all members of UGent
- [ ] other (specify): ...

3b. Other files

---

* Which other files have been stored?
- [x] file(s) describing the transition from raw data to reported results. Specify: described in detail in SPSS syntax file on my pc/fileserver
- [x] file(s) containing processed data. Specify: SPSS datafile ready for analyses is stored on my pc/fileserver
- [x] file(s) containing analyses. Specify: specified in SPSS syntax file on my pc/fileserver
- [x] files(s) containing information about informed consent. Specify: a blank copy is saved on my PC
- [ ] a file specifying legal and ethical provisions
- [ ] file(s) that describe the content of the stored files and how this content should be interpreted. Specify: ...
- [ ] other files. Specify: ...

* On which platform are these other files stored?
- [x] individual PC
- [x] research group file server
- [ ] other: ...

* Who has direct access to these other files (i.e., without intervention of another person)?
  - [x] main researcher
  - [x] responsible ZAP
  - [x] all members of the research group
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% Data Storage Fact Sheet Chapter 5, Study 1

% Name/identifier study: Insecurity breeds negativity
% Author: Anne Joosten
% Date: 12/05/2016

1. Contact details
==========

1a. Main researcher

- name: Anne Joosten
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium
- e-mail: anne.joosten@ugent.be

1b. Responsible Staff Member (ZAP)

- name: Alain Van Hiel
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium
- e-mail: alain.vanhiel@ugent.be

If a response is not received when using the above contact details, please send an email to data.pp@ugent.be or contact Data Management, Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences, Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium.

2. Information about the datasets to which this sheet applies

==========

* Reference of the publication in which the datasets are reported:
Joosten, A., van Dijke, M., De Cremer, D., Bostyn, D. H., & Van Hiel, A.. (re-submitted (R2) for peer review). Insecurity breeds Negativity: Synergetic Effects of Employee and Leader Neuroticism on Abusive Supervision and Antisocial Work Behavior. Journal of Applied Psychology
* Which datasets in that publication does this sheet apply to?:
Study 1

3. Information about the files that have been stored

==========

3a. Raw data

---

* Have the raw data been stored by the main researcher? [x] YES / [ ] NO
If NO, please justify:

* On which platform are the raw data stored?
- [x] researcher PC
- [x] research group file server
- [ ] other (specify): ...

* Who has direct access to the raw data (i.e., without intervention of another person)?
 - [x] main researcher
 - [x] responsible ZAP
 - [x] all members of the research group
 - [ ] all members of UGent
 - [ ] other (specify): ...

3b. Other files

---

* Which other files have been stored?
 - [x] file(s) describing the transition from raw data to reported results. Specify: described in detail in SPSS syntax file on my pc/fileserver
 - [x] file(s) containing processed data. Specify: SPSS datafile ready for analyses is stored on my pc/fileserver
 - [x] file(s) containing analyses. Specify: specified in SPSS syntax file on my pc/fileserver
 - [ ] files(s) containing information about informed consent. Specify: a blank copy is saved on my PC
 - [ ] a file specifying legal and ethical provisions
 - [ ] file(s) that describe the content of the stored files and how this content should be interpreted. Specify: ...
 - [ ] other files. Specify: ...

* On which platform are these other files stored?
  - [x] individual PC
  - [x] research group file server
  - [ ] other: ...

* Who has direct access to these other files (i.e., without intervention of another person)?
  - [x] main researcher
  - [x] responsible ZAP
  - [x] all members of the research group
  - [ ] all members of UGent
  - [ ] other (specify): ...

4. Reproduction

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* If yes, by whom (add if multiple):
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  - address:
  - affiliation:
  - e-mail:

% Data Storage Fact Sheet Chapter 5, Study 2

% Name/identifier study: Insecurity breeds negativity
% Author: Anne Joosten
% Date: 12/05/2016

1. Contact details
==========

1a. Main researcher

- name: Anne Joosten
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium
- e-mail: anne.joosten@ugent.be

1b. Responsible Staff Member (ZAP)

- name: Alain Van Hiel
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium
- e-mail: alain.vanhiel@ugent.be

If a response is not received when using the above contact details, please send an email to data.pp@ugent.be or contact Data Management, Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences, Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium.

2. Information about the datasets to which this sheet applies

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* Reference of the publication in which the datasets are reported:
Joosten, A., van Dijke, M., De Cremer, D., Bostyn, D. H., & Van Hiel, A.. (re-submitted (R2) for peer review). Insecurity breeds Negativity: Synergetic Effects of Employee and Leader Neuroticism on Abusive Supervision and Antisocial Work Behavior. Journal of Applied Psychology
* Which datasets in that publication does this sheet apply to?:
Study 2

3. Information about the files that have been stored

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3a. Raw data

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* Have the raw data been stored by the main researcher? [x] YES / [ ] NO
If NO, please justify:

* On which platform are the raw data stored?
- [x] researcher PC
- [x] research group file server
- [x] other (specify): data were collected in collaboration with several other researchers

* Who has direct access to the raw data (i.e., without intervention of another person)?
 - [x] main researcher
 - [x] responsible ZAP
 - [x] all members of the research group
 - [ ] all members of UGent
 - [x] other (specify): data were collected in collaboration with several other researchers

3b. Other files

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* Which other files have been stored?
 - [x] file(s) describing the transition from raw data to reported results. Specify: described in detail in SPSS syntax file on my pc/fileserver
 - [x] file(s) containing processed data. Specify: SPSS datafile ready for analyses is stored on my pc/fileserver
 - [x] file(s) containing analyses. Specify: analyses are performed by Dries H. Bostyn and are stored on his and my pc/fileserver
 - [ ] files(s) containing information about informed consent
 - [ ] a file specifying legal and ethical provisions
 - [ ] file(s) that describe the content of the stored files and how this content should be interpreted. Specify: ...
 - [ ] other files. Specify: ...

* On which platform are these other files stored?
  - [x] individual PC
  - [x] research group file server
  - [x] other: PC Dries H. Bostyn

* Who has direct access to these other files (i.e., without intervention of another person)?
  - [x] main researcher
  - [x] responsible ZAP
  - [x] all members of the research group
  - [ ] all members of UGent
  - [ ] other (specify): ...

4. Reproduction

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* Have the results been reproduced independently?: [ ] YES / [x] NO

* If yes, by whom (add if multiple):
  - name:
  - address:
  - affiliation:
  - e-mail: