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Kaftinformatie: "The conversion of the ascetics" Gandhara, 2nd-3rd century AD. Sculpture located within the British Museum. Picture by Tillo Detige.

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Dialogues With(in) the Pāli Vinaya

*A Research into the Dynamics and Dialectics of
the Pāli Vinaya's Ascetic others,
with a Special Focus on the Jain other*

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- *C'est le temps que tu as perdu pour ta rose qui fait ta rose si importante.*
- *C'est le temps que j'ai perdu pour ma rose ...., fit le petit prince, afin de se souvenir.*

Antoine de Saint-Exupéry, Le Petit Prince, 1999 (1946) : 78.

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From the bottom of my heart, I thank you.

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Claire Maes
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Prologue

> *[E]very tradition, including Buddhism, is a flowing together of currents [...] . There is no pure substratum, no static and independent core called 'Buddhism' – in the founder's day or in later generations. What we have come to call 'Buddhism' was always becoming, being made and remade over and over again in contact and exchange, as it was carried along in the flow of things.* (Tweed 2011: 23)

In a Pāli Vinaya narrative introducing the first *pārājika* precept a conversation is rendered wherein a Buddhist *bhikkhu* (Skt. *bhikṣu,* 'ascetic')[1] inquires the Buddha for the reasons why the virtuous ascetic conduct or Brahma-life (*brahmacariyā*)[2] lasted long under some of the 24 Buddhas of the previous *kalpas*, and why it was short lived among others. From the Buddha's answer it becomes clear that one of the key factors for ensuring the presence of Brahma-life is the Pātimokkhasutta, for without it, disciples are like "various flowers, loose on a flat piece of wood, not tied together by a thread, [and] are scattered about, whirled about and destroyed by the wind."[3] On hearing the Buddha's reply the *bhikkhu*, being apprehensive for a long continuation of the Brahma-

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[1] With reference to the early Indian Buddhist context, I use the term 'ascetic' in a broad sense, this is, as referring to any individual possibly understood by the '*samaṇa-brāhmaṇa*' compound (Skt. *śramaṇa-brāhmaṇa*). On the *samaṇa-brāhmaṇa* compound, see Appendix 'Labeling the Ascetic other' p. 152 ff. I will thus use the term 'ascetic' simply in opposition to 'householder,' irrespective of the varying degrees of practiced austerity (*tapas*) between the various *samaṇa-brāhmaṇa* communities or within one and the same community.

[2] On the social context and various meanings of the term *brahmacariyā*, see Gombrich 2009: 202-3. See also Horner 2004 (1940) BD I: liv-lvi for her insightful reflections on her difficulty to translate this term in the Pāli Vinaya.

The Padabhājaniya (old word commentary) to *saṃghādisesa* VIII equates '*brahmacariyā*' with monkhood (*bhikkhubhāva*), *śramaṇa-dharma* (*samaṇadhamma*), morality (*sīla*) and austerity (*tapas*). Cf. Vin III: 163-4; BD I 282.

[3] Vin III 8: "*seyyathāpi Sāriputta nānāpupphāni phalake nikkhittāni suttena asaṃgahitāni tāni vāto vikirati vidhamati viddhaṃseti*" (trsl. I.B. Horner BD I 16).

life, presses the Buddha to proclaim the Pātimokkhasutta without delay, but the Buddha tells him to be patient, since, he explains:

> The teacher does not make known [...] the course of training [sikkhāpadaṃ] for disciples, or appoint the Pāṭimokkha until some conditions causing the cankers appear here in the Order.4 (trsl. I.B. Horner BD I 18)

According to this tradition recorded in the Suttavibhaṅga ('Explanation of the Rules'), the Pātimokkhasutta is not a body of precepts conceived and imparted at the outset of the saṅgha to guide its members on the path to liberation, but it is the outcome of having had to practically meet specific unfavourable conditions that, if left unregulated, might have led to the deterioration of the virtuous conduct of Buddhist bhikkhus and consequently also of the saṅgha as a whole. This brief tradition further also provides an explanation for the presence of introductory stories to each precept in the Pāli Vinaya in which the monk-editors went through obvious great efforts to record the supposed events that led to the formulation of these precepts.

Without taking prior notice of the specific content of the precepts or of their introductory stories, one could correctly presume that some precepts and narrative elements came into being due to the various relationships existent between the early Buddhist community and the other ascetic communities present at that time. Surely, the interaction and confrontation of the Buddhist *saṅgha* with contemporary ascetic communities might repeatedly have effected 'unfavourable conditions' that led to the formulation of various precepts of the Pātimokkhasutta. But even when leaving the 'unfavourable conditions' aside, already the mere presence of other but similarly organized ascetic communities most certainly resulted in actual dynamic forces triggering and directing the development of the Buddhist ascetic organization.

Certain contemporary ascetic communities, such as the Jain (*nigaṇṭha*, Skt. Nirgrantha) and *ājīvika* communities, were already well-established at the very beginning of the Buddhist *saṅgha*. The fact that Buddhists shared their claims on leading a *samaṇa* (Skt. *śramaṇa*) lifestyle and on offering an effective path to liberation, must have pressurized the Buddhist community to adopt a number of their practices that were already widely recognized by contemporary ascetics and lay-followers alike to be effective means to lead a virtuous *samaṇa* lifestyle. At the same time, during the course of development of the Buddhist monastic *saṅgha,* the customs of these contemporary ascetics might also have functioned as negative reference points against which Buddhist *bhikkhus* felt the need to differentiate themselves. In other words, it is only reasonable to assume that the various relations existent between the Buddhist *saṅgha* and other

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4 Vin III 9: "*na tāva Sāriputta satthā sāvakānaṃ sikkhāpadaṃ paññāpeti uddisati pātimokkhaṃ yāva na idh' ekacce āsavaṭṭhāniyā dhammā saṃghe pātubhavanti.*"

contemporary ascetic communities regularly acted as a dynamic force that stirred the Buddhist community to endorse regulations to, on the one hand, be in conformity with certain well-established ascetic customs and on the other hand, to (re)define their community as a clearly separate order. Any study aimed at understanding the history of the early Buddhist ascetic tradition must therefore necessarily try to reconstruct the nature of the interaction of the Buddhist *saṅgha* with contemporary ascetic movements, and consider the questions how this interaction influenced the development of their organization, or also, how these ascetic others were perceived and dealt with and how it affected their self-perception and definition. Framing this PhD are precisely these research questions.

Departing from this truism that the development of the early Buddhist ascetic community evolved in intense dialogue with its wider Indian contexts, I question how and how much of this dialogue can still be traced in an important Buddhist monastic text, i.e. the Pāli Vinaya of the Theravāda school.[5] The treatment of these research questions will be dealt with in the following way. In section I, 'Scholarly Frameworks, Past and Present,' I first discuss how the very question of *dialogue* relates to today's larger contemporary scholarly language. In section II, 'A Brief Typology of Contact Opportunities' I turn to examine the occasions when and the places where early Buddhist *bhikkhus* could come into contact with their ascetic others, and ask how this affected their on-going boundary and identity negotiation. In section III, I examine processes of othering in the Pāli Vinaya, and in the final section, section IV, I show how the early Buddhist ascetic community evolved in close symbiosis with its wider Indian ascetic landscape by means of a philological excursion of the term *titthiya,* being the Pāli Vinaya's most frequently employed term to refer to the early Buddhist *bhikkhu's* ascetic other.

    To study which elements within the Pāli Vinaya are products of and best understood within these dialogical contexts of the early Buddhist tradition, is to admit that the development of the early Buddhist ascetic *saṅgha* should not be understood as a simple, coherent, internal or linear development, but as a dynamic, changing and dialectic process wherein the contemporary ascetic communities did not play a marginal but a central role. It is my personal conviction that a critical reading of the Pāli Vinaya is bound to be unsuccessful, or at least incomplete, if the dynamic and dialectic force of the early Buddhist *bhikkhu's* ascetic others, is not fully taken into consideration. For, as it has recently been underscored again in a theoretical reflection on the current state of affairs of Religious Studies, the formative stages of any religious system is always characterized by the

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[5] On the question "how Theravāda is Theravāda," see Skilling: 2012.

amalgamation of elements from different traditions. This process is the general rule; purification and homogenisation are secondary phenomena.[6]

In full agreement with this observation, my study aims in addition to identifying those elements within the Pāli Vinaya that developed in response to the various existing inter-religious contacts, to dismantle strategies reflected within and of the Pāli Vinaya that enabled the early Buddhist ascetic community to, in a most basic sense, become a community and to be recognized as such. Or, to put it differently, this research also investigates the dynamic processes that enabled the early Buddhist monastic community to be both qualified as a community and, to use an anachronistic term, as 'Buddhist.' This double quest translates itself into various research specific questions, such as how did early Buddhists define themselves and their contemporary ascetic others? What terms did they adopt to refer to these ascetic others and what do these terms reveal about the manner in which early Buddhists perceived and defined themselves *vis-à-vis* those very others? Which precepts address the problem of 'conversion' or 'otherness' and are there different treatments for different 'others'? To the narratological level of the Pāli Vinaya the question is put forward *how* the Pāli Vinaya refers to these ascetic others and what it establishes with these very references. Also, we ask which narrative structures or strategies are developed to help to create, as it were, a 'Buddhist' tradition?

At this point, one may already justly remark that it is counterintuitive to hope to find in the Pāli Vinaya faithful reflections of the impact of other ascetic traditions on the development of the early Indian Buddhist monastic organisation since the Pāli Vinaya, as it is generally well realized, being compiled within and for the Theravāda tradition is a highly normative and prescriptive source that moreover evolved during a long period of time before it was written down in the first century BCE. Yet, how tricky our current task may appear in this light, it is nevertheless highly important to try to circumvent this problem by developing effective methodological readings of the Pāli Vinaya wherein the role and impact of these 'others' can be brought fully to the foreground. Otherwise the risk exist that when consulting the Pāli Vinaya, one elapses in the academic loophole of merely being 'paraphrasing the texts,' offering nothing more than a 'weak continuation of the tradition itself,'[7] or also, that one presents the monastic tradition the Pāli Vinaya reflects as a static unity that simply was and continued to be there for some time, ignoring the constant negotiating of the early Buddhist monastic community with itself and its ascetic surroundings in order to create its very tradition.

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[6] Krech 2012: 19.

[7] For this risk of remaining at a descriptive level when researching any religious tradition and for thus just being echoing the voice of the tradition itself, see Jensen 2008 and Smith 2001.

I hope that the following pages achieve to offer an effective and much needed move away from the traditional stories concerning the development of the Buddhist monastic precepts and structures wherein (the authority of) the Buddha is having the central role, to the boundaries of the early Buddhist ascetic community where 'Buddhist' identity was continuously being negotiated, just as the possibility of incorporating new, or differing and alternative ascetic ideas and practices. By concentrating on the *dynamic and dialectic force of the ascetic others*, I hope to successfully move the spotlight from the centre of the early Buddhist community to its boundaries where the 'flowing together of currents' can be seen, or where, in short, *the dynamics of "the making off"* can still be best appreciated.

Dialogues *with* the Pāli Vinaya

Scholarly Frameworks, Past and Present

> *[U]nderstanding something implicitly involves the prejudices of one's own 'historical situatedness'; one simply cannot avoid having an agenda or a perspective upon things by virtue of one's cultural and historical particularity.* (King 2008 (1999): 95)[1]

All scholars produce a scientific discourse inasmuch as they are directed by it. Scholars both simultaneously belong to a scholarly tradition as well as they actively (but therefore not necessarily consciously and purposefully) create that tradition. Consequently, "[i]t does not matter whether one generation applauds the previous generation or hisses it – in either event, it carries the previous generation within itself."[2]

Research is conducted within the scholarly language one has been taught in, and one may either be inspired or limited by it, but one is certainly being directed by it. By "scholarly language" I mean the received scientific discourse of an academic generation with its dominant and framing research paradigms, wherein scholarly questions are raised, discussed, pursued or abandoned for other questions. Shaping to a great extent the research content and applied methodologies of a particular scientific discourse are the various specific academic disciplines, institutionally supported, and artificially separated from one another in terms of required specialization, treated subjects and

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[1] Richard King formulated this lucid observation in his critical discussion on the question whether the act of 'Orientalism' is not inevitably present to a lesser or higher degree in any study of Indian religious and philosophical material. For this observation he was inspired by the German philosopher Gadamer. Cf. King 2008 (1999): 95. For a discussion on the act of orientalism, see the second section of this chapter.

[2] José Ortega y Gasset quoted in Charles Hallisey 1995: 31. See also Richard DAVIS 1999 (1998): 214- 223 for a similar observation on the difficulty to escape the patterns of traditional scholarly narratives, here, in regards to the traditional scholarly account on South Indian Jainism and Śaivism.

generally also in terms of distinct physical centres.[3] Characterizing this scholarly language is the fact that it tends to change gradually, with changes becoming perceptible only in retrospect, after a (few successive) generation(s) of academics. Notable exceptions to this tendency of slow change should be expected in the event of historical axial moments that urgently require and effect new theoretical approaches, such as World War II or the 1968 cultural revolutions.[4] Our concept of scholarly language agrees thus with Jacques Derrida's notion of *langue*, namely inasmuch as we speak in a language the language is also speaking us.[5]

As scholars, it is essential to develop an awareness concerning this fact that one is simultaneously speaking in and being spoken by a particular scholarly language, and this for two reasons. First, it effectively underscores the plain but important observation that our products of knowledge are relative. Being the outcome of a particular *dialogue* between one's scholarly language, one's research questions and one's object of inquiry, any 'fact' presented as knowledge will by its very nature be relative.[6] Second, if a particular scholarly language is to change, if the structuring frame for our research material is to become more appropriate and meaningful to discuss a particular subject, then it needs to, so to speak, become aware both of itself, and of its framing relationship to its object of study. In other words, if scholarly language is to become more adequate one needs to develop an awareness of, in King's words, "one's own 'historical situatedness'." The purpose of the following chapters is precisely this: to analyse the "historical situatedness" of this *Dialogues with(in) the Pāli Vinaya.* I try to answer, as far as possible, how this PhD relates with today's larger contemporary scholarly framework. The questions of the *dynamics and dialectics of the Pāli Vinaya's ascetic others* are framed, directed and inspired by, what I would like to term, the modern scholarly discourse on *anti-essentialism.* In broad terms, the anti-essentialist discourse may be conceived as the discursive thought rejecting the humanist idea that a subject is defined by an inherently present, unique and essential characteristic. Our discussion of this anti-essentialist discourse and its historical development will bring us to an analysis of the paradigm-shifting period of the 1970s (Part II). As this paradigm-shifting period of the 1970s should be understood in its – albeit mostly negative – relation to the late

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[3] For a brief and insightful discussion of the history of the modern university with its main division of the "two cultures" ('sciences' and 'humanities') and its subdivisions into various disciplines, see Wallerstein 2004: 1-22.

[4] It is, for instance, no coincidence that we speak of "Post World War II scholarship," since the hangover of the Second World War and the subsequent period of decolonization required an urgent rethinking and restructuring of the academic disciplines, both with regards to their methods and subjects of knowledge. See further part II: Anti-Essentialist Framework of *Dialogues with(in) the Pāli* Vinaya.

[5] See "Force et signification," *in* Derrida 1967: 9-49.

[6] Cp. Jonathan Smith's lucid statement "I work very hard at persuading my college students that facts become data only for purposes of argumentation." McCutcheon 2008:1 (quoting Smith 2002: 9).

nineteenth century, early twentieth century scholarly language, I start with an analysis of the dominant research paradigms of that period. This is, I begin with an examination of the questions and methodologies directing the then on-going scholarship on the Jain and Buddhist ascetic traditions, and ask which particular 'Jainism' and 'Buddhism' came thus to be constructed.

Part I: Originating Origins. The Late Nineteenth, Early Twentieth Century Scholarly Framework

The 'Jainism' and 'Buddhism' of late nineteenth century and early twentieth century European scholars, were a Jainism and a Buddhism informed by historicism, scientism, and by what modern scholars have referred to as some long-standing Protestant presuppositions regarding the importance of scriptures.[7] The research questions and methods directing their particular construction of Jainism and Buddhism were modelled after those of the recently established disciplines of Science of Religion and Science of Language, and inspired by the language of evolutionary Theories which reached a high in the 1860s with Charles Darwin's publication *On the Origin of Species.* A theme connecting all academic disciplines of that time is the set of interrelated questions of origins and development.

While considering that within contemporary academia the assessment of the *history* of a religious field - as Jain and Buddhist studies are - is being researched both by historians (of religion), and by those scholars directly engaged in the field, it is not surprising to find many research papers discussing the dominant paradigms of late nineteenth and early twentieth century scholarship on Jainism and Buddhism.[8] Some

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[7] For a good general academic introduction into Jainism, see Dundas 2002² (1992). For Indian Buddhism see Gombrich 2009 & Williams (et al) 2012.

[8] Many various groups of scholars are directly engaged in the fields of Buddhist and Jain studies: Indologists, Buddhologists, Jainologists, anthropologists, sociologists, Sinologists, Japanologists, philologists etc.

It may be noted that 1807 is traditionally considered to be the birthdate of Jain Studies (cf. Schubring 1935: 1) as Jains were for the first time mentioned in a scholarly publication on India. It concerns the publications of Colin Mackenzie's (1754-1821) and Sir Henry Thomas Colebrooke's (1765-1837) accounts of India and its inhabitants in the journal *Asiatic Researches* 9. Both Mackenzie, who became the first Surveyor General of India in 1815 and Colebrooke, who was the director of the Royal Asiatic Society, resided for many years in India and became pioneers in the collection of documents and manuscripts for the Oriental study of India's heritage.

Flügel notes that the emic and etic use of 'Jains' as a term of (self-) designation became current from 1807 onwards, due to Colebrooke's article 'Observations on the Sect of Jains.' Flügel 2005: 4. Cf. Coolebrooke 1807.

outstanding papers outlining these paradigms in either general historical terms, or by means of specific case studies are Judith Snodgrass 2007's "Defining Modern Buddhism: Mr. and Mrs. Rhys Davids and the Pāli Text Society," Charles Hallisey 1995's "Roads Taken and Not Taken in the Study of Theravāda Buddhism," Mitch Numark's "The Scottish 'Discovery' of Jainism in Nineteenth-Century Bombay" (2013), and John Cort 1990's "Models of and for the Study of the Jains." Philip Almond's 1988 *The British Discovery of Buddhism* is still today a most informative monograph discussing the many cultural and ideological frames shaping the British discussions (or better, creations) and multiple evaluations of 'Buddhism' during the Victorian period.[9]

In the presence of this scholarship I have chosen to elucidate the research paradigms by especially focussing on those scholars whose work may be considered as being paradigmatic examples of the then current approach to the early Jain and Buddhist ascetic traditions. Being a critical reflection of our inherited mould for understanding the early Jain and Buddhist ascetic traditions, the following pages should by no means be understood as a rejection of this late nineteenth and early twentieth century scholarship. On the contrary, much of the research presented in this PhD is highly indebted to the many valuable contributions of that time. It may therefore be stressed that the main concern of our analysis is not a (re-)evaluation of the research results of that time; rather, the main objective is to point out the dominant research paradigms that directed the very research questions and methodologies of that time (= Part I) to, in a second instance, question how these affected our current understanding of and approach to the early Jain and Buddhist ascetic traditions (= Part II). The value of this discussion lies in the facts that it will not only enable us to better understand our own 'historical situatedness,' but also that it effectively underscores the importance of an on-going methodological reflection that, ideally speaking, would be in dialogue with one's scholarly heritage, one's own contemporary scholarly language, and one's object of study.

On the history of the study of the Jain tradition, see Winternitz 1920: 289-356. Discussing the canon of the Jains, Winternitz reviews the western study of the Jain texts from its inception onwards up to 1920. Three articles of the late Kendall Folkert (and edited by John Cort) discuss with great lucidity the history of Jain studies, its generative context, initial research questions and patterns and some of its lasting consequences. Folkert 1993 (1989; 1980-1984; 1975-1980). See also Flügel 2005 'The Invention of Jainism: A Short History of Jaina Studies' and Cort 1990 where many more references treating the history of Jain studies may be found.

[9] As starting date of the Victorian period the year 1837 is generally given, being the year that Victoria became a queen, and as closing date the year 1901, being the year of Queen Victoria's death. Other conventional data are 1830-1900.

Historicism

Late nineteenth, early twentieth century scholarly language was one predominantly concerned with the interrelated questions of origins and development. These questions were informed by a then newly felt need for *history* which was caused by an in those days prevailing belief in historicism, or in the idea that all contemporary things could be accounted for in terms of their past, or in terms of their specific historical development.

Any cursory reading of late nineteenth century and early twentieth century European accounts on 'Jainism' or 'Buddhism' shows the scholars' deep engagement with questions pertaining to the historical origins of these religious traditions. It underlay, for instance, Hermann Jacobi's very concern with the historicity of the twenty-third and twenty-fourth Jain *tīrthaṅkara* Parśvānath and Mahāvīra (cf. below), and Rhys Davids' efforts to construct his historical biography of the Buddha.[10] As John Cort noted, in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century " '*Origin and development* of something became almost a cliche,' " for at that time an "[i]nterest in history naturally led to an interest in origins and beginnings."[11] The then fairly newly established discipline of Science of Religion ("Religionswissenschaft") was first and foremost a *History* of Religion.[12]

The strong interest in and need for history in nineteenth century Europe was a tail end of the rapid social and cultural changes effected by the then on-going industrialization processes. These changes awoke an awareness of the cultural and historical contingency of one's own present situation that, as Krech noted, arose an interest in history, but not in history as a sole reservoir of facts, but as a means to understand the contemporary society. The need was felt for a history that could answer

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[10] Cf. Rhys Davids, 1878, *Buddhism: being a Sketch of the Life and Teachings of Gautama, the Buddha.* London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge. He constructed his biography by means of a critical comparison of the various Buddhist canonical texts he had at his disposal. In his construction he shows a positive appreciation for the Pāli canon – considering it to be the oldest and hence most authoritative version, and a general negative appreciation for all the 'supernatural' elements surrounding the Buddha's life, explaining them away as common features of 'hero-worship' of common people. Cf. Davids 1878: 17.

[11] Cf. Cort 1990: 50 & 51. Cort (p.50) quotes here from Mircea Eliade, 1969. *The Quest.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

[12] The discipline 'Science of Religion' originated within the configuration of the modern university in the second half of the nineteenth century. For a socio-cultural historical analysis of the rise of the 'science of religion' with its initial stress on 'origin and development,' see Krech (2000). See also Kippenberg's (2002) monograph discussing the rise of the historical concept of religion against the nineteenth century background of modernization *Discovering Religious History in the Modern Age,* being a translation of his 1997 volume *Die Entdeckung der Religionsgeschichte, Religionswissenschaft und Moderne.* On the discipline's aim and methodology, see further in this chapter.

the why of the present being as it is and not being something else.[13] This particular interest in history wherein "the present had to be contextualized with regard to the past" resulted in historicism.[14] A historicism that, it should be realized, "permeated almost all nineteenth-century scholarship in Europe and North America."[15]

Science of Religion and Science of Language

How was the question of history in late nineteenth and early twentieth century Europe approached? More specifically, how did European scholars of that time go about in writing the history of the Indian religious traditions? To further our critical understanding of both our inherited mould for Jain and Buddhist studies and our awareness concerning our own 'historical situatedness' as scholars, we need to have a knowledge not only of the nineteenth century Jainism and Buddhism, but also of the *manner* in which that particular Jainism and Buddhism was constructed. This is, if nineteenth century scholars wrote a history of early Buddhism, we need to take note not only of that particular history, but also of *the manner* in which they wrote that history. Which questions directed them? Why did these questions direct them, and not a different set of questions? From what sources did they draw their information, and what informed their source selection? Which methodologies underlay their research? Even if we know *a priori* that our answers to such questions are bound to be partial and do injustice to the complexity of the diverse realities that informed the scholars' writing, they are nevertheless worthy of our reflection. For, such reflections effectively remind us, as mentioned, both of the inescapability of framing paradigms and of the relativity or dialogical aspect of knowledge production.

The manner how late nineteenth century European scholars wrote their history of 'Jainism' and 'Buddhism' was informed by the overall aim of that recently established discipline Science of Religion (read *History* of Religion). The discipline's aim was to discover the 'origin' of religion, to find both that one principle underlying all religions, and the 'laws' causing religions to change, or better, *develop* into their present *stage* or manifestation, or, alternatively, causing religions to stop or freeze in their development.[16] This Science of Religion's general aim of identifying the dynamic origin

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[13] Cf. Krech 2000, esp. 245-50 and 261-65.

[14] Krech 2000: 261.

[15] Hallisey 1995: 36.

[16] Animism and ancestor worship have been alternatively postulated as lying at the genesis of religion. Cf. Krech 2000: 245-50.

Some nineteenth century Victorian scholars evaluated Buddhism as a religion that had in its development stopped "one stage" short of (becoming) Christianity. Cp. Almond 1988: 132-138.

and growth of religion also motivated the late nineteenth century historical writings on 'Jainism' and 'Buddhism.' This may be exemplified with the work of Rhys Davids. In his introduction to *The Hibbert Lectures*, which full title significantly reads *Lectures on the Origin and Growth of Religion, as Illustrated by Some Points in the History of Indian Buddhism,* he notes:

> [T]he task allotted to us is ... to discuss those points in the history of Buddhism which appear likely *to throw light on the origin and growth of religious belief.* This means, as I understand it, the *origin and growth* of religion outside, as well as inside, the circle of the Buddhist beliefs themselves. What we have to do is, in a word, to apply a particular method, the *comparative method*, to the study of the facts revealed to us by the history of Buddhism. (Davids 1906 (1881): 1, emphasis mine)

Subscribing to the discipline's aim of throwing "light on the origin and growth of religious belief," he sets out using the "comparative method." The comparative method was adopted from the equally relatively new discipline Science of Language and introduced into the discipline Science of Religion by Friedrich Max Müller (1823-1900), one of the discipline's progenitors.[17] The comparative method not only served the general purpose of tracing that common foundation of all religions and their development, but also helped nineteenth century European scholars to better understand the history of their own religion, 'Christianity.' Rhys Davids in a lecture entitled "*What has Buddhism derived from Christianity,*" which was posthumously published in 1923 by his wife and Pāli scholar Mrs. Rhys Davids, observes with a distinct enthusiastic tinge how:

> [Buddhism is] a religion whose development runs entirely parallel with that of Christianity, every episode, every line of whose history seems almost as if it might be created for the very purpose of throwing the clearest light on the most difficult and disputed questions of the origin of the European [i.e. Christianity] faith. (Davids 1920-3: 51-52)

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[17] For Friedrich Max Müller, who among Sanskritist is best remembered for his edition of the Ṛgveda, and as editor of the famous series "Sacred Books of the East," the "comparative method" was primordial in the scientific study of religion. With reference to Goethe's paradox *He who knows one language knows none,*" he similarly asserted that for the study of religion *He who knows one [religion], knows none.*" (Müller 1882² [1873]: 12-13). Considering that he was the first professor of Comparative Philology at Oxford University in 1868, we should not be surprised that he modeled his methodological approaches and departing premises for the scientific study of religion on the ones of Science of Language. Because of the use of the comparative method "Science of Religion" was in its early days also known as (and today better remembered under the name of) "Comparative Religion." Today the discipline is known as "Religious studies."
See for Max Müller's view on and questions for Science of Religion "Philologist Out of Season. F. Max Müller on the Classification of Language and Religion," in Masuzawa 2005: 207-256.

It is also telling that Rhys Davids' 1878 publication *Buddhism* was published by the 'Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge.' Comparing 'Buddhism' and 'Christianity' meant charting their alleged similarities and differences. And as Davids' quote above makes apparent, the noted similarities between the two were considered – at the very least – remarkable. In general terms, the knowledge produced on Buddhism was put at the disposal of the newly established discipline 'Science of Religion' and its overarching aim of charting the *origin and development* of religion.

For us today it is apparent, in retrospect, that the noted similarities between 'Buddhism' and 'Christianity' were not so much a mere reflection of 'objective facts,' but more the result of nineteenth century scholars drawing Buddhism within their given conceptual framework and language, this being their deep-rooted Christian theological worldview. To nineteenth century European scholars the similarities were, however, discovered 'facts' that could be accounted for in historical terms. Friedrich Max Müller saw two possible explanations for the similarities between Buddhism and Christianity: "Either, one of these two religions borrowed from the other, or the similarities between them must be traced back to that common foundation which underlies all religions."[18] Müller and Rhys Davids, among others, adhered to the latter explanation, while still others adhered to the first. Irrespective of the nineteenth century scholars' reasons for adhering to either one of these two possibilities,[19] the two proposed possibilities are in themselves reflective of the argumentative patterns reigning the nineteenth century scientific discourse on religion. Discussing similarities and differences in terms of "borrowing" and "originality," while searching for origins, may be viewed as characteristic of nineteenth century scientific discourse on religion. The scientific discourse of that time was one dominated with a general search for origins; with the questions of originality or of who copied who. As we shall see, underlying this search for origins is "the historiographical assumption of the purity of the historically prior" (cf. below).[20] But first, let us illustrate how this scientific discourse with its stress on origins directed the then on-going research on the early Jain ascetic tradition by means of Hermann Jacobi's (1850-1937) argumentation on the independent origins and authentic status of the Jain community.

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[18] Müller cited in Almond 1988: 126.

[19] Similarities were by some seen to be the result of the influence of Nestorian Christians on Buddhism. For a detailed elaboration of this and other views, see Almond 1988: 126-9.

[20] Almond 1988: 96. This normative qualification of the "historically prior" is a correlative of an inherited Christian monogenetic worldview. For an examination of how the Christian monogenetic worldview affected the understanding of "new worlds," see Smith 2004 (1985) and Smith 2004 (2001).

Interlude. Nineteenth Century Scholarly Language Exemplified

Jacobi and his Search for Origin and Originality in Jain and Buddhist Precepts

Jacobi's argumentation on the independent origins and authentic status of the Jain community, is generally considered to be a first axial moment in nineteenth century European scholarship on Jainism. It is well-known that before Hermann Jacobi's 1884 historic argumentation, western Indological discourse conceived the early Jain community to be the oldest schismatic offshoot of the Buddhist tradition.[21] Jacobi had already tried to counter this pro-schismatic argument in 1880 in his article 'On Mahāvīra and his Predecessors,' by arguing for the historicity of Pārśva, this is, the Jain teacher or *tīrthaṅkara* prior to Mahāvīra, and thus arguing also for dating the historical start of the Jain community as anterior to the one of the Buddhist community. Key to his argumentation was his identification of *cātu-yāma-saṃvara-saṃvuto* ('controlled by the fourfold restraint'),[22] being a description given of *nigaṇṭhas* in the Pāli Sāmaññaphala Sutta (DN I 58:29), with the 'Fourfold Restraint' of Pārśva's teachings in Jain texts.[23] Though this identification, together with other circumstantial evidence,[24] would ensure

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[21] This view was held e.g. by Auguste Barthe (1834-1916), Christian Lassen (1800-1876) and Albrecht Weber (1825-1901). Cf. Wiley 2004, *Historical Dictionary of Jainism*: *s.v.* Jacobi, Hermann. Note, however, that not all information listed is accurate.

[22] Other translations given for the technical description *cātu-yāma-saṃvara-saṃvuto* (Skt. *cātur-yāma-saṃvara-saṃvṛta*) are 'being protected by the four kinds of restraints or rules' (cf. Watanabe 2002); 'retenu par le frein de quatre abstentions réunies' (Burnouf as quoted in Jacobi 1880:160); or 'bound by a fourfold restraint' (*Thus Have I heard,* Walshe 1987: 97).

For a critical discussion on the Buddhist interpretation of this Jain technical term, see Watanabe 2002 and Huang 2008. See also Jaini 2001 (1979): 15-19 where he points to the possibility that *cātu-yāma-saṃvara* may not be referring to the four vows of Pārśva, but to 'the four *modalities* (mind, body, speech, and the senses) through which evil could be expressed.' Cf. Jaini 2001 (1979): 18. On this possibility see also Dundas 2002² (1992): 32. Further see Bronkhorst 2000: 515-517 who points out that 'early Buddhists were aware of the exact meaning of the four restraints of the followers of Pārśva.' If the definition given in Buddhist texts does not agree with the one in Jain texts then this should be understood, according to Bronkhorst, as a Buddhist punning. Bronkhorst 2000: 517 & 515.

[23] Jacobi 1880: 160-1. Pārśva would have stipulated a Fourfold Restraint (*caujjāma*) for his ascetic followers whereas Mahāvīra would have stipulated five restraints, i.e. his five Great Vows (*mahavvaya*). For the specifics of Pārśva's Fourfold Restraint and Mahāvīra's five Great Vows, see Dundas 2002² (1992): 30-1.

[24] It is not easy to trace back the arguments that lead to the current widespread and unquestioned scholarly acceptance of the historicity of Pārśva. It seems to be one of those arguments that gained weight by force of repetition. This correspondence of the description of the fourfold restraint of *nigaṇṭhas* in Buddhist texts with the *caujjāma* (*caturyāma*) of Pārśva in Jain texts seems to be one of the few decisive arguments that lead to accept Pārśva's historicity. Other circumstantial evidence corroborating Pārśva's historicity is the fact that a description of his teachings is found in the 'Sayings of the Seers' (IBh 31). Another generally accepted fact regarding the history of the early Jain community that is based on rather meagre evidence, is the conception of Mahāvīra having renounced within Pārśva's ascetic lineage. The evidence conventionally drawn upon in

a widespread scholarly acceptance of Pārśva's historicity in later scholarly circles, it did not suffice to persuade the then on-going academic discussion on the origins of the Jain community. As we will see, the turning point would have to wait until 1884 with his introduction to his translation of the first book of the Āyāraṅga Sutta and the Kappa Sutta, wherein he goes to great length to substantiate his earlier argument.[25]

The reasons why some scholars of that time[26] viewed the Jains as Buddhist sectarians were the many real - and apparent - similarities the two traditions shared; the too much Buddha-like biography of the Jain teacher Mahāvīra; and the fact that the Jain Prākrit texts were viewed to be not as old as the Buddhist texts.[27] Additional reasons were the resemblances between early Jains and Buddhists regarding their epithets for their teachers; their supposed worship of "mortal men" (i.e. the Buddha and Mahāvīra); stress on non-violence and conception of the world history into "those enormous periods of time which bewilder and awe even the most imaginative fancy,"[28] were conventionally drawn upon in support of the pro-schismatic argument of the Jain community. Also the similarities between the principal vows and precepts of the two communities were quoted as corroborating evidence for the sectarian origin of the Jain community. With this argumentation in view, Albrecht Weber (1825-1901) showed the correspondences between the five great vows of the Jains (*pañca-mahāvratas*) and the five precepts or virtues of the Buddhists, and Ernst Windisch (1844-1918) drew attention to the similar content of the Jain vows and the *dasasīlas* or the Ten Precepts for the Buddhist novice.[29]

Establishing the independent origination of the Jain tradition, Jacobi refuted these common pro-schismatic arguments one by one. And though each one of his refutations could lead to stimulating discussions, for the present purpose I will focus on his negation of the pro-schismatic argument that early Buddhists and Jains shared basic vows and precepts.[30] For the manner in which Jacobi – successfully - negated this argument, may be considered as a paradigmatic example of how studies would frame their discussion of the early Jain and Buddhist ascetic organization. This is, in terms of true origin and originality, authenticity and authority, borrowing and adaptation. For

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support of this statement, is the fact that the Āyāraṃga Sutta mentions that Mahāvīra's parents were followers of Pārśva. Cf. Dundas 2002² (1992): 30.

[25] Cf. *Jaina Sūtras. Part I: The Âcârâṅga Sūtra, The Kalpa Sūtra,* Hermann Jacobi (tr.), Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Private Ltd (Sacred Books of the East vol. 22), 1989 [1884].

[26] See note 21.

[27] See Folkert 1993 (1989): 97.

[28] Jacobi 1884, *op. cit.*: xxi.

[29] Ibid.: xxii – xxiii.
The ten precepts, or the 'ten rules of training' (*dasa sikkhāpada*)' for the novice (*sāmaṇera*) are in the Pāli Vinaya recorded at Mahāvagga I.56.1 (Vin I 83-4; BD IV 105-6).

[30] See Jacobi 1884: xff.

his refutation of this pro-schismatic argument we turn to his translation activities of the Āyāraṅga Sutta (Skt. Ācāraṅga Sutta), the oldest extant - and until then unknown – Jain Śvetāmbara text on ascetic conduct.[31]

During his translation work on the Āyāraṅga Sutta, Jacobi became familiar with the Dharmasūtra of Baudhāyana, a law book containing various prescriptions for the *brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsin*,[32] as its translation by George Bühler became published in 1882 in Max Müller's famous Sacred Books of the East series.[33] This fact is important. For, with this translation of Baudhāyana's Dharmasūtra made available for the first time, new insights were gained both into the ascetic organization of the ascetic members of the ancient Indian *brāhmaṇa* community, and into the age of this *brāhmaṇa* ascetic institution that, without entering into details, was considered to be older than the historical start of both the Buddhist and Jain ascetic communities.[34]

Jacobi soon observed that there where the vows or precepts of the Jain ascetic agreed with those of the Buddhist *bhikkhu,* they also agreed with those of the *brahmaṇa saṃnyāsin.* For example, the general correspondence between the main *mahāvratas* of the Jains and the precepts of the Buddhists, was also found in the five principle vows of the *brahmaṇa saṃnyāsin.* Regarding this fact Jacobi made the following observation and though brief, both its formulation and underlying reasoning could be considered paradigmatic, as I will soon elaborate upon, for studies on the origins of the Jain community:

> neither the Buddhists nor the *G*ainas have in this regard any claim to originality, [as]... both have only adopted the five vows of the Brahmanic ascetics (*saṃnyāsin*).

And after having enumerated the respective five vows of the *brahmaṇa* ascetics, he continues:

> Our foregoing inquiry suggests where we have to look for the original of the monastic orders of the *G*ainas and Buddhists. The Brahmanic ascetic was their model, from which they borrowed many important practices and institutions of ascetic life. (Jacobi 1884: xxiii - xxiv)

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[31] Jacobi completed the editing and translation of the Āyāraṅga Sutta in respectively 1882 and 1884. For a discussion of this Sutta, see p. 58 ff.

[32] On the semantic history of the term *saṃnyāsa,* see Olivelle 1981.

[33] *The Sacred Laws of the Âryas. Part II: Vâsishtha and Baudhâyana*, George Bühler (tr.), Oxford: Oxford University Press (Sacred Books of the East vol. 14), 1882.

[34] The Dharmasūtra of Baudhyāyana was then generally considered to date between 500-200 BCE. In a recent re-evaluation of the relative chronology and absolute dates of the Dharmasūtras, Patrick Olivelle came to a "much narrower time span for the composition of the three earlier documents [i.e. the Dharmasūtra of Āpastamba, Gautama, and Baudhyāyana], from the beginning of the third to the middle of the second centuries BCE." Cf. Olivelle 2009 (1999): xxxiv, see also p. xxv ff.

The facts that the Jain ascetics (and also Buddhists for that matter) have in common with the *brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins* not only their major vows but also various other precepts, was considered by Jacobi to be conclusive evidence to counter the then current pro-schismatic assertion on the basis that both traditions shared some precepts. For, he argued, why would Jains copy the Buddhists when they had in the institution of the *brahmaṇa saṃnyāsin* a "model of higher antiquity and authority"? The Jain ascetics indubitably would have followed in their articulation of vows and precepts this model of the *brahmaṇa saṃnyāsin,* rather than "the less respected and second-hand model of their rivals, the Buddhists." In fact, "the life of *Ǥaina* monks is but an imitation of the life of the Brahmanic ascetics."[35]

The pattern of Jacobi's argumentation may be clear. In order to establish the independent origination of the Jain tradition he, among other things, compared the precepts of the three known and documented wandering traditions of early north India, the *brāhmaṇa,* Jain and Buddhist. Taking the *brāhmaṇa* tradition to be the most ancient and (hence?) most authoritative model, he understood all similarities as an indication of Jains and Buddhists to be following the authoritative *brāhmaṇa* model. And it is this type of reasoning and argumentation that became formative for the way subsequent comparative studies dealt with identical praxes of the three wandering traditions. Corresponding practices were found to reflect the common ascetic substratum, which was naturally dictated by the *brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins,* from which they developed and as such did not constitute the real 'original' or 'genuine' elements of the ascetic traditions. Indeed, the scholarly opinion developed that only when the corresponding practices were removed, only then the unique characteristics and realizations of each wandering tradition would come to the foreground, an opinion that, it may be noted, is still to some extend adhered to today. With the *brāhmaṇa* tradition determining this common ascetic substratum, Jains and Buddhists in their agreement with it, became commonly portrayed to be merely copying the *brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins* and to be, at least in this respect, 'unoriginal.' This double tendency to view both the Jain and Buddhist ascetic precepts in relation to the ones of the *brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins,* and to interpret their correspondences in terms of 'adoption', 'borrowing' or 'imitation' *versus* 'original,' has had pernicious effects for the conception of the Jain and thus also the Buddhist tradition as a movement "in and for itself."

Jacobi was well aware that central to his argumentation was the supposed older date of the *brāhmaṇa* Dharmasūtras, and thus also of the *brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsin* institution, to the rise of the Jain and Buddhist tradition. Realizing that George Bühler's dating of the

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[35] Jacobi 1884, *op cit.*: xxix & xxv.

Dharmasūtras was still very speculative,[36] Jacobi does briefly venture to consider the reverse scenario: what if the Dharmasūtras were not older or at least as old as the rise of the Jain and Buddhist tradition? Would it mean that the common precepts are a result of the *brāhmaṇa ascetics* copying the Buddhists? Jacobi dismisses the possibility altogether and his reasoning is worthy to be quoted here as, again, it is a beautiful paradigmatic example of how the relationship between the three wandering institutions came to be conceived:

> Even in that case, which is not a probable one, those lawgivers [of the Dharmasūtras] are not likely to have largely borrowed from the Buddhists whom the Brahmans at that time must have despised as false pretenders of a recent origin. They would certainly not have regarded laws as sacred which were evidently appropriated from heretics. On the other hand, the Buddhist had no reason not to borrow from the Brahmans, because they greatly respected the latter for the sake of their intellectual and moral superiority. (Jacobi 1884: xxx)

It is truly remarkable how quickly the possibility is rejected. In the light of the fact that not only the Buddhist sources developed over a long period of time and present true chronological labyrinths to the philological historian (cf. below) but also the *brāhmaṇa* texts such as the Dharmasūtras, the possibility should at least be considered that if one similarity is the result of Buddhists copying *brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins* at one time and place, that another might be the outcome of *brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsins* copying the Buddhists at a different time and/or place, if at all, indeed, similarities necessarily need to point to the fact that one is consciously copying or imitating the other. And what about religious flexibility, or the possibility of multiple sources of identity? How about the possibility of a *brāhmaṇa* Buddhist or Buddhist *brāhmaṇa*, or Jain Buddhist? How strict were the boundaries between the various traditions, or also, how well were they defined? The questions are complex, bring more confusion than clarity, but are legitimate and urgent. For example, if the tradition recorded in the Pāli Vinaya regarding admission to the Buddhist ascetic *saṅgha* may be trusted, the procedure to become a Buddhist *bhikkhu* (i.e. an ascetic disciple of the Buddha), at least in the initial formative stages of the *saṅgha*, constituted not much more than one expressing the wish to become a disciple, and the Buddha granting the wish with the standard formula '*ehi bhikkhu,*' this is 'come here *bhikkhu*.'[37] This admission does not seem to demand a clear or rigid abandonment of a previous (religious) identity. Considering in addition the simple fact that prior to becoming a disciple of the Buddha one was not a Buddhist *bhikkhu*, the

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[36] See n. 34.

[37] The ordination formula of '*ehi bhikkhu*' is seen used for the first time in the Pāli Vinaya at MV I 6.32 (Vin I 11; BD IV 18). For a discussion of the various formulation procedures, see Horner BD IV xff.

feasibility of carrying a double (or multiple sources of) identity seems very actual, if at all identity negotiation was indeed carried along the lines (of our analytical categories) 'Buddhist,' 'Jain' and 'brāhmaṇa.'[38] Temporarily suspending the treatment of these questions, the main issues that need to be underscored here are the facts that in the nineteenth century European discussions on the origins of the Jain ascetic organization, the brāhmaṇical ascetic institution came by some scholars to be viewed as the example for both the Jain and Buddhist systems, and the direction of influence as unilateral. For, irrespective of the truth value of Jacobi's claim in the last quoted passage that early Buddhists attributed 'intellectual and moral superiority' to their brāhmaṇa other, this much has become clear: nineteenth century scholars, such as Jacobi, certainly did. The ascetic institution of the brāhmaṇas was viewed and presented as 'the model' par excellence. To assemble the terms from the brief passages of Jacobi quoted above, the brahmanical ascetic institution was in relation to those of the early Jains and Buddhists seen as: the 'original' one, the one endowed with 'originality', a 'model of higher antiquity and authority,' and of an 'intellectual and moral superiority.' Again, when considering the chronological heterogeneity of also the Brahmanical texts, the confidence with which this view was presented and accepted could not solely have rested on the supposed elder date of the Dharmasūtras as a whole.[39] Part of the certitude must instead have lied in the fact that early European scholars most probably (and perhaps unquestioningly) accepted the Brahmins' own claim of superiority, this is, their ideological division of society into four different groups or vaṇṇa (Skt. varṇa), and viewing themselves to be occupying the highest vaṇṇa.

To conclude this discussion, it may be made explicit how the questions and pattern of Jacobi's argumentation are reflective of the dominant scholarly language of his time. Already his very questions concerning the historical origins of the Jain tradition, of the historicity of the Jain tīrthaṅkaras Pārśva and Mahāvīra, and of the origin of the common Jain and Buddhist precepts, are reflective of the late nineteenth century general concern with the questions of origins and history. It is very significant how Jacobi went into great trouble to find the 'real source' or origin for the precepts the Jain community shared with Buddhists. For in the end, the fact that the brāhmāṇa saṃnyāsin came to be presented and accepted as the authoritative source of these Jain precepts, does – regardless whether it is actually correct or not – not per se need to abolish the possibility that Jains were Buddhist sectarians. Jacobi might very well have convinced his audience of the fundamental difference between Jains and Buddhists by showing how adherence to the same precepts was by each community believed to have

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[38] Cf. Part II Dialogue.

[39] Note how recent scholarship does not consider the Dharmasūtras, among which the one of Baudhyāyana, to be as old as was then commonly thought. See n. 34.

fundamentally different soteriological consequences[40] - even though, indeed, they still lead to the same soteriological goal of *mokṣa*. Conversely, he might have argued that Jains sharing Buddhist precepts did not have to signify anything particular, but that it is just an indication of the simple fact that similarly organized ascetic communities who both claim and are recognized to be ascetic communities can only be expected to share fundamental vows and precepts. Instead, as we have amply seen, Jacobi searched and found an origin for these Jain precepts different than the Buddhist one.

Further, Jacobi's pattern of argumentation may be considered as representing one of the dominant moulds that developed during his time to understand the early Jain and Buddhist traditions. This mould being, once again, the view that the *brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsin* presented the oldest and most authoritative model, and all agreement found with the Jain and Buddhist mendicant would be seen as further confirming this fact. In addition, there would be a general tendency to positively appreciate the *brāhmaṇa saṃnyāsin* in so far it represented the 'original' ascetic institution, and to negatively appreciate the Jain's and Buddhist's ones for being merely 'imitating' or, in the words of Jacobi, to be 'false pretenders of a recent origin.' As we will see in the upcoming discussion of the so-called Protestant paradigm, in addition to this model where Jains and Buddhist came to be considered as mere 'imitators' of the original and authoritative *brāhmaṇa* institution, another model developed wherein the historical beginnings of the Jain and Buddhist traditions came to be articulated in terms of "heterodoxy" and "orthodoxy." This is, another mould developed wherein the beginnings of the Jain and Buddhist traditions came to be conceived as a "heterodox reaction" against the "orthodox" (and corrupted) *brāhmaṇa* priests.

Evolutionary Theories

Returning to our general description of the dominant research paradigms of the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century scholarly language, we may briefly note how also evolutionary theories left a mark on the manner how 'the origin and development' of a religion came to be conceived. Evolutionary theories, reaching a high point in the 1860s with Charles Darwin's *On the Origin of Species*, offered the concept of evolution as a workable model for tracing 'phases,' 'stages', and 'laws' of the 'origin and growth of religion.'[41] As noted by Jeffrey Franklin the nineteenth century British

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[40] For the Jain doctrine I am hinting at the shedding off of the atomic *karmic* particles obstructing the *jīva.* Atomic *karma* particles and *jīva* being two fundamental conceptions of Jains not shared with Buddhists.
[41] Charles Darwin's *On the Origin of Species* was published in 1859.

construction of Buddhism clearly drew inspiration from the evolutionary model, when it "emphasized the parallels between scientific law … and the *Dharma,* often translated as "Law," or between natural causality and causal necessity of *karma,* or between the evolution of species and the progressive evolution that many Westerners assumed occurred between lives in the cycle of reincarnation."[42] To return to Rhys Davids' *Buddhism,* also his construction of Buddhism was scientific and rational. This was not only in line with this general on-going evolutionary theory inspired scientism, but also with his personal inclination for the Enlightenment ideals. This latter can briefly be illustrated with his choice to translate *'bodhi'* with 'Enlightenment', and his preference for stressing the human aspect, and not the divine aspect of the Buddha by consistently referring to the Buddha not with the term 'Buddha' but with his family name 'Gotama.'[43]

Protestant Paradigm

The Protestant paradigm or trope is customarily referred to by present-day scholars to explicate the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century European scholars' preference for reifying 'Jainism' and 'Buddhism' from the religions' so-called canonical texts; their subsequent devaluation or simple disregard of the Buddhism and Jainism represented in later (non-canonical) texts, in archaeological material, and in contemporary praxes. It is further commonly alluded to, to explain the scholars' penchant for a scientific, rational presentation of Jainism and Buddhism at the cost of neglecting or suppressing the tradition's magical elements; and their insistence to view the rise of the Jain and Buddhist traditions as heterodox reform movements against the orthodox *brāhmaṇical* supremacy. Regarding the latter, the narrative of Mahāvīra and the Buddha as having been *reformers, protesting* against the corrupt *brāhmaṇa priest*hood and their oppressive caste system, is a particular well-known narrative as it became a frequently used mould to explicate the rise of Buddhism and Jainism in both popular and scholarly introductory works. It is therefore interesting to note how this particular

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Compare also Foucault who in the introduction to his discourse analysis in *Archéologie du savoir* notes how the discipline of history in 'its classical form' (i.e. before 1970) " suppose…que l'histoire elle-même peut être articulée en grandes unités – stades ou phases – qui détiennent en elles-mêmes leur principe de cohésion. », and how in the classical methodology for the discipline of history « on avait été habitué à chercher des origines, à remonter indéfiniment la ligne des antécédences, à reconstituer des traditions, à suivre des courbes évolutives… ." Foucault 1969: 18 & 22.

[42] Franklin 2005: 943.

[43] See Snodgrass 2007; 192-3. Rhys Davids' choice to present a rational, scientific Buddhism was his way to respond to the ongoing crisis of faith in Victorian England.

narrative, irrespective of its historical accuracy, was one supposedly effected by so-called Protestant sentiments against the Catholic institution.[44]

The following pages mainly focus on how longstanding Protestant ideas concerning the importance of scripture would have informed the source selection and evaluation of the then current scholarship on Jainism and Buddhism. It begins with a discussion of the scholars' tendency to localize 'real' Jainism and 'real' Buddhism in the religions' canonical texts, and proceeds to illustrate the various consequences of this nineteenth century positivistic textual attitude on the manner how scholars would approach, select, describe and appreciate the various sources for describing Jainism and Buddhism. The discussion concludes with noting some reservations of this so-called Protestant paradigm.

Localization of "Real" Jainism and "Real" Buddhism in Canonical Texts

The question of unveiling the origins of the Jain and Buddhist traditions translated itself in the task of revealing and describing their *essence.* This meant studying the Jain and Buddhist canonical texts. Having a positivistic textual attitude, the nineteenth century European scholars located the *essence* of the Jain and Buddhist tradition in texts, but not in just any text. They located it in those texts only that were considered 'authoritative,' these being ancient 'canonical' texts written in the 'original' languages.[45] According to some present-day reviewers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century knowledge production,[46] this positivistic textual attitude was informed by some longstanding western Protestant presuppositions regarding scripture as the ultimate source of authority for matters of faith and practice, regardless whether the scholars themselves were Protestant or not.[47] Be as it may, it was generally believed that the ancient Jain and Buddhist canonical texts could *reveal* the essence of the Jain and Buddhist tradition if read adequately. I write "could *reveal*" for 'Jainism' and 'Buddhism' was not considered to be simply coinciding with the canonical texts. Though containing the essence of the Jain and Buddhist tradition, canonical texts were not seen, however, to be just corresponding with or to be simply mirroring that essence. 'Jainism' and

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[44] For more details, see Almond 1988: 70-74. See also further 'Reservations of the Protestant Paradigm' where I point out how this narrative wherein Jainism and Buddhism are presented as *reform* movements is not the sole narrative to have developed in nineteenth century European scholarship.

[45] My choice to put the word 'canonical' in this discussion between single quotation marks is to avoid creating the idea that our given concept of canon as a closed, authoritative, body of texts would agree or would find a strong resonance with the manner how early Buddhists and Jains approached their 'texts,' or also pre-colonial Buddhists and Jains for this matter. On this subject, see Collins 1990, "On the Very Idea of the Pali Canon." JPTS, 89-126.

[46] See e.g. Cort 1990 and Folkert 1993 (1980-1984; 1975-1980).

[47] Cf. p. 32.

'Buddhism' had to be distilled from these texts and this could be achieved by means of specific methodological readings. The Jain and Buddhist canonical texts had to be read in such a fashion that the authentic could be separated from the false, the older from the later, the rational from the irrational, the factual from the mythical. In short, they had to be read in a manner that would *uncover* the *hidden* essence of the Jain and Buddhist tradition.

The optimistic conviction of nineteenth century European scholars that in such readings one was merely *'revealing'* the essence and not, at least to some extent, *constructing* it with one's very frames, paradigms and questions, is typical for that time. For instance, returning to Rhys Davids' foreword to his *Hibbert Lectures* where he was explaining his goal "to throw light on the origin and growth of religious belief," we can also read how he hopes to achieve his goal. He writes: "What we have to do is ... to apply a particular method, the comparative method, to the study of *the facts revealed to us* by the history of Buddhism."[48] Davids writes "the facts revealed" as if 'facts' were just 'out there' but hidden (in the canonical texts), as if they were clear, self-evident, and well-defined objects of knowledge that only needed to be, so to speak, unveiled or discovered by the scholar to start meaning. For the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century academic it was common to simply view 'facts' or , to go back to the topic of our current discussion, 'essences' to be 'out there', only, they needed the apt scholar to reveal them and voice their silent meaning.[49]

The European scholars' preference for the Jain and Buddhist canonical texts above the later vernacular texts was shared with other nineteenth century orientalists. Missionaries, for instance, though mostly known for their work on contemporary languages, their description of the manners and customs of local people and their religious expressions, have nevertheless also devoted a great deal of time searching for, translating and/or paraphrasing the ancient sacred texts of the religions of the people they encountered. That missionaries, compared to their contemporary nineteenth century European scholars, gave more serious attention to the various popular religious manifestations, was due to their specific agenda, this is, conversion. Still, just as the nineteenth century European scholars, missionaries too considered the ancient sacred texts as the authoritative source of information on a religious tradition. Having the view that a religion could only be truly grasped by means of its sacred texts, missionaries dedicated themselves to the study of canonical texts of the various 'religions' they came

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[48] Davids 1906 (1881): 1, emphasis mine.

[49] Compare also with Foucault who writes how traditionally (i.e. before 1970) within the discipline of history "le document était toujours traité comme le langage d'une voix maintenant réduite au silence, - sa trace fragile, mais par chance déchiffrable. » Foucault 1969 : 14.

across. It is not accidental that the very first English translation of a Jain canonical text was carried out by a missionary.

The first English translation of a Jain *sūtra* available to European scholars was from the Bombay-based Scottish Protestant missionary, John Stevenson (1798-1858). John Stevenson's 1848 *Kalpa Sutra and Nava Tatva: Two Works Illustrative of the Jain Religion and Philosophy* provided the European 'arm-chair' scholars for the first time a published translation of two Jain *sūtras* from which they could study and reify Jainism.[50] Nineteenth century missionaries such as John Stevenson in India or Spence Hardy in Ceylon (cf. below) attached great importance to the ancient sacred texts of the religions of those they sought to proselytize. They actively searched for, collected, and examined manuscripts enclosing the religions' sacred words. Encouraging their activities, was a strong conviction that through the study of authoritative sacred texts they could truly penetrate the religions to, in a second instance, successfully unearth them. A beautifully clear expression of this double conviction can be found in the foreword to *Eastern Monachism,* published in 1850 and written by the Wesleyan missionary Spence Hardy.[51]

> In the month of September, 1825, I landed in the beautiful island of Ceylon as a Wesleyan Missionary, and one of the first duties to which I addressed myself was, to acquire a knowledge of the language of the people among whom I was appointed to minister. After reading the New Testament in Singhalese, *I began the study of the native books, that I might ascertain, from authentic source, the character of the religion* [i.e. 'Buddhism'] *I was trying to displace.* (Hardy 1860 (1850): vii, own emphasis)

Calling *'the native books'* an *'authentic source,'* Hardy shows his great liking for the written word. However, these so-called native books he utilized to describe the Ceylonese Buddhist monastic system were not, as we might expect, those books considered to be canonical, but were 'only' books written in "the more modern languages." Subscribing to the view of his times, he recognizes this, so to speak, shortcoming - for his time, that

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[50] Cf. Numark 2013: 20. Numark (2013) 's article offers an excellent historical discussion of nineteenth century Bombay based Scottish missionaries and their 'discovery,' or better encounter and subsequent reification and study of Jainism, and their conceptual proselytization method to spread the Gospel in India.

[51] *Eastern Monachism* was a four-hundred-page-plus-monograph describing the Ceylonese Buddhist monastic system, which Hardy quickly succeeded with a second – and as voluminous – monograph *A Manual of Budhism, in its Modern Development* in 1853. Though both volumes have for their many and explicit Buddhist unfriendly remarks, in the words of Hallisey, "received if not continuing criticism then what is thought to be a well-deserved neglect," they nevertheless exerted at their time of publication a considerable influence as they "offered a first systematic account of Theravada Buddhist beliefs and practices and so provided a framework to structure the fragmentary knowledge collected to that date." Quotes from Hallisey 1990:39 and Snodgrass 2007: 187-8.

is - and values the superiority of descriptions based on 'original' canonical sources. So we can read a little further in his forward:

> [T]hey who study the original canon may be regarded as actually entering the land, and winning here and there a portion of territory more or less extensive, and by the whole the region will be gained ; when the initiatory labours I am now pursuing will be forgotten, as they will have been succeeded by more authoritative investigations. (Hardy 1860 (1850): viii, own emphasis)

Hardy, just as his contemporaries, valued canonical texts as superior to the later and more modern or contemporaneous texts.[52] Hardy and other missionaries opined that the knowledge drawn from 'original' canonical sources provided the most effective tool to convert, or to, in Hardy words, really *enter the land* and *win a portion of territory* – metaphors drawn from the at that time overarching British colonial enterprise.

The Normativity behind the Idea of Essence

Some general and well-known consequences of this nineteenth century positivistic textual attitude are the second-class treatment and evaluation of (the information derived from) later, non-canonical texts, archaeological sources, and contemporary, popular forms and expressions of 'Jainism' and 'Buddhism.' These consequences resulted not only from the fact that nineteenth century scholars located, as we just have seen, the *essence* of the Jain and Buddhist tradition in the ancient canonical texts, but also because they viewed that *essence* as *normative.* Eckel, drawing from Ernst Troeltsch's article "Was heist 'Wesen des Christentums'?" shows how in historical studies the concept of essence has "two inescapable functions." The concept of essence has a *critical principle* and a *developmental principle.*

> It [i.e. the concept of essence] is a *critical principle* that abstracts from the historical manifestations of a tradition and creates a normative image against which concrete historical cases can be compared and evaluated. It is also a *developmental principle* that functions, in Troeltsch's words, as "a driving spiritual force which contains within itself purposes and values and which elaborates these both consistently and accommodatingly."[53]

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[52] This strong nineteenth century penchant for original, canonical texts is also beautifully reflected in a comment of Rhys Davids to Hardy's selection of sources for his monographs. Using among others Hardy's *A Manual of Budhism* for his biography on the Buddha, Davids remarks how Hardy's *Manual* is not very "reliable" as it is based on Ceylonese books "which date after the twelfth century of our era." Davids 1877: 13.

[53] Eckel 1994: 1095. Eckel draws here from Troeltsch via Pye 1973's "Comparative Hermeneutics in Religion." in *The Cardinal Meaning: Essays in Comparative Hermeneutics: Buddhism and Christianity.* Ed. by Michael Pye and Robert Morgan, The Hague: Mouton, pp. 9-58.

The *essence* distilled from canonical sources; the 'Jainism' and 'Buddhism' marked and advanced as the original Jainism and Buddhism, became a normative reference point against which scholars would evaluate other, later forms and popular expressions of the traditions. In other words, the positivistic aspect of the textual attitude of nineteenth century European scholars should be understood as having this threefold peculiarity of locating the essence in texts, as considering that essence to be the original Jainism and Buddhism, and of qualifying this – and, in their opinion merely 'revealed' - original Jainism and Buddhism as normative.

Devaluation of non-canonical Sources

The late nineteenth and early twentieth century description of the origins of the Jain and Indian Buddhist ascetic organisations drawn from the canonical texts was considered to be not only a faithful, historical account, but also to be reflecting the monastic institutions' essence and thus, so to speak, their 'golden period'. If contemporary praxes of Jain and Buddhist ascetics in respectively India and Ceylon, or if the monastic reality presented in later texts or in archaeological and epigraphical sources would contradict the monastic reality of the authoritative, canonical sources, they would have to be explained away as a 'falling from,' or as a late change of (i.e. degradation from) the original monastic institutions. Schopen in his 1991 article "Archaeology and Protestant Presuppositions in the Study of Indian Buddhism" offers a good example of this latter.

"Archeology...in service of written sources"

Though archaeological remains and donative inscriptions strongly suggest that Buddhist monks in India owned personal property, Schopen shows how nineteenth century orientalists tried hard to explain away this evidence as it contradicted the textual monastic ideal.[54]

> [E]very time epigraphers, archaeologists, or art historians encountered evidence that even suggested the possibility that monks or nuns owned personal property they first signalled their surprise ... and then immediately invoked either explicitly or implicitly the rules in the canonical monastic codes against it to assert, in one way or another, that they were not really seeing what they saw. Either that, or they neutralized what they were seeing by attributing it to a "late change" or implied "decline" within the tradition. They all axiomatically assumed that the textual ideal either was or had been actually in operation, that if it said so in a text it must have been so in reality. (Schopen 1991: 7-8)

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[54] Schopen 1991: 1-9.

Schopen justly calls this type of interpretation of archaeological evidence an "archaeology ... in service of the written sources." The reopening and interpretation of the Kaṅkālī Ṭīlā site at Mathurā in search of support for Hermann Jacobi's textual argumentation on the independent origin of the Jain tradition (cf. above) is another notable example of 'archaeology in service of the written sources.'

In search for material, archaeological evidence to corroborate Jacobi's literary based argument of the independent origin of the Jain community, the Kaṅkālī Ṭīlā site at Mathurā was reopened in 1888.[55] The manner in which the interpretation of the Mathurā finds suffered from being framed by the then on-going canonically based discussion on the origins of the Jain community, has been expounded with great lucidity by Kendall Folkert in his 1989 essay 'Jain Religious Life at Ancient Mathurā: the Heritage of Late-Victorian Interpretation.' Because of the overly concern with the origins of the Jain community at least three important aspects concerning the early Jain history remained untreated or misrepresented. First, the presence of a flourishing and important lay-community of which the Mathurā 'Jain stūpa' was a first-hand testimony, was bluntly ignored. Second, the Mathurā finds, that cover no less than five centuries (200 B.C.E. to 300 C.E.) were taken to show the ancient and unchanging character of the Jain tradition, thus simply silencing away "the extraordinary fluidity in Jain history." Third, the question of the role of Mathurā itself, as a powerful *tīrtha,* in attracting the Jain presence remained unasked.[56]

Second-class treatment of later textual sources

Rhys Davids established the Pali Text Society in 1881 to facilitate the edition and translation of the Theravāda Buddhist *Piṭaka.*[57] From the moment of its establishment, the Society received several requests of Ceylonese Buddhists to edit and translate texts they considered either important for practicing Buddhists or representative of Theravāda philosophy. Though Ceylonese Buddhists were together responsible for more than half of the Society's financial income, their requests were granted neither enthusiastically nor rapidly. The texts they viewed to be significant were not canonical, and the efforts made to translate such texts were, therefore, seen as lost efforts in the Society's more urgent and primordial goal of disclosing "original Buddhism" from its

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[55] Despite the fact that Jacobi's 1884 argumentation on the historicity of Mahāvīra and the independent and authentic origin of the Jain community came to be generally accepted, a few scholars remained skeptical due to the fact that Jacobi's argumentation solely rested on literary evidence.

[56] Cf. Folkert 1993 (1989).

[57] Cp. with the first rule of the Pali Text Society: "The Society is founded to edit in Pali, and if possible to translate into English, such Pali books as still exist in MSS. preserved either in Europe or the East." See e.g. Journal of the Pali Text Society 1920-1923: vii.

canonical texts. Anāgārika Dharmapāla, the famous initiator of the Ceylonese Buddhist revival movement, presented the Pali Text Society in 1893 with a manuscript of Yogāvacāra's Manual. Once the translation was accomplished by Mrs. Rhys Davids she introduced it as "untimely" not because it saw the light only thirteen years after Dharmapāla's request, but because "so much important matter in the Pāli canon is still only accessible to Pāli readers." She saw the translation of Yogāvacāra's Manual as interfering with the more valuable work of publishing and translating the canonical texts, and if Mrs. Davids carried the task forward at all, it was only in acknowledgement to Dharmapāla's financial support, so she writes in her preface: "it was incumbent upon us to meet the wishes of one who had shown the Society so much [financial] generosity."[58] In addition to such reluctance to translate non-canonical Buddhist texts, the late nineteenth and early twentieth century scholars' normative qualification of their, so to speak, distilled Jain and Buddhist essence, is also visible in their assessment of contemporary praxes.

Depreciation of contemporary expressions of Jainism and Buddhism

Against the pure, original Jainism and Buddhism, late nineteenth century and early twentieth century scholars tended to negatively evaluate contemporary praxes. This negative evaluation is hinted at, sometimes casually, sometimes bluntly (but therefore not necessarily maliciously), throughout their writings on Jainism and Buddhism. Rhys Davids, for instance, wrote how "The Buddhism of the Pāli Pitakas is not only a quite different thing from Buddhism as hitherto commonly received, but antagonistic to it."[59] Another anecdotic example may be taken from I.B. Horner's translation of the Pāli Vinaya. To her translation at Vinaya III.161 of the Pāli word *pāpabhikkhū* as "depraved monks" (literally meaning "bad monks") she adds the following footnote:

> This acquiescence in "*pāpabhikkhū*" is curious. *It reminds one of the lax monks, not uncommon in Burma at the present day, who do not keep the Vinaya precepts.* There are said to be good and earnest monks who do keep them, but who are not seen about much for the very reason that they lead the good life, as intended. (Horner 2006 (1938) BD I: 277, fn. 1, emphasis mine)

From a different corner we have Henry Steel Olcott, co-founder of the Theosophical Society, being in disbelief on his arrival in Ceylon by "the shocking ignorance of the

[58] See Snodgrass 2007: 195. Quotes Mrs. Rhys Davids in Snodgrass 2007: ibid. Another request for translation to the Society by Asian Buddhists that took a considerable amount of time (30 years) was the *Abhidhammattha-sangaha*. Ibid.
On Anāgārika Dharmapāla's Buddhist revival movement, see a.o. Obeyesekere 1972 and Freiberger 2003.
[59] Rhys Davids (*Buddhist Suttas* 2: xxv) quoted in Snodgrass 2007: 198.

Sinhalese about Buddhism" as it did not match his "bookish conception" of 'original Buddhism'. What is remarkable, however, is that instead of adjusting his image of Buddhism while living in this Buddhist country, he sat out teaching Ceylonese Buddhists how to be Buddhists.[60]

Reservations of the Protestant Paradigm

A first reservation concerns the very denomination "Protestant" paradigm. The denomination gives the wrong impression that all nineteenth century orientalist scholars were if not Protestants themselves, at least working within a Protestant dominant culture. Though true for the Victorian Rhys Davids, it cannot be said to be true for other nineteenth century pioneers, such as, for instance, the German Indologist Hermann Oldenberg (1854-1920). And yet, also Hermann Oldenberg in his 1881 publication *Buddha. Sein Leben, Seine Lehre, Seine Gemeinde* searched to describe, just as his contemporary Rhys Davids, the 'original' Buddhism that he too located within the ancient, authoritative Pāli texts.[61]

The nineteenth century insistence to view the Buddha as a social reformer, or to understand the beginnings of 'Buddhism' as a heterodox reaction against the dominating, corrupt and abusive "priest" or *brāhmaṇa* system, has also been explained as a result of the Protestant paradigm. Regardless whether this narrative is historically correct or not, the point that needs to be made here is that it was not the sole narrative in circulation. For instance, in contrast to Rhys Davids' portrayal of the Buddha, Oldenberg's account pushes the supposed reformist motives of the Buddha into the background and deliberately softens the contrasts between 'Buddhism' and 'Brahmanism.' Almond explains the divergence between the two scholars' accounts as the outcome of two different discourses, necessitated by different agendas, or at the very least, different convictions. The Buddha of Rhys Davids was described in religious terms, whereas the Buddha of Oldenberg came to be described within a political language and this at a time when socialism was viewed by many to be threatening to society. In the words of Almond: "A religious discourse [as used by Davids] – Protestantism, sacrementalism, sacerdotalism – has been replaced by a political one [in Oldenberg's account]– democratic, lower classes, aristocracy, socialist... [I]n a context of anti-Catholicism [as for Rhys Davids], a radical social reformer rejecting the pretensions of a priestly ruling class could be embraced. But in a context of anti-Socialism [as for

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[60] See Prothero 1995: 296. Quote Olcott in Prothero 1995: ibid. Olcott together with Blavatsky, who both founded the Theosophical Society in 1875, were the first Americans (Blavatsky received U.S. citizenship) to convert to Buddhism in an Asian country.

[61] Oldenberg's monograph was translated in 1927 into English. See Oldenberg, Hermann, 1927, *Buddha. His life, his doctrine, his order.* Calcutta: Book Co.

Oldenberg] a radical social reformer rejecting the pretensions of the secular ruling class was unacceptable."[62] Whereas Rhys Davids' Buddha can be seen as a response to the ongoing crisis of *faith* in Victorian England, Oldenberg's Buddha can be seen as a response to the ongoing crisis in *politics.*

Davids's and Oldenberg's differing accounts form a paradigmatic example of how dominating ideologies codirect the analysis, assessment and presentation of source material. Today, many of the nineteenth and early twentieth century orientalist assumptions, ideologies or agendas can – for various and at times also most obvious reasons – no longer be agreed with. We are thinking here mainly of the imperial or colonial narrative. However, disagreeing with their assumptions must not mean that their conclusions should *a priori* be disagreed with too. As Silk noted, "If in evaluating the researches of our predecessors we give too much weight to their ideological motivations, we will end up throwing out many babies with the bathwater. In some cases, it may be better to keep the babies, and just change the water."[63]

In addition to highlighting one particular narrative at the cost of other nineteenth century narratives, the Protestant paradigm further seems to suggest that the portrayal of *brāhmaṇas* as protagonists of a corrupt priest-system is reflective of either Victorian (i.e. Protestant) resentments against Catholic institutions or, more general, of the European crisis of faith endured by the ongoing secularization and modernization processes. The image of the corrupt *brāhmaṇa* priest that, it may be noted, incidentally coincides with various Buddhist accounts of the *brāhmaṇa*,[64] was also formed on pre-existing western representations and ideas of the *brāhmaṇa*. The Indian *brāhmaṇa* had already entered the western imagination from the time of Alexander the Great onwards. Throughout the following centuries various representations of the *brāhmaṇa* developed first in Christian libraries and later on in ethnographical accounts too, and though some of the *brāhmaṇa* narratives are hard to reconcile with one another, they all share a framing Christian theological worldview. Within that Christian monogenetic frame holding that "the [whole] world had known the biblical God .... [and that the Christian] religion could be traced back to Adam and Eve and ... that its remnants survived in the most distant quarters of the world,"[65] the *brāhmaṇa* first came to be presented as a virtuous and faithful ascetic, as a true Christian exemplar. From the sixteenth century onwards, the *brāhmaṇa* entered the polemic vocabulary of Reformation and came to be represented in terms familiar to the nineteenth century Protestant paradigm, namely as

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[62] Almond 1988: 76, see also pp. 69-79.
[63] Silk 1994: 180.
[64] For an insightful analysis of negative accounts of Brahmins in Pāli *sūtras,* see Freiberger 2009.
[65] Gelders 2009: 571.

corrupt priests upholding a perverse system.[66] In other words, the narrative of the corrupt *brāhmaṇa* priest cannot solely be accounted for by nineteenth century Protestant ideas about sacerdocy. It was inasmuch informed by a pre-existing sixteenth century image of the *brāhmaṇa* as Christian apostate, an image developed by and used within the reformist polemics.

Another fact that needs to be underscored is that the 'language of decline' employed by nineteenth century scholars to describe all but the initial stage of Jainism and Buddhism is not restricted to the principles of the Protestant paradigm. True, the *localisation* of original Jainism and Buddhism in their ancient canonical texts can be understood as a tail end of some longstanding Protestant presuppositions concerning scriptures.[67] However, the *normative qualification* of the origins of the two religions as original Jainism and Buddhism is not *per se* or only the result of a Protestant framework. As mentioned, at the basis of such normative qualification lies the nineteenth century scholars' triple equation of origins, essence, and originality. With Troeltsch we have further seen that the qualification of a religion's origins as normative is a natural consequence of the very concept of essence, that carries within itself a critical and developmental principle. It is not surprising, therefore, to see the nineteenth century orientalist devaluation of historical forms of Jainism and Buddhism finding correspondence with traditional Jain and Buddhist assessments of their own history. Indeed, wherever the idea of origins is qualified as normative the 'language of decline' may be expected to arise. Or also, it is safe to say that "a valuation of the past and a devaluation of the present [is]", as John Cort noted "also a powerful tendency *within* the religious traditions themselves." Giving the example of Jainism, he writes:

> "Jain cosmology locates contemporary humanity as being in the fifth spoke of the downward cycle of time. This is an era when liberation is impossible, and both religion and culture are in an irreversible state of decline. The 24 Jinas, however, lived in the middle two spokes of the cycle, when true dharma and liberation were possible. That was the "golden era," of which the present is only a dim and fading reflection. Thus, Jain dogma and Orientalist scholarship coincide in their valuation of the past over the present. The assumptions behind these two subjective judgements (for that is what they are), however, are very different. Whereas the assumption behind Jain dogma is that of salvifically-oriented cosmology, that behind the Orientalist/Indological scholarship is based on European belief in the

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[66] See Gelders 2009 who offers a detailed genealogy of pre-colonial western narratives on the Brahman.

[67] It may be noted though, with John Cort, that for nineteenth century German scholars working on Jainism "[t]he influence of the Renaissance emphasis on classics and classical origins may in fact have been greater on the German Indologists than Protestant emphasis on the Bible and Christian origins." Cf. Cort 1990: 50.

value of history and culturally-mediated Renaissance and Protestant critiques of tradition." (Cort 1990: 48-9)

Further, as it is well known, with the realization that the tradition's present situation is only a weak reflection of its glorious past; that its temporal (and in many cases geographical)[68] distance from its origins equals an alienation from its original, pure state, often comes the development of all sorts of strategies to enable if not to return, to at least stay as close and faithful as possible to the original. For, it is in its relation to the original, in its so-called continuation of the tradition's origins, that a tradition can rest its claim to legitimacy, authenticity and hence authority too.

Power Relations in the western Construction of Buddhism and Jainism

"Knowledge is power." It is easy to understand how this is true regarding the knowledge accumulation of nineteenth century missionaries in India and Ceylon on the 'new religions' they encountered. The knowledge they amassed concerning the various 'new religions' served as a powerful tool to convert. If they took pains to describe and reify the various peoples' believes and practices into "religion-things,"[69] or if they exerted themselves to collect and study the manuscripts containing the so-called sacred words' of those new religions, it is because they believed that in doing so they could show people the internal inconsistencies and erroneous nature of their religious beliefs and practices to, in a second instance, introduce and convert them to the one and only true religion, being the one proclaimed by the missionaries themselves. As an example of knowledge serving as tool to convert, we may refer to the 'Buddhism' given by the Wesleyan missionary Spence Hardy. To quote again from his preface to *Manual of Budhism*:

> By the messenger of the cross, who may succeed me in the field [i.e. Ceylon] in which it was once my privilege to labour, this Manual will be received, I doubt not, as a boon; *as it will enable them more readily to understand the system they are endeavouring to supersede, by the establishment of the Truth.* I see before me, looming

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[68] Think, for instance, of the so-called "borderland-complex."

[69] The term "religion-things" is taken from Numark's analysis of the manner how Bombay based Protestant missionaries reified the religion of the Jains. Arguing that the missionaries their "understanding of Indian religions was in large part an isomorphic projection and homologous expression of the longstanding Protestant view of Roman Catholicism," he shows how they "reified and transformed the religion of the Hindus, … Parsis, and … Jains into objective, systematic, bounded and individual religion-things – [that were] structurally isomorphic to other entities deemed religions." Numark 2013: 35-36.

in the distance, a glorious vision, in which the lands of the east are presented in
majesty; happy, holy, and free. I may not, I dare not, attempt to describe it; but it
is the joy of my existence to have been an instrument, in a degree however feeble,
to bring about this grand consummation. (Hardy 1853: xiii)

That "knowledge is power" is obvious here; knowledge of 'Buddhism' provided in his
Manual is meant to serve the missionary goal of 'establishing the Truth', and thus
'freeing' Ceylon and its people. Though far more subtle, power relations are also
involved in the nineteenth century European academic knowledge production on
Jainism and Buddhism. To see how this is true, it is useful to give Foucault's short but
effective definition of power. For, power, as a concept, is all too easily linked with its
obvious forms of manifestations only, wherein a strong entity is having a clear political,
economic and/or physical dominance over a weaker entity. Foucault's definition of
power succeeds, however, to capture subtler forms of dominion too. It reads «le pouvoir
est une relation entre deux individus, c'est une relation qui est telle que l'un peut
conduire la conduite d'un autre. »[70] When orientalists located the 'essence' of Jainism
and Buddhism in canonical texts, then the power to describe 'original' Jainism and
Buddhism came to lie with those mastering the philological method. Jains and Buddhists
desiring to co-define the orientalist discourse on their 'religion,' had to command and
adhere to the recognized research methods of the western scholar. It is telling, for
instance, to read how prior to becoming a Jain monk, Muni Jina Vijaya being desirous to
participate and to be heard in the then on-going orientalist discourse on 'his' religious
tradition, went to Germany in 1928 to meet Hermann Jacobi with the aim to, in his
words, "acquiring first-hand knowledge of the methods of research [in German
institutions] and with a view to establishing close contact with the German scholars
working on Indological subjects and especially on Jain literature."[71]

Also, when Rhys Davids' established the Pali Text Society in 1881 he created a
platform that would both promote the study of Pāli texts and Buddhism, and
institutionalize it. The institutionalization of Buddhist studies through an establishment
as the Pali Text Society means that those who wished to join and be heard in the
discussion on 'what is Buddhism,' or better, on 'what is original Buddhism' had to be
able to adhere to its research norms, and have access to its recognized publishing
systems. In other words, the authority and power of an institution as the Pali Text
Society lies in the manner in which it *directs* both the content and methodology of
Buddhological research.[72]

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[70] Cf. Foucault 1981.

[71] Muni Jina Vijaya quoted in Flügel 1999: 9-10.

[72] Cp. with the fourth rule of the Pali Text Society as being republished in the preface to the PTS journal of
1923: "It shall be the duty of the President [of the Pali Text Society] to choose the books to be edited, and to

Part II: Anti-Essentialist Framework of *Dialogues with(in) the Pāli Vinaya*

> *[T]he student [or scholar] of religion .... must be relentlessly self-conscious. Indeed, this self-consciousness constitutes his primary expertise, his foremost object of study.* (Smith 1982: xi)[73]

Continuing the previous chapters' line of thought that a scholar is simultaneously speaking in and being spoken by a scholarly language, and keeping in mind the above quoted reflection of Jonathan Smith that 'the student [or scholar] of religion...must be relentlessly self-conscious,' it is a good opportunity here to consider the manner in which this current PhD research fits within the larger contemporary scholarly framework. For also this research is not only codirecting the general patterns of the present day scientific discourse but it is also, and if not much more, directed by those patterns.

As mentioned at the onset, the questions of the *dynamics and dialectics of the Pāli Vinaya's ascetic others* are framed, directed and inspired by the modern scholarly discourse on *anti-essentialism.* I defined the anti-essentialist discourse as the discursive thought rejecting the humanist idea that a subject is defined by an inherently present, unique and essential characteristic. For reasons I shall mention below, this discursive anti-essentialist thought started to seep through various academic disciplines of both the Faculty of Humanities and Faculty of Science after World War II, to gradually become a well-established and authoritative assumption during the 1970s and 1980s. It should be clear that what I call anti-essentialist discourse does not stand for a definite set of ideas, as if it was a discourse first formulated independently from the on-going

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arrange with editors or translators to do their work, with printers to do the printing, and with publishers or other persons to distribute the volumes when printed." See Journal of the Pali Text Society 1920-1923: vii.

The lasting influence of the research norms and interests of the Pali Text Society on Buddhologists has been scornfully referred to by Tambiah as the "Pali Text Society Mentality". See Hallisey 1990: 34.

On the difficulty of Asian Buddhists to be heard in the European discussions on Buddhism because of their limited access to dominating western institutions, see Snodgrass 2007: 195.

[73] Smith 1982, *Imagining Religion: From Babylon to Jonestown*, quoted by Richard King 2008 (1999), *Orientalism and Religion: Postcolonial Theory, India and 'the mystic East'.* London and New York: Routledge, p. 11.

scientific research or the social and political discourses, to subsequently become accepted by and uniformly integrated within the various academic disciplines of the Humanities and Science. Instead, I use *anti-essentialist* discourse here as a general category of thought to refer to various and distinct, but clearly observable, patterns (this is, in the luxury of retrospect) from the 1970s onwards within the various scientific disciplines to openly start questioning their traditional research topics, presuppositions and subject boundaries. What is important here, is the fact that this critical questioning was accompanied with a general *de-essentialization* of the traditionally received knowledge and boundaries of one's discipline. We will return to these points later.

As pointed out in the Introduction, to question the *dynamics and dialectics of the ascetic others* on the development of the early Buddhist ascetic community, is to try to apprehend, among other things, the mechanisms that made it possible for the early Buddhist ascetic community to be perceived and recognized as being both a distinct ascetic community among other communities and as 'Buddhist,' to use, once again, this anachronistic but conventional denomination. Further, in focussing on the early Jain-Buddhist *contact*, this PhD is not so much trying to assess the degree of positive influence of the Jains on the development of the Buddhist ascetic community, or trying to determine which of the two communities was original in their agreement as Hermann Jacobi did, but instead it is seeking to understand how contact with members representing the Jain community stirred Buddhist ascetics to dialectically define themselves in terms of similarity and difference. In other words, this research deals with the dynamic and on-going processes of boundary-negotiation and self-definition through the definition of one's multiple others. These two connected problems belong to the broader and complex issue of identity.

To raise these questions of what made a 'Buddhist' Buddhist; what did it entail to be recognized by both fellow Buddhist *bhikkhus* (insiders) and non-Buddhist *bhikkhus* (outsiders) to be a Buddhist mendicant; or to consider under which circumstances and conditions one could become a member of the Buddhist ascetic community, is to raise questions pertaining to the dialectical subject of early 'Buddhist' *identity,* or better, *identities.* For, underlying this inquiry of what it meant to be a Buddhist *bhikkhu* during the formative stages of the Buddhist ascetic *saṅgha,* is an anti-essentialist assumption about the nature of identity. This is, I understand identity, whether of an individual subject or of a community, not as an innate essence pertaining to that individual or community, but as a dynamic, changing and dialectically negotiated notion. More specifically, I view identity as a relational concept, requiring and resulting from the so-called process of othering.[74] This means that we believe that the answer to the question

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[74] On the concept of othering, see section III.

of what it means to be a Buddhist *bhikkhu* will not only vary diachronically, this is according to the differing time frames the question relates to, but also within one and the same synchronic moment. Within a synchronic moment, for instance, there may be as many definitions viable of a Buddhist *bhikkhu* as there are others to whom a *bhikkhu* dialectically relates. The significance and meaning of a Buddhist *bhikkhu* will alternate in accordance to his alternating 'proximate others.'[75] The definition of a Buddhist *bhikkhu* will depend thus on whether the *bhikkhu* is mainly relating (for whatever reasons) to a lay-follower, householder, relative, woman, man, *brāhmaṇa,* Jain, fellow Buddhist *bhikkhu* etc. To view the concept of identity as a relational one opens up the possibility for collating multiple definitions under the term 'Buddhist *bhikkhu',* definitions that, it should be noted, may but not necessarily need to complement one another. Also conflicting definitions may be found for 'Buddhist *bhikkhu.*'

It is apparent that when such a non-essential relational definition of 'identity' is applied to the study of the early Buddhist ascetic community, a complex, heterogenic 'picture' is bound to emerge of that community. Any hope to find a clear-cut answer to what it meant to be a Buddhist *bhikkhu* during the formative stages of the *saṅgha* may, therefore, readily be dismissed. A simple definition can at the very best represent an abstracted and normative idea(l) of *the Buddhist bhikkhu,* but fails to transmit the dynamic and dialectical processes entailed in the very act of (self-) definition.

Another presupposition underlying this research is the view that not a homogenized essence but a heterogeneous diversity will necessarily be characterizing the early Buddhist ascetic *saṅgha*. This stress on heterogeneity is not unique to this research. As we will shortly see, for Indology and the related fields of Buddhology and Jainology, to emphasize the heterogeneity of one's research subject has been one of the strategies formulated to the post-colonial critique that late nineteenth and early twentieth century orientalist scholarship constructed essential and thus homogenized and stereotyped forms of knowledge regarding 'the' Indian 'traditions.'

In the previous chapter, we discussed in some detail Hermann Jacobi's argumentation for considering the historical beginnings of the Jain tradition to be independent (i.e. not schismatic) from the Buddhist tradition. His concerns with origins, typical as we have seen for the then on-going scientific discourse, translated itself into questioning which among the *brāhmaṇa,* Jain and Buddhist ascetic traditions came first in matters concerning shared vows and precepts. Subscribing to the idea of the "purity of the historical prior," Jacobi thus questioned who copied who, who borrowed from who, in other words, who came first, who was original? What needs to be pointed out here is the

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[75] The term 'proximate other' has been coined by Jonathan Smith. A critical discussion of this dynamic concept is given in Part III.

fact that Jacobi's pattern of argumentation is representative of a then on-going scholarly discourse producing homogenized and stereotyped products of knowledge on the early Indian traditions. A consequence, though most probably an involuntary one, of questioning the historical origins of the Jain tradition in the manner of Hermann Jacobi, is an oversimplification of the early Indian ascetic landscape into these three principal, well-defined, clear-cut and unchanging ascetic communities: *brāhmaṇa,* Jain and Buddhist. In searching who was older and/or original the questions concerning not only the fluidity *within* a tradition but also the fluidity *between* the *brāhmaṇa*, Jain and Buddhist traditions remained unasked. In addition, the idea developed that once the common precepts of the three traditions would be removed, the true original contribution of each ascetic community would come to the foreground. Ludwig Alsdorf, for instance, made this observation explicitly when considering the advantages of comparing Buddhist and Jain material. So he noted:

> La comparaison réciproque ne se borne pas à éclairer de façon surprenante maints détails de doctrine et de pratique: elle permet aussi – ce qui est plus important – de déterminer à partir des concordances le substrat commun des réformes religieuses[76] du vi^e siècle *et, en faisant abstraction, de reconnaître ce que chacune de ces deux religions a réalisé d'original.* (Alsdorf 1965 : 3, emphasis mine)

Alsdorf made this observation in his 1965 reflection on the then "état présent et taches futures" of Jain studies, a booklet republished in an English translation in 2006.[77] Not denying the many valuable and valid contributions to Jain studies contained in this booklet, I wish to point out, however, the problematic assumption underlying Alsdorf's starting point, namely the very idea that there is something as an "original" Jainism and an "original" Buddhism to be uncovered; that there is something unique or essential to both traditions, that clearly separates them into two distinct entities. In other words, underlying Alsdorf's research is an essentialist understanding of the notion of identity.

In critical response to such views and methodologies as Jacobi's and Alsdorf's, approaches developed departing from the inherent complexity of any 'entity.'[78] This stress on heterogeneity fits within and belongs to the broader scholarly scientific

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[76] Note how Ludwig Alsdorf's choice of words *"réformes religieuses"* is reminiscent of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century tendency to view the beginnings of the Jain and Buddhist traditions in Protestant reformist language. See above 'Protestant Paradigm.'

[77] Cf. Alsdorf, Ludwig & Bollée, Willem (tr.), 2006, *Jaina Studies: Their Present State and Future Tasks.* Mumbai: Hindi Granth Karyalay.

[78] In this context, note also Freiberger's lucid observation how it is 'methodologically problematic for historians to declare that a doctrine [or practice] that is advocated in Buddhist canonical texts was "non-authentic," that is, non-Buddhist.' Freiberger 2008: 248.

discourse on *anti-essentialism*, which started to gain ground in various academic disciplines from the 1970s onwards.

Again, I would like to underscore the fact that the discourse on *anti-essentialism* does not stand for one specific academic movement or one definite set of ideas. With *anti-essentialist* discourse I refer to the general trend translated in diverse manners, in the 1970s among both theorists and post-colonial critics to question and reject some fundamental assumptions on which the disciplines of Humanity and Science had thus far relied, causing important shifts in the perception of the traditionally received knowledge, the structures of knowledge and the production of knowledge. One specific response to this new heightened awareness regarding one's discipline's tradition was to de-essentialize its products of knowledge, and to study and stress instead the inherent complexity and relativity of one's research subjects. This argument may be exemplified with the specific cases of literary studies and identity studies, as their research questions and methodologies have often found and developed parallels in Jain and Buddhist studies.

For literary studies, the 1970s marked fundamental changes in its key premises concerning 'meaning.' The humanist concepts that the meaning of a literary text was essentially contained within the text itself, unambiguous, consciously produced by the author, and comprehensible through a close reading of the text, became rejected and replaced for a (post)structuralist, non-essential notion of meaning. This is, the meaning of a literary text was no longer considered to be essentially present in that text, but to be dependent on the text's multiple relations with various elements both inside and outside of it. Meaning became therefore something ambiguous and fluid. Further, in (post)structuralist literary theories the author was no longer viewed as the starting point or origin of a literary text. Instead language itself came to be positioned at the starting point. Language came to be seen as a 'pre-existing structure' (*langue*) that when used does not reflect but actively shapes reality. The author is presented then as one moving within those structures, combining its elements to create a particular *parole*. Meaning became consequently also understood as one of the possible products the system of language (*langue*) allows, and thus not as the conscious result of the author's efforts. In accordance with these changing presuppositions on which literary studies were based, the central question underlying literary studies changed from *what* a text meant, to *how* a text *produced* meaning.[79]

This general shift from an essential to a non-essential conception of a discipline's subject matter can also be noted in sociological identity studies. Together with a

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[79] For a more comprehensive overview of the fundamental changes taking place in literary studies in the 1970s, see Klages 2010 (2006), esp. pp. 1-9; 47-53.

changing focus from the question of individual identity to the question of collective identity, in the 1970s identity scholars gradually abandoned the idea that the attributes building up identity emerged from innate, essential characteristics. Studying 'the "we-ness" of a group,'[80] identity scholars started to take up an anti-essentialist position by, for instance, stressing the social constructiveness of a collective's identity, or later also by rejecting altogether the possibility of a homogeneous identity experience among a collective's members. Also Cerulo in her helpful 1994 review of identity studies sees the 1970s as marking a shift from an essential to a non-essential conception of identity. Pointing out that research on collective identity focuses on 'the similarities or shared attributes around which group members coalesce,' she notes how:

> Early literature [i.e. before 1970] approached these attributes as "natural" or "essential" characteristics – qualities emerging from physiological traits, psychological predispositions, regional features, or the properties of structural locations. A collective's members were believed to internalize these qualities, suggesting a unified, singular social experience, a single canvas against which social actors constructed a sense of self. [But] [r]ecent treatments of collective identity question the essentialism of collective attributes and images. Anti-essentialist inquiries promote the social construction of identity as a more viable basis of the collective self. Other works stress the problems inherent in collective categorization, presenting a postmodern challenge to arguments of unified group experience. (Cerulo 1994: 386-7)

Both anti-essentialist approaches hinted at in the quote, namely the social constructionist and the postmodern approach, underscore in their own way the indefinite, changing or heterogeneous nature of a collective's identity. For the social constructionist approach, 'every collective becomes a social artefact – an entity molded, refabricated, and mobilized in accord with reigning cultural scripts and centers of power.'[81] On the other hand, the postmodern, deconstructionist approach while questioning the very possibility of a homogenous experience of a collective, stresses the variation *within* identity collectives and draws attention to 'the complex, often contradictory, nature of collective existence.'[82] The point here being that both approaches firmly reject the possibility that a collective's or any subject's identity is constituted of essentialist attributes.

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[80] Cerulo 1997: 386.

[81] Ibid.: 387.

[82] Postmodern approaches to collective identity saw several flaws in the constructionist approach. For the postmodern, the constructionist approach 'reinscribes an essentialist logic at the very level of historicism;' 'underemphasizes the role of power in classification process;' and has 'an insufficient agenda.' Cf. Ibid.: pp. 391-2.

These changes in the conception of and approach to the research subjects in literary studies and sociological identity studies are two paradigmatic examples of the general trend within the various academic disciplines in the 1970s and 1980s to de-essentialize both their subjects of research and products of knowledge.

In broad brush strokes, this trend may be understood as a reflexive and much needed response within academic circles to the changing world scene of post-World War II, the 1968 cultural revolutions, and the subsequent heightened political awareness in academia brought about by theorists of knowledge such as Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida.[83] The discipline of Indology and the related but younger disciplines of Buddhology and Jainology had, in addition, to consider the rising and angry voice of those who had previously been a 'colonial agent.'[84] Finally, in 1978 Edward W. Said's *Orientalism* heralded the era of post-colonial cultural studies.

Orientalism was received, not without criticism,[85] as a powerful analysis of the construction of European knowledge of the Islamic Middle East during the colonial period. Within 'orientalistic' disciplines it effected a critical re-evaluation of the disciplines' history, methodology and premises. Though Said's case study cannot be extrapolated without difficulties to the fields of Indology, Buddhist studies or Jain studies,[86] sufficient successful exercises have already been made to show how there is

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[83] The post-World War II socio-political background of the nineteenth century modern university had changed so drastically that the traditional configuration and interpretation of the sciences became challenged. The difficulty to further sustain the discipline of anthropology in its original conception may be viewed here as an example *par excellence* of this. Anthropology was initially a social science that had seen the light during and because of the colonial rule of the nineteenth century world powers. It was a science intent on describing the 'primitive' people 'who were under actual or virtual colonial rule.' After 1945, however, '[a]nthropology was forced to redefine its focus rather radically, since both the concept of the "primitive" and the reality it was supposed to reflect were disappearing .... anthropologists "came home".' Orientalists who had primarily been 'textual ethnographers,' became historians. With the hegemonic position of the US, the US university system became the dominant university model. What would also come to have a significant impact on the Humanist structures of knowledge, would be the rise of the two new fields of Area studies and Religious studies in the US in the 1960s and 1970s. Cf. Wallerstein 2004, *op cit.*: 7 & 11, 7-12. See also Lopez 1994: 8-13 that specifically treats the socio-political background of Buddhology in the US.

[84] This was naturally also true for the discipline of anthropology.

[85] The criticism on Said's *Orientalism* has become as standardized as the list of the many lucid points that have been and still are being appraised. Among the points of criticism, the most relevant one for our current purpose is the fact that Said has treated the colonial subject as a completely passive subject, a subject not able to respond to, direct or use to his own advantage the dominant colonial discourse. For books critical of Said, see a.o. Varisco 2007 and Irwin 2006. I thank Oliver Freiberger for having brought those two publications to my attention.

[86] With regards to Buddhist studies, Donald Lopez notes three important points preventing one to consider the initial western representation of 'Buddhism' as an identical act of orientalism as the European representation of the colonized Islam World was: (1) the Buddhist world was not 'frighteningly' proximate to Europe as the Islam world was, (2) a direct political role of Buddhist studies is not evident, (3) Buddhist studies was

something distinctly 'orientalist' about the western knowledge production in those three fields during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.[87] When disentangling 'orientalist' processes from the need of a specific historical context of western colonization, or when trying to view, as Snodgrass has suggested, Said's case study as "a much more general process of the way one society forms knowledge of another," we are able to identify various 'orientalist' features in nineteenth century western Indological knowledge.[88] This is also true for the western production of knowledge concerning 'the' Indian Buddhist tradition, the study of which occurred in the absence of a specific colonial context for the simple reason that "[b]y the time that India became part of the British empire, Buddhism was long dead there, present only in the form of palm leaf manuscripts, stone inscriptions, statues, and monuments."[89] In the absence of a specific colonial context for the western study of Indian Buddhism, what then can be considered to be typically 'orientalist' about it?

One typical 'orientalist' aspect is the manner in which European conceptual frameworks have been transposed onto the subjects of study or, reversely, how the subjects of study were drawn into the European conceptual frameworks. Richard King has amply shown how 'orientalist' discourses are characterized by this 'projection of domestic concerns, tension and power struggles onto the colonies abroad.'[90] A specific example of this, is the manner how Catholic and Protestant struggles were *read into* the historical beginnings of both the Jain and Buddhist traditions. As we have seen in our discussion of the so-called Protestant paradigm, there was an insistence to present Mahavīra and the Buddha as *reformers* of the corrupt *brāhmaṇa priests.*

As discussed, a current belief of late nineteenth century and early twentieth century scholarly discourse was the view that the Jain and Buddhist 'canonical' texts contained, if read adequately, the real 'essence' of the Jain and Buddhist traditions. This brings us to a second, and for our current purpose, very significant 'orientalist' feature of Indological endeavour, namely the fact that Indological discourses created essentialized products of knowledge (cf. above). In the words of Donald Lopez, this characterizing feature is "the representation of the complex as the simple, of the co-mingled as the

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conducted by scholars of various nationalities, and thus not only by nationals of the colonizing countries. Cf. Lopez 1995: 11.

[87] For the field of Indology see among others Tull 1991; Pollock 1993; Alduri 2011 and the reaction of Grünendahl 2012 on the publications of both Pollock 1993 and Alduri 2011; McGethin 2010. For Buddhist studies see e.g. Eckel 1994; Lopez 1995; Hallisey 1995; Freiberger 2003; Franklin 2005; Snodgrass 2007. For Jain studies, see a.o. Orr 2009 and Numark 2013.

I thank Tillo Detige for having brought to my awareness many of the references referred to here.

[88] Snodgrass 2007: 200.

[89] Lopez 1995: 11. Lopez does not fail to note that the situation was different in Sri Lanka and Burma.

[90] King 2008 (1999): 155.

pure."[91] The positivistic textual attitude of orientalist scholars of that time led to representations of the Indian traditions as ahistorical and homogenised entities. The preference of orientalist scholars for the information provided in classical Indian texts to the actual complex and varied contemporary practice of these traditions, made them locate the true and original essence of these traditions within textual sources only. As we discussed in great detail in the preceding chapters, this had several consequences. For our current argumentation, we may underscore the fact that the knowledge thus obtained and presented was highly essentialist in nature. It was essentialist because scholars not only believed that the Buddhist and Jain traditions had, in the first place, something that could be determined as their *essence,* but also because they believed that the *essence* of the Buddhist and Jain traditions could only be retrieved from their 'canonical' texts and this by means of a careful philological reading. The presented knowledge was further essentialist in the manner in which it viewed all history and contemporary practices of these traditions as degenerations from their initial pure, original state. In other cases orientalist scholarship simply denied history altogether, presenting the complex Indian traditions as ahistorical or static and unchanging entities. This essentialist attitude resulted in homogenized, stereotyped conceptions of what the Indian traditions are, but most importantly what they had been in their more remote and therefore more glorified and pure past.

For instance, within the field of Jain studies it was not uncustomary in the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century to present the early Jain ascetic community as a homogeneous, well-defined community with a set of ascetic praxes that hardly changed in the course of the centuries. John Cort in his introduction to *Open Boundaries* discusses the main models in which the Jain tradition has commonly been portrayed by western scholarship. He notes how western scholarship has dominantly presented the Jain tradition as a 'fundamentally unoriginal movement,' this being a result of a 'degenerationist model' wherein

> a supposedly pure, original ur-Jain doctrine is contrasted with the later impure, degenerated Jainism largely composed of half-understood and ill-digested Hindu influences and accretions. It is a powerful Orientalist doublebind: "pure" Jainism is defined as conservative and unchanging, and all innovations are portrayed as degenerations. Original Jainism is the essence of Jainism, historical Jainism consists of a falling away from that essence. (Cort 1999 (1998): 3)

Such models for interpreting not only the Jain but also, as we have shown, the Indian Buddhist tradition have proven to be highly problematic. First, by stereotyping Indian traditions into ahistorical and fixed entities, they fail to recognize both the historicity

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[91] This is for Lopez a standard feature of the Orientalizing process. Cf Lopez 1994, *op cit.*: 15.

and the inherent complexity and heterogeneity of these traditions. Second, post-colonial critics have correctly pointed out how western scholars hegemonised the authority and power to speak of these Indian traditions. For, when the true essence of the Jain and Indian Buddhist tradition comes to be located within their classical and canonical texts, the power to speak about these traditions comes to lie with those who can correctly extract their essence from the texts, those being the orientalist scholar with his philological skills (cf. 'Power Relations' above). Third, the essentialist, textualist approach has resulted in a negative appreciation of the contemporary practices of the Indian traditions. Contemporary practices came to be negatively evaluated against the 'extracted essences' of the philologist or against the "purity of the 'original texts'" *tout court.*[92]

These problems inherent to an essentialist approach have been identified and recognized by scholars both within and outside the disciplines of Indology, Buddhology and Jainology. Within the current and previous two generations of orientalist scholars we can observe the formulation of new approaches and presuppositions in answer to the post-colonial critique and in general accordance to the changing academic climate of the 1970s and 1980s. To avoid the fallacy of 'the act of orientalism' in general (if, indeed, this can be avoided completely)[93] and essentialization in particular, new research strategies have been developed. One strategy has been to develop that which I have termed an anti-essentialist approach. This is, research on the Indian Buddhist or Jain tradition that no longer sets out to describe their real, original or pure essence, but aims to instead understand their inherent complexity, constant change and fluidity, and this in both a diachronic and synchronic fashion. Multiple scholarly research of the past few decades, including this current PhD, should be understood within this anti-essentialist discourse.

The manner how orientalist scholarship started to de-essentialize its subjects of research and products of knowledge bears great similarity to the processes of de-essentialization within literary studies and identity studies. We have seen how literary studies began to view meaning as ambiguous and fluid, as being dependent on changing elements both within and outside the literary work. In a similar fashion, the positivistic philological perspective that had accompanied the essentialist attitude of the textual orientalist, began to be replaced for a historical one. Traditional texts began to be

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[92] Cf. King 2008 (1999): 146. See also above 'Devaluation of non-canonical Sources.'

[93] One might justly ask whether the act of 'orientalism' is not bound to be present to some higher or lesser degree in any scholar's formation of knowledge about 'the' Orient. For, as has been remarked, 'the very act of interpretation by Western Orientalists when approaching the Orient inevitably involves an appropriation and 'colonialization' of the material under consideration. Indeed, this is not only an issue for the Orientalist, or even for the Westerner, but for everyone involved in the hermeneutical moment.' King 2008 (1999): 95.

approached as normative, prescriptive sources whose significance or meaning was unfixed and dependent on their specific historical contexts. Also, just as the postmodern deconstructionist approach within identity studies emphasized the heterogeneity within collectives, the heterogeneity within the various Indian traditions came to be studied. This anti-essentialist scholarship within the different fields of 'orientalist' studies may be exemplified.

Not surprisingly, many examples can be found from the 1970s onwards. To start, we can think of the numerous studies, presented at conferences and/or published in articles and monographs, that explicitly start off from the question of identity within Buddhist, Jain, or other Indian 'religious' traditions. In a first instance the question of identity, this is when it is relationally conceived in terms of self and other, enables the researcher to study the dialectic formation of a tradition from within the tradition itself, thus avoiding – to some extent at least – the imposition of conceptions and formations from outside the studied tradition. In a second instance, and also due to the paradigm shift from the essentialist conception to the social constructivist and postmodern deconstructionist conception of 'identity,' scholars started to stress the heterogeneity, relativity or 'multiplicity' of what it meant to be Jain or Buddhist at any given time and place.

As a specific example of such anti-essentialist scholarship within Jain studies, we may return once more to John Cort's *Open Boundaries.* The edited volume, being a brilliant academic testimony to the inherent complexity of that what we call the Jain tradition, proceeds from a clear anti-essentialist perspective and aim. So we read in the introduction:

> it is useful to view Jainism not as a thing but rather as a style, one style (or family of styles) among many in South Asia. In the end, ... efforts in pursuit of simple definitions, useful as they may be in clarifying one's thought, peter out in inconclusiveness. We do not have a single Jainism, but multiple Jainisms, and multiple visions of what Jainism is. We have contested identities of what it means to be Jain, and .... these contested identities of what it means to be Jain can only be studied as paired with contested identities of what it means to be non-Jain. (Cort 1999 (1998): 12-3)

Departing from this notion of 'multiple Jainisms,' the volume succeeds in deconstructing any single, static notion one may have had regarding the Jain tradition into 'multiple, contested' notions and it does this without losing all grip on 'Jain reality' when speaking of these 'multiple Jainisms.' The individual articles that each sought 'to locate Jain materials in a ... dynamic, reciprocal, and interactive relation to South Asian

society,' demonstrate well the indefinite, relational meaning of that what is termed Jain at any given time and place.[94]

Of contemporary date, we can cite the Indological and Buddhological research being conducted at the consortium 'The Käte Hamburger Kolleg (KHK) *Dynamics in the History of Religions between Asia and Europe.*' This consortium, established in 2008 under the direction of Volkhard Krech at the Rühr University in Bochum, is a paradigmatic example of a research centre which perspectives and aims are clearly framed by an 'anti-essentialist' standpoint. Stressing, as the consortium's title suggests, the multiple *dynamics* in the historical development of religions, the research consortium thematically studies seminal dynamic stimuli in the history of religions such as their interreligious and socio-cultural *contacts,* their processes of religious *differentiation* and *demarcation*, or their intra- and inter religious *conflicts.* The centre further focusses on religions' formative, expansionary and contemporary stages, moving back and forth between micro, meso and macro levels of analysis, between case studies and theoretical frameworks, and between exemplary and comparative studies.[95] The KHK consortium in being able to bring together these different transdisciplinary methodological approaches with high thematic specialization is not only further complexifying our understanding of the various religious traditions, but is also pushing, or perhaps better, transcending the traditional academic boundaries of religious studies. We may end by quoting the first paragraph from the blurb of the book series *Dynamics in the History of Religions* as it captures the anti-essentialist premise so fundamental to the KHK research consortium:

> The so called world religions and other religious traditions are not, and have never been, homogenous, nor have they formed or evolve in isolation. *Trying to overcome cultural stereotypes and their ideological misuse,* the series "*Dynamics in the History of Religions*" focuses on the crucial role of *mutual encounters* in the origins, development, and *internal differentiation* of the major religious traditions. The primary thesis of the series consists in the assumption that interconnections of self-perception and perception by the other, of adaptation and demarcation are

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[94] Cort 1999 (1998): 3. Other examples of studies that underscore the inherent complexity within either the Jain or Buddhist tradition, are studies investigating the processes of othering within the Jain or Buddhist tradition, see e.g. Folkert 1993 (1975-1989), Krämer et al. 2010; Lindquist 2011, Deeg 2013 and Maes 2015 (forthcoming).

[95] The consortium is artificially divided into four research fields, being 'Formation,' 'Expansion,' 'Notions,' and 'Globalisation' which are integrated into the three transversal focus groups of 'Inclusion and Demarcation,' 'Transfer and Resistance,' and 'Dynamics and Stability.' For more information of the research activities, visit the KHK website: http://www.khk.ceres.rurh-uni-bochum.de (Last accessed: 27th of December 2013)

crucial factors for historical dynamics within the religious field. (Krech, emphasis mine)[96]

In conclusion, I hope to have convincingly shown how an anti-essentialist discourse started to gain ground and became prominent in various disciplines of post-World War II academia. The anti-essentialist discourse not being a single set of well-defined ideas can, however, be clearly observed in the several processes of de-essentialization in a discipline's premises, goals, and products of knowledge. And it is within this anti-essentialist scholarly framework that this current PhD *Dialogues with(in) the Pāli Vinaya* should be understood. Though the very possibility of being able to study the Pāli Vinaya today is a direct result of the heyday of nineteenth century Buddhological activities,[97] the questions raised to the Pāli Vinaya in the course of this dissertation are aimed to further complexify or de-essentialize our pre-conceived conceptions regarding the early Indian Buddhist ascetic tradition.

Part III: The Pāli Vinaya

The main source text used in this PhD is the Pāli Vinaya, the disciplinary code of the Buddhist Theravāda school. The Pāli Vinaya is a large and highly redacted ascetic text regulating many and diverse aspects of ascetic life through detailed descriptions of legal procedures, ceremonies, multiple do's and don'ts and several hundreds of rules (Pāli *sikkhāpada,* Skt. *śikṣāpada*) for the Buddhist *bhikkhu* and *bhikkunī.* The text leads in each one of these hundreds of ascetic regulations with an introductory story recounting the occasion and the specific incident that would have necessitated their formulation, making it a potentially rich source of information regarding the formative stages of the early Indian Buddhist ascetic community. However, as Vinaya experts have pointed out,

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[96] Book blurb of the series *Dynamics in the History of Religion.*
Available at: http://www.brill.com/publications/dynamics-history-religions. Last accessed: 23rd of December 2013.

[9797] This is, without the orientalist scholar looking for a Buddhist canon after the model of the Christian biblical canon the study of Pāli texts such as the Pāli Vinaya would not have taken such an important place in the Buddhological research activities. Further, the Pāli 'canon' is easily accessible to present day scholars, as it is usually taken up in the library collections of the Indology or Buddhology department of universities. And this too is a direct result of nineteenth century scholarly activities, more specifically, of Rhys Davids' establishment of the Pali Text Society in 1881 which became an institute with authoritative knowledge regarding Buddhism. Cf. p. 31 ff.

there are several serious difficulties with consulting the Pāli Vinaya as a historical document. Regarding factuality and completeness of the Pāli Vinaya, we cannot be sure to what extent the precepts (and this is true for all Vinayas) were actually observed and, turning this problem around, we do not know how much of the precepts regulating the early Indian Buddhist ascetic life have factually been included in the Pāli Vinaya.[98] Broadly speaking, the main difficulties with consulting the Pāli Vinaya as a historical source relate to (1) its complex textual development and (2) its overt concern for tradition versus historical facts. Elucidating these difficulties, this chapter, and by extension this whole PhD, argues for considering the Pāli Vinaya as a nevertheless rich source of information regarding many diverse facets of early Indian Buddhist ascetic life. At the same time, the basic internal structure of the Pāli Vinaya will be expounded as this will prove helpful for understanding the many extracts from the Pāli Vinaya coming up in the following chapters.

Structure of the Pāli Vinaya

Much light on the language, internal structure and textual development of the Pāli Vinaya has already been thrown by renown philologists such as Oskar von Hinüber, Kenneth Roy Norman, Anthony Kennedy Warder, Wilhelm Geiger, Dieter Schlingloff and Edith Nolot. For a detailed exposition, I therefore refer to the works of these authors.[99]

The Pāli Vinaya is divided into three main parts: the Suttavibhaṅga; the Khandhaka and the Parivāra. The Suttavibhaṅga meaning "explanation of the (*Pātimokkha-*)sutta" contains and comments on the Pātimokkhasutta or the 227 rules of conduct for Buddhist *bhikkhus* and the 311 rules of conduct for Buddhist *bhikkhunīs,*[100] which are systematically arranged according to the gravity of offense committed when

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[98] On this issue see among others Schopen 1989; 1991; Collins 1990: 89, 102; Hallisey 1990: 207-8; Clarke 2009: 35-9. For helpful methodological guidelines to extract 'social and religious realities' from Vinayas, see Witkowski (forthcoming) and Nattier 2003: 63-69. See also Part II "Nattier's 'Principle of Irrelevance' and 'Principle of Counterargument'," where the methodological guidelines are explained in some detail.

[99] See von Hinüber 1996 & 1999 both works containing many references to other scholars on Vinaya, and von Hinüber 2001 (1986); Norman 1980; 1989; 1990-2001; Warder 1967 & 2001 (1963, 1974², 1991³); Geiger 1994; Schlingloff 1964 and Nolot 1994.

[100] For an edition and translation of both the Bhikkhu-and Bhikkhunīpātimokkha, see *The Pātimokkha,* William Pruitt (ed.) & K.R. Norman (tr.), 2001.

The Pātimokkha had to be known by heart for its fortnightly recitation on *uposatha* day. For a religio-historical analysis of this *pātimokkha* ceremony, see Holt 1999: 2, 16, 106-137 and Holt 1978 where he considers it as a cultic celebration of the disciplinary rules through which both the complete purity (*pārisuddhi*) and corporate identity of the early Buddhist ascetic *saṅgha* could be established and preserved. On *uposatha,* see also Hu-von Hinüber 1994.

transgressing the rule of conduct.[101] The Suttavibhaṅga leads in every rule of conduct of the Pātimokkha with an introductory story (*vatthu*) recounting the supposed when and why of the rule's promulgation (cf. below). Following the introductory story is the formulation of the rule of conduct in question (*paññatti*)[102] accompanied with the type of penalty incurred for transgressing it. This is followed by a word for word commentary (Padabhājaniya) and a casuistry ("Kasuistik", *anāpatti* "no offence").[103] Sometimes this is concluded with an exposition of other exemplary cases (*vinītavatthu*), which, if necessary, is followed by a reformulation of the initial rule of conduct.[104] In accordance with this structure, Nolot distinguishes three types of introductory stories in the Suttavibhaṅga: a *principal* introductory story justifying the need for the Pātimokkha rule; a *secondary* introductory story justifying the modification of the Pātimokkha rule; and an *annexed* introductory story treating a specific case at the end of the casuistry.[105]

The Khandhaka ("mass") is divided into the Mahāvagga ("great division") and Cullavagga ("small division"). Also the Khandhaka contains many rules of conduct and just as in the Suttavibhaṅga here too they are embedded in a larger text. Also in the Khandhaka the precepts are provided with an introductory narrative, but apart from one exception[106] not with a word for word commentary.[107] In addition to a set of rules, the Khandhaka gives an account of the Buddha's enlightenment; of the first council; it further contains technical descriptions of ordination procedures and ceremonies such

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[101] Thus we have, in descending order of gravity: *pārājika rules* (offences involving defeat, for more details on the consequences of transgressing a *pārājika* rule, see Clarke 2009. On the term '*pārājika*' see a.o. Heirman 1999); *saṃghādisesa* rules (offences entailing a formal meeting of the *saṅgha*); *aniyata* rules (indefinite rules, the consequence of transgressing such a rule is to be determined according to the gravity of the offence); *nissaggiya-pācittiya* rules (offences entailing expiation with forfeiture, such offences require a 'confession of the fault and forfeiture of the item involved in the offence'); (*suddha-*)*pācittiya* rules (offences involving expiation, such offences can be 'redressed through a general confession that does not specify the fault being confessed,' this is equally so for the *pāṭidesanīya* and *sekhiya* rules); *pāṭidesanīya* rules (offences require a confession); *sekhiya* rules (are rules of training, there are no consequences for transgressing such a rule); *adhikaraṇasamatha* (seven ways for settlement). For a discussion of this classification of the Pātimokkha precepts and the sanctions for breaking a particular precept, see *The Pātimokkha,* William Pruitt (ed.) & K.R. Norman (tr.), 2001, pp. xlvii-lv.

[102] The exact formulation of the rule of conduct may vary with the formulation of the Pātimokkha. Cf. Nolot 1994: 103.

[103] See Schlingloff 1964: 538, n. 22; Nolot 1994: 103.

[104] It may be noted that the Pāli terms given for the different divisions of the Suttavibhaṅga, this is *vatthu* (introductory story); *paññatti* (rule of conduct); *anupaññatti* (additional conditions); *padabhājaniya* (word for word explanation); *anāpatti* (exceptions to the rule); *vinītavatthu* (exemplary cases), are given in the account of the first council at Vin II 286 (line 23-29) (BD V 396) and are discussed in the Samantapasādika commentary on *pārājika* I. Cf. von Hinüber 1996: 13 §22.

[105] Cf. Nolot: 1994: 105.

[106] Vin I: 103-4.

[107] Cf. von Hinüber 1996: 15.

as the fortnightly *pāṭimokkha* recitation, and the *pavāraṇā* and *kaṭhina* ceremonies held at the end of the *vassa* or rain-retreat.

The third part, the Parivāra ("appendix") is a highly technical text giving a "systematic survey of law" and presupposes both the Suttavibhaṅga and Khandhaka parts.[108]

The Crux of the Pāli Vinaya's Textual Development

Having developed over a long period of time, the Pāli Vinaya presents itself as a very fragmented, heterogeneous text. First, the various 'Māgadhisms' encountered in the so-called Pāli language[109] suggest that the Pāli Vinaya is in part the result of a transposition from (an) earlier eastern version(s).[110] Second, the Pāli Vinaya knows a complex textual development for having ensued from a set of ascetic regulations that was first brought from India to Sri Lanka during Aśoka's reign, before being written down into a Vinaya compilation in the first century BCE. The textual fragmentation of the Pāli Vinaya is still well observable at the temporal gap between the precepts and their accompanying introductory story in the Suttavibhaṅga. In this section of the Pāli Vinaya introductory stories often betray a made up character by misunderstanding or showing a different concern than the precepts they introduce.[111] This has been examined in detail by Schlingloff who noted how many introductory stories in the Suttavibhaṅgha fail to grasp either the meaning or underlying motivation (or both) of the precept they introduce, while still other introductory stories betray their made up-character by having been clearly spun around one particular word or concept of the precept.[112]

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[108] Cf. von Hinüber 1996: 21-22. The Parivāra will in our discussion of the Pāli Vinaya be left out of consideration.

[109] Though Buddhists traditionally view "Pāli" to be the language wherein the Buddha taught, it may be noted with von Hinüber that "Pāli has never been a spoken language neither in Magadha [the cradle of Indian Buddhism] nor elsewhere… [Pāli] has been created as some kind of *lingua franca* presumably used in a large area at a time considerably later than the Buddha." Cf. von Hinüber 1996: 5. Further, the term 'Pāli' was "not originally the name of a language, but a term meaning firstly a line, bridge, or causeway, and thence a 'text.'" Cf. Collins 1990: 91.

[110] On the Māgadhisms in the Pāli language and the Pāli canon being in part the result of a 'transposition' of (an) earlier eastern version(s), see Warder 1967: 7-14; Norman 1980; Norman 1989, von Hinüber 2001 (1986) and von Hinüber 1996: 4-5, §7-9. See also von Hinüber 1999: 47f. & 84f. where he argues for a temporal or geographical distance between the Pātimokkhasutta and the Padabhājaniya (the word for word commentary) on the basis that the monetary unit *pāda* occurring in a precept of the Pātimokkhasutta has been replaced by *māsaka* in the accompanying Padabhājaniya section.

[111] Cf. von Hinüber 1996: 13, §20; Schlingloff 1964: 536-551.

[112] Cf. Schlingloff 1964: 458f.

Oskar von Hinüber pointed out that such introductory stories misunderstanding the precept will not be found in the Khandhaka section. For, in this section 'the author(s) could drop rules no longer understood, which is not possible in the fixed Pātimokkhasutta: *suttaṃ hi appaṭivattiyaṃ, ...* [meaning] "for it is impossible to revoke the (Pātimokkha-)sutta."'[113] Apart for the complex textual relationship *between* the various ascetic regulations and their accompanying introductory stories, different textual layers can also be present *within* one and the same introductory story.[114] Finally, a complex textual development also characterizes the Pātimokkha, the rules and legal procedures of the Khandakha; as well as the relationship between the Suttavibhaṅga and Khandakha sections of the Pāli Vinaya.[115]

Tradition Versus Historical Facts

Another main difficulty with consulting the Pāli Vinaya as a historical document is the problem of tradition versus historical facts. Given the invented tone of many introductory stories and their temporal distance from the precepts, it is clear that they were – contrary to what we would have liked - not developed as faithful historical reports. But then the question presses itself why were they developed?

Being structured around the principles of what today is called 'case law,' the Pāli *Vinaya* needs to ground each of its precepts on a specific incident. It needs to record the facts of the controversy that led to the formulation of a particular regulation. The overall function of the introductory stories within the Pāli Vinaya is precisely this: recounting the alleged when and why of each Pāli Vinaya regulation, providing thus a reference frame for future incidents.[116]

When we question the function of introductory stories by considering their narrative structure, then their prime function appears to have been the *creation* of the very tradition they claim to represent. The typical narrative structure of introductory stories effects a strong traditional story regarding the origin and development of the Buddhist ascetic *saṅgha*. As I will illustrate with an introductory story below, this is created by reverting to stock phrases; by using a repetitive structure; and, most importantly, by

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[113] von Hinüber 1996: 20, §37.

[114] For linguistic tools to relatively date (fragments of) the various introductory stories, see Nolot (1994: 106-107).

[115] Cf. von Hinüber 1996: 19, §37 where he notes how the *Suttavibhaṅga* and *Khandhaka* "have a long history of development and of mutual influence" and where he gives a provisional sketch of the development of the various parts of the *Suttavibhaṅga* and *Khandhaka* sections.
See also 'Epilogue' where tools are expounded to relatively date Vinaya passages.

[116] On the type of law embodied in the Pāli Vinaya, see also Dutt 1996 (1924): 25.

placing the executive role for every legal decision with the Buddha himself. It is this great emphasis on tradition that makes extracting historical data from the Pāli Vinaya a particularly hazardous task.

Recognizing this and other, so to speak, 'flaws' of the Pāli Vinaya as a ready historical document for the ins and outs of early Indian Buddhist ascetic life, scholars have been quick to point out that the Pāli Vinaya has nevertheless a rich historical value too. For instance, according to Charles Hallisey the Pāli Vinaya is historically valuable "in its being a coherent expression of a particular Buddhist *mentalité.*"[117] Also, if not representing actual Indian Buddhist ascetic life, it is at least "providing us with rich insights into how the canonical authors/redactors, the ascetic lawmakers, envisaged the Indian Buddhist experience [...] ."[118] Shayne Clarke in a recent study highlighted the value of Vinaya introductory stories as follows:

> Whether the narratives attached to ascetic regulations are based on historical events or not, it is precisely the narratives that are [...] invaluable for the historian of religion or religious thought. What is of importance here is not the historicity of the event, but the value that the ascetic traditions themselves attached to and invested in it. Such stories must be, at least in part, credible or plausible [...] .[119]

Concurring with this opinion that introductory stories are indeed invaluable for the present day researcher, I hope that my reading of the Pāli Vinaya presented in the following sections shows how introductory stories can disclose much valuable information on the dialectical role non-Buddhist ascetics played on the development of the early Buddhist ascetic community.

Introductory Stories, an Example

Introductory stories follow, as mentioned, a typical narrative structure. The first sentence of an introductory story invariably starts with a temporal setting '*tena kho pana samayena*' or 'now at that time' before starting to recount the supposed incident that led the Buddha to promulgate a particular regulation. The Suttavibhaṅga gives in tandem with the temporal setting a spatial setting, thus starting all of its *principal* introductory

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[117] Hallisey 1990: 208. Compare on this point also Dutt 1996 (1924): "[E]ven those [introductory] stories which are obviously legendary are valuable as letting us into the social, moral and mental atmosphere of the times in which they originated."

[118] Clarke 2009: 36. Clarke formulated this pointed observation with regard to all Indian Buddhist monastic law codes, thus not particularly to the Pāli one.

[119] Clarke 2009: 36.

stories with '*tena samayena buddho bhagavā* X *viharati* Y,'[120] with X being the name of the village or town where the Buddha was staying, and Y being the particular *ārāma* or *cetiya* ('shrine') within that village or town. Schlingloff correctly pointed out that the purpose of such a spatio-temporal framework lies in historicizing the introductory stories.[121]

In case the introductory story is one ushering in a Pātimokkha precept, then the spatio-temporal setting is followed by an account of the supposed incident which, in turn, is succeeded by a series of stock phrases expressing how the incident came to be known; how it subsequently came to be reproved by a particular individual or a group of 'people' (*manussā*) or monks that were 'annoyed, angry and speaking dispraisingly' (*ujjhāyanti khīyanti vipācenti*); and how it came to be reported to the Buddha through a short or long chain of particular witnesses. This is followed by some more stock phrases containing a reprimand of the Buddha given to the wrong-doer(s) and his reasons for promulgating the precept.

An example of an introductory story from the Suttavibhaṅga may be given. Quoting the introductory story to *pācittiya* LXXXV (Vin IV 1-2), I marked in bold the stock phrases and placed in italic all repetitions, so that the construction of a typical narrative structure through stock phrases and repetition may become visually apparent.

> **Tena samayena buddho bhagavā** Sāvatthiyaṃ **viharati** Jetavane Anāthapiṇḍikassa ārāme. **tena kho pana samayena** Hatthako Sakyaputto vādakkhitto hoti. so titthiyehi saddhiṃ sallapento avajānitvā paṭijānāti paṭijānitva avajānāti aññen' aññaṃ paṭicarati sampajānamusā bhāsati saṃketaṃ katvā visaṃvādeti.
>
> titthiyā **ujjhāyanti khīyanti vipācenti: kathaṃ hi nāma** Hatthako Sakyaputto amhehi *saddhiṃ sallapento avajānitvā paṭijānissati paṭijānitvā avajānissati aññen' aññaṃ paṭicarissati sampajānamusā bhāsissati saṃketaṃ katvā visaṃvādessatīti.* **assosuṃ kho bhikkhū tesaṃ titthiyānaṃ ujjhāyantānaṃ khīyantānaṃ vipācentānaṃ. atha kho te bhikkhū yena** Hatthako Sakyaputto **ten'** upasaṃkamiṃsu, upasaṃkamitvā Hatthakaṃ Sakyaputtaṃ **etad avocuṃ: saccaṃ kira** tvaṃ **āvuso** Hatthaka *titthiyehi saddhiṃ sallapento avajānitvā paṭijānāsi ... visaṃvādesīti.*
>
> ete kho āvuso titthiyā nāma yena kenaci jetabbā n'eva tesaṃ jayo dātabbo 'ti.
>
> **ye te bhikkhū appicchā**[122] **te ujjhāyanti khīyanti vipācenti: kathaṃ hi nāma** *Hatthako Sakyaputto titthiyehi saddhiṃ sallapento avajānitvā paṭijānissati paṭijānitvā avajānissati aññen' aññaṃ paṭicarissati sampajānamusā bhāsissati saṃketaṃ katvā visaṃvādessatīti.* **atha kho te bhikkhū bhagavato etam atthaṃ ārocesuṃ.**
>
> **atha kho bhagavā etasmiṃ nidāne etasmiṃ pakaraṇe bhikkhusaṃghaṃ sannipātāpetvā** Hatthakaṃ Sakyaputtaṃ **paṭipucchi: saccaṃ kira** tvaṃ Hatthaka

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[120] 'Now at that time the Buddha, the Bhagavat, was staying at X in Y.'

[121] Schlingloff 1964: 538. Cf. Nolot 1994: 105.

[122] appiccha < apa + iṣ 'desiring little' => unassuming, contended, modest

titthiyehi saddhiṃ sallapento avajānitvā paṭijānāsi...bhāsasi saṃketaṃ katvā visaṃvādesīti.

saccaṃ bhagavā.

vigarahi buddho bhagavā: kathaṃ hi nāma tvaṃ moghapurisa *titthiyehi saddhiṃ sallapento avajānitvā paṭijānissasi ... bhāsissasi saṃketaṃ katvā visaṃvādessasi.* n' etaṃ moghapurisa appasannānaṃ vā pasādāya – pa – evañ ca pana bhikkhave imaṃ sikkhāpadaṃ uddiseyyātha:

sampajānamusāvāde pācittiyan ti.

At that time Buddha, the Bhagavat, was staying at Sāvatthī in the Jeta Grove in Anāthapiṇḍika's monastery (ārāme). **Now at that time**, Hatthaka, son of the Sakyans, came to be overthrown in debate. He, talking with *titthiyas* (i.e. adherents of a different ascetic community), agreed while just having denied; denied while just having agreed; shunned (a question) by another; deliberately lied (and) after making an appointment (with *titthiyas*) he deceived with words.

The *titthiyā-s* **were irritated, angry and speaking dispraisingly: How can this** Hatthaka, son of the Sakyans, who is talking with us *agree while just having denied (and) deny while just having agreed, shun (a question) by another, deliberately lie (and) having made an appointment, deceive with words?*

Monks heard these *titthiyas* **who were irritated, angry and speaking dispraisingly. Then these monks approached** Hattahaka, son of the Sakyans, **having approached (him) they spoke thus to** Hatthaka, son of the Sakyans:

"Is it true, reverend Hatthaka, **that you** *when talking with titthiyā-s agree while just having denied .... deceive with words?"*

"These [matters] are indeed true, reverend ones, these *titthiyā-s* should be conquered in whatever way, victory should not be given to them."

Those who were modest monks were irritated, angry and speaking dispraisingly: "How can this Hatthaka, son of the Sakyans, **when** *talking with titthiyas agree while just having denied (and) deny while just having agreed, shun (a question) by another, deliberately lie (and) having made an appointment, deceive with words?"*

Then these monks told the matter to the Bhagavat.

Then the Bhagavat, on this occasion, in this connection, having had the *bhikkhu saṅgha* **convened, questioned** Hatthaka, the son of the Sakyans:

"Is it true, as is said, that you Hatthaka, **when** *talking with titthiyas agree while just having denied .... having made an appointment deceive with words?"*

"It is true, Bhagavat."

Then the Bhagavat rebuked him: "How can you, foolish man, when *talking with titthiyas agree while just having denied .... having made an appointment, deceive with words?"*

It is not, foolish man, for the benefit of un-believers ['*pa***'= nor for the increase in the number of believers, but, foolish man, it is to the detriment of both unbelievers and believers, and it causes wavering in some].**

And thus, monks, this rule of training should be set forth:

> "In telling a conscious lie, there is an offence of expiation." (trsl. partly following I.B. Horner BD II 164-166)

It may be noted that both the amount of repetition as well as the rebuke of the Buddha occur in a shortened version in our quoted introductory story. Hermann Oldenberg, the editor of the Pāli Vinaya abbreviated the repetitions and stock phrases after their first occurrence (indicated with "..." in the text), this is also true for the Chatta Sangayana edition.[123] Be as it may, the typical narrative structure of introductory stories may be clear. By reverting to stock phrases and using a rigid, repetitive narrative structure wherein the Buddha is playing the executive role for every legal decision, they produce a strong traditional story concerning the origin of each precept. The following chapters break, as it were, through this one-dimensional, normative façade of the Pāli Vinaya and bring to the foreground the many dialogues of the early Buddhist community with its wider ascetic landscape.

In a first instance, I try to break through the one-dimensional, normative façade of the Pāli Vinaya by searching for concrete dialogue opportunities. By means of a methodological reading of the Pāli Vinaya based on Nattier's 'principle of irrelevance' and 'principle of counterargument,'[124] I draw a typology of contact opportunities for the early Buddhist *bhikkhu* and his ascetic others. How easily could a Buddhist *bhikkhu* come

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[123] In the first and thus lengthier introductory story of the Suttavibhaṅga (i.e. the introductory story to *pārājika* I) the rebuke of the *bhikkhu's* offence is first uttered by monks and later, when the Buddha is informed of his disciple's misdeed, repeated by the Buddha himself. In both cases, the content and wording of the rebuke are identical. There is only a difference in the mode of address: monks address their fellow *bhikkhu* with '*āvuso*', while the Buddha addresses his disciple with '*moghapurisa*' ('foolish man'). Cf. BD I 35-37.

Similarly, the introductory story to *pārājika* I gives both a lengthier rebuke of the Buddha as well as a fuller version for his reason to promulgate the precept. The full rebuke reads as follows:

"It is not fit, foolish man, it is not becoming, it is not proper, it is unworthy of a recluse, it is not lawful, it ought not to be done. How is that you, foolish man, having gone forth under this dhamma and discipline which are well taught, are not able for your lifetime to lead the Brahma-life which is complete and wholly purified? How can you strive, foolish man, while dhamma is taught by me in various ways for the sake of passionlessness....foolish man, by me for the sake of passionlessness. Foolish man, is not dhamma taught by me in various ways for the waning of passion ....the destruction of pleasures of the senses...the allaying of the fever of the pleasures of the senses been declared? . . . . It is not, foolish man, for the benefit of un-believers, nor for the increase in the number of believers, but, foolish man, it is to the detriment of both unbelievers and believers, and it causes wavering in some" (tr. I.B. Horner BD I 36-37)

The fuller version of the Buddha's reason to promulgate a precept, here *pārājika* I reads:

"On account of this, monks, I will make known the course of training for monks, founded on ten reasons: for the excellence of the Order, for the comfort of the Order, for the restraint of evil-minded men, for the ease of well-behaved monks, for the restraint of the cankers belonging to the here and now, for the combating of the cankers belonging to other worlds, for the benefit of non-believers, for the increase in the number of believers, for establishing dhamma indeed, for following the rules of restraint." (tr. I.B. Horner BD I 37-38)

[124] See p. 84 ff.

into direct or indirect contact with his ascetic others, and how frequent was this contact? As we will see, nearly any basic and daily activity of a Buddhist *bhikkhu* could give rise to contact. What did this mean for the boundary negotiation of the early Buddhist ascetic community, or also, how much of a 'Buddhist' (to use an anachronistic term) was an early Buddhist *bhikkhu*? The contact opportunities drawn from the Pāli Vinaya will be substantiated with similar and other examples taken from the Jain Āyāraṅga Sutta. Being the oldest extant Jain (Śvetāmbara) text on ascetic conduct ('*āyāra*'), the Āyāraṅga Sutta (Skt. Ācāraṅga Sutta) will be, next to the Pāli Vinaya, a second principal source text used in this PhD. The Sutta has been edited and translated by Hermann Jacobi in respectively 1882 and 1884.[125]

Despite the fact that the historical start of the Jain ascetic tradition precedes the development of the Indian Buddhist ascetic tradition, its 'canonical' literature cannot claim the same antiquity as the early Pāli texts. According to a Jain tradition itself, the collecting and writing down of Jain 'canonical' texts did not occur before the middle of the fifth century A.D., implying a long and complex textual development of the Jain 'canon.'[126] Beyond this late *composition* date, parts of the *content* of the Jain 'canon' may, however, have a greater antiquity. Indeed, based on an investigation of metre and language, Jacobi suggested that the most ancient parts of the Āyāraṅga Sutta, and at the same time of the Jain 'canon,' must approximately date from the end of the fourth or the beginning of the third century B.C.[127]

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[125] Edition: *The Âyâraṃga Sutta of the Çvetâmbara Jains,* Hermann Jacobi (ed.), London: Pali Text Society, 1882. Translation: *Jaina Sūtras. Part I: The Âcârânga Sūtra, The Kalpa Sūtra,* Hermann Jacobi (tr.), Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Private Ltd (Sacred Books of the East vol. 22), 1989 (1884).

The first of the two books constituting the Āyāraṅga Sutta has also been edited and translated by Walther Schubring: *Ācârânga-Sūtra (Ester Śrutaskandha) Text, Analyse und Glossar*, Walther Schubring (ed.), Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes, vol. 12, no 4, Leipzig, 1910. For Schubring's translation see *Pure Life (Bambhacerāiṃ).*

For the first book of the Āyāraṅga Sutta there exists both a word and reverse word index, and a pāda and reverse pāda index, see Yamazaki, Moriichi & Ousaka, Yumi, 1994 & 1996.

[126] For the reason why I put 'canonical' between quotation mark, see above fn. 45. The Jain tradition I am alluding to is the Śvetāmbara tradition regarding the 'second council of Valabhī,' held during the middle of the fifth or the beginning of the sixth century A.D., that was presided over by Devarddhi Kṣamāśramaṇa and during which a Jain canon was collected and written down, in order to prevent a complete loss of the Jain *suttas.* Cp. Deo 1956: 21 ff, Winternitz 1999 (1983, revised edition): 416 ff.

[127] Cf. Jacobi 1989 (1884) (SBE 22): xli-xliii. Jacobi considers the first of the two books of the Āyāraṅga Sutta to constitute the eldest part. Together with the first book of the Āyāraṅga, Jacobi also considers the Sūyagaḍaṃga (Skt. Sūtrakṛtāṅga) and the Uttarajjhayaṇa Sutta (Skt. Uttarādhyayana Sūtra) to belong to the oldest strata of the Jain canon.

On metre as a tool to relatively date the various parts of the Āyāraṅga Sutta and other Jain texts, see Schubring's 'The Canon of the Śvetāmbara Jainas,' in his Mahāvīra's Words (2004), pp. 1-32. See also Winternitz 1999 (1983, revised edition): 414 ff.

The Āyāraṅga Sutta, composed in Ardhamāgadhī,[128] is divided into two main parts (*suyakkhaṃdha,* Skt. *śrutaskhandha*), each being subdivided into various lectures (*ajjhayaṇa*) and contains, in the words of Dundas, "doctrinal statements about the nature of reality, concerning particularly the soul and action, a biography of Mahāvīra and injunctions about monastic discipline."[129] Its early date (relatively speaking, that is) together with its many precepts and guidelines for the daily life of the Jain ascetic, makes the Āyāraṅga Sutta a valuable textual source for conceptualizing the early Jain ascetic life. Further, when taken together with the Pāli Vinaya, the Āyāraṅga Sutta helps conceptualizing the early Indian ascetic life in general. I will therefore frequently be referring to this Sutta when discussing the contact opportunities of early ascetics (cf. upcoming section 'A Brief Typology of Contact Opportunities'), as well as in the sections 'Processes of othering in the Pāli Vinaya,' and in the final section called From 'Ascetic' to 'Ascetic other.'

In the section 'Processes of othering in the Pāli Vinaya,' I bring to the foreground the important role of dialogue between the early Buddhist ascetic community and its wider ascetic landscape by means of identifying and analysing processes of othering in our main source text. This is, I examine when and how the Pāli Vinaya narratives refer to the early Buddhist *bhikkhu's* ascetic others. I will thus show how the early Buddhist ascetic community both negotiated its identity and reflected on the importance of its ascetic practices in direct relation to these ascetic others. In my examination of the processes of othering, I argue that the terms a community adopts and/or develops to refer to its so-called others, can reveal much of the manner how these others were perceived and related to, and how a community perceives itself vis-à-vis his others. In this context, I offer an examination of the various denominations found in the Pāli Vinaya for the early Buddhist *bhikkhu's* ascetic others (cf. Appendix 'Labelling the Ascetic other').

In the final section, the role of dialogue in the early Buddhist ascetic community will be illustrated by means of a philological excursion of the Pāli term *titthiya,* and other kindred terms. I show how the Pāli term '*titthiya,*' being the denomination most frequently used to refer to the early Buddhist *bhikkhu's* ascetic other, underwent a semantic shift wherein its initial meaning of '*an*' ascetic came to be narrowed down to designate ascetic *others* only. Underlying this semantic shift lies, I argue, a shift of the

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[128] On Ardhamāgadhī as scriptural language, see Dundas 2002² (1999): 69 ff. Though within the Jain Śvetāmbara tradition, Ardhamāgadhī is considered to be the language wherein Mahāvīra preached, this is historically not correct. Ardhamāgadhī ('half Māgadhī') was 'certainly not the vernacular in which Mahāvīra himself preached, [it] evolved from some underlying dialect, presumably a variety of Māgadhī, into a specifically Jain scriptural dialect, a sacred language which could be differentiated from Sanskrit [...].' Ibid: 70.

[129] Dundas 2002² (1999): 73.

manner how the early Buddhist ascetic community perceived itself within its wider ascetic landscape, and related to its various ascetic others.

Dialogues *in* the Pāli Vinaya

A Brief Typology of Contact Opportunities

How well did early Buddhists knew their Jain ascetic other?

Early Buddhist *bhikkhus* knew their Jain ascetic other, and they knew them well. They displayed a knowledge that went beyond the clichéd features of Jain doctrine and praxes; a type of knowledge suggestive of intensive contact between early Buddhist *bhikkhus* and *niganthas*.[1] Before starting to analyze the various contact opportunities for early Buddhist *bhikkhus* and *niganthas,* I first discuss some *nigantha* references in early Buddhist texts that illustrate well the fact that early Buddhist *bhikkhus* had a very good knowledge of their Jain ascetic other.

When referring to them with '*nigantha,*' Buddhist monk-redactors showed their familiarity with the internal naming policy of the Jain ascetic community.[2] They knew Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta and they were acquainted with various peculiarities of Jain soteriology. The Jain conception of vegetation and the four elements as living beings endowed with the faculty of sense (Pkt. *ekindiya jīva,* Pāli *ekindriya jīva*) was known to early Buddhists. In fact, several Pāli Vinaya passages indicate that this Jain concept of *ekindriya jīva* together with some consonant ascetic praxes fuelled Jain-Buddhist debates.[3]

Buddhists or for these points, perhaps better, learned Buddhist *bhikkhus*[4] also knew that some Jain *bhikkhus* considered a harmful physical action to be more pernicious than

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[1] For examples of Buddhists displaying a detailed knowledge of subtle features of Jain disciplinary conduct, see a little further in this chapter.

[2] For a discussion of the 'internal' use of '*nigantha*' (AMg. *nigantha; niyaṃtha*) see the appendix in the following section 'Labelling the Ascetic other,' *lemma* 'Nātaputta Nigaṇṭha; *nigantha; niganthasāvaka.*'

[3] Cf. Maes 2010-2011.

[4] These soteriological differences are very subtle in nature and I doubt that 'all' 'Buddhist' and 'all' 'Jain' *bhikkhus* were aware of these differences, hence my choice for 'learned *bhikkhus.*'

a harmful speech or thought.[5] Both learned Buddhist and Jain *bhikkhus* distinguished three locales of an action: body, speech and mind. In agreement with this tripartite division learned *bhikkhus* of both communities laid down 'three types of wrongs for effecting an evil deed,' wrong of body (*kāyadaṇḍa*), wrong of speech (*vacīdaṇḍa*), and wrong of mind (*manodaṇḍa*). Following this scheme, 'stealing' would thus be divided into the *act* of stealing, *voicing* the intention of stealing or inciting another to steal, and the *thought* of stealing.

Learned *bhikkhus* of both the Jain and Buddhist community discussed the karmic trace, or the wholesomeness or unwholesomeness, of an action according to this tripartite scheme. Buddhists and Jains appeared to have developed differing opinions on this point, and from what may be inferred from both early Jain and Buddhist *suttas,* they not only knew that they were at variance on this point, but they also appeared to have debated with one another over this issue. Be as it may, both Buddhists and Jains did not hesitate to ridicule one another's position in their respective texts. Before turning to give an illustration, I would like to note that both Jains and Buddhists developed a nuanced 'philosophy of action.'[6] The (un)wholesomeness of an action could not only be assessed according to differing criteria (e.g. in terms of its direct effect of causing suffering or happiness, in terms of its contribution to progress on the path to liberation),[7] but also according to its specific discourse. This is, the (un)wholesomeness of an action may also be assessed differently when treated in a purely *karmic* discourse, or when treated within a *social* discourse or context. For instance, for Buddhists (the type of) intention, which in the tripartite scheme of action is located within the mind,[8] is considered the most important factor for determining the *karmic* trace of an action, irrespective of its (physical) effects. In a certain sense, intention is a *conditio sine qua non* for an action to produce a karmic trace (whether positive or negative). This primordial importance of intention for Buddhists is also seen within the legal scheme of the Pāli

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[5] Put to practice, however, the intention could dominate the physical consequences. The Jain ideal of complete abstinence from harming one-sensed facultied beings was for obvious reasons impossible: living means breathing, eating and sleeping – all activities involving to some extent the hurting of *ekindriya jīvas*. The Jain mendicant was, therefore, encouraged to develop *samiti* ('circumspection') in his actions (cf. UD 24.2), in unintentionally harming small living beings he was not to blame. In Malayagiri's commentary of the Vavahārasutta ('Manuals of Monastic Proceedings'), being the third of the six Cheyasuttas, one can read how only an intentional act of transgression incurs guilt. *Vyavahāra Bhāṣya Pīṭhikā,* Bollée (tr. & ed.) 2006: 90. On *samiti* see Maes 2010-2011: Part I *ekindriya jīva* in Jain scriptures; Dundas 2002²: 164. See Mette 2002: 213-226 for an analysis of the Pāriṣṭhāpanikī-niryukti being a commentary on the fifth *samiti* or 'the disposal of bodily excreta' (*uccāra*).

[6] Regarding the 'philosophy of action' developed by Buddhist *bhikkhus,* see Harvey 2003 (2000): 46ff.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Cf. MN I 377 (tr. Horner, *Middle Length Sayings* Vol II: 42) where it is noted how a wrong intention belongs to 'the wrong of mind.'

Vinaya where the presence or absence of intention is crucial for determining whether or not a *bhikkhu* committed an offence.[9] Nevertheless, the *bhikkhu* who merely *intents* to transgress a precept (but does not physically transgress it) is generally speaking not considered to have committed an offence. For determining the gravity of an offence, the Pāli Vinaya also takes into consideration the social impact of a *bhikkhu's* action. When we consider again our example of 'stealing,' this means that in the Pāli Vinaya the *thought* or intention of stealing will not be treated similarly (i.e. as severely) as the *act* of stealing.[10] This being said, both Jains and Buddhists in (mis)representing (and ridiculing) each other's' views on the pernicious effects of the wrong of body, speech and mind could transpose an argument of their opponent that was made within a *karmic* discourse to a social discourse, or vice versa.

In the Upāli Sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya (MN I 371- 387) the Buddhist view on the pernicious effects of the wrong of body, speech and mind is explained in direct opposition to the Jain one. In the narratological setting of a dialogue between the Buddha and a disciple of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta named Dīghatapassin, the Jain position of viewing the wrong of body as graver to that of thought is introduced, refuted and superseded by the correct, this is, Buddhist view.[11] If this passage of the Upāli Sutta gives us some insights into the fact that (learned *bhikkhus* of the) Buddhist and Jain communities were aware of their subtle doctrinal differences, it also provides us an illustrative example of the rivalry that at times must have coloured the Jain-Buddhist interaction. It proceeds in telling how the *nigaṇṭhas* lost to the Buddhist community one of their prominent lay donors, the householder Upāli (*gahapati Upāli*). Though being warned by Dīghatapassin that "the recluse Gotama is a magician [*māyāvin*] and [that he] knows a converting magic [*āvaṭṭanī*] by which he converts disciples of other sectarians [*aññatitthiyānaṁ sāvaka*],"[12] the householder Upāli sets out to go and refute the Buddha's standpoint on "the three types of wrong." During his debate with the Buddha the householder Upāli naturally – for we are reading a Buddhist Sutta after all - comes to realize the superiority of the Buddha's teaching to the one of the *nigaṇṭhas*, and instead of upholding Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta's view, he ends up taking refuge to the Buddha (*bhagavat*), the *dhamma* and the *saṅgha* of *bhikkhus* (*bhikkhusaṅgha*). The rivalry between Buddhists and Jains becomes even more explicit, when the monk-editors do not hesitate

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[9] It is well known, for instance, that a *bhikkhu* who transgressed a rule while being mad is not found 'guilty.'

[10] This may be illustrated with a section of the Casuistry to *pārājika* II, this is, the offence involving defeat for stealing: "If, *intending to steal,* he thinks: 'I will steal these[se] goods...'" he either searches for a companion, or goes himself, *there is an offence of wrong-doing* [*dukkaṭa*]. If he makes them quiver, there is a grave offence [*thullaccaya*]. *If he removes them from the place, there is an offence involving defeat [pārājika].*" (Vin III 48, trsl. Horner BD I 80, emphasis mine)

[11] Cf. Upāli Sutta MN I 372 ff. (trsl. Ñāṇamoli 2001 [1995]: 477 - 492).

[12] MN I 375.12-14 (trsl. Ñāṇamoli 2001 [1995]: 480)

to make this conversion of the householder Upāli the direct cause of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta's death. Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta was unable to hear the householder Upāli praising the Buddha and "hot blood then and there gushed from his mouth."[13]

That Jains too were aware of their doctrinal difference with Buddhists regarding "the three types of wrong" is seen from a passage of the Jain Sūyagaḍa (Skt. Sūtrakṛtānga). They, on their part, ridicule the Buddhist emphasis on intention by noting how a *bhikkhu*, according to Buddhist reasoning, is not committing an offence when eating a roasted baby thinking it to be a vegetable, while committing an offence when eating a vegetable and mistaking it for a roasted baby.[14]

Concerning the disciplinary conduct of *nigaṇṭhas*, early Buddhists knew how some of them observed nakedness as an ascetic practice; they knew that *nigaṇṭhas* could be strong practitioners of *tapas;* that they tried to avoid drinking water containing living beings; and that they practiced the plucking out of hair and beard.[15] But apart from these typifying features early Buddhists displayed also a familiarity with subtle practices of the Jain ascetic. To illustrate this important point, let us turn to the Kandaraka Sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya (MN I 341-347). The Kandaraka Sutta enumerates various ascetic practices of 'men practicing *tapas*' (*puggala attantapa*). The same list of ascetic practices is repeated at various places in the Sutta Piṭaka.[16]

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[13] MN I 387.5-6 (trsl. Ñāṇamoli 2001 [1995]: 492)

[14] Cf. Sūyagaḍa II. 6 § 26-29, trsl. Jacobi SBE 45: 414-5. For a discussion of references to Buddhists and their believes and praxes in earlier Jain Śvetāmbara literature, see Bollée 1974.

[15] For Buddhists referring to the Jain praxis of nakedness, see e.g. Vin I 305 (trsl. Horner BD IV 436). For Buddhists on the Jain praxis of drinking hot [i.e. boiled, lifeless] water see e.g. MN I 376 (trsl. Ñāṇamoli 2001 [1995]: 481-2). In this MN passage the Buddha points out how an ill *nigaṇṭha* needing cold water (*sītodaka*) to recover from his illness will rather die than drink any water other than *uṇha* ('hot,' i.e. devoid of living beings) one. That Buddhists associated a *nigaṇṭha* with *tapas* is shown by the epithet '*tapassī*' often met with in names of Jain ascetics, see e.g. *Dīgha*tapassī *nigaṇṭho* at MN I 376. Jaini considers the '*dīgha-*' of the epithet Dīghatapassī to be referring to the many long fasting practices of the Jains. Cf. Jaini 2001 (1979): 21. Concerning the 'plucking out the hair,' see MN 349 where it is said to be practiced by men devoted to *tapas* (i.e. *nigaṇṭha).* The Pāli term '*kesamassulocana*' further corresponds to the technical term in Jain texts. That in the daily reality of the Jain *bhikkhu* there was some flexibility regarding this practice, is seen at the *Kappa Sutta* where *shaving* the head is incidentally mentioned as a valid action next to the plucking out of the hair. Cf. Kappa Sutta 57 (trsl. Jacobi SBE 22: 308).

[16] Cf. Kandaraka Sutta ('The Kandaraka') MN I 343 (trsl. Ñāṇamoli 2001 [1995]: 446-447). The same list of austerities appears in: the Mahāsīhanāda Sutta ('The Greater Discourse on the Lion's Roar') MN I 77.28-78.22 (trsl. Ñāṇamoli 2001 [1995]: 173) where the Buddha himself claims to have performed this asceticism (*tapassitā*) when he was 'a supreme ascetic' (*paramatapassin*); the Cūḷadhammasamādāna Sutta ('The Shorter Discourse on the Destruction of Craving') MN I 307.21 – 308.19 (trsl. Ñāṇamoli 2001 [1995]: 406-407) where the practices are introduced by the Buddha in a sermon to his disciples as 'the way of undertaking things that is painful now and ripens in the future as pain'; AN I 295.1-296.15 chapter XVI Acelaka ('The Unclothed') (trsl. Woodward, Vol. I, 1979: 272-274) where they are introduced as the practices of the self-tormentor; AN II 205.24 - 211.29

Summarized by Freiberger, "the list comprises the violation of decencies; several restrictions concerning the acceptance, the amount, and the types of food; restrictions concerning the types of clothes; and a few other practices of mortifying the body."[17] In the translation of Ñāṇamoli (2001 [1995]: 446-447) the list reads:

> Here a certain person goes naked, rejecting conventions, licking his hands, not coming when asked, not stopping when asked; he does not accept food brought or food specially made or an invitation to a meal; he receives nothing from a pot, from a bowl, across a threshold, across a stick, across a pestle, from two eating together, from a pregnant woman, from a woman giving suck, from a woman in the midst of men, from where food is advertised to be distributed, from where a dog is waiting, from where flies are buzzing; he accepts no fish or meat, he drinks no liquor, wine, or fermented brew. He keeps to one house, to one morsel; he keeps to two houses to two morsels; ... he keeps to seven houses, to seven morsels. He lives on one saucerful a day, on two saucerfuls a day . . . on seven saucerfuls a day. He takes food once a day, once every two days . . . once every seven days; thus even up to once every fortnight, he dwells pursuing the practice of taking food at stated intervals. He is an eater of greens or millet or wild rice or hide-parings or moss or ricebran or rice-scum or sesamum flour or grass or cowdung. He lives on forest roots and fruits, he feeds on fallen fruits. He clothes himself in hemp, in hemp-mixed cloth, in shrouds, in refuse rags, in tree bark, in antelope hide, in strips of antelope hide, in kusa-grass fabric, in bark fabric, in wood-shavings fabric, in head-hair wool, in animal wool, in owls' wings. He is one who pulls out hair and beard, pursuing the practice of pulling out hair and beard. He is one who stands continuously, rejecting seats. He is one who squats continuously, devoted to maintaining the squatting position. He is one who uses a mattress of spikes; he makes a mattress of spikes his bed. He dwells pursuing the practice of bathing in water three times daily including the evening. Thus in such a variety of ways he dwells pursuing the practice of tormenting and mortifying the body. This is called the kind of person who torments himself and pursues the practice of torturing himself.

(trsl. Woodward, Vol. I, 1979: 218-219) also introduced here as the practices of 'the self-tormentor' (*attantapo*); the Udumbarikāsīhanāda Sutta ('The Great Lion's Roar to the Umbarikans) DN III 40 (trsl. Walshe 1987: 387) introduced as the higher austerities (*tapo-jigucchā*) practiced by the *paribbājaka* Nirgrodha; the Mahāsīhanāda Sutta ('The Great Lion's Roar') DN I 165-166 (trsl. Walshe 1987: 153-154) where it is introduced as '*tapo-pakkamā ekesaṃ samaṇa-brāhmaṇānaṃ*' ('all kinds of ascetic practices undertaken by certain *śramaṇas* and *brāhmaṇas*'). In the Mahāsaccaka Sutta ('The Greater Discourse to Saccaka') MN I 238.12-35 (trsl. Ñāṇamoli 2001 [1995]: 333-334) not the complete list, but the part on the restrictions for the acceptance, the amount, and types of food is repeated. Here the practices are said to be performed by three *ājīvikas,* named Nanda Vaccha, Kissa Sankicca and Makkhali Gosāla.

[17] Freiberger 2006: 238.

Offering in his 1971 article "Anmerkungen zum buddhistischen Häretikerbild" a minute examination of both the content and terminology of this list of ascetic practices, Willem Bollée was able to identify several parallels within Jain, Brāhmaṇical and pūraṇic sources. The various ascetic practices of our Kandaraka Sutta bear thus reference to *tapas* practitioners of not just one ascetic community, but of several ascetic communities.[18] It is therefore interesting to note that the redactor(s) of this list did not choose to organize the various practices according to the various types of ascetics, but according to the ascetic practices concerning 'food,' 'clothes,' and 'body.' Regardless whether this was a deliberate choice or not, the division tells us much how 'food,' 'clothes' and 'body' were three important locales of identity (cf. further).[19] Also, since a few of the listed practices may be found practiced by members of several ascetic communities (cf. below), it would have been difficult to divide the practices according to 'ascetic community.' Be as it may, several of the practices listed in the Kandaraka Sutta are known to have been practised by members of the Jain community.

What is most interesting about the Kandaraka Sutta is that in addition to 'gross' or 'typifying' Jain practices (such as the practice of plucking out the hair as noted above),[20] it also lists, as we shall shortly see, ascetic practices and injunctions found in Jain texts that are highly specific in detail. This detailed knowledge points to intensive contact between early Buddhists and Jains. Anticipating the discussion in the next section on contact occasions and contact places, I can already point out that contact with Jains certainly must have been intense (in terms of frequency and nature) during the formative stages of the Buddhist community. Direct and indirect contact with other ascetics appear to have been part of the daily reality of early Buddhists. What this might have meant for the 'boundaries' between the two communities will be considered later, but for now, I wish to point out that the clear distinctions implied by our analytical categories (here, 'Buddhist' and 'Jain') cannot be taken to (always) have been so neatly present in the early ascetic Indian landscape.

'The Buddhist' might in relation to 'the Jain', not be relating to 'the Jain' but solely to a specific practice or doctrine of a *nigaṇṭha*, a practice or doctrine that the *nigaṇṭha* might, moreover, be sharing with other *samaṇas* or *brāhmaṇas.* Therefore, in his relation with *nigaṇṭhas,* 'the Buddhist' might at times have been more relating to a *samaṇa* other

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[18] See also Freiberger 2006: 238-239 who pointing out the contradictory nature of some practices, takes the list "to represent the practices of various types of ascetics rather than the ascetic career of one individual." Freiberger joins here the argument of Julius Dutoit (1905, *Die duṣkaracaryā des Bodhisattva in der buddhistischen Tradition*, Strassburg: Trübner).

[19] See especially the chapter 'Householder' further in this section.

[20] Cf. Kandaraka Sutta MN I 342.23-24 (nakedness): *ekacco puggalo acelako hoti;* MN I 343.13-14 (plucking out of the hair and beard): *Kesamassulocako pi hoti kesamassulocanānuyogam-anuyutto.*

(or, if you will, a *samaṇa* equal) than a *nigaṇṭha* other, and at other times, vice versa. In other words, boundaries between Buddhists and *nigaṇṭhas* might be blurred or sharpened in accordance with the specific practice or doctrine that a Buddhist was relating to. In the following discussion of the ascetic practices of the Kandaraka Sutta, this blurring and sharpening of boundaries will become clear when I point out how some 'Jain' practices were, for instance, not practiced by all Jains, or how they might have been practiced by *ājīvikas* or *brāhmaṇa* ascetics as well, or even by Buddhist *bhikkhus* too. The first practice of the so-called '*attantapo*' might immediately illustrate this point: '*Idha bhikkhave ekacco puggalo acelako hoti'*, 'Here, *bhikkhus*, a man becomes unclothed.' (MN I 342.23)

MN I 342.23, or on the ascetic practice of nakedness

Any scholarly account dealing with the early Indian ascetic landscape, researching its various ascetic communities, their practices and distinctive marks, is sooner or later bound to be snarled up with the question of *acelaka* or the ascetic practice of nakedness among the members of the early Jain ascetic community. Did the *nigaṇṭhas* that the early Buddhists knew, practice nakedness? Though within a later period of the Jain community self-conscious Digambaras fully institutionalized *acelatva* or nakedness by putting it forward as a fundamental observance to the path of enlightenment,[21] nakedness seemed to have been an optional practice for the earliest members of the community.

If it is difficult to state with any confidence whether or not the *nigaṇṭhas* referred to in the earliest Buddhist texts were practitioners of *acelatva,* it is because the term '*nigaṇṭha,'* bearing reference to the ideal 'knot-less' state of the Jain mendicant, is, in the words of Balbir, "devoid of descriptive content."[22] In itself, the term *nigaṇṭha* does not provide any clue regarding the presence or absence of a cloth or a garb for the Jain mendicant.[23]

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[21] The split of the Jain community into Śvetāmbara and Digambara is supposed to have taken place around the first century AD. Cf. Balbir 2000: 14. See also Schubring 2000² (1962): §26 where he takes the nakedness of sculptured figures at Mathura that date around the second century AD, to indicate that the schism must have occurred already by then.

[22] Balbir 2000: 14.

[23] On (the etymology of) the term *nigaṇṭha* (Pkt. *niggantha; niyaṇṭha*) see a.o. Caillat 1975: 33; Balbir 2000: 4 showing how the etymological explanation of *nigaṇṭha* provided in Buddhist texts corresponds to the one attested within the Jain tradition itself.

Also the denomination *acela(ka)* that is frequently used in Buddhist texts to refer to naked ascetics is not helpful as the term appears to have had a generic application.[24] The Padabhājaniya to *pācittiya* XLI gives for *acelaka* "*yo koci paribbājakasamāpanno naggo,*" or "whoever is being naked has reached (the stage of) a wanderer."[25] The accompanying introductory story to *pācittiya* XLI links *acelakas* with *ājīvikas.*[26] Though nakedness is also at other places in the Pāli Vinaya explicitly associated with *ājīvikas,*[27] there is no reason to join Jacobi in taking the term *acela(ka)* in Buddhist texts to be exclusively referring to *ājīvikas.*[28] Such an exclusive interpretation is already complicated by the Padabhājaniya understanding *any* naked wanderer for *acelaka.*

To point out the difficulty of gaining a clear idea whether the *nigaṇṭhas* of Buddhist texts were practitioners of *acelatva,* we may turn to two enumerations or classifications of various ascetic groups at Saṃyutta-Nikāya (SN) I 78 and Aṅguttara-Nikāya (AN) III 383-4.

SN I.78 gives the following enumeration of ascetic groups: "*. . . ca jaṭilā . . . ca nigaṇṭhā . . . ca acelā . . . ca ekasāṭakā . . . ca paribbājakā.*" AN III 383-4 while reproducing Pūraṇa Kassapa's sixfold classification of men,[29] lists the following groups of ascetics and layfollowers: "*bhikkhū . . . . nigaṇṭhā ekasāṭakā . . . . gihī odātavasanā acelakasāvakā. . . . ājīvika ājīvakiniyo.*"

First, regarding Pūraṇa Kassapa's classification of men, it may be remarked that if the term *acelaka* was indeed exclusively used for denoting *ājīvikas,* why the need then to make a distinction within one and the same enumeration between *acelakas* (more specifically, *acelakasāvakā* referring here most probably to the lay disciples of *acelas*) and *ājīvikas?* Further, with '*ekasāṭaka*' meaning 'one-cloth,' '*nigaṇṭhā ekasāṭakā*' at AN III 383-4 has been taken as testimony "to the clothed state of at least some Jaina monks in Mahāvīra's time."[30] The difficulty with such an interpretation, however, is that *ekasāṭaka*

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[24] Within the Pāli Vinaya the term *acelaka* occurs in the Padabhājaniya to *pācittiya* XLI (BD II 349; Vin IV 91). In the Suttapiṭaka there are 149 references for the forms *acelo, acelaṃ, acelassa;* and more than thirty references for a form of *acelaka.* See Maes 2015 (forthcoming) for an extensive discussion of the light this metonymical denomination *acela(ka)* throws on the early Buddhist community's process of othering.

[25] Vin IV 92, trsl. I.B. Horner BD II 349.

[26] The introductory story in question is quoted at p. 108 ff. where it is discussed in detail in the context of direct contact possibilities at *vihāras.*

[27] Cf. Vin I 290-32 (BD IV 414-17) and Vin III 212 (BD II 45-7). See also Maes 2015 (forthcoming).

[28] Jacobi SBE 45 (2004 [1895]): xxx-xxxi.

[29] Basham identified Pūraṇa Kassapa as having been an important leader of the *ājīvika* community. On Pūraṇa Kassapa and his sixfold division of men (*abhijātis*), see Basham 1981 (1951): 80f. & 243-6.

[30] Jaini 2001 (1979): 18. Jaini points out how Śvetāmbaras themselves have referred to this Pāli *passage* in order to argue to their Digambara other for the clothed state of Jaina mendicants during Mahāvīra's time. Digambaras take this passage to refer to "certain laymen who progressively renounce their possessions while continuing in the household life."

is read as an adjective defining *nigaṇṭha* while *ekasāṭakā* is here most probably a noun and part of an enumeration, just as '*gihī odātavasanā acelakasāvakā*' and '*ājīvika ājīvakiniyo*'. If in the absence of the conjunction '*ca*' it remains uncertain whether '*ekasāṭaka*' should be read as an adjective or noun, the enumeration at SN I.78 leaves no room for doubt. In this enumeration *nigaṇṭhas* are explicitly separated from *ekasāṭakas* (and *acelas*) with the conjunction '*ca.*' Despite the presence of this conjunction '*ca,*' Nalini Balbir proposes the possibility of considering the *acelas* and *ekasāṭakas* of this list as referring to subdivisions of the *nigaṇṭhas.*[31] As we will see, Balbir's suggestion is in part justified when considering the information contained in the commentary texts.

If the information regarding *nigaṇṭhas* and *acelatva* often appears "contradictory" in the early Buddhist texts, the same holds true for the later commentarial literature.[32] Collating explicative references of *nigaṇṭhas* in the Pāli commentaries, Balbir notes how *nigaṇṭhas* are sometimes understood to be naked ascetics (*nagga*);[33] to be *purimabhāgapaṭichanna* or 'covered (*paṭichanna*) in the front (*purima*) parts (*bhāga*);'[34] to be white-robed ascetics (*setapaṭa-nigaṇṭha-rūpa-dhārino*);[35] to be white-robed '*aḍḍhapālikā*' ascetics,[36] and, to add one more, they are sometimes taken to be *ekasāṭaka* ('having a single cloth').[37] Further, in a reference in Buddhaghosa's Dhammapada-Aṭṭhakathā (Dhp-a) a distinction is made between *acelaka nigaṇṭhas* who are star naked (*sabbaso apaṭicchanna*) and *nigaṇṭhas* who wear a 'front and back' cloth (*purima-passa*).[38]

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[31] Balbir 2000: 13-14.

[32] Balbir 2000: 11-16. The Pāli commentaries "in their final form date about one millennium after the Buddha and Mahāvīra and certainly long after the split between the Digambaras and Śvetāmbaras..." Balbir 2000:14.

[33] Cf. Udāna-aṭṭhakathā of Dhammapāla (Ud-a) 338 (line 22) using the compound *nagga-nigaṇṭha.* See also Buddhaghosa's Sāratthappakāsinī (Spk) III 100 (line 7). (both passages quoted by Balbir 2000:14)

[34] Cf. Buddhaghosa's Manorathapūraṇī (Mp) III 334 on AN III 276 "*ājīvako ti naggapabbajito, nigaṇṭho ti purimabhāgapaṭicchanno.*" (quoted by Balbir 2000:14)

[35] Cf. Ud-a 330 (line 20). (quoted by Balbir 2000:14)

[36] Cf. Samantapāsādikā of Buddhaghosa (Sp) 1213 (line 6): "*yathā setapaṭā aḍḍhapālikā nigaṇṭhā pārupanti.*" (quoted by Balbir 2000:15). On *aḍḍhapālika* (Skt. *ardhaphālaka*) *nigaṇṭhas* see Schubring 2000² [1962]: §26; on the possibility of *ardhaphālaka* or 'partially covered' *bhikkhus* being the Jain Yāpanīyas *bhikkhus*, see "Jaina Monks From Mathura" of Jaini 1995 (reprinted in 2000). On the (now extinct) Yāpanīya Jain sect, see also Upadhye 1973 and Upadhye 1974 (reprinted in 1983).

[37] *ekasāṭaka nigaṇṭhas* are *nigaṇṭhas* "who move about with a small piece of cloth tied on their hands with one end of which they cover the frontal portion of their body." Jaini 2000: 308. Cf. Ud-a 330-31: "*ekasāṭakāti. ekasāṭaka-nigaṇṭhā viya ekaṃ pilotika-khaṇḍaṃ hatthe bandhitvā eken'antena hi sarīrassa purima-bhāgaṃ paṭicchādetvā vicaraṇakā.*" (quoted by Jaini 2000: 319, n.35)

[38] Cf. Dhp-a (c. fifth century AD) III 489 (line 17-19) where conversing *bhikkhus* say the following: "*sabbaso apaṭicchannehi acelakehi ime nigaṇṭhā varatarā ye ekaṃ purimapassaṃ pi tāva paṭicchādenti . . .*", which may be translated as "Those who cover [themselves] with a front and back [cloth] [or, those who cover themselves with a cloth covering the front and back] are better *nigaṇṭhas* than the *acelakas* who are completely uncovered [*apaṭicchanna*, i.e. naked]." For an alternative and in my opinion incorrect translation of this passage, see Burlingame 1921:196.

These various distinct qualifications of *niganṭhas* are insightful for imagining the Jain community of that time, even if their exact meanings and reference fields are not always obvious. They point to the plain but significant conclusion that the Jain community knew multiple internal divisions concerning the wearing or not wearing of a cloth, or robe. It would be erroneous, in my opinion, to try to interpret the various qualifications simply within the twofold framework of the Śvetambara and Digambara division. This is not to deny the possibility that some of these qualifications indeed bore reference to Śvetāmbara and Digambara ascetics, for the division had already occurred about three centuries before the Pāli commentarial literature was redacted. But to relegate the *nagga*-qualification to the Digambara ascetics, the *setapaṭa*-qualification to the Śvetambara ascetics, and to understand all other qualifications to be reflecting "gradual" or "in between" stages, would, in my opinion, be a too gross simplification of what must have been a more heterogeneous reality. The very development of the various terms (*acela, nagga, aḍḍhapālika, ekasāṭaka, setapaṭa* etc.) referring to a particular clothed or unclothed state of the Jain mendicant, points to the fact that the – at times subtle, at least in our eyes – differences were considered to be meaningful differences. The practices revolving around 'cloth' and 'nudity' were considered to be significant practices around which boundaries could be drawn, resulting in multiple divisions within the Jain community and between 'the' Jain and other communities.

The so-called "contradictory" information of our texts need not to be understood as contradictions per se, but may be seen as reflections of what must have been a heterogeneous reality. Such a reality was most probably the case for both the period reflected in the later commentarial literature, as for the *niganṭhas* of our early Buddhist texts. That among the *niganṭhas* of our early Buddhist texts there may have been some *niganṭhas* who practiced *acelatva* as well as some *niganṭhas* who wore a cloth and/or a robe, is perhaps seen confirmed in the Āyāraṅga Sutta, the oldest extant disciplinary text of the Jains. The Sutta appears to simply be assuming a heterogeneous reality with regard to the practice of wearing (or not wearing) a cloth or robe, when encouraging Jain *bhikkhus* who respectively use "three robes" (*bhikkhū tihiṃ vatthehiṃ*) "two robes" (*bhikkhu dohiṃ vatthehiṃ*) and "one robe" (*bhikkhu egeṇa vattheṇa*) to try not to beg for an additional robe.[39] Further, for all these types of Jain *bhikkhus,* the three-robed *bhikkhu,* the two-robed *bhikkhu* and the one-robed *bhikkhu,* we find the instruction to dispel his (most) used-up garment(s) once the hot season has arrived, leaving the choice with the mendicant whether he throws away just one, or all his robes; whether he wanders

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[39] Cf. AS I.7.4 § 1 where Jain *bhikkhus* using three robes are encouraged to not beg for an additional robe: '*je bhikkhū tihiṃ vatthehiṃ parivusite . . . tassa ṇaṃ no evaṃ bhavati: cautthaṃ vatthaṃ jaissāmi.*' Similarly AS I.7.5 § 1 and AS I.7.6 § 1 where Jain *bhikkhus* using respectively two and one robe are encouraged to not beg for an additional one.

clothed or naked.[40] This flexibility regarding the amount of garments (*vattha*) is remarkable. It shows how in the early Jain community multiple practices concerning the robe co-existed, complicating any scholarly attempt to neatly classify the various ascetics of the early Indian landscape according to their clothing practices. Further, when the Āyāraṅga Sutta allows a naked *bhikkhu* (*bhikkhu acela*) to use a *kaḍibhaṃdhaṇa* or a type of loin cloth if he finds it too difficult to leave his private parts uncovered, the Sutta assumes as unproblematic the presence of *acela* mendicants in the early Jain community.[41] The Āyāraṅga Sutta reflects thus a reality of the early Jain community where both clothed and naked (*acelaka*) Jains co-existed, and a gradation of different possibilities between the Jain mendicant's clothed state and naked state. When considering these facts, together with the fact that the term *acela(ka)* in the early Buddhist texts was most probably a generic denomination, it is safe to conclude that the *nigaṇṭhas* of the Buddhist texts could have referred to both clothed and naked Jain ascetics.[42]

With this let us return to our discussion of the Kandaraka Sutta list of ascetic practices. The remark that the so-called *attantapo* becomes naked (*acelako hoti*) may thus have borne reference to some ascetics of both the *ājīvika* community and Jain community.[43]

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[40] See e.g. AS I.7.4 § 1 addressing the Jain *bhikkhu* with three robes "But know further, that, after winter is gone and the hot season has come, one should leave off the used-up (garment of the three), being clad with an upper and under garment, or with the undermost garment, or with one gown, or with no clothes – aspiring to freedom from bonds Penance suits him." (trsl. Jacobi 1989 (1884) SBE 22: 68). Similarly for the *bhikkhu* with two robes, and one robe. See respectively AS I.7.5 § 1 and AS I.7.6 § 1.

[41] Cf. AS I.7.7 § 1. On *kaḍibaṃdhana* see Jacobi 1989 (1884) SBE 22: 73. Later Jain Śvetāmbara commentaries explain *acela* as still being clothed. See Deo 1956: 161, n.114.

[42] It may be noted that also Bronkhorst considered the question of *nigaṇṭhas* and nakedness in his 2010 article "The riddle of the Jainas and Ājīvikas." Departing from a division in the early Jain ascetic community between Pārśva's followers characterized by taken the Four Vows (*cātuyāma,* cf. p 17) and the wearing of an ascetic garb, and between Mahāvīra's followers characterized by taken the Five Vows and wandering naked, Bronkhorst argues for considering the '*nigaṇṭhas*' in early Buddhist literature as bearing reference to Pārśva's followers, and the Jain naked ascetics (i.e. Mahāvīra's followers) as being included within the general and broader category of '*ājīvikas.*' Though being a valid suggestion, it rests on some unconvincing arguments, such as the argument to consider the terms '*ājīvika/ājīvaka*' and '*acela(ka)*' as synonyms. The fact that in Buddhist texts the so-called Four Vows are sometimes being attributed to Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta (i.e. Mahāvīra) also complicates the argument, just as the fact that, as we have seen, both Jain and Buddhist sources suggest a wide array and gradation of practices related to the wearing or not wearing of an ascetic garb that prevent a simple twofold categorization of clothed and unclothed.

[43] I write *some* members of the *ājīvika* community for even though *ājīvikas* are habitually associated with nakedness in both early Buddhist texts and later Buddhist commentarial literature, pictorial and sculptural representations of *ājīvikas* as well as later textual and epigraphical sources on the *ājīvikas* present a more complex reality where *ājīvikas* also came clothed.

Before turning to discuss other and more subtle ascetic practices of the Kandaraka Sutta, we may conclude with observing how our analytical categories 'Buddhist,' 'Jain,' or '*ājīvika*' may at times be inadequate for discussing the early Indian landscape. These analytical categories can give the wrong impression that boundaries between the 'Buddhist,' 'Jain' and '*ājīvika*' communities were at all times well-negotiated and perceptible. As our discussion on the practice of *acelatva* has demonstrated, there might, however, at times have been more similarity between two members of two distinct ascetic communities, than between two members of one and the same ascetic community. Ascetic practices as *acelatva* cut across community boundaries, making our analytical categories inadequate.

MN I 342.26-27

> [1] he does not accept food brought or [2] food specially made or an [3] invitation to a meal.
> *[1] nābhiṭaṁ [2] na uddissakataṁ [3] na nimantaṇaṁ sādiyati* (MN I 342.26-27)

Early Buddhists, unlike the so-called *attantapo* of the Kandaraka Sutta, accepted invitations to a meal. This is evidenced by the many suchlike references found in the Pāli texts. Within the Pāli Vinaya it is standard to see the Buddha and the order of *bhikkhus* being invited to – and 'silently' accepting the invitation to - a meal (*bhatta*) by a (lay) householder with the phrase: "*adhivāsetu me bhante bhagavā svātanāya bhattaṃ saddhiṃ bhikkhusaṃghena*" ('Respected one, let the Bhagavat consent to a meal with me on the morrow together with the *bhikkhusaṃgha*').[44] In addition to the occurrence of this stock phrase, the Pāli Vinaya also holds 'incidental references' to *bhikkhus* accepting invitations to a meal, suggesting that it was both practiced and considered to be unproblematic by if not all, then by at least an important fraction of the early Buddhist *saṅgha*.[45] I write "by at least an important fraction" for, as Freiberger noted, early

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For examples of *ājīvikas* being explicitly associated with nakedness in the Pāli Vinaya, see n.27. For examples of *ājīvikas* being associated with nakedness in Buddhist commentarial literature, see Basham 1981 (1951): 37, 82-4 and Schlingloff 1994: 71. For examples of clothed *ajīvikas* see Basham 1981 (1951): 107-109 and Schlingloff 1994: 72-4.

[44] These invitations are usually extended by a lay follower after having received a talk on *dhamma*. By those who are about to take refuge to the Buddha, *dhamma* and *saṅgha* the invitation to a meal is extended after having received a 'gradual instruction' or *anupubbikathā* (translated by Horner with 'progressive talk'). See e.g. Vin I 236 (MV VI 31.12; trsl. Horner BD IV 324).

[45] e.g. Vin IV 177: *tena kho pana samayena bhikkhū kulesu nimantitā bhuñjanti.* ('Now at that time *bhikkhus* ate invited by families'). On 'incidental references' or 'the principle of irrelevance' to distract historical information from normative sources, see p. 84 ff.

Buddhist texts display a tension between critics and advocators of ascetic praxes, suggesting the presence of *ascetically* inclined Buddhist *bhikkhus* next to *monastic* members of the early Buddhist *saṅgha*.[46] It is not unlikely that some of these ascetic *bhikkhus* or 'monks of ascetic temperament' who, in the words of Freiberger 'lived "on the edge" of the Middle Way'[47] might have refused invitations to a meal. This ascetic praxis was one of the five points of restraints demanded by Devadatta - and made optional by the Buddha.[48] It also occurs in a discussion on nine *dhutaṅga* in the Sappurisa Sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya where "the context clearly shows that practicing the nine *dhutaṅgas* was common and accepted among Buddhists of the time."[49] However, if some members of the Buddhist *saṅgha* refused to subsist on invitations, it is clear that others certainly did and that the monk-editors principally considered this to be unproblematic. For *nigaṇṭhas,* however, the disciplinary texts are unambiguous in rejecting this practice; accepting an invitation to a meal was totally not done. Whether this means that early Jain ascetics never actually accepted an invitation, we cannot know. But that the soteriological and ethical frames underlying the Jain precepts could not support invitations to a meal is unambiguously clear from the information contained in their scriptures (cf. below).

When consulting their disciplinary codes, we are led to assume that *nigaṇṭhas* would have refused to even consider an invitation to a meal. This may be deduced from the often repeated injunctions in the Āyāraṅga Sutta, the oldest extant disciplinary text of the Śvetāmbaras, prohibiting the Jain ascetic from accepting food that was specially prepared for him. If, when preparing food, a householder does anything that could involve the killing of living beings (including the one-sensed beings) such as grounding

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[46] Cf. Freiberger 2006 "Early Buddhism, Asceticism, and the Politics of the Middle Way." In this excellent article Freiberger also argues (p.250-1) how "the concept of the Middle Way was a rhetorical tool against severe asceticism; its polemical power was more important than its (varying) contents. Apparently it was created, or at least used, to criticize not only non-Buddhist ascetics but also Buddhist ones. .... . While assuming that the Middle Way doctrine is targeted also at Buddhists, it is tempting to consider the possibility that the other "extreme" mentioned there, the indulgence in sensual pleasures, points to *saṅgha* members as well." Ibid: 250-1.

[47] Freiberger 2006: 243-244.

[48] The famous account of the schematic Devadatta demanding the Buddha to implement five *dhutaṅgas* as stringent precepts is taken up in the introduction to *saṅghādisesa* X (Vin III 171-4, BD I 296-303), and repeated in the Cullavagga that contains a more detailed account of Devadatta's aspirations (Vin II 184-206, BD V 259-90). The second *dhutaṅga* request, on refusing invitations to a meal, reads: *yāvajīvaṃ piṇḍapātikā assu, yo nimantanaṃ sādiyeyya, vajjaṃ naṃ phuseyya* ('For as long as life lasts let them be beggars for alms; whoever should accept an invitation sin would besmirch him.'). Freiberger justly suggests to read the dispute between Devadatta and the Buddha as reflecting "two voices within early Buddhism, one demanding more radical practices and one rejecting them." Freiberger 2006: 243.

[49] Freiberger 2006: 244. For the list of the nine *dhutaṅgas* see MN III 40.23-42.18.

grains, or winnowing fossil salt for "the sake of the mendicant" (*bhikkhupaḍiyâ*), then the mendicant should consider that food to be impure (*aphâsuya*) and unacceptable (*aṇesaṇigga*).[50] In other words, grounded grain or winnowed fossil salt were as such not prohibited for the Jain ascetic. They became prohibited when they were grounded or winnowed *for the mendicant's sake*. For the same reason, the editors of the Āyāraṅga Sutta would like the Jain ascetic not to visit his relatives for, on seeing him, they might "for his sake, procure or prepare food."[51] However, that this rule is prescriptive – as all Jain and Buddhist disciplinary rules are - and therefore not necessarily reflecting actual historical praxes, can be seen from the fact that a different precept simply assumes the reality of Jain mendicants visiting their relatives, when regulating that a Jain mendicant wishing to visit their relatives should inform a *thera* and be "accompanied by a well-versed monk (*bahussuë babbhāgame*) if he was still unripe in knowledge (*appasuya appāgama*)." This precept can be find in the Vavāhara Sutta.[52] As the Vavāhara Sutta is of a later date than the Āyāraṅga, the facts that this precept assumes the reality of Jain mendicants visiting their family and that this is contrary to the information reflected in the Āyāraṅga regulation, remind us, therefore, not only of the prescriptive nature of our sources, but also of the importance to allow ambiguity (or complexity, or so-called contradictions) to arise in both our synchronic and diachronic discussions of the early Jain and Buddhist ascetic communities. Be as it may, the Vavāhara Sutta echoes the Āyāraṅga Sutta's insistence to not consume food that has been specially prepared for oneself, by instructing the Jain mendicant who is visiting a relative to accept "only that [food] which was cooked before his arrival (*puvvāgamaṇeṇaṁ puvvaütte*)."[53] The ethical concern that living beings would be harmed or killed *for the sake* of the mendicant also underlies the Jain precepts prohibiting the *nigaṇṭha* to accept food brought to him [1].[54] The three prohibitions to not accept food brought; specially made for, and an invitation to a meal can also be found repeatedly in the Dasaveyāliya Sutta (Skt. Daśavaikālika Sūtra).[55]

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[50] Cf. AS 62: II.1.6 §8; §9 (Jacobi 2002 [1884] SBE 22: 104)

[51] AS 65: II.1.9 §2 (Jacobi 2002 [1884] SBE 22: 111)

[52] Deo 1956: 283, with reference to Vav. [Vyavahāra] 6.1.

[53] Ibid. Note how the technical category of *āhākammia* (Skt. *ādhākarmika*) was developed to denote unfit food involving the killing of living beings in its preparation (for the *bhikkhu*?). Cf. Deo 1956: 231, Jacobi SBE 22: 81. For some more injunctions against accepting food that has been specially prepared for a Jain mendicant, or *śramaṇas* and *brāhmaṇas* see AS 50: II.1.1 § 12; AS 52: II.1.2 § 6.

[54] Cp. e.g. AS 50: II.1.1. § 13 where food which has been *brought out of the house* for the sake of *śramaṇas* and *brāhmaṇas* is not allowed for the *nigaṇṭha*. See also Nis 3.13-15 where the *nigaṇṭha* is not allowed to accept food brought from a distance beyond three houses. Cf. Deo 1956: 285.

[55] *Dasaveyāliya Sutta* (DS, Leumann (ed.) & Schubring (tr.) 1977 [1932]) 5.55: 'He should avoid (alms) especially prepared for him personally, bought, mingled with food prepared for monks (in general), (alms) which has to be fetched, (alms) which is given after the original quantity has purposely been increased, (alms) which has

MN I 342.27-31

After these three prohibitions the Kandaraka Sutta continues with some more detailed restrictions on food, for most of which one may also find striking parallels in Jain texts. It reads:

> [4] he receives nothing from a pot, from a bowl, across a threshold, across a stick, across a pestle, [5] from two eating together, [6] from a pregnant woman, [7] from a woman giving suck, [8] from a woman in the midst of men, [9] from where food is advertised to be distributed, [10] from where a dog is waiting, [11] from where flies are buzzing; [12] he accepts no fish or meat, he drinks no liquor, wine, or fermented brew.

> [4] *so na kumbhīmukhā patigaṇhāti na kaḷopimukhā patigaṇhāti, na eḷakamantaraṁ na daṇḍamantaraṁ na musalamantaraṁ, [5] na dvinnaṁ bhuñjamānānaṁ, [6] na gabbhiniyā, [7] na pāyamāmāya [8] na purisantaragatāya, [9] na saṅkittisu, [10] na yattha sā upaṭṭhito hoti, [11] na yattha makkhilā saṇḍasaṇḍacārinī, [...].*[56] (MN I 342.27-31)

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been borrowed, (and alms) which is destined partly for the household and partly for the monk'; DS 6.49: 'Those who accept food ... bought, prepared, or fetched for them, are privy to murder, thus it was said by the Great Sage.' DS 10.4 '(When a meal is prepared,) animals and plants, (the former) living in the earth (or) on grass or wood, are terrified. He who, therefore, does not eat or drink that which is prepared exclusively for him nor causes (another person) to (do so) – he (is) a (true) monk.'
For a discussion of the *Dasaveyāliya Sutta,* see p. 203.

[56] MN I 342.31-32 further also mentions '*na macchaṁ na maṁsaṁ na merayaṁ na thusodakaṁ pibati.*' ('He accepts no fish or meat, he drinks no liquor, wine, or fermented brew.') I have left this reference out of consideration, since the question of 'vegetarianism' in the early Indian ascetic landscape is a historical very complex question, requiring a detailed study. Cf. p. 140 ff. Within the early Buddhist community, divergent opinions circulated (and thus most probably also divergent practices) concerning the question of 'vegetarianism.' Cf. p. 140 ff. The earliest Jain ascetics, or better, among the earliest Jain ascetics there appeared to have been meat and fish eaters (cf. appendix 'Labeling the Ascetic other,' *lemma* 'Nātaputta Niganṭha; *niganṭha; niganṭhasāvaka,*' p. 139 ff.). Further, when consulting the Dharmasūtras, we may note that the question of meat eating is interpreted in various ways with respect to the various types of individuals under consideration. For instance, the abstinence from eating meat is explicitly prescribed for the young *brahmacārin* or student (see e.g. DS of Āpastamba I.2.23; I.4.6), while for 'a student who has returned home' meat appeared to have been permissible (this may be incidentally inferred from the following prescription that states how 'meat that has been cut with a knife used for slaughtering is not fit to be eaten.' DS of Āpastamba I.17.33, tr. Olivelle 2000:53, see also I.17.29-39 that discusses which animals may (not) be eaten). The same texts, prescribes for the 'forest hermit' (*vānaprastha*) that 'he should roam about, living on roots, fruits, leaves, and grasses, and finally on what he happens to find lying about,' thus implying an abstinence from meat and fish for the forest hermit. (DS of Āpastamba II.22.2, tr. Olivelle 2000: 105)

The first two praxes under [4] may readily be contrasted with the following *suttas* of the Dasaveyāliya:

> *kaṃsesu kaṃsa-pāesu kuṇḍa-moesu vā puṇo |*
> *bhuñjanto asaṇa-pāṇāī āyārā paribhassaī ǁ51 ǁ*
> *sīodaga-samārambhe matta-dhoyaṇa-chaḍḍaṇo |*
> *jāiṃ chaṇanti bhūyāiṃ diṭṭho tattha asaṃjamo ǁ 52 ǁ*
> *pacchākammaṃ purokamma siyā tattha na kappaī |*
> *eyamaṭṭhaṃ na bhuñjanti nigaṇṭha gihi-bhāyaṇe ǁ 53 ǁ*

51. [A *bhikkhu*] who takes food and drink from a brass vessel (*kaṃsesu*), a bowl (*kaṃsa-pāesu*), or a pot (*kuṇḍa-moesu*), falls from good conduct. 52. Lack of self-control is to be perceived, when living beings are hurt by the use of cold water [and] by washing and cleaning a vessel. 53. Where cleaning [of the vessel] after [use or] before [use] is to be [foreseen], it is not allowed to accept [the alms]. For this reason, the Free Ones do not eat from a householder's vessel (*gihi-bhāyaṇe*). (DS Leumann ed. & Schubring tr. 1977 [1932]: 6.51-53, trsl. 99-100)

Similarly, Āyāraṅga II.1.7 §3 prohibits the Jain '*bhikkhu*' and '*bhikkhuṇī*' (for that is how the Jain mendicant is mostly referred to in the Āyāraṅga)[57] from accepting food that is kept in an earthen vessel (*maṭṭiolitta asaṇa*), for fear that the layman would *for the sake of the mendicant* break the earthen vessel and thus injure earth-bodied beings.[58]

Also the following three practices mentioned in the Kandaraka Sutta, namely: "he receives nothing [5] from two eating together, [6] from a pregnant woman, [7] from a woman giving suck" can be found in Jain disciplinary codes. These three are, for instance, encountered in the Dasaveyāliya –and in the same sequence:

37. If of two persons engaged in taking their meal the one should invite him, he should not accept that which is given, unless he has made out the kind disposition [of the other person]. 38. [But] if both should invite him, he should accept (it) because it is allowed food. 39. He should avoid food and drink of all kinds destined for a pregnant woman [and] being eaten by her, [but] he should eat that which she has left. 40. It may happen that a pregnant woman in her ninth month sits down for his sake, when standing, and rises when sitting; 41. [and alms thus given] is not

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[57] *bhikkhu* was thus not a term exclusively used by 'Buddhist' ascetics to refer to their members. It had a wider application within the ascetic landscape. Note also how the 'group of five monks' the Buddha decides to teach *dhamma* to after his awakening are also termed '*bhikkhu*'. Cf. Vin I 8 (BD IV 13) where 'the group of five monks' is termed '*pañcavaggiyā bhikkhū*'.

[58] The *sutta* further states that the layman breaking an earthen vessel, might also injure fire-bodied beings, wind-bodied beings, plants and animals Cf. AS 61, II.1.7 §3: '*assaṃjae bhikkhupaḍiyâe maṭṭiolittaṃ asaṇaṃ … ubbhiṃdamâṇe puḍhavikâyaṃ samâraṃbhejjâ, tahâ teuvâuvaṇassatitasakâyaṃ samâraṃbhejjâ.*'

allowed to monks, [and] he should refuse [it, saying]: "I may not accept such [alms]". 42. If she brings food and drink having put down her crying boy or girl to whom she is giving the breast, 43. that food and drink is not allowed. (DS Leumann ed. & Schubring tr. 1977 [1932]: 5.1. 37-43, trsl. 90-1)[59]

MN I 342.32-343.3

Following these, the Kandaraka Sutta continues with minute restrictions concerning the amount of food:

> *So ekāgāriko vā hoti ekālopiko, dvāgāriko vā hoti dvālopiko — sattāgāriko vā hoti sattālopiko; ekissā pi dattiyā yāpeti, dvīhi pi dattīhi yāpeti — sattahi pi dattīhi yāpeti; ekāhikam - pi āhāraṁ āhāreti. dvīhikam - pi āhāraṁ āhāreti — sattāhikam - pi āhāraṁ āhāreti, iti evarūpaṁ addhamāsikam - pi pariyāyabhattabhojanānuyogamanuyutto viharati.* (MN I 342.32-343.3)

In the translation of Bhikkhu Ñāṇamoli and Bhikkhu Bodhi, this reads:

> He keeps to one house, to one morsel; he keeps to two houses to two morsels;... he keeps to seven houses, to seven morsels. He lives on one saucerful a day, on two saucerfuls a day ... on seven saucerfuls a day. He takes food once a day, once every two days...once every seven days; thus even up to once every fortnight, he dwells pursuing the practice of taking food at stated intervals. (Ñāṇamoli 2001 [1995]: 446)

These practices of the so-called *attantapo* are reminiscent of the many fasts and food restrictions practiced by *nigaṇṭhas*. Jains classified *tapas* into 'external *tapas*' (*bāhiraa tavo*) and 'internal *tapas*' (*abbhintaraa tavo*). While internal *tapas* consisted of expediation, studying, meditation and the like, much of the external *tapas* resolved around various types of fasts and food restrictions.[60] *Nigaṇṭhas* could keep temporary fasts (*itvara anaṣana*) for a day upto six months.[61] Fasting was considered to be a quintessential *tapas*

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[59] See also DS 7.4 and Vav 10.1. For a discussion of the DS, see p. 203.

[60] The six divisions of *abbhintara(y)a tavo* ('external *tapas*) are: "[1] atonement for any faults committed, [2] respect both for one's ascetic superiors and for the truths embodied in the Jain religion, [3] service to one's fellow ascetics, [4] study and reflection, [5] the giving up of personal attachments, [6] and meditation." Dundas 2002²: 166, cf. Uttarādhyana Sutta (UD) Jacobi 2004 [1895] SBE 45: 179 ff. The six divisions of *bāhira(y)a tavo* (internal *tapas*) are, according to the UD, (1) *anaṣana* ('fasting'); (2) *avamôdarikā* ('abstinence'); (3) *bhikśācaryā* ('collecting alms'); (4) *rasaparityāga* ('abstention from dainty food'); (5) *kāyakleṣa* ('mortification of the flesh'); (6) *saṃlīnatā* ('taking care of one's limbs'). UD 30 'The Road to Penance,' Jacobi 2004 [1895] SBE 45: 174 ff. On *bāhira(y)a* and *abbhintara(y)a tavo* see a.o. Caillat 1975: 91 ff; 'Asceticism' in Dundas 2002²: 163 ff.

[61] Cf. Deo 1956: 188. The UD divides fasting into temporary (*itvara*) and 'life-long,' this is, fasting unto death (*maraṇakāla*). UD Jacobi 2004 [1895] SBE 45: 175.

by *niganṭhas.* This is seen in the Uttaradhyāyana Sutta where a theoretical mathematical calculation allows for no less than 16 777 216 types of fasts.[62]

Two other categories of external *tapas* that seem to be alluded to in the quoted MN extract are the *avamôdarikâ tapas* ('abstinence') and the *bhikśācaryā tapas* ('collecting alms'). The first, *avamôdarikâ tapas* consists of a "[g]radual reduction of food, from a full meal of thirty-two morsels to one of one morsel."[63] Under the category of *bhikśācaryā tapas* all types of self-imposed restrictions for one's alms-begging are understood. So a *nigaṇṭha* could set out for alms imposing beforehand restrictions concerning the places he would go to, or, as in our quote, the amount of mouthfuls he would be accepting.[64] Concerning this latter, compare also the following allowance from the Jain Kappa Sutta:

> A monk who during the Pa*ggu*san [i.e. rain retreat] restricts himself to a certain number of donations, is allowed to accept (e.g.) five donations of food, and five of drink; or four of food, and five of drink; or five of food, and four of drink. (Kalpa Sûtra, Jacobi SBE 22: 300)[65]

Other ascetic practices of the so-called *attantapo* in the Kandaraka Sutta could be singled out as having been practiced by Jains, but the discussion of our selected group of practices suffices to draw the following important conclusion. Early Buddhists, or at the very least the editors and reciters of this passage on the *attantapo,* knew their Jain ascetic others. This is evident from the striking correspondences between the detailed food praxes of the *attantapo* and the alms-begging instructions and *tapas* possibilities treated in canonical texts of the *nigaṇṭha* and *nigaṇṭhī.* The fact that some of these food praxes are so subtle in nature reflects a deep inside-out knowledge. For how to notice that an ascetic is not accepting food directly from a vessel, or from a pregnant woman, or that an ascetic is 'keeping to one house, to one morsel' unless one is aware of the existence of these ascetic practices? To know that Jain ascetics performed these ascetic practices is to have a detailed knowledge of the Jain other, a knowledge that goes beyond the obvious and typifying features. This in turn, suggests contact. Without contact, knowledge of the other is not possible. But how are we to understand contact, be it direct or indirect between the early Buddhist *saṅgha* and other *samaṇa* communities? How were the ideas, practices and doctrines of non-Buddhist *samaṇas* exposed to 'the' Buddhist *bhikkhu?* When and how did other *samaṇas* challenge the

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[62] UD 30.10, Jacobi 2004 [1895] SBE 45: 175.

[63] Jacobi 2004 [1895] SBE 45: 175, fn. 2.

[64] Cp. UD 30.14 & 15, Jacobi 2004 [1895] SBE 45: 176. "Abstinence [*bhīkśācārya tapas*] is briefly of five kinds: with regard to *a.* substance; *b.* place; *c.* time; *d.* state of mind; *e.* development. *a.* He who takes less food than he usually does, in the extreme case but one mouthful, performs abstinence with regard to substance."

[65] For a discussion of the Kappa Sutta, see p. 197.

monastic organization of the Buddhist *saṅgha*? And how frequent was this contact? Was it accidental or regulated? Which places and occasions could bring about contact, and what did it mean for the boundaries between the various *samaṇa* communities? The following chapters address these questions by offering a typology of contact possibilities for the early Buddhist *bhikkhus.*

Direct and Indirect Contact

It is well-known that the early Jain and Buddhist community developed in much the same region of eastern India, a region which some scholars have designated "Greater Magadha."[66] To this we may add that within this region of eastern India the members of the Jain and Buddhist community (and of other *samaṇa* communities too) wandered and resided in very close vicinity to one another.

Michael Willis retracing the (amount of) steps of an ideal wandering Buddhist *bhikkhu* at Sanchi around the 3rd C BCE, suggested that such a *bhikkhu* must have wandered around five kilometres a day.[67] This is not much and one may assume that the earliest Jain and Buddhist *bhikkhus* covered a similar distance. This limited wandering radius combined with (or perhaps resulting in) the fact, as our analysis of direct contact opportunities will show, that *samaṇas* could bump into other *samaṇas* while performing

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[66] Already in 1924 Sukumar Dutt in his *Early Buddhist Monachism* referred to the region where the Buddhist tradition developed and flourished with "Greater Magadha." In more recent scholarship Johannes Bronkhorst revived the notion of "Greater Magadha" with his similarly titled 2007 monograph.
Bhaskar (1972) argued for geographically locating the development of the early Jain and Buddhist communities in the same regions of eastern India by means of charting the places where Mahāvīra and the Buddha are said to have been spending the rains (*vassaŋ vassati*). On the problem of considering the names of places in Buddhist literature as historical elements see Schopen 1997 'If You Can't Remember, How to Make it Up: Some Monastic Rules for Redacting Canonical Texts.' In this article Schopen identifies some redactional rules in the *Kṣudrakavastu* of the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya* instructing redactors, a.o., which place-name to use if they forgot where a *sutta* was delivered or a rule promulgated. Though these redactional rules are late (ca. 4th-5th century CE) they raise the awareness of the possibility that also the place-names of so-called 'early' Buddhist literature were determined by a similar set of rules or system. That this was indeed the case is convincingly argued by Schopen who pointing out how according to one of these redactional rules 'stories of the past' should be set in 'Vārāṇasī,' shows how more than four hundred of the five hundred Pāli Jātaka stories are set in Vārāṇasī.
[67] Michael Willis presented his idea of a *bhikkhu* walking an average distance of five kilometer a day during the conference "Network and Identity" (Ghent, 18th-20th December 2013) in his paper entitled "Early Historic Buddhism and Buddhists in Central India: Networks in Miniature."

any of their daily activities, reflects a very close socio-geographical proximity of the various s*amaṇa* groupings. As I will demonstrate, any basic activity of the early Buddhist *bhikkhu* could give rise to direct contact with his *samaṇa* others. Going for alms, eating, wandering, bathing, and even resting and sleeping were occasions for early Buddhist *bhikkhus* to come into direct contact with other *samaṇas.* Also public festal events appeared to have brought *samaṇas* of various communities together.

Before the establishment of some sort of permanent and exclusive resident quarters for Buddhist *bhikkhus* (where contact with the 'outside' world becomes a highly regulated matter), direct contact with their ascetic others seemed to have been a part of their daily reality. Many places, events and facilities that Buddhist *bhikkhus* frequented for eating, resting or sleeping were not exclusively provided or erected for Buddhist *bhikkhus,* but for 'everyone' (*sabbe, savvajaṇa*), and as such they inevitably functioned as platforms for direct contact opportunities.[68]

My treatment of the various direct contact opportunities will problematize the notion of a 'Jain' ascetic and a 'Buddhist' ascetic. It will problematize the idea that difference (in however many different ways this could be negotiated) between a 'Jain' and a 'Buddhist' *bhikkhu* was being negotiated in such a manner that a 'Jain' could indeed at all times be distinguished from a 'Buddhist,' and vice versa. The various direct contact opportunities will show that in many cases neither the activity nor the place of an ascetic supplied or secured his distinct identity. During the earliest stages of the development of the Buddhist community, the socio-geographical proximity between Buddhist *bhikkhus* and other ascetics was often such that no material boundaries supported their distinct identity. To appreciate the significance of this socio-geographical proximity, this is, of this *absence* of material boundaries, one may consider the significance of the *presence* of material boundaries on the development of identity.

It is not difficult to understand how the presence of permanent and fully equipped Buddhist monasteries both minimizes and regulates direct contact opportunities. Such monastery-complexes providing cooking, eating, bathing, sleeping and other facilities within their very boundaries, restrict the possibility for the Buddhist *bhikkhu* to (spontaneously) come into *direct* contact with his ascetic others while performing any of these basic activities. (The absence of) archaeological and epigraphical evidence suggests that such Buddhist monastery-complexes were not a feature of the Buddhist community before or even during the Mauryan period (ca. 322 BCE-185 BCE). They appear, however, as an established feature during the Gupta empire (ca. 320-550 CE), pointing to the fact that it is most probably "in the period between the Mauryan and

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[68] Cp. AS 57-8: II.1.5.§ 4 where food is said to be prepared for all (*savvajaṇa*).

Gupta empires *. . .* that Buddhist communities came to be fully monasticized, permanently housed, landed, propertied, and – to judge by almost any standard – very wealthy."[69] Regarding the notion of identity, one may remark that such monastery-complexes provide Buddhist *bhikkhus* with an important source of identity. Part of their self and community definition becomes provided, supported by and intimately linked with these monastery-complexes. By their very structure monastery-complexes create a material boundary between 'the Buddhist *bhikkhu'* and the 'outside' world. In the absence of such permanent monastery-complexes during the earliest stages of the Buddhist community, Buddhist *bhikkhus* of that time evidently had different sources of identity, if indeed, as it will become apparent throughout our discussion of direct contact opportunities, a clearly negotiated and perceptible distinctiveness or identity can at all be taken for granted.

It further may already be remarked that if some passages of the Pāli Vinaya reflect an absence of material boundaries, some other passages reflect a stage where Buddhist *bhikkhus* started to settle down in *vihāras* having material boundaries and with various facilities. Though these *vihāras* certainly did not reach the material complexity and sophistication of the Buddhist monastery-complexes of the Guptan period, they did start, as it will be illustrated, to (materially) separate Buddhist *bhikkhus* from the 'outside world.' In the final part I will discuss the development of these *vihāras* in the early stages of the Buddhist community, and consider their impact on both contact and identity negotiation.

Nattier's 'Principle of Irrelevance' and 'Principle of Counterargument'

In what follows, I discuss and illustrate direct contact opportunities arising either from a particular activity (e.g. alms-begging) or from a specific socio-geographical space (e.g. public rest-house). The aim is to offer a critical contribution towards the, so to speak, 'materialization' of contact opportunities – being a dynamic contributor for *dialogue* - between Buddhist *bhikkhus* and their ascetic others; it is not to offer an exhaustive overview of direct contact opportunities.[70]

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[69] Schopen 2007: 60. In the introduction to his article on the ambivalence of the practice of Buddhist *bhikkhus* wearing 'clothes of the dead,' Schopen also points to the fact that the language used in the Aśokan inscriptions suggests that Aśoka did not know Buddhist monasteries since the tax reductions he granted to "the place of the Buddha's birth," is not granted "to a monastery or even to a monastic group, but to the village of Lumbini itself." Ibid.: 61.

[70] For an exhaustive overview of direct contact opportunities one naturally would need to consult many other sources, to begin with the remaining Buddhist texts of the Pāli canon.

The direct contact opportunities are drawn from the Pāli Vinaya and from the lecture *piṃḍeseṇâ* ('Begging of Food') of the Jain Āyāraṅga Sutta. Though being drawn from normative sources, I will present these direct contact opportunities as socio-historical realities on the basis of a methodological reading that follows Nattier's 'principle of irrelevance' and 'principle of counterargument.' Before explaining these two principles, I briefly want to remark that it has not been my intention to try to relegate the different contact opportunities into an absolute timeframe. This is not only because of the complex textual stratification within each used source text, but also between the source texts themselves.[71] I hope the following pages convince the reader, however, that both texts are informative and can be used as complementary sources in the quest of visualising dialogue opportunities between early Buddhist and Jain ascetics.

The 'principle of irrelevance' entails the idea that items mentioned in a normative narrative that are "unrelated to the author's primary agenda" can be taken to reflect social realities of that time. I will refer to such items as socio-historical realities *incidentally* referred to.

The 'principle of counterargument' holds the idea that if an author of a normative text prohibits X it may be taken to indicate that at least one person did X since otherwise the need would not have been felt to explicitly prohibit it.[72]

Needless to say, both principles should be applied critically and appropriately. If we read the whole of the Pāli Vinaya with solely the 'principle of counterargument' in mind, for instance, then virtually all precepts must be taken to bear reference, albeit negatively, to situations that really did occur. As we know, it is proper to the legal structure of the Pāli Vinaya to have an introductory story to each precept with a *bhikkhu*, a *bhikkhunī*, or a group of *bhikkhus* and *bhikkhunīs* doing exactly that which will be prohibited in the precept the story introduces.[73] However, when going through the Pāli Vinaya, one intuitively understands that some precepts were formulated in theoretical elaborations on and modifications of already existing precepts. Or that some precepts were formulated in theoretical consideration on how an ideal *bhikkhu* should

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[71] Cf. p. 50 ff. and p. 58 ff. for a discussion of the dates of the texts.

[72] Nattier 2003: 63-69 'Extracting Historical Data from a Normative Source'. Nattier suggests two more principles. The 'principal of embarrassment' being the idea that "When an author reveals, in the course of a discussion, something that is quite unflattering to the group or the position that he or she represents, there is a high degree of probability that the statement has a basis in fact." The 'principle of corroborating evidence' is based on the idea that if two or more independent sources agree in their representation of X, then X might very well have been as described in those sources.

[73] See also Dutt 1996 (1924): 25 discussing why the introductory stories to each precept were felt to be necessary in the legal law code of the Pāli Vinaya: "In primitive conception, every law being an adjudication and command, the 'state of facts' on which the adjudication was made could not be dispensed with in laying down the law."

(not) behave; or in theoretical reflection on how to (not) act upon both factual and imagined possibilities the 'outside' world offers; or also, that some precepts were formulated in analogy with already existing law systems. In other words, not all precepts can be taken to have been formulated in negative response to factual incidents. On this critical note, let us turn to consider some direct contact opportunities for early Buddhist and Jain *bhikkhus.*

Eat and Meet

Going for alms

The daily quest for food was a most basic activity that brought alms-begging ascetics into both direct and indirect contact with other ascetics. I will show how contact opportunities arose from the alms-begging activity itself; from certain public facilities and events; and from donating householders. The latter played a most vital role, for without donating householders ascetics could simply not have developed their practice of alms-begging. In addition, they oftentimes appeared to have been donating alms-food to ascetics irrespective of their specific affiliation. This fact, as we shall see, was conducive to bring ascetics into both direct and indirect contact with one another.

The denominations '*bhikkhu*' and *bhikkhunī* (AMg *bhikkhu* and *bhikkhunī,* Skt. '*bhikṣu*' and *bhikṣuṇī,*) are found in both the Pāli Vinaya and the Jain Āyāraṅga Sutta to refer to their male and female mendicants. The root '*bhikṣ*' means 'to beg for alms', and this 'alms begging' is indeed one significant practice shared between (some) Buddhist and Jain ascetics.[74]

Though the Pāli Vinaya contains ample evidence of Buddhist *bhikkhus* accepting 'invitations to a meal'[75] and of householders *going to* Buddhist *bhikkhus* to offer and provide them with food at their own place of residence,[76] an equally ample amount of

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[74] For a discussion of the meaning of the term *bhikkhu* in Jain texts, see Caillat 1975: 34 where she points to the divergence between the etymological meaning of the term ('one who lives of charity') and the applied meaning of the term. According to the twelfth century commentator Malayagiri '*bhikkhu*' in the Jain *Kappa* and the *Vavahāra Sutta* refers 'not [to] one who lives of charity etc. [= etymological meaning], but one who correctly devotes all his efforts towards his salvation, and who knows how to control himself [= applied meaning].' Ibid.

[75] On the practice of accepting an 'invitation to a meal' (*nimantaṇaṁ sādiyati*) see my discussion of 'Food restrictions' in the previous section 'How well did early Buddhists knew their Jain ascetic other?'.

[76] See e.g. the introductory story to *pāṭidesaniya* IV (BD III 115-116, Vin IV 181-182) from which one incidentally can infer the fact that it was not unusual for people to go to the jungle lodgings (*āraññaka senāsana*) of *bhikkhus* to prepare a meal (*bhatta*) for the *bhikkhus* there, in the *bhikkhus*' very own dwelling-places. See also MV VI.24.1

evidence indicates that some Buddhist *bhikkhus* and *bhikkhunīs* lived up to their name and went themselves to the householders' residences to beg for alms.[77] And here, a direct contact opportunity arises. On their way to, and at a householder's place, Buddhist *bhikkhus* could and certainly did come across other ascetics. Explicit examples of such encounters are, however, not found in the Pāli Vinaya. This is not surprising considering the text's economic and strategic (mis)use of references to the ascetic *others* of the early Buddhist.[78] Luckily the Jain Āyāraṅga is more helpful on this point. To illustrate that alms-begging ascetics could meet their ascetic others when going for alms, we may turn to the Jain Āyāraṅga (p. 58) *sutta* II.1.5 §6, translated by Jacobi as:

> "When a [Jain] monk [*bhikkhu*] or [Jain] nun [*bhikkhunî*] on a begging tour [? *samâna*] perceives that a *Sramana* [*samaṇa*] or Brâhmana [*mâhaṇa*], a beggar [*gâmapiṃḍolaga*] or guest [*atihi*] has already entered the house, they should not overtake them and address (the householder) first. Knowing this, they should go apart and stay where no people pass or see them. But when they perceive that the other has been sent away or received alms, and has returned [to his *ārāma*], they may circumspectly enter the house and address the householder." (Jacobi SBE 22: 102)

This *sutta* with its rather dramatic image of mendicants overtaking other mendicants to be first in receiving alms at a householder's house, may serve as an illustration to show how householder's houses could be frequented by various mendicants from a same or different ascetic community, and this at one and the same time too. Whether Jain *bhikkhus* and *bhikkhunīs* on seeing other alms-begging ascetics entering a householder's house that they were about to enter themselves really did stop, turned away, and went to find a place nearby where no one could see them, we cannot say. This is the normative prescription of the redactors of our *sutta*: it shows the redactors' opinion on how a Jain mendicant ideally should behave in such a circumstance. It, therefore, does not –necessarily – reflect a socio-historical reality too. However, with the principle of

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(Vin I 219; BD IV 300-301) where Buddhist *bhikkhus* wandering from one town to another in a caravan-like formation are joined by people who cook for them.

Alms-food could also be send (*pāheti*) to a *bhikkhu* by his *upaṭṭhākakūla* or by the family who ministers him. See e.g. introductory story to *pācittiya* XLVI (Vin IV 98; BD II 362-3).

Note also that by means of the principle of counterargument one may deduce that some Buddhist *bhikkhus* might also have prepared their own food. Cp. MV VI.17.3: "Monks, one should not make use of what is cured indoors, cooked indoors, *cooked by oneself [sāmaṃ pakkaṃ].* Whoever should make use (of any of these things), there is an offence of wrong doing." (Vin I 211; trsl. I.B. Horner BD IV 287, emphasis mine)

[77] This is for instance well-reflected in the development of the denomination '*piṇḍacārika bhikkhu*' to indicate a 'Buddhist *bhikkhu* walking for alms-food' occurring in several introductory stories of the Pāli Vinaya (e.g. Vin IV 78; BD II 321).

[78] Cp. p. 123 ff. and p. 168 ff.

counterargument one can assume with a large degree of certainty that some Jain mendicants must not have stopped and turned away but simply joined others in their alms-begging quest at a householder's place. Also, and more importantly for our present question of direct contact opportunities, this passage provides us with the socio-historical information that mendicants belonging to different communities could meet at householders' places for alms. This is evidenced by the fact that it is incidentally referred to in our *sutta*. The reality of different '*samaṇas, brāhmaṇas,* beggars and guests' meeting at a householder's place for alms-food is here simply assumed. In addition, this socio-historical reality presented in our *sutta* is not an isolated case. It is referred to in several other *suttas* of the *piṃḍeseṇâ* of the Āyāraṅga Sutta, which further suggests that meeting a *samaṇa* or *brāhmaṇa* other at a householder's place did not happen infrequently when begging for alms. For instance, in the preceding *sutta* (*sutta* II.1.5 § 5) one finds an instruction for the Jain mendicant very similar to the one just quoted above. *Sutta* II.1.5 § 5 instructs the Jain mendicant to go and stand in a place where no one can see him when noticing that a '*samaṇa, brāhmaṇa,* beggar or guest' has already entered the householder's place he himself intended to enter for alms. This *sutta,* as the one just discussed, also simply assumes the possibility of a Jain mendicant coming across other non-Jain mendicants when wandering for alms among householders.

Another interesting piece of information that may be inferred from these *suttas* by means of the 'principle of irrelevance,' is the socio-historical fact that householders who offered food (if not all, then at least some of them) offered alms to mendicants irrespective of their specific ascetic affiliation. After instructing a Jain mendicant to go and stand where no one can see him in case others have already entered a householder's place, *sutta* II.1.5 § 5 continues a little further thus:

> Another man [*paro*] may bring and give him food . . . while he [i.e. the Jain mendicant] stays where no people pass or see him, and say unto him: 'O long-lived *Ś*ramana! [*âusaṃto samaṇâ*] this food . . . **is given for the sake of all of you [*savvajaṇâe nisaṭṭhe*]**; eat it or divide it among you. (trsl. Jacobi SBE 22: 101, emphasis mine)

These *suttas* (II.1.5 § 5 and II.1.5 § 6) indicate that it was not unusual for householders to donate to *samaṇas* of different ascetic communities. This is not to exclude the possibility that some householders chose to donate to only one particular community or even to one particular *bhikkhu*,[79] but the point is that contrary to the various normative statements found in both Jain and Buddhist texts that lay-followers supporting their

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[79] Note how there is a Pāli term for designating a family supporting (a) particular *bhikkhu*(s): *upaṭṭhakakula.* A *bhikkhu* being dependent on a certain family or families is called a '*kulūpaka bhikkhu.*' See e.g. Vin III 187 (BD I 330).

community (should) only support their community,[80] the socio-historical reality did not (always) agree with the textual ideal. (Some) householders (sometimes) offered alms to mendicants irrespective of their ascetic affiliation. This fact is also seen in *suttas* of the *piṃḍeseṇâ* of the *Āyāraṅga* that discuss what mendicants should do, or should not do, when a festival is being held nearby. As I will discuss below, for donating householders, festivals functioned as merit-making opportunities. Preparing and serving food for *all* who subsisted on alms offerings, donating householders turned festivals into direct contact platforms for the various alms-begging *samaṇas.*

Public Rest-Houses (*āvasatha*)

Other direct contact platforms for *samaṇas* arising from the combination of donating householders and specific socio-geographical places are the *āvasathas. Āvasathas,* sometimes also called *āvasathāgara,* were public rest-houses where householders could donate alms-food and provide a sleeping place to passing wanderers.[81] What makes *āvasathas* true contact platforms is that they were erected not solely for the needs of Buddhist *bhikkhus,* but for *all* ascetics. Further, references to *āvasathas* in the Pāli Vinaya inform us that also travelling householders could stay there. In other words, *āvasathas* or public rest-houses were strong contact hubs where Buddhist *bhikkhus* could meet and enter into dialogue with both their ascetic other and householder other.[82]

The references to *āvasathas* in the Pāli Vinaya show that public rest-houses could be erected both by individual householders or by a group of householders;[83] and that these

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[80] At Vin I 246 (BD IV 340) Keniya the Jaṭila, one devoted to *brāhmaṇas* (*brāhmaṇesu abhippasasanna*), is being told by the Buddha that 'for those giving alms, desiring merit, the [Buddhist] Order is indeed the chief.' At Vin I 236-327 the general Sīha whose family always had been supporting the Jains and who wishes to become a Buddhist layfollower repeats the following words he once heard the Buddha say: "Gifts should be given to me [i.e. the Buddha] only, not to others should gifts be given; gifts should be given to my disciples only, not to the disciples of others should gifts be given. What is given to me is alone of great fruit, what is given to others is not of great fruit; what is given to my disciples alone is of great fruit, what is given to the disciples of others is not of great fruit." (trsl. I.B. Horner BD IV 323) For a discussion of this Vinaya passage see p. 153. Cp. also the *Upāli Sutta* in the MN 483 where the householder Upāli converted from being a Jain disciple to a Buddhist disciple is presented as repeating the same words of the Buddha.

[81] "*āvasatha*" as "public rest-house" occurs in four distinct Pāli Vinaya narratives: Vin IV 17-20 = *pācittiya* VI (*āvasathāgara*); Vin IV 69-71 = *pācittiya* XXXI; Vin IV 161-164 = *pācittiya* LXXXIV; Vin I 226-230 = MV VI.28 (*āvasathāgara*).

[82] On the householder being an important dialectic other in the development of the early Buddhist community, see p. 131 ff.

[83] Vin IV 17-20 mentions an *āvasathāgāra* made ready by a certain woman (*aññatari itthi*) (= individual householder); Vin I 226-230 talks of an *āvasathāgāra* prepared by the lay-followers of Pāṭaligāma (= a group of householders).

could be of a permanent structure[84] that was either enclosed or open.[85] They further seem to also have been of varying accommodation capacities and facilities (cf. below).

Where exactly *āvasathas* were located in relation to the dwellings of householders and the dwellings and/or wandering routes of ascetics is not entirely clear. Since householders were responsible for both their erection and maintenance, we may assume that they were located somewhere that was within reach of householders. *Āvasathas* must, therefore, have been erected within villages and towns.[86] One could suggest that smaller *āvasathas* or *āvasathas* erected and maintained by an individual householder might (initially) have been part of a householder's dwelling itself. Being derived from the root *āvas* 'to dwell,' the term *āvasatha* has the non-technical meaning of 'abode.' Despite the term's indefiniteness regarding the type of abode(s), it is not unlikely that '*āvasatha*' may have been (part of) a householder's dwelling. The term occurs in the Pāli Vinaya in two compounds where it is clearly associated with the realm of householders. This is, the household-robe allowed to menstruating *bhikkhuṇīs* is called '*āvasatha-cīvara*,' and at Vin IV 20 the compound '*āvasatha-dvāra*' is used to refer to the door of a living-room of a householder's dwelling (*nivesana*). Being located within the householder's realm, *āvasathas* might, therefore, very well have sprung from householder's abodes themselves. Larger ones may have been detached from a specific householder's dwelling. Vin I 226 speaks, for instance, of the lay-followers of Pāṭaligāma inviting the Buddha and his *bhikkhu-saṅgha* to *their āvasatha.* The fact that this *āvasatha* is considered to be able to accommodate lay-followers and the Buddha and his *bhikkhu-saṅgha,* suggests that *āvasathas* could be large. Further, with the lay-followers of Pāṭaligāma collectively referring to the *āvasatha* as "*theirs,*" the "public" character of *āvasathas* is apparent. As there is no indication that they were privately owned, larger *āvasathas* appear to have been an integral part of the infrastructure of a village or town. Be as it may, both small and larger *āvasathas* must have been located in the vicinity of householders, as they were the ones erecting and maintaining them.

Regarding the varying facilities, the *āvasatha* or public rest-house mentioned in the introductory story to *pācittiya* XXXI (Vin IV 69-70), quoted in detail below, appears to provide "staying" and "eating" facilities for wandering ascetics; at Vin I 226-227 (BD IV

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[84] The fact that at Vin IV 17-20, e.g., the public rest-house is said to [only] be **made ready (*paññattaṃ hoti*)** suggests an already existent construction.

[85] Cf. Padabhājaniya to *pācittiya* LXXXIV: "within an *āvasatha* means: inside the *āvasatha* when an *āvasatha* is fenced in; the precincts when it is not fenced in." (BD III 80, Vin IV 163: "*ajjhāvasatho nāma parikkhittassa āvasathassa antoavasatho, aparikkhittassa upacāro.*")

[86] Note how at Vin IV 17-20 the public rest-house is explicitly located *in* a village. Also at Vin I 226-230 is the public rest-house located *in* a village (cf. *Pāṭaligāma*).

309) the *āvasatha* is used as a sort of *dhamma* hall where both lay-followers and *bhikkhus* met to listen to the Buddha giving a talk on *dhamma*; and at Vin IV 17 the *āvasatha* appears to be a place where both wandering *bhikkhus* and travellers could spend the night. In other words, characteristic of an *āvasatha* is that not only it could be used for various purposes, but also that its facilities were *public.* As such, they were direct contact platforms bringing Buddhist *bhikkhus,* other ascetics and (donating and travelling) householders together. The introductory story to *pācittiya* XXXI offers a good example:

> Now at that time, not far from Sāvatthī, alms-food [*piṇḍa*] came to be prepared in a public rest-house [*āvasatha*] by some guild [*pūga*]. The group of six monks, dressing in the morning, taking their bowl and robes, entering Sāvatthī for alms-food, (but) not obtaining alms-food, went to the public rest-house [*āvasatha*]. People, saying: "At last reverend ones [*bhaddantā*] have arrived," respectfully served them. Then also on the following day as the day after that the group of six monks . . . [*pa*], dressing in the morning . . . [*pa*] going to the public rest-house [*āvasatha*], ate (a meal). Then it occurred to the group of six monks:
> "What difference do we make?" Having gone to the monastery [*ārāma*], then tomorrow it will be right to return just here." Staying on and on just there, they ate alms-food at the public rest-house. Adherents of other ascetic communities [*titthiyā*] went away. People were [irritated, angry (and)] speaking dispraisingly:
> **"How can these recluses, sons of the Sakyans, staying on and on, eat alms-food at the public rest-house? The alms-food at the public rest-house is not prepared merely for them, the alms-food at the public rest-house is prepared simply for everybody [*sabba*]."**
> Monks heard these people who were [irritated, angry (and)] speaking dispraisingly. Those who were modest monks were [irritated, angry (and)] speaking dispraisingly: "How can the group of six monks, staying on and on, eat alms-food at a public rest-house?" . . . [*pa*]
> "Is it true, as is said, that you monks [stayed on and on and ate alms-food at a] public rest-house?"
> "It is true, Bhagavat."
> The Buddha, the Bhagavat, rebuked them [. . . .] It is not, foolish men, for pleasing those who are not (yet) pleased . . . And thus, monks, this rule of training should be set forth:
> One meal at a public rest-house may be eaten. If he should eat more than that, there is an offence of expiation."
> And thus this rule of training for monks came to be laid down by the Bhagavat.
> (Pācittiya XXXII, Vin IV 71-72; trsl. partly following I.B. Horner BD II 303-304)

This Pāli Vinaya passage is very informative. The *pācittiya* rule itself suggests that it was an accepted practice among Buddhist *bhikkhus* to go to *āvasathas* and to enjoy the alms-food prepared by devoted householders. The introductory story illustrates, on the other hand, how an *āvasatha* was a place where Buddhist *bhikkhus* could come into contact

with their ascetic others (*titthiya,* Skt. *tīrthika*).[87] This contact opportunity arises both from the place itself (*an āvasatha being an open public place*) and from donating householders (here a 'guild') who are presented as preparing alms-food for "simply everybody."

Festivals

Public festal events, such as religious festivals (AMg. *maha*),[88] festive entertainments (AMg. *saṃkhaḍi;* Pāli *samajja*),[89] and public feasts (Pāli *ussava*)[90] also constituted direct contact opportunities for *samaṇas.* Both Buddhist and Jain canonical texts associate public festal events with the many temptations of worldly existence improper for *the bhikkhu:* alcohol, gossip, seduction, sex, music, dance, perfume etc.[91] As caricatural depictions of the excesses of a householder's life, public festal events often serve as a rhetorical device to laud the *samaṇa* lifestyle in contradistinction to the householder one. However, despite the fact that Jain and Buddhist canonical sources condemn public festal events for their worldly temptations and excesses, their precepts for their *bhikkhus* against attending public festal events; their regulations on what to avoid or how to behave *at* public festal events; together with references to *bhikkhus being* at a public festal event, indicate that early Buddhist *bhikkhus* and Jain *bhikkhus* did go and hence, as I will illustrate, could meet one another on such occasions.

In the introductory story to *pācittiya* XXXVII (Vin IV 85; BD II 335) a group of *bhikkhus* are presented as going to a festival on the mountain top. People seeing those *bhikkhus*

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[87] The term *titthiya* literally means 'one belonging to a *tīrtha* ('ford')' and in general bears reference to any member of the early Indian society who followed a specific ascetic path stipulated by a certain '*tīrthika*' or 'ford maker.' In Buddhist texts such as the Pāli Vinaya, however, the term is almost exclusively used to designate members of an ascetic community other than the Buddhist one. For an in-depth analysis of the term *titthiya,* see p.174 ff. and p. 187 ff.

[88] The Ardhamāgadhī term '*maha*' can (cf. PSM, *s.v.*) be related either to the Sanskrit word '*maha*' meaning 'a feast, a festival' or to the Sanskrit word '*makha*' meaning 'sacrifice, offering' beside 'a feast, festival, or any occasion of joy or festivity.' I chose to translate it with 'religious festival' as its use at AS 51-52 (cf. quote in text) indicates that *maha* was a feast or a festival (with food during which sacrifices may have been performed or offerings donated) that were held on or for an auspicious occasion or day.

[89] The Ardhamāgadhī term '*saṃkhaḍi*' is a *deśi* word meaning a 'feast, banquet' or 'food prepared for relatives and others on festive occasions such as weddings etc.' (cf. PSM, *s.v.*)

The Pāli term '*samajja*' stands for 'festive gathering; fair' and is thought to have originated from a mountain cult as 'it was especially held on the mountains near Rājagaha.' (cf. PED, *s.v.*)

[90] The Pāli term '*ussava*' is related to the Skt. word '*utsava*' meaning 'feast, making merry, holiday'.

The distinction between '*maha*', '*saṃkhaḍi*', '*samajja*' and '*ussava*' is not always clear, however, their common aspect is clear: during all these festive occasions food is being served and people are brought together.

[91] See e.g. Vin II 107-108 (BD V 145) where the group of six *bhikkhus* are being rebuked for going to a festival on a mountain-top (*giragga-samajja*) as they, just like householders, were enjoying the dancing, singing and music. For examples taken from the *Āyāro* see a little further in main text.

offered them food. The issue expressed in the *pācittiya* offence is not with the fact that *bhikkhus* are at a festival (*samajja*), but that they are eating at the 'wrong time'. Similarly, at Vin IV 179 (BD III 111) *bhikkhus being* at a festival (*ussava*) is taken as an unproblematic setting to introduce the main point under discussion, this is, whether or not a *bhikkhu* should accept food from families agreed upon as learners. That festive events could turn into direct contact platforms, may be illustrated with the following suttas from the Āyāraṅga:

> A [Jain] monk or a [Jain] nun on a begging-tour should not accept food . . . . on a festival [*maha*] of Indra or Skanda or Rudra or Mukunda or demons [*bhûta*] or Yakshas [*jakkha*] or the snakes [*nâga*], or on a festival in honour of a tomb [*thûbha*], or a shrine [*ceiya*], or a tree [*rukkha*], or a hill, or a cave, or a well, or a tank, or a pond, or a river, or a lake, or the sea, or a mine – **when on such-like various festivals [*virûvarûvesu mahâmahesu*] many Sramanas and Brâhmanas, guest, paupers, and beggars are entertained with food**, & c. [out of one or two or three or four vessels, pots, baskets, or heaps of food; such like food which has been prepared by the giver . . . is impure and unacceptable] . . . .
>
> But when he perceives that all have received their due share**,** and are enjoying their meal, he should address the householder's wife or sister or daughter-in-law or nurse or male or female servant or slave and say: 'O long-lived one [*âuso*]! (or, O sister!) will you give me something to eat?' After these words of the mendicant, the other may bring him food [*asaṇa*], & c., and give it to him. Such food, & c., whether he beg[s] for it [*jâejjâ*] or the other give[s] it, he may accept, for it is pure [*phâsuya*] and acceptable [*paḍigâha*]. (AS 51 - 52: II. 1.2 § 3 - 4, trsl. Jacobi SBE 22: 92-93, emphasis mine)

And also,

> When he [i.e. the Jain *bhikkhu*] has eaten or drunk at **a festive entertainment [*saṃkhaḍi*],** he might vomit (what he has eaten), or not well digest it; or some other bad disease or sickness might befall him. (1)
>
> The Kevalin says this is the reason:
>
> A mendicant [*bhikkhû*], having drunk various liquors [*soḍa*], together with the householder or [the householder] his wife [*gâhâvatiṇî*], [together with other] monks [*parivâyaa,* Skt *parivrâjaka*] or nuns [*parivâiyâ,* Skt. *parivrājikā*], might not find the (promised) resting-place [*uvassaya*] on leaving the scene of entertainment and looking out for it; or in the resting-place he may get into mixed company [*sammissîbhâva*]; in the absence of his mind or in his drunkenness he may lust after a woman [*itthi*] or a eunuch [*kilîva*]; approaching the mendicant (they will say): 'O long-lived Sramana [*âusaṃto samaṇâ*]! (let us meet) in the garden [*ârâma*], or in the sleeping place [*uvassaya*], in the night or in the twilight.' Luring him thus by his sensuality (she says): 'Let us proceed to enjoy the pleasures of love.' He might go to her, though he knows that it should not be done.

These are the causes to sin, they multiply continuously. **Therefore should a well-controlled Nirgrantha [*saṃjae niyaṃṭhe*] not resolve to go to any festival [*saṃkhaḍi*] which is preceded or followed by a feast [*puresaṃkhaḍi vâ paccâsaṃkhaḍi*].** (AS 53: II.1.3 § 1-2, trsl. Jacobi SBE 22: 94-95)

These *suttas* of the Āyāraṅga illustrate well how public festal events were perceived to be offering serious pitfalls for a mendicants' conduct. Liquor, seducing women, seducing eunuchs, consuming 'the pleasures of love,' are all but small matters. And though as platforms of temptation, public festal events are best avoided by mendicants, these *suttas* inform us that ascetics did hang around such events. *Suttas* AS II. 1.2 § 3 – 4 in instructing the Jain mendicant *when* he may accept alms-food at a festival (*maha*), simply assumes the socio-historical reality of Jain mendicants attending a festival. Similarly, by means of both the principle of irrelevance and the principle of counterargument we may infer from *suttas* II.1.3 § 1-2 that Jain mendicants hung around festive entertainments (*saṃkhaḍi*) and partook of the feast served at these occasions. The presence in this context of both the stock enumeration of all those subsisting on food (*samaṇa mâhaṇa gâmapiṃḍolaga atihi*), and of *paribbājakas* (AMg. *parivâyaa*) further corroborates the fact that public festal events could function as direct contact opportunities.

In addition, we can again infer from these examples that householders – or at least some householders – offered alms to mendicants irrespective of their specific ascetic affiliation. Householders are here presented as distributing food (and offering resting-places '*uvassaya*'[92]) on festal events to *any* wanderer. This is an important socio-historical fact that needs to be taken fully into consideration when considering the processes of identity negotiation of early Buddhist *bhikkhus*. In the final section of this part on contact I will go more deeply into the various dynamic roles of householders in the processes of identity negotiation of the early Buddhist *bhikkhus*. First, some more direct contact opportunities may be discussed. I turn to direct contact arising from non-exclusive sleeping and residence facilities.

Sleep and Meet

The Pāli Vinaya hosts a wide range of different sleeping facilities for the Buddhist *bhikkhu*. The long period of time over which our monastic text developed undoubtedly accounts for some of this diversity. Because of (or thanks to) its long oral tradition,

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[92] The PSM defines '*uvassaya*' [Skt. *upāśraya*] as 'a place where Jain *sādhus* could make their dwelling'. It bases its definition from several Jain texts, but not from the Āyāro. In our passage quoted above it appears, however, to be a place prepared by a householder where Jain *bhikkhus* but also other people could spend the night.

some sleeping practices and residence facilities that became obsolete in the course of the development of the early Buddhist *saṅgha* still made it into the Pāli Vinaya. On the other hand, the co-existence of various sleeping practices and residence facilities at one time and place also must be contributing to the diversity. While some sleeping practices and residence facilities recorded in the Pāli Vinaya suggest the presence of (material) boundaries separating the members of the Buddhist community from the 'outside' world,[93] other sleeping practices and residence facilities indicate 'open' boundaries. It is on these latter ones that we will focus.

Titthiyaseyyā

Concerning 'open' or 'mixed' sleeping places, we are already familiar with *āvasathas* (Pāli Vinaya) and *uvassayas* (Āyāraṅga). In addition to these public rest-houses, Buddhist *bhikkhus* searching for a sleeping place, could encounter other ascetics at *titthiyaseyyās*. The term '*titthiyaseyyā',* literally meaning a 'sleeping place of (a) *titthiya(s)* (Skt. *tīrthika),'* occurs in three separate but near identical Suttavibhaṅga passages of the Pāli Vinaya.[94] It occurs in the casuistry section of *pācittiya XLVII, pācittiya LXXXV* and *pāṭidesaniya* I.

Pācittiya XLVII prescribes a *bhikkhu* to not enter a house for alms-food just before or after he has been invited and provided with a meal elsewhere. *Pācittiya LXXXV* prohibits a *bhikkhu* from entering a village at the wrong time without having asked for permission first; and *pāṭidesaniya* I forbids a *bhikkhu* to accept alms-food from a *bhikkhunī* who is not a relation and who 'has entered among the houses' (*antaragharaṃ paviṭṭhāya*), this being the standard Pāli expression to refer to the active begging for alms-food among householders.

A common feature of these three Vinaya rules is the exception made in their accompanying casuistry section for a *bhikkhu* who is either going to or who is at a *titthiyaseyyā*.[95] This exception is significant as it points to the fact that Buddhist *bhikkhus* could frequent sleeping places of *titthiyas*. These may, therefore, be considered as specific socio-geographical places that could give rise to direct contact opportunities.

One may critically remark that *three* references to *titthiyaseyyās* is a truly negligible amount for such a large text as the Pāli Vinaya. It would indeed be problematic to state on the basis of only these three references that it was common for Buddhist *bhikkhus* to

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[93] Cf. following section 'a Dwell and Meet' where the growing materiality and sophistication of Buddhist sleeping/dwelling facilities will be discussed.

[94] Vin IV 101 (in the 'exception to the rule section' to *pācittiya* XLVII; BD II 367); Vin IV 166 (in the 'exception to the rule section' to *pācittiya* LXXXV; BD III 86); Vin IV 176 (in the 'exception to the rule section' to *pāṭidesaniya* I; BD III 106).

[95] For *pācittiya* XLVII and LXXV there is no offence if he is going to a *titthiyaseyyā*. For *pāṭidesaniya* I there is no offence if he is at a *titthiyaseyyā*.

go to a *titthiyaseyyā.* On the other hand, one should also not deny this possibility. Though very few, there are references. These are, furthermore, incidental which suggests that the practice was considered unproblematic. The point I wish to make is that when consulting the normative Pāli Vinaya for extracting historical information of how the early Buddhist *saṅgha* might have organized itself, or how, with respect to contact opportunities, it stood in dialogue with other ascetic communities, one has to be especially sensitive to these odd references. While the Pāli Vinaya will not hesitate to frequently repeat (and partly because of this repetition also establish) the ideal norm, it will certainly not mention as frequently or reflect as transparently the (changing) realities on the ground. For these, one has to be sensitive to the information contained in such 'incidental' references whose historical value are not dependent on their frequency in the text, but on their 'innocent' or 'incidental' nature. Regarding *titthiyaseyyās* one may, therefore, state that it was an unproblematic practice of early Buddhist *bhikkhus* to frequent sleeping places of other ascetics, despite the fact that only three references are met with in the Pāli Vinaya.

In the above discussion of direct contact opportunities arising from the combination of alms-donating householders and alms-begging ascetics, I pointed out that the very possibility of ascetics meeting one another when walking for alms, suggested that they resided in very close vicinity to one another. I further would like to draw attention to the fact that during such moments of direct contact, the activity itself of the ascetic (i.e. alms-begging) does not support his distinct identity. We cannot assume that when a 'Jain' *bhikkhu* and a 'Buddhist' *bhikkhu* are receiving alms at a festal event or at a householder's place, they were (always and easily) recognized to be two *bhikkhus* belonging to two distinct ascetic communities. Unless their distinctiveness was translated into visible, known and unambiguous dietary restrictions, or distinguishing emblems and garbs, the specific affiliation of ascetics might have gone unnoticed during direct contact.[96] In the course of this and the following section I will return to 'food' and 'clothing' as being two important locales for placing identity or for establishing meaningful difference. We will see how many passages and precepts of the Pāli Vinaya regulating the garb of the Buddhist *bhikkhu* can be understood as a conscious effort of the monk-editors to distinguish the members of the Buddhist community from their ascetic others. For the moment, I wish to remark that despite the gradual codification and clear desire of uniformization of the Buddhist *bhikkhu's* garb, various 'options' or better 'practices' co-existed within (and throughout) the (early) history of the Buddhist community. The best known example of this variety is the practice of wearing 'rags

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[96] I will return later to these two possible locales (food and garb) for placing identity (or distincitiveness).

taken from the dust heap' (*paŋsukūla*)[97] existing next to the practice of wearing 'the yellow robes' (*kāsāyāni vatthāni*).[98] The same is true regarding dietary regulations: also here a variety of food-practices was being adhered to by the various members of the Buddhist community.[99] In other words, a variety of practices (or meaningful differences) existed not only *between* two distinct ascetic communities, but also *within* one and the same ascetic community. This co-existence of various practices regarding food and clothes might at times have resulted in a greater similarity *between* two ascetics of distinct affiliation, than between two ascetics of one and the same community. This is to underscore the fact that one cannot assume that in direct contact a 'Buddhist' was surely recognized to be a 'Buddhist' and a 'Jain' to be a 'Jain.' In many instances of direct contact the distinction between a 'Buddhist' and a 'Jain' might not have been unambiguously established.[100] But what is more is that the presence of 'open' sleeping places (as is, e.g., indicated by the Pāli Vinaya references to '*titthiyaseyyās*) suggests that distinctive boundaries between a 'Jain' and a 'Buddhist' might not only have been lacking during direct contact opportunities, but also at their 'places of being,' this is, their places of sleep and/or residence.

For also the possibility of early Buddhist *bhikkhus* frequenting *titthiyaseyyās* problematizes the notion of a 'Buddhist' *bhikkhu* being clearly identifiable among his contemporaneous but distinct ascetic others. The very possibility of attending *titthiyaseyyās,* in addition to the already discussed *āvasathas* and *uvassayas,* indicates the presence of sleeping places with open boundaries within the Indian ascetic landscape. In other words, it indicates the presence of sleeping places that because of their 'open' nature, cannot bestow a separate identity to Buddhist *bhikkhus.* Such places instead accentuate the shared *samaṇa*-component of Buddhist *bhikkhus* with their contemporaneous wanderers.

Also passages of the Āyāraṅga Sutta complexify this idea of clearly distinguishable *samaṇa* communities who resided and wandered in geographically close but nevertheless still separate locations. The Āyāraṅga Sutta contains references indicating that *samaṇas* of differing affiliation met one another not just when going for alms or when attending public festal events or facilities, but also at their *vihāras.* An example may be given. Among the several instructions of *sutta* II.1.1. §8, we find the instruction for the Jain *bhikkhu* and *bhikkhuṇī* to not enter or leave the grounds of a *vihāra*

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[97] On the (problematic) practice of wearing *paŋsukūla* see Schopen 2007 and Witkowski (forthcoming).

[98] On *kāsāyāni vatthāni* see Heirmann 2014.

[99] While some Buddhist *bhikkhus* might have made a conscious effort to avoid eating meat or fish, other Buddhist *bhikkhus* might have not.

[100] What must at all times have been perceptible, however, is their *samaṇa* status.

(*vihārabhūmi*)[101] together with an ascetic belonging to a different community (*annautthia*).[102] Applying the principle of counterargument, we can deduce that Jain *bhikkhus* and *bhikkhuṇīs* must, at times, have been together with other ascetics at *vihārabhūmis.* The indefiniteness of both the term *annautthia* and its contextual use, does not allow us to determine the (possible) affiliation(s) of these ascetics. This indefiniteness, however, does not alter the main point of our argument, namely, that the distinction between the followers of differing ascetic communities was very often not provided or supported by distinct socio-geographical places and facilities. The socio-geographical closeness between Jain and other ascetics is further seen in *suttas* II.1.1 §7, §9 and §10 that respectively prohibit a Jain *bhikkhu* to enter the abode of a householder for alms-food together with an *annautthia;* to wander from village to village together with an *annautthia;* and to give his alms-food to an *annautthia.*[103]

The socio-historical reality of 'mixed' sleeping places may be illustrated with a final example taken from the Āyāraṅga Sutta. At Āyāraṅga (p. 77) II.2.3 §2 the Jain *bhikkhu* is asked to be extra vigilant when entering or leaving a small (public) lodging (*appagāra uvassa*), since "There might be a badly bound, badly placed, badly fastened, loose umbrella [*chatta*], pot [*matta*], stick [*daṃḍa*], staff [*laṭṭhī*], [seat (*bhisî*)] robe [*cela*], hide [*cilimilî*], leather boots [*cammakosa*] or piece of leather [*cammacheda*] belonging to **Sramanas or Brâhmanas [***samaṇa va mâhaṇa***];** and the mendicant, when leaving or entering (the lodging) at night might stumble or fall; stumbling or falling he might hurt his hand or foot [...], kill [...] all sorts of living beings." (AS 77: II.2.3 §2; tr. Jacobi SBE 22: 130). The reality of having to share a lodging with various other ascetics belonging to different communities is also here simply assumed.

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[101] Śīlaṅka's commentary gives the technical meaning of a 'place of study' to the Prakrit term *vihārabhūmi* ('grounds of a *vihāra*'). Cf. Jacobi SBE 22: 90 who follows Śīlaṅka's interpretation. Simalarly, the *Jaina Pāribhāṣika Śabdakośa* (JPŚ) gives for *vihārabhūmi:* "That place, which is earmarked for performing *Svādhyāya* (scriptural studies and teaching) by the ascetic (*Muni*)." JPŚ 315, *s.v.*

[102] *annautthi(y)a* is the Ardhamāgadhī equivalent of the Pāli *aññatitthiya* (Skt. *anyatīrthika*). For an etymological excursion of these terms, see the final section: From 'Ascetic' to 'Ascetic other.'

[103] Cf. AS 50: II.1.1 § 7-10, trsl. Jacobi SBE 22: 90. The Jain *bhikkhu* and *bhikkhuṇī* should also not do any of these activities together with a householder (*gāratthia*). The purpose for these regulations is to, according to the *Āyāraṅgasuttas* themselves, protect the dietary restrictions of the Jain *bhikkhu* and *bhikkhuṇī;* they are meant to ensure that the Jain *bhikkhu* accepts his alms-food (*bhīkṣā*) in conformity to all the canonical instructions. As householders and *annautthias* do not adhere to the same dietary restrictions and alms-begging instructions, they might entice the Jain *bhikkhu* or *bhikkhuṇī* to commit an offence related to food. This shows how 'food' was an important source of identity.

Outdoor Open Sleeping Places

Thus far we have discussed sleeping places that were open to various ascetics either because of their public nature or because of their non-exclusive character. We provided the example of public rest-houses (such as *āvastahas* [Pāli] and *uvassayas* [Amg.]) and of *titthiyaseyyās* that allowed the presence of various affiliated ascetics. To these mixed and open-boundaried sleeping places, we can add sleeping-places giving rise to direct contact opportunities because of their location in public spaces. Ascetics spreading their sleeping-mat in a public sphere cannot make demands on having exclusive rights to these places as this simply goes against the 'public' aspect of a *public* sphere. I am referring to places such as cemeteries (*susāna*), places at the root of a tree (*rukkhamūla*), or any place in - what the Pāli Vinaya calls - 'open air' (*ajjhokāsa*). On the basis that sleeping or residing at any of these places was considered to be an ascetic practice, I will argue that some Buddhist *bhikkhus* resorted to these sleeping places (or practices) even once the Buddhist community started to settle down in monastery(-like) complexes. For, despite monk-editors condemning asceticism (at times laudably, at other times silently), asceticism kept being practiced during (and after) the 'monasticization' period of the Buddhist community, by an albeit minor but nevertheless important fraction of *bhikkhus* (cf. below). To introduce this special type of open sleeping places, we turn to the beginning of the sixth chapter of the Cullavagga:

> At one time the Buddha, the Bhagavat was staying at Rājagaha in the Bamboo Grove at the squirrels' feeding place. Now at that time **lodgings [*senāsana*]** had not been permitted to monks by the Bhagavat. **So these monks stayed [*viharanti*] here and there: in a forest [*arañña*], at the root of a tree [*rukkhamūle*], on a hillside [*pabbata*], in a glen [*kandarā*], in a mountain cave [*giriguhā*], in a cemetery [*susāna*], in a forest glade [*vanapattha*], in the open air [*ajjhokāsa*], on a heap of straw [*palālapuñja*].**[104] Early in the mornings these went out from this and that place: from the forest ... [omission of repetition is according to Vinaya edition] from the heap of straw, pleasing when approaching and when receding, when looking before, when looking back, when bending back (their arms), when stretching them out, their eyes cast down and possessed of pleasant behaviour.
>
> Now at that time a (great) merchant [*seṭṭhi*] of Rājagaha went early one morning to a pleasure grove [*uyyāna*]. The (great) merchant of Rājagaha saw these monks going out from this and that place: from a forest ... from a heap of straw, and seeing them he made up his mind. **Then the (great) merchant of Rājagaha approached those monks; having approached, he spoke thus to those monks: "If I,**

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[104] Horner (BD V 204, fn. 1) notes that the same enumeration occurs at D I 71, M III 3, A II 210 and a shorter one at A I 241.

> revered sirs, were to have dwelling-places [*vihāra*] built, would you stay in my dwelling-places? [*me vihāresu*]"
>
> "Householder [*gahapati*], dwelling-places [*vihāra*] have not been allowed by the Bhagavat."
>
> "Well then, revered sirs, having inquired of the Bhagavat, tell me (what he says)."
>
> "Very well, householder," and these monks, having answered the (great) merchant of Rājagaha in assent, approached the Bhagavat; having approached the Bhagavat, having greeted him, they sat down at a respectful distance. As they were sitting down at a respectful distance, these monks spoke thus to the Bhagavat: "Bhante, the (great) merchant of Rājagaha is anxious to have dwelling-places built. What line of conduct should be followed by us, Bhagavat?" Then the Bhagavat on this occasion having given reasoned talk addressed the monks, saying:
>
> **"I allow, monks, five (kinds of) abodes [*lena*]: a dwelling-place [*vihāra*], a curved house [*aḍḍhayoga*], a long house [*pāsāda*], a mansion [*hammiya*], a cave [*guhā*]."** (CV VI 1.1-2, Vin II 146-7, trsl. partly following Horner BD V 204-5)

Despite being compound and (thus) ahistorical, this Vinaya passage is insightful for our current purpose. Listing various sleeping/resident places, it provides several examples of 'outdoorsy' places in the public sphere where *bhikkhus* could be encountered. The inconsistent use of semi-technical terms points to the passage's compound nature. The term '*senāsana*' in the first part of the introductory story is in the second part replaced by '*vihāra*' that, in turn, is replaced in the allowance-formulation by *lena.* This is in itself sufficient to establish the ahistorical nature of the incident narrated in the introductory story. Reinforcing its ahistorical tone, however, is its suspicious ideal portrayal of both the Buddhist *bhikkhus* and the *gahapati* desiring to build them *vihāras.* Following the allowance-formulation, we find the *gahapati* building no less than sixty *vihāras* in one day. Fuelling the *gahapati's* singular charity was his anxious desire for merit (*puñña*) and heaven (*sagga*).[105] Pondering whether having *vihāras* constructed for the Buddhist *saṅgha* will indeed secure him merit and heaven, he is reassured by the Buddha who thanks him with the following verses:

> "They ward off cold and heat and beasts of prey from there
> And creeping things and gnats and rains [*vuṭṭhi*] in the cold season [*sirisa*].
> When the dreaded hot wind arises, that is warded off.
> To meditate and obtain insight in a refuge and at ease
> The gift of a dwelling-place [*vihāradāna*] is praised by the Buddha as chief [gift] to an Order.

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[105] PED gives for '*sagga:*' "Sagga [Vedic svarga, svar+ga] heaven, the next world, popularly conceived as a place of happiness and long life (cp. the pop. etym. of "suṭṭhu -- aggattā sagga" PvA 9 [...])" PED 662, *sv.*

> Therefore a wise man [*paṇḍita*], looking to his own weal [*attha*],
> Should have charming dwelling-places built so that those who have heard much
> can stay therein.
> To these food and drink, raiment and lodgings [*vathhasenāsana*]
> He should give, to the upright, with the mind purified.
> (Then) these teach him *dhamma* dispelling every ill;
> He, knowing that *dhamma,* here attains *nibbāna,* cankerless [*anāsava*]."
> (CV VI 1.1-2, Vin II 147-8, trsl. partly following Horner BD V 205-6)

The Buddha's verses of thanks unambiguously promote the comforts of *vihāras*.[106] Offering protection from wild animals, from the discomfort of buzzing and stinging insects; offering shelter from the rain, the cold, or simply the fickleness of the weather, *vihāras* are presented as positive supports of a *bhikkhu's* meditational practices and general religious progress. That a *bhikkhu* was able to book results on his path to liberation thanks to *vihāras,* is further presented as being conducive to also the religious progress of the 'wise man' (*paṇḍita*) who donated the *vihāras.* These verses of thanks are interesting. They seem to provide *bhikkhus* with arguments to talk wealthy householders (*gahapati*) into donating *vihāras.* They also clearly echo the stance of *monastic bhikkhus* on the advantages of residing in concrete material dwelling places. In fact, this whole passage serves to introduce a technical section on constructing and furnishing *vihāras.* The section's many stipulations and allowances point to sophisticated and comfortable dwelling places, reflecting a stage in the early history of the Buddhist *saṅgha* during which *bhikkhus* (or at least "the monastic camp" of the early Buddhist *saṅgha*) started or wanted to start to settle down in monastery-like complexes (cf. further).

The sections of the introductory story thus far discussed, appear to suggest that once dwelling places had been permitted and once the types of abodes had been regulated, Buddhist *bhikkhus* abandoned their practice of staying in outdoor places. From that moment onwards, according to our introductory story, Buddhist *bhikkhus* would have stopped staying in open places such as forests, roots of trees, cemeteries or simply 'the open air.' This suggestion is untenable and this for several reasons.

Not only is the transition from any stage to another gradual (this is to a higher or lesser degree according to whether the transition is the result of a natural process or of an artificial stimulation), but also the customs of a former stage remain practiced – for a longer or a shorter period of time - alongside the 'new' practices. This was certainly also the case for outdoorsy sleeping/resident practices. Once the early Buddhist *saṅgha*

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[106] On the varying reference field of the term *vihāra,* see the following section.

(gradually) started to settle itself in monastery-like complexes, the practice of staying in outdoor places was not at once abandoned. In fact, it is safe to state that a fraction of the Buddhist *bhikkhu* community kept using some of the outdoor lodgings listed at the beginning of the introductory story, even after sophisticated, well-equipped monastery-complexes had become an established feature of the Buddhist *bhikkhu* community. The underlying reason is that staying at some of these outdoor lodgings was considered to be an ascetic practice. Staying in a 'forest', at 'the root of a tree', in a 'cemetery', and in the 'open air' is viewed in several places within Buddhist texts to be an ascetic practice. Whether staying at any of these places was viewed as an ascetic practice from the beginning of the Buddhist community, or whether it only became thus considered once staying within monastery-complexes had become the established norm, one cannot know. In any case, the practices' occurrence in several enumerations of ascetic practices, indicates their characterization as ascetic. This enables us to state that the practice of staying at any of these outdoor lodgings was still being performed by some Buddhist *bhikkhus* even when monastery-complexes became prominent for, as Freiberger noted, 'despite "monasticization," severe asceticism continued to exist throughout Buddhist history."[107] In addition to being mentioned in various lists of ascetic practices, such as the one of the *dhutaṅgas*,[108] the practice of staying in a 'forest', at 'the root of a tree', in a 'cemetery', and in the 'open air' is also at several places incidentally being referred to in the Pāli Vinaya.[109] When considering these facts

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[107] Freiberger 2006, *op. cit.*: 248.

[108] The *dhutaṅga* list of Devadatta occurs in two separate Pāli Vinaya passages: Vin III 171-4 (BD I 296-303) & Vin II 184-206 (BD V 259-90). A list of nine *dhutaṅga* practices occurs at *Sappurisa Sutta* of the MN. See also the *Mahāsakuludāyi Sutta* of the MN with a list of some ascetic practices, including the practices of sleeping at the root of a tree etc. See also the four *nissayas* at Vin I 58. For a discussion of these ascetic practices, see Freiberger 2006. On *dhutaṅgas* see Dantinne 1991.

[109] For an incidental reference to *bhikkhus* staying in the 'open air' (*ajjhokāsa*) see e.g. Vin IV 39 (BD II 238; introductory story to *pācittiya* XIV).

An incidental reference to staying at the foot of a tree (*rukkhamūla*) is encountered in the casuistry section to *pācittiya* XV (Vin IV 41-42; BD II 243 - 246) stipulating the removal of a sleeping-mat (*seyyā*) by *bhikkhus* before they leave a *vihāra*. The casuistry informs us that a *bhikkhu* commits (only) an offence of wrong-doing if he does not remove his *seyyā* if it was spread, among other places, 'at the foot of a tree.' See also the casuistry section to *pācittiya* XVII (Vin IV 45; BD II 252) listing various dwelling possibilities of Buddhist *bhikkhus,* among which 'the open air' (*ajjhokāsa*) and 'foot of a tree'(*rukkhamūla*).

Vin IV 308 (BD III 343; introductory story to *pācittiya* LII) incidentally refers to a Buddhist *bhikkhu* (the venerable Kappitaka who was the venerable Upāli's preceptor) living in a cemetery (*susāne viharati*); Vin IV 89 (BD II 344-345) refers to a Buddhist *bhikkhu* who while living in a cemetery (*susāne viharati*), refused to accept alms and instead fed himself on the food that people had deposited in a cemetery or at the foot of a tree for the departed masters (*ayyovosāṭitakāni*). This incident is used to introduce *pācittiya* XL stating that 'whatever monk should convey to his mouth nutriment not given,' commits an offence of expiation.

together with the fact that neither these places nor the practice of staying at any of these places were exclusively 'Buddhist,' I may conclude with stating that 'forests', 'roots of a trees', 'cemeteries', and 'open air' were sleeping/resident places that could bring a Buddhist *bhikkhu* directly into contact with an ascetic other.

Dwell and Meet

'Open' *vihāras*

Extending my argument that during the earliest stages of the Buddhist and Jain ascetic communities some of the mendicants' sleeping places and facilities were of 'open' nature, I would like to propose here that also some *vihāras* were of 'open' nature. Functioning as study, sleeping or (semi-)permanent resident facilities, certain *vihāras* were not necessarily or inherently exclusive, but could be open to various ascetics. These *vihāras* may, therefore, be viewed as also having been potential direct contact platforms.

The exact interpretation(s) of the term *vihāra* will be discussed below, for the moment it suffices to define *vihāra* as a demarcated social space within the Indian landscape that was generally understood to be for the benefit of wandering ascetics. As direct contact platform, a *vihāra*-ground was, I suggest, open to wanderers of differing affiliations and was thus not *per se* for the benefit of wanderers of one particular community only. I believe that the exclusivity of a *vihāra*-ground was not an initially given, but was something that developed over time. The development of the exclusivity

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That the practice of living in a forest was a well-known practice is seen for instance in the fact that a special denomination developed to refer to *bhikkhus* living in the forest: '*āraññaka bhikkhu.*' The practice must have been quite prominent for Vin I 92 even allows an *āraññaka bhikkhu* to live independently, something which is not allowed for other Buddhist *bhikkhus.* Some incidental references to Buddhist *bhikkhus* staying in *āraññaka senāsana* or 'jungle lodging' is found at Vin IV 181-184 (BD III 115-119; *pāṭidesaniya* IV) where Sakyan woman are said to set off for the *āraññaka senāsanas* in order to give alms-food to the *bhikkhus* residing there. Further, that the practice of living in a forest was performed by *bhikkhus* even when the Buddhist community started to settle down in monastery-like complexes, is seen at Cullavagga VIII. In this section that clearly reflects an evolved stage of monastic settlement, we find a passage stipulating "an observance (*vatta*) for monks who are forest dwellers (*āraññaka bhikkhu*) and which should be observed by monks who are forest dwellers," that contains several small instructions directed specifically to forest *bhikkhu* (CV VIII.6.1-3; Vin II 217, BD V 304-305). Several *bhikkhus* as actors of introductory stories are further presented as staying in the jungle, see e.g. the venerable Belaṭṭhasīsa who as actor of the introductory story to *pācittiya* XXXVIII is presented as 'staying in the jungle' ('*araññe viharati*') (Vin IV 86; BD II 338).

Regarding staying on a 'hillside', 'glen', 'mountain cave', 'forest glade' etc. the introductory story to *sanghadisesa* VI (Vin III 147, BD I 251) presents a certain *bhikkhu* as living in a thicket (*vanasaṇḍa*) on a slope on the Himalayas (*Himavantapassa*).

of a *vihāra*-ground undoubtedly went hand in hand with both a growing material complexity and sophistication of *vihāras* in general and, herewith correlated, a growing emphasis on a consciously articulated and negotiated distinctiveness of the different ascetic communities.

The introductory story to *pācittiya* XVII is instructive for imagining the presence of both 'Buddhist' and non-Buddhist *vihāras,* and by extension for imagining the presence of exclusive and non-exclusive *vihāras* in the Indian ascetic landscape. *Pācittiya* XVII forbids a *bhikkhu* to throw out a fellow *bhikkhu* from a *saṃghika vihāra* ('a *vihāra* belonging to the [Buddhist] *saṅgha*). Its introductory story tells us of a group of Buddhist *bhikkhus* who, looking for a place to spend the rains (*vassaṃ vasati*), decided to repair a large *vihāra* (*mahāvihāra*)[110] that was lying in the neighbourhood[111] of Anāthapiṇḍika's 'monastery' or '*ārāma'.* Some malicious Buddhist *bhikkhus* seeing them, concocted the plan to throw those *bhikkhus* out of the *mahāvihāra* once they finished repairing it and to use it for themselves. Whether or not this story is based on a historical incident is of no concern for our reading of the Pāli Vinaya. Regarding *vihāras,* however, we learn from this small introductory story that they could be situated in the neighbourhood of a 'monastery,' this is, outside the precincts of an *ārāma;* that they could be of a concrete material construction (some *vihāras* were solely open demarcated spaces, cf. below); and that they were at the disposal of wandering mendicants for spending the rains. This allows us to formulate the hypothesis that in the early Indian landscape there were *vihāras,* whether commissioned by lay-people or guilds, whether built or owned by a wandering individual himself, that were ready to be used by any group of wandering ascetics.[112]

In the introductory story to *pācittiya* XVII a group of *bhikkhus* looking for a place to spend the rains, just start repairing a *mahāvihāra* that, not unimportantly, is said to be situated in the neighbourhood of a 'Buddhist' *ārāma,* this is, the *mahāvihāra* is not situated within a Buddhist *ārāma* or within a demarcated space that is understood to be 'Buddhist'. Later in the story, when the malevolent *bhikkhus* try to throw them out, they asked whether the *vihāra* was one belonging to the Order (*saṃghika*). The Pāli Vinaya specifies a *vihāra* that is meant for the exclusive use of its *bhikkhus* with the term '*saṃghika'.* A *saṃghika vihāra* is a *vihāra* belonging to the *saṃgha* or '['Buddhist'] Order.'[113]

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[110] Vin IV 44-45 (BD II 250-253). The same introductory story is used to Cūḷavagga VI.11 (Vin II 166).

[111] Pāli: *paccantima* ('bordering, adjoining, next to').

[112] For an example of *vihāras* being commissioned by a *gahapati* see e.g. CV VI.1.2 (Vin II 146; BD V 204);

[113] '*saṃghika vihāra*' will be explained in the Padabhājaniya section as a *vihāra* that 'comes to be given to the Order, handed over to it.' (*saṃghiko nāma vihāro saṃghassa dinno hoti pariccatto*). See e.g. Vin IV 45 (BD II 251); Vin III 163 (BD I 281).

The very question of the malevolent *bhikkhus* whether or not the *vihāra* was one belonging to the Order reflects the possibility that it might not have been, which, in turn, reflects the possibility of the presence of non-exclusive *vihāras,* or of *vihāras* that though not belonging to the 'Buddhist' Order could be frequented by Buddhist *bhikkhus.* At this point, the paraphrasing of the introductory story to *pācittiya* XVII serves mainly for presenting the hypothesis of the (co-)existence of both exclusive and non-exclusive *vihāras* in the early history of the Buddhist *saṅgha*, it does not serve to press the argument already.

Reference Field '*vihāra*'

Throughout her six volumes counting *Book of the Discipline,* Isaline Horner consequently translated the term '*vihāra*' with 'dwelling place.' Scanning the various Pāli Vinaya contexts of the term, one soon notices, however, it's very varied reference possibilities.

Demarcated 'open' space

As "dwelling place," *vihāra* can stand for any demarcated space where *bhikkhus* could spread their sleeping mat.'[114] As such, a *vihāra* does not *per se* need to stand for a material construction, it can stand for any place where one could spread his sleeping mat. '*Vihāra*' can be used interchangeably with outdoor *senāsanas* or lodgings discussed in the previous section on 'Open Sleeping Places.' The term *vihāra* can, just as *senāsana,* refer to places as the 'open air' (*ajjhokāsa*) and 'roots of trees' (*rukkhamūla*) that could be located either within or outside the parameters of an *ārāma* ground.[115]

Individual dwelling place

As a material construction, '*vihāra*' can stand for a *bhikkhu's* individual dwelling place, ranging from a simple self-built hut,[116] to a commissioned solid well-plastered and

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[114] To spread a sleeping place: *seyyaṃ santharati.* On *santharati* ('to spread') and its *pp. santhata* see Horner BD II xxi. For an example of such a use of '*vihāra*' see Vin IV 41 (*pācittiya* XV) (BD II 243) where the group of seventeen *bhikkhus* are introduced as having spread their sleeping place (*seyyaṃ santharitvā*) in a *vihāra* belonging to the Order (*saṃghika*). Vihāra is here simply understood as a place (most probably within an *ārāma*) where one could sleep. A *vihāra* here does not *per se* need to be a material construction, it could stand for any demarcated space where one could put his sleeping mat. The Padabhājaniya and casuistry section display an already much more sophisticated understanding of *vihāra.* Being part of the later strata of the Pāli Vinaya, they reflect later developments.

[115] I employ here *ārāma* in its restricted sense of a private park/monastery for ascetics, not in its general sense of a public park or garden for pastime.

[116] e.g. Vin III 41ff. (BD I 64 ff) for references to *bhikkhus* staying in various types (grass, mud, wood etc.) of huts (*kuṭika*). The huts are in this passage not explicitly equated with *vihāra,* but it is clear from the context, however, that they are used as individual dwelling places.

roofed dwelling,[117] to a very sophisticated cell with various rooms and pieces of furniture (cf. further). As an individual dwelling place, a *vihāra* could also be located either within or outside the parameters of an *ārāma* ground. Vin IV 47 (*pācittiya XIX*) gives an example of the term *vihāra* standing for a *bhikkhu's* individual dwelling place. It is here one commissioned by a benefactor[118] and it appears to be located outside the precincts of a Buddhist *ārāma.* For, regarding where such an individual dwelling place may be built*, pācittiya XIX* only instructs that it should be established where there is 'little or no grass' (*appaharita*). Another Pāli Vinaya passage (Vin III 155-157; *saṅghādisesasa* VII) with '*vihāra'* standing for a *bhikkhu's* individual dwelling place instructs how a site for such a dwelling (*vihāravatthu)* should be marked. It simply says that it should not involve any destruction. Both Vinaya passages do not mention '*ārāma'.* If every single *vihāra* would have been located within an *ārāma* ground and would thus have been part of a larger complex, one would expect to find instructions as to where it should be situated within the *ārāma* ground or where it should be positioned vis-à-vis other *vihāras* or facilities. In the absence of any indication that these individual *vihāras* were part of a larger complex, one may, therefore, suggest that (at least) some *vihāras* were 'randomly' located within the ascetic landscape. This is, some *vihāras* were not located within an *ārāma* or a demarcated 'Buddhist' ground.

Monastery-complex

At Vinaya IV 45-46 (BD II 254-5) the term *vihāra* stands for an open demarcated space with its grounds holding *upari-vehāsa-kuṭī-s* or 'lofty cells with an upper part.' When referring to a demarcated ground[119] holding various material constructions and facilities for the Buddhist *bhikkhu* such as *upari-vehāsa-kuṭī-s,* then the term *vihāra* is used interchangeably with the term *ārāma.* Both the term '*vihāra'* and '*ārāma'* can be used to refer to a monastery-complex itself.[120] Though permanent and fully equipped monastery-complexes only became an established feature of the Buddhist community during the Mauryan and Guptan empires (cf. above), the process of 'monasticization' had certainly already begun by the time the Pāli Vinaya was being redacted. Several sections of the Pāli Vinaya reflect a stage of monasticization where the Buddhist

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[117] e.g. Vin IV 47 (BD II 257).

[118] Benefactor as a *bhikkhu's* personal supporter is termed *upaṭṭhāka.* If an *upaṭṭhāka* commissions the construction of a *vihāra* for the *bhikkhu* he supports, then this *vihāra* is qualified as '*sassāmika'* , this is, as 'having a master.' Cf. Vin IV 47.

[119] A ground could either be demarcated by means of a 'fence', or, if not being fenced in (*parikkhitta*), it is understood to be demarcated by means of its agreed upon 'precincts' (*upacāra).*

[120] Cf. Cone's PD Vol I: 329 *ārāma,* sv.

community started to settle down in rather sophisticated and (semi-)permanent *vihāras* or monastery-complexes.

The growing material complexity and sophistication of Buddhist monasteries are well reflected in the following chapters of the Pāli Vinaya: among others Mahāvagga I.25, Cullavagga VI, and Cullavagga VIII. At Cullavagga VI[121] the term *vihāra* stands for the individual dwelling-places of *bhikkhus* within a monastery-complex, and at times it designates as *pars pro toto* the entire monastery-complex itself (in these instances being used synonymously with *ārāma*). In this passage we learn of the types of roofs, windows, doors, and door-locks of the individual *vihāras*; and of the furniture allowed in a *vihāra* (couches, chairs, mattresses, a spittoon etc.). We further learn of the various possibilities to fence in a monastery-complex by means of bricks, stones or wood; and of the presence of verandas, porches[122] and balustrades. We learn of the construction within a monastery-complex of assembly halls where *bhikkhus* could eat together (*upaṭṭhanasāla*),[123] of a special hall to keep the drinking water (*pāniyasāla*), and of a fire hall (*aggisāla*). This whole chapter of the Cullavagga throws much light on how monastery-complexes became sophisticated material structures with diverse facilities increasing the independence, self-sufficiency and separateness of the Buddhist monastic *saṅgha* from the outside world. The same holds true for Mahāvagga I.25[124] and Cullavagga VIII. To the various facilities of a monastery-complex just mentioned, Mahāvagga I.25 adds a privy (*vaccakuṭī*) and a steam-room (*jantāghara*).[125]

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[121] Vin II 146 ff. (BD V 204 ff.).

[122] The Pāli term for porch is *koṭṭhaka.* Rhys Davids and Hermann Oldenberg understand '*koṭṭhaka*' to be 'a room without a window' (Vin Texts III 109 fn. 1) which in the Pāli Vinaya can be understood as a room at the gate of a monastery-complex, or as a storeroom (for grains?). For *koṭṭhaka* as a storeroom within a lay-house, see e.g. Vin III 161 (BD I 277), for *koṭṭhaka* as a storeroom within a monastery-complex, see Vin III 162 (BD I 278). Mahāvagga VI.14.3 mentions an *udaka-koṭṭhaka* or 'water-vat' used for the sweating treatment (*sedakamma*) (BD IV 278-279; Vin I 205).

[123] Apart for offering a (comfortable) shelter from the weather to eat, the *upaṭṭhanasāla* could also be used as an assembly hall to give *dhamma* talk to both *bhikkhus* and lay followers alike (cf. Vin III 70; BD I 120-1). If needed the *upaṭṭhanasāla* could also serve as a sleeping-place for novices, *bhikkhus* and lay followers (Vin IV 15; BD II 194; Vin IV 42-43; BD II 243-244).

[124] MV I.25.6-25 'What is Due to a Preceptor' (Vin I 49 ff.; BD IV 65 ff.) incidentally reflects the increasing sophistication of a monastery-complex when outlining the tasks of a '*sadhivihārika*' or ' one who shares a *vihāra* [with his preceptor or *upajjhāya*].' One encounters a near identical enumeration of the various facilities and material possessions of a monastery-complex (that here needs to be cleaned by a *sadhivihārika*) with Cullavagga VI.

[125] Horner (BD I 62) translates *jantāghara* with 'bathroom'. Also Dutt (1996 [1924]: 183) understands *jantāghara* as a sort of common bath. 'Steam room' seems, however, a more apt translation. Though *jantāghara* has an uncertain etymology (see for various suggestions the PED 278 and Cone's *A Dictionary of Pāli* 204 *s.v.*) the textual context makes it clear that a *jantāghara* was a sort of steam room as one should smear his face and body with a clay mixture before entering and sit on a chair (*pīṭha*) inside (cf. Vin I 47). Cone's *A Dictionary of Pāli* gives 'a

Contact possibilities at *vihāras*

The reference field of the term *vihāra* in the Pāli Vinaya stretches thus from a simple place in the open where a *bhikkhu* could sleep (used interchangeably then with '*senāsana*'), to a hut, to an individual cell within an *ārāma*-ground, to a large sophisticated and well-organized monastery-complex. Regarding the latter, the fact that it holds within its delineated grounds various facilities of which many are, moreover, of concrete material nature, increases not only the independence and separateness of the Buddhist community from the outside world, but also its exclusivity. [126] With eating halls, toilets, and steam-rooms located within the precincts of a monastery-complex, the possibility for a Buddhist *bhikkhu* to come into direct contact with other ascetics when eating, bathing, or seeking a suitable place to go to the toilet decreases significantly.

Though such monastery-complexes thus both created and supported an exclusivity, they did not annihilate the possibility of direct contact altogether. Direct contact remained possible. It became, however much more regulated and controlled. The introductory story to *pācittiya* XLI provides a good example of such regulated direct contact at a 'Buddhist' monastery-complex: the distribution of the *saṃgha's* excess of food to 'those who eat scraps of food' (*vighāsāda*).

Pācittiya XLI forbids a *bhikkhu* to give with his own hands food to an *acelaka* or to a *paribbājaka* and *paribbājikā.* As we have seen, such precepts are also found in the Āyāraṅga. The presence of these precepts in both the Pāli Vinaya and the Āyāraṅga indicates that it must not have been unusual for ascetics of differing affiliation to exchange or to give (their) alms-food to one another.[127] This, in turn, reflects once again their very close socio-geographical proximity. Providing an example of regulated direct contact, the introductory story to *pācittiya* XLI sets in with the venerable Ānanda asking the Buddha what to do with the surplus of food:

> Now at that time there came to be abundant solid food for the Order. Then the venerable Ānanda told this matter to the Bhagavat. He said: "Well, Ānanda, give the cakes [*pūva*] to those who eat scraps of food [*vighāsāda*]."
> "Very well, Bhagavat," and the venerable Ānanda, having answered the Bhagavat, having made those who eat scraps of food sit down one after the other, giving a

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heated room; a room with a fire (normally used before bathing, not for bathing?)' and the Abhidhānappadīpikā (Abhp.), being the twelfth century Pāli dictionary (of synonyms) written by Moggallāna Thera of Ceylon, gives for *jantāghara* '*aggisāla*' or 'fire room' (PED 278). On 'bathhouses' in Indian (and Chinese) Buddhist monasteries, see Kieschnick 2013; Heirman & Torck 2012: 27-32.

[126] When the terms *vihāra* and *ārāma* stand for such an organized monastery-complex that both creates and supports an exclusivity, then their qualification with 'Buddhist' (though still anachronistic) may become appropriate.

[127] Āyāraṅga *sutta* II.1.1 § 10 prohibiting a Jain *bhikkhu* to give his alms-food to an *annauttia.* Cf. above p. 98.

cake to each, gave two cakes to a certain female wanderer [*paribbājikā*], thinking that they were one. Neighbouring female wanderers spoke thus to this female wanderer:

"This recluse [*samaṇa*] is your lover [*jāra*]."

"This recluse is not my lover; he gave two cakes thinking that they were one."

And a second time . . . [*pa*] A third time did the venerable Ānanda, giving a cake to each one, gave two cakes, thinking that they were one, to this female wanderer. Neighbouring female wanderers spoke thus to this female wanderer . . .

"This recluse is not my lover; he gave two cakes thinking that they were one."

Saying, "The lover is not a lover," they quarreled. (Vin IV 91; trsl. mostly following I.B. Horner BD II 347).

If this part of the introductory story would be a case of an introductory story that was developed *post* precept, then it was one spun around the term '*paribbājikā*' and one focused on developing the teasing story line of two wanderers being lovers (*jāra*). Be as it may, concerning direct contact opportunities one can infer from the story that the distribution of the *saṃgha's* excesses of food by Buddhist *bhikkhus* was for them another occasion, albeit a regulated one,[128] to come into direct contact with other ascetics.[129] The second part of the introductory corroborates this by narrating another such-like example of regulated direct contact. It also gives insights into an important issue arising from direct contact, this is, the issue of proximity.

Then a certain *ājīvika* went to a distribution of food [*parivesanā*]. A certain [Buddhist] monk, mixing cooked rice with a quantity of ghee, gave a large alms-meal [*mahanta piṇḍa*] to that *ājīvika*. Then that *ājīvika*, taking that alms-meal, went away. A certain [other] *ājīvika* said to that *ājīvika*:

"Where, your reverence, was an alms-meal obtained by you?"

"It was obtained, your reverence, at the distribution of food (made) by a shaven householder [*muṇḍagahapatika*][130] of that recluse Gotama."

Lay followers [*upāsaka*] heard this talk of those *ājīvikas*. Then these lay-followers approached the Bhagavat, and having approached, having greeted the Bhagavat, they sat down at a respectful distance. As they were sitting down at a respectful distance, these lay-followers spoke thus to the Bhagavat:

"Bhagavat, these *titthiyā-s* desire blame for the enlightened one, they desire blame for dhamma, they desire blame for the Order. It were well, Bhagavat, that the

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[128] Also note how the venerable Ānanda is said to have made 'those who eat scraps of food,' sit one after the other.

[129] The introductory story focusses on the venerable Ānanda being mistaken for a *paribbājikā's* lover, rendering the reference to the very act of distributing food (here 'cakes') 'incidental'.

[130] I.B. Horner (BD II 348, fn. 1.) justly understands the term *muṇḍagahapatika* to be a term of humiliation.

masters [*ayyā*] would not give to *titthiyā-s* with their (own) hand(s). (Vin IV 91; trsl. mostly following I.B. Horner BD II 347-348)

Apart from providing another case of Buddhist *bhikkhus* coming into regulated direct contact with other ascetics during a distribution of food, this part of the introductory story also problematizes the proximity between Buddhist *bhikkhus* and *titthiyas*. For, the problem with Buddhist *bhikkhus* giving food directly to other ascetics is mainly a problem of proximity. In fact, both this part of the introductory story advising Buddhist *bhikkhus* against distributing (the *saṅgha's* surplus of) food to *titthiyas,* and *pācittiya* XLI explicitly prohibiting it, reflect the desire to keep other ascetics *literally* at arm's length. Though the very structure of a monastery-complex partly grants this desire for distance (read also difference, cf. further), it clearly could not prevent direct contact altogether. Direct contact with his ascetic others remained a part of the Buddhist *bhikkhu's* reality, also when his residence and sleeping facilities became more and more exclusive. This is also seen in the casuistry section to *pācittiya* XLI. The fact that it stipulates that a *bhikkhu* commits no offence when 'he gives water [and thus not 'solid food or soft food' as mentioned in the precept] for cleansing the teeth' to a *titthiya,* or also 'if he gets someone to give, (but) does not (himself) give; if he gives depositing (it) near; if he gives ointment for external (use),'[131] shows that direct contact with his ascetic others was a part of the Buddhist *bhikkhu's* reality, also when the exclusivity of monastery-complexes started to ensure a certain separation and distance from the 'outside' world. In short, the rise of monastery-complexes did not annihilate direct contact opportunities, though they most probably did become less frequent, less accidental and more regulated.

This overview of the reference field of the term *vihāra* in the Pāli Vinaya may be concluded by remarking that the exclusivity typical of monastery-complexes should not be read into all the '*vihāras*' mentioned in the Pāli Vinaya. After all, there is not much exclusive about an 'open space,' or a place at a 'root of a tree,' or a 'dwelling place needing repair' being randomly present in the ascetic landscape. I write 'randomly' to stress the fact that certain *vihāras* used by Buddhist *bhikkhus* were, as we have seen, not situated within an *ārāma* or within a demarcated 'Buddhist' space.

Leaning on this fact that not all *vihāras* were of a strong exclusive nature, whether this was because of a lack of concrete material boundaries, or because of their random location within the ascetic landscape, I suggest that ascetics of different affiliation could also encounter one another at certain *vihāras.* That this indeed occurred was seen confirmed at Āyāraṅga *sutta* II.1.1. §8. By means of counterargument we could infer from the respective *sutta* that Jain *bhikkhus* and *bhikkhuṇīs* at times stayed with other

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131 Vin IV 92; trsl. I.B. Horner BD II 349-350.

ascetics (*annautthia*) on a *vihārabhūmi.* It is further interesting to note that for Āyāraṅga *sutta* II.1.1. §8 the main issue is not particularly that Jain *bhikkhus* and *bhikkhuṇīs* are together with other ascetics on a *vihārabhūmi,* but that they are in the company of people who eat what - for them is - not allowed.[132] In other words, the main issue lies in the fact that Jain *bhikkhus* would be together with ascetics who do not adhere to the same dietary restrictions. The same concern underlies both the prohibition for Jain *bhikkhus* to wander together with an *annautthia;* and the prohibition for Jain *bhikkhus* to enter a householders' house together with an *annautthia* for alms food. To prohibit Jain *bhikkhus* from mingling with other ascetics on the ground that they eat what is not allowed, shows the importance of food as a source of identity. This is not surprising when considering the limited resources ascetics had to differentiate themselves from one another. Alms-donating householders will not discern subtle doctrinal differences between various ascetics, unless these differences are visually translated and, hence, noticeable to the naked eye. The food restrictions or special dietary of an ascetic constitute together with his begging-attributes and his ascetic garb one of the rare locales for identity. The following section concentrating more deeply on the role of householders in bringing about direct and indirect contact opportunities, will pause on such-like (unintentional) consequences of (in)direct contact on the identity negotiation of ascetic communities.

Householders

Though Buddhologists readily acknowledge the important role of householders in the development of the early Buddhist monastic community, they often fail to note the complexity and diversity of this role. Their role went beyond their, I do not deny paramount, input of 'financial and material support.' To begin, drawing on the vocabulary of social network theory, we may consider householders as having been important and dynamic information 'hubs.'[133] In spreading the knowledge of real or imagined ascetic practices, values and doctrines, householders played a most central role. Their great social mobility and their –for some, intense - involvement in the ins

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[132] The *sutta* expresses it thus: '*parihārio aparihārieṇa saddhiṃ*' translated by Jacobi as 'a monk who avoids all forbidden food [being] together with one who does not.' AS 50: II.1.1 §7 Jacobi SBE 22: 90. Ratnachandraji's AMg. dictionary technically defines an '*aparihāriya*' as "a Sādhu not abstaining from Mūla Guṇa and Uttara Guṇa; one of the five sorts of tainted Sādhus e.g. Pāsattha, Avasanna, etc.", cp. R.AMg. (*s.v.* 304).

[133] Within social network theory 'hubs' are individuals who connect (groups of) individuals with socially different (groups of) individuals via their many 'strong ties' (close friends and family) and 'weak ties' (acquaintances). On social network theory see e.g. Granovetter 1983: "The Strength of Weak Ties: A Network Theory Revisited."

and outs of the (daily) life of ascetics, effected a diffusion of knowledge of ascetic life to members of both the householder community and ascetic community. Further, standing (more) easily in dialogue with the various members of society, householders were vital in constructing and spreading normative ideas of what ascetic life should be. In other words, householders too, just as ascetics, actively shaped the continuously changing, negotiated and contested *samaṇa* ideal. Their normative notions of ascetic life often came into conflict with the factual practices of Buddhist *bhikkhus.* This resulted not infrequently in the implementation of new regulations. Their dispraise of a particular behaviour of a Buddhist *bhikkhu* is brought forward as the catalyst of many Pāli Vinaya precepts. 'Householders' often take up the subject position of the stock phrase '*manussā ujjhāyanti khīyanti vipācenti'* ('people were irritated, angry [and] speaking dispraisingly'). This stock phrase serves in introductory stories to mark the earlier mentioned action of a particular (group of) *bhikkhu(s)* as improper and is invariably followed by a reprimand of the Buddha and his reasons to promulgate an appropriate precept. It may be noted that I do not consider all precepts of the Pāli Vinaya that are preceded by this stock phrase with 'householders' in its subject position, to have factually been the result of 'complaining householders.' For, as is apparent by now, I am not in favour of a linear reading and interpretation of the Pāli Vinaya. I take, however, the very fact that householders *could* take up the subject position of this stock phrase, to indicate that the Buddhist monastic community made conscious efforts to be in good terms with the householder community. If some of its practices, or lack of practices, came into conflict with the normative expectations of householders, it oftentimes would have tried to accommodate itself to meet these expectations. It may be noted that certain householders who financially and materially supported the ascetic community, might even have felt entitled to have a say in the organisation of the Buddhist *bhikkhu's* ascetic life.

Finally, in addition to affect the manner how the early Buddhist community organized its ascetic life, householders also played a dynamic role in the early 'Buddhist' identity negotiation. Concluding this section on *contact,* I specifically focus on how householders influenced the early Buddhist identity negation through the many direct and indirect contact opportunities they created for householders, Buddhist ascetics and the latters' ascetic others.

Direct Contact via the Mediating Role of Householders

During the earliest stages of the development of the Buddhist ascetic community, the negotiation of sameness with other *samaṇas* was if not more, then at least as important as the negotiation of difference. This, I suggest, is an immediate result of the many direct contact opportunities brought about by the mediating role of the donating householder. Because of the facts that many householders donated alms-food to ascetics

irrespective of their specific affiliation, and that certain householders established and served at eating, resting and sleeping facilities open to *all* ascetics, direct contact with both his householder other and ascetic other was part of the early Buddhist *bhikkhu's* daily reality. As we have amply illustrated in the preceding discussion, a Buddhist *bhikkhu* could stand in direct dialogue with both his householder and ascetic other at a householder's residence when going for alms, or at *āvasathas,* or on auspicious days, or during festal events and meal times for recluses. Because he often stood in direct dialogue with both his householder and ascetic other, it was important for the Buddhist *bhikkhu* to be able to both negotiate sameness and difference. Let us begin with the importance for the early Buddhist *bhikkhu* to be able to claim the '*samaṇa*' denominator.

Sameness

Having, maintaining and developing similarity with its ascetic *samaṇa* others was something to be desired if the Buddhist community wanted to be recognized and socially acted upon as a *samaṇa* community. A householder donating alms to *all samaṇas might* when offering alms to a Buddhist *bhikkhu* be perceiving and relating to a *Buddhist bhikkhu,* but he *certainly* will be perceiving and relating to a *samaṇa.* This latter is seen confirmed, for instance, in the denomination householders are said to have used to refer to Buddhist *bhikkhus.* In Pāli texts, householders (in fact, all 'outsiders' or all who are simply not a Buddhist *bhikkhu*) consequently refer to Buddhist *bhikkhus* with the terms '*samaṇā Sakyaputtiyā*' or '*samaṇas* who are sons (*puttiya*) of the Sakya.' In direct contact, Buddhist *bhikkhus* had to be able to embody the *samaṇa* ideal. Negotiating their title to the *samaṇa* denominator must, therefore, have played an important, dynamic role in the early Buddhist identity negotiation. This aspiration of the early Buddhist *bhikkhu* community to belong to the wider *samaṇa* 'community' to be embodying the *samaṇa* ideal, is best reflected with the stock phrase with which the Buddha reprimands a reprehensible deed of his disciples: 'It is not fit, foolish man, it is not becoming, it is not proper, it is unworthy of a recluse (*assāmaṇakaṃ*), it is not lawful, it ought not to be done.'[134] However, if among other *samaṇas* Buddhist *bhikkhus* wanted to be recognized as constituting a separate group, they also had to negotiate difference. And for this too, direct contact occasions acted as a dynamic force.

Difference

Concerning the negotiation of difference, direct contact can be considered as having been especially conducive to the introduction of *visible* distinction marks. Doctrinal differences, however important they may have been, were not *per se* sufficient to

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[134] This is part of the larger stock expression in which Buddhist *bhikkhu*(s) are being reprimanded for their deeds by the Buddha. For the full rebuke see e.g. Vin III 43 (trsl. I.B. Horner BD I 36).

support a distinctive identity. In direct contact difference had to be perceptible to the naked eye of both the householder other and ascetic other. *Sutta* 32 of lecture XXIII of the Jain *Uttarajjhaṇa Sutta* explicitly states how 'the various outward marks' of ascetics have a 'distinguishing character' and were 'introduced in order that people might recognise them as such.'[135] If not translated into visible marks or distinctive ascetic practices such as special dietary restrictions, doctrinal differences could by themselves not serve to draw observable boundaries between one and another *samaṇa.* This explains why various Pāli Vinaya narratives and precepts tackle the importance of uniformizing the Buddhist robe and bowl. As we will see in the following section 'Processes of othering,' various sections of the Pāli Vinaya dealing with the robe and bowl of the Buddhist *bhikkhu* may be understood against this background of direct contact and boundary negotiation.

When considering the fact that in direct contact the distinction between a Buddhist *bhikkhu* and another *samaṇa* could neither be provided by the *bhikkhu's* 'place of being' (e.g. a householder's residence) nor by his 'activity' (e.g. begging for alms), one cannot sufficiently underscore the importance of visible distinguishing marks. At the same time, this makes us appreciate the role monastery-complexes played in providing and supporting a distinctive Buddhist identity. Monastery-complexes could, by means of their material structure, provide a separateness to Buddhist *bhikkhus* from their ascetic others. With the development of more sophisticated and exclusive monastery-complexes, difference became in addition to the outward marks also provided by the *bhikkhu's* place of being. Difference became, in part, structurally provided.

Indirect Contact via the Mediating Role of Householders

Buddhist *bhikkhus* acquired a knowledge of their so-called ascetic other not only through direct contact opportunities, but also *in*directly, via the mediating role of householders. As pointed out, the great(er) social mobility of householders made them true information 'hubs'. If a Buddhist *bhikkhu* did not come *directly* into contact with his ascetic others, he nevertheless could still stand in dialogue with them via the ideas, practices, and values 'brought in,' so to speak, by householders. The Pāli Vinaya contains many examples of occasions for householders to be *going to* 'Buddhist' *ārāmas* and *vihāras,* showing how Buddhist *bhikkhus* did not have to 'go out' to be interacting with householders. An important, yearly occasion was the *kaṭhina* ceremony,[136] during which lay-followers donated cloth to the *bhikkhu saṅgha.* Besides this regulated occasion,

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[135] Cf. Jacobi 2004 [1895], SBE 45: 123. On the function and symbolism of the 'outward sign' of the Jain ascetic stick, see Balbir 2000b.

[136] On the *kaṭhina* rite see, a.o. Holt 1999 (1981, 1995²): 134 ff. and Bechert 1968.

there were also multiple less official occasions for householders to go to the dwelling places of Buddhist *bhikkhus.* So we find householders going to the dwelling places of Buddhist *bhikkhus* to offer alms-food;[137] we regularly find them to be simply 'touring the dwelling places [of Buddhist *bhikkhus* or *bhikkhunīs*]'[138] or to be going to a Buddhist *ārāma* to listen to *dhamma* talk. At Vinaya IV 15 (BD II 194) lay-followers are even presented to be staying the night inside a Buddhist *ārāma's* assembly hall (*upaṭṭhanasāla*) together with novices (*navaka bhikkhu*) after having listened to *dhamma* talk.[139] Other occasions for householders and Buddhist *bhikkhus* to be in direct contact with one another on Buddhist premises, or better premises-to be, were created by devoted householders who donated or commissioned the building of a *vihāra* to either an individual *bhikkhu*, or to a local *bhikkhu*-or *bhikkhuṇi saṅgha.*[140] It should be noted that on all these contact occasions, Buddhist *bhikkhus* did not just interact with their householder other; they interacted with the householder's pre-conceived ideas and normative expectations of what *ascetic* life should entail. Ideas and expectations of ascetic life that the householder formulated, consciously or unconsciously, during previous encounters with Buddhist *bhikkhus,* other *samaṇas* and *brāhmaṇas*, and in conversations with his householder confrères. Peculiar of interaction (whether it is direct or indirect, real or imagined) is its reflexive aspect. Both parties standing in interaction or dialogue with one another are bound - to a higher or lesser degree - to reflect, re-consider and, if found necessary, re-adjust their own practices and ideas on both oneself and the other.

The Pāli Vinaya mentions a few public meeting places and occasions that are helpful in conceiving the manner how normative ideas on Buddhist ascetic life came about and how these, in a second instance, coloured and shaped the perception of householders of how Buddhist *bhikkhus* (should) organize their ascetic life. Vinaya III 213-214 (*nissaggiya* VIII; BD II 50-51) gives the insightful example of a village assembly hall or *sabhā* where householders, and sometimes ascetics too,[141] would converse with one another. On such occasions householders would, among other things, when talking about their experiences with ascetics, refine their knowledge and expectations of the ascetic

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[137] See e.g. Vin IV 181 (BD III 115) and Vin IV 182 (BD III 116). Cf. fn. 75.

[138] See e.g. Vin IV 169 (*pācittiya* LXXXVIII; BD III 92).

[139] Cf. fn. 123.

[140] This could result in intense contact. See e.g. Vin III 156 (BD III 156) where a householders who had a *vihāra* built for the *bhikkhuni saṅgha* continuously went to the nunnery (*bhikkhunūpassaya*) to see how the works were progressing.

[141] Cf. Vin IV 164-165 (*pācittiya* LXXXV; BD III 82-84) where the group of six *bhikkhus* sat down in a village assembly hall (*sabhā*) and upset householders with their 'worldly talk' (*tiracchānakatha,* lit. 'animal talk'). Not expecting *bhikkhus* to be engaging in low, worldly affairs, the householders condemn them with the stock phrase '*seyyathāpi gihikāmabhogino'ti*' meaning 'just like householders enjoying pleasures of the senses.' On the significance of this stock phrase, see the following section 'Processes of othering.'

members of society.[142] Similarly, also 'meeting-days for townspeople' (*negamassa samaya*) were conducive to spreading the knowledge on both factual and ideal ascetic life among the members of the householder community. Vinaya III 219-221 (*nissaggiya* X; BD II 62-65) gives the example of how householders during a 'meeting-day for townspeople' came to hear of the insistent begging of one particular Buddhist *bhikkhu* for a robe, and as a consequence collectively dispraised the insatiable desires of Buddhist *bhikkhus*. Regardless whether this is based on a factual incident, this reference together with the ones to *sabhās* or village assembly halls are helpful to envisage how householders were important information hubs concerning the spreading of both factual and normative ideas of the early Buddhist ascetic life.

In conclusion, it may be said that both the direct and indirect contact opportunities between the early Buddhist *bhikkhu* and his ascetic others brought about via the mediating role of householders, lead to the dialectic identity negotiation of both sameness and difference. In the following section, 'Processes of othering', we will see how 'the' householder was also an important dialectic other of the early Buddhist *bhikkhu*. We will see how the householder was, just the ascetic other, also – to a higher or lesser degree – a 'proximate other' of the early Buddhist ascetic community. In a certain sense, a Buddhist *bhikkhu* was a *bhikkhu* insofar he was not a householder.

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[142] At Vin III 213-214 householders are becoming displeased with the excessive robe-begging of Buddhist *bhikkhus* while learning from each other at the village assembly hall or *sabhā* that they all individually gave robes to the same group of *bhikkhus* who told each one of these householders that Buddhist robes had been stolen. Regardless of the fact if this Vinaya passage is based on a historical event or not, it shows how public places such as a *sabhā* or a village assembly hall where householders would converse with one another, were conducive to spreading the knowledge on ascetic practices and in the formation of normative ideas of how ascetic life should be lead.

Processes of othering in the Pāli Vinaya

Focussing on the various direct and indirect contact opportunities between the early Buddhists and their ascetic others, the previous section showed well how the early Buddhist community evolved in intense dialogue with its wider ascetic environment. Seen in this light, it is only evident to consider the various ascetic others as having constituted a dynamic force in the early Buddhist community's development. It is in constant dialogue with its wider ascetic environment that the early Buddhist community negotiated an identity rhetoric and organised the ascetic life of its members. Regarding the latter, it is not difficult to understand how direct and indirect contact effected the formulation or establishment of various ascetic regulations and structures. Indeed, as we have seen in the section 'Scholarly Frameworks, Past and Present,' the many agreements between the ascetic regulations/vows between the early Buddhist, Jain and *brāhmaṇa* ascetic organizations, had led Hermann Jacobi to argue that both Buddhists and Jains extensively copied from the *brāhmaṇa* ascetic institution, which he regarded as having been the most authoritative model.[1]

Further, other nineteenth century scholars and (near) contemporaries of Hermann Jacobi had already pointed out that in addition to regulations/vows, the Buddhist and Jain ascetic communities shared similar life-stories of their teachers; epithets; an extraordinary chronology, and so on.[2] As we have seen, these similarities were during that time commonly drawn upon to erroneously argue for a schismatic origin of the Jain tradition. Today, however, these many similarities may serve to illustrate how the development of any organization needs to be understood as a development in *dialogue.* With respect to the early Buddhist community, its shared features with the Jain and other contemporaneous ascetic communities may, therefore, be interpreted as either pointing to a deep-rooted and unquestioned general outlook on how ascetic life should

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[1] Cf. p. 17 ff.

[2] Cf. Scholarly Frameworks, Past and Present, p. 18.

be led, or, on the other hand, as pointing to consciously articulated similarities in order to ensure a social recognition of its organisation. In either case, similarities are illustrative of this basic but important fact that the early Buddhist community evolved in dialogue.

The aim of this section is to further bring out this dialogic aspect of the development of the early Buddhist community by examining in the Pāli Vinaya processes of othering brought about by the various early Buddhist ascetic others. In the discussion on contact opportunities, I have repeatedly pointed out how contact demanded the early Buddhist community to negotiate both 'sameness and difference.' Othering, as it will here be understood, is this on-going dynamic process of placing sameness and difference while negotiating one's identity. Such a process of othering underlies both the individual search of identity, as the articulation of the collective identity of a community. The very notion of an individual or collective self depends on the ability to relate, in terms of sameness and difference, to the various subjects of one's environment.

Remembering the Pāli Vinaya's normative nature and its stress on (creating 'the' Buddhist) tradition, we readily understand that the text will not transparently reproduce the early Buddhist community's processes of othering. Subscribing to William Green's view that the terminology a society develops to refer to its so-called others are "primarily clues to its self-understanding,"[3] I examine the processes of othering by means of a critical discussion of the fact that the Pāli Vinaya holds several terms for the early Buddhists' ascetic others. Drawing on the theory of "proximate other" of Jonathan Smith, I make explicit how the various ascetic others, whether real or imagined, had an important reflexive and dynamic impact on the early Buddhist ascetic community. This will be dealt with in part I. In part II I examine the process of othering by means of a close reading and analysis of a selected group of Pāli Vinaya passages with explicit references to supposed practices of the early Buddhists' ascetic others. In this part, I will also briefly pause on the dialectic role of 'the' householder, and show how also the householder effected processes of othering. In the final part, part III, special attention is given to one particular denomination for the early Buddhists' ascetic other, namely 'acela(ka)' or 'one without cloth.' Pointing out the reflexive aspect of this metonymical denomination, I show how the term *acela(ka),* used in the Pāli Vinaya to refer to a certain group of ascetic others, reflects how Buddhist *bhikkhus* valued and stressed the importance of their practice of wearing a 'cloth' (*cela*) in direct relation to the practice of their ascetic others of being '*acela*' or 'without cloth.'

In the course of my analysis, I will make explicit two aspects of the processes of othering of the early Buddhist ascetic community. I show how through processes of othering

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[3] Cf. Green 1985: 49, see further p. 134.

Buddhist *bhikkhus,* or at the very least the monk-editors of the Pāli Vinaya, both negotiated a collective identity notion, and reflected on the significance of their own practices and values in direct relation to the ones of their ascetic others, whether real or imagined.

Part I: What's in a Name?

Labelling the Ascetic other

The terms the Pāli Vinaya uses to refer to the early Buddhist's real or imagined ascetic others can, I believe, give valuable insights into the processes of othering of the early Buddhist ascetic community. For denominations are never neutral. They are value carriers and establishers. Each denomination gives a unique insight into how the early Buddhist community perceived and related to its ascetic other in terms of sameness and difference.

When perusing the Pāli Vinaya a first plain but important observation that needs to be made concerns the fact that the Pāli Vinaya hosts a wide array of terms to refer to the early Buddhist's ascetic others. This, in itself, is already reflective of the dynamic and dialectic force ascetic others exerted on the Buddhist ascetic *saṅgha*. For analytical purposes, the various terms may be grouped into three categories: one-to-one denominations; generic denominations; and metonymical denominations. Before starting to discuss these three categories of denominations, it should be noted that in appendix to this chapter ('Labelling the Ascetic other') a discussion is given of the various denominations' reference field and occurrences in the Pāli Vinaya.

By one-to-one denominations I understand terms having an explicit correspondence with an individual or a group of individuals belonging to the historical ascetic landscape of the early Indian Buddhist community. Belonging to this group are the terms *nigaṇṭha, nigaṇṭhasāvaka, Nātaputta Nigaṇṭha, ājīvika, jaṭila* and perhaps also *paribbājaka.*[4] As it will be made explicit in the discussion of these denominations in the appendix 'Labelling the Ascetic other,'[5] the presence of such one-to-one denominations in the Pāli Vinaya show that early Buddhists knew how members of other contemporary ascetic communities

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[4] *nigaṇṭha* (Skt. *nirgrantha*) 'without bonds,' i.e. a Jain ascetic*; nigaṇṭhasāvaka* (Skt. *nirgranthaśrāvaka*) 'a lay-disciple of the Jain fold;' *Nātaputta Nigaṇṭha* 'Mahāvīra;' *jaṭila* 'matted hair ascetic;' *paribbājaka* (Skt. *parivrājaka*) 'a *paribbājaka* wanderer.' Cf. Appendix 'Labelling the Ascetic other,' p. 139ff.

[5] Cf. p. 139 ff.

denominated themselves, or at least, if the terms in question were not (the sole ones which were) applied internally, how they were commonly referred to by others (cf. Appendix 'Labelling the Ascetic other,' p. 139 ff.). Therefore these terms could have sufficed to refer to their contemporary ascetic others. Yet, despite the presence and knowledge of these denominations that, it should be stressed, had an unambiguous one-to-one correspondence, they adopted a large vocabulary for their ascetic others with far more ambiguous terms.

The group of generic denominations holds terms referring to individuals or communities supposedly belonging to the historical ascetic landscape of the early Buddhist community, but whose ascetic affiliation is uncertain. In generic denominations the specific affiliation of the ascetic cannot be deduced from the denomination itself. Terms belonging to this group are the compound *samaṇa-brāhmaṇa;* and the terms *samaṇa; brāhmaṇa; paribbājaka; aññatitthiya; aññatitthiya paribbājaka; titthiya; titthiyasāvaka; titthiyapakkanta; sabbapāsaṇḍika;* and *samaṇakuttaka.*[6]

Standing alone in the third category is the metonymical denomination *'acela(ka).'* Though also having an ambiguous reference field, *acela(ka)* needs to be set apart from the group of generic denominations for its explicit reflexive element. As will be explained, in metonymical denominations the other is being referred to in direct relation to the self. This reflexive aspect typical of metonymical denominations makes the term *'acela(ka)'* particularly suited for our present study of the processes of othering of the early Buddhist ascetic community. It will therefore be analysed in detail in Part III.

Of all the Pāli Vinaya terms referring to ascetic others, the generic denominations are the ones reverted to most frequently, and then especially *'titthiya.'* When including its occurrence in the compounds *titthiyasāvaka* and *titthiyapakkanta,*[7] the term *titthiya* appears over seventy times in the Pāli Vinaya, spread over approximately forty different narratives (cf. Appendix 'Labelling of the Ascetic other'). Among these various narratives are references to supposed practices of *titthiyas* that serve as negative reference points in the development of the early Buddhist community's identity

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[6] *samaṇa* (Skt. *śramaṇa*) 'recluse'; *paribbājaka* as a generic denomination can refer to any ascetic of any community; *aññatitthiya* (Skt. *anyatīrtika*) '(an adherent of) a different ascetic community'; *aññatitthiya paribbājaka* 'a wandering ascetic having a different ascetic community/doctrine'; *titthiya* (Skt. *tīrthika*) '(an adherent of a) different ascetic community; *titthiyasāvaka* (Skt. *tīrthikaśrāvaka*) 'a lay-disciple of a different ascetic community'; *titthiyapakkanta* 'one gone over to a different ascetic community; *sabbapāsaṇḍika* 'all heretics'; *samaṇakuttaka* 'a sham recluse'. Cf. Appendix 'Labelling the Ascetic other,' p. 139 ff. A philological discussion of the terms *titthiya* and *aññatitthiya* will be given at Section IV 'From 'Ascetic' to 'Ascetic other.'

For an examination of the reference field of the term *paribbājaka* in the Pāli canon, see Freiberger (1997).

[7] For the meaning of these terms, see fn. 6.

rhetoric. It may already be noted that our selected group of Pāli Vinaya passages for examining the early Buddhist community's processes of othering will contain this type of negative *titthiya* references.

With the Pāli Vinaya's unfailing stress and creation of 'the' Buddhist tradition, it is not surprising to note that the generic denominations are the ones most resorted to. Generic denominations can refer to the Buddhist's ascetic others without accrediting the positive influence they had on the development of the Buddhist ascetic *saṅgha.* One-to-one denominations if used too abundantly do. The very presence in the Pāli Vinaya of this wide array of terms referring to ascetic others, shows how they played a dynamic role in the development of an early Buddhist identity rhetoric. This especially becomes clear when ascetic contemporaries to the early Indian Buddhists are understood to be the latter's 'proximate other'.

The Dynamic Concept of 'proximate other'

The dynamic concept of 'proximate other' has been developed by theorist and historian of religion Jonathan Z. Smith in his essays entitled "Differential Equations: On Constructing the Other" and "What a Difference a Difference can make."[8] The core idea behind the concept of proximate other is that, unlike the ideologically (*and* - in our case- geographically)[9] remote other (as, for instance, the Native American Navajo is to the Indian Jain), the proximate other demands, and effects, a process of othering. The proximate other invites a discourse of difference wherein a rhetoric of self-definition and reflection can be developed. Unlike the remote other or absolute Other, the presence of a proximate other creates the basic need for the establishment, or at least the re-consideration, of boundaries where differences and similarities can be

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[8] "Differential Equations: On Constructing the "Other" *in* Smith, Jonathan [1992] 2004. *Relating Religion. Essays in the Study of Religion.* Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, pp. 230-250. This essay was first delivered in 1992 as a University Lecture in Religion at the Arizona State University.
"What a Difference a Difference Makes," *in* Smith, Jonathan [1985] 2004, *Relating Religion. Essays in the Study of Religion.* Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, pp. 251-301. This essay was initially developed as a keynote lecture for the 1984 conference at Brown University, entitled *"To see ourselves as others see us" Christian, Jews, "Others" in Late Antiquity.* An identically titled volume based on the conference was edited by Jacob Neusner and Ernest S. Frerichs in 1985.
[9] As the notion of distance is being drastically reconceived in our digitized world, geographical proximity – in literal terms of kilometers – is not indispensable for initiating processes of othering in present day societies. However, for the formative stages of the Buddhist community, during which time period verbal word-of-mouth communication was the sole means of ideas to spread - the importance of geographical proximity is obvious. Regarding the concept of 'remote other,' Jonathan Smith gives as example the Kwakiutl as Christians' remote other. Cf. Smith ([1992] 2004: 276).

negotiated. The dialectical force of the proximate other lies in the fact that when a community is defining its proximate other it is simultaneously defining itself. Dealing with and defining one's proximate other entails "complex reciprocal relationships" and results in a double definition of 'them' and 'us' with this 'us' being defined vis-à-vis 'them' and 'them' vis-à-vis 'us'.[10] It is in the presence of one's proximate other that a 'theory of the other' becomes compelling. In the words of Jonathan Smith:

> [R]ather than the remote 'other' being perceived as problematic and/or dangerous, it is the proximate 'other,' the near neighbor, who is most troublesome. That is to say, while difference or 'otherness' may be perceived as being either LIKE-US or NOT-LIKE-US, it becomes most problematic when it is TOO-MUCH-LIKE-US or when it claims to BE-US. It is here that the real urgency of theories of the 'other' emerges, called forth not so much by a requirement to place difference, but rather by an effort to situate ourselves. This, then, is not a matter of the 'far' but preeminently of the 'near'. The deepest intellectual issues are not based upon perceptions of alterity, but, rather, of similarity, at times, even of identity.[11]

To this he further shrewdly adds:

> A "theory of the other" is but another way of phrasing a "theory of the self."[12]

Jonathan Smith formulated his reflections on 'proximate other' while investigating "the history of the western imagination of the 'other.'" And though his reflections are therefore mainly framed by a historical perspective on the dynamics of cultural encounters, it is nevertheless highly relevant to question to what extent his dynamic, dialectical concept of 'proximate other' is applicable to the manner in which early Buddhists conceptualized and dealt with their contemporary ascetic others, for, as Jonathan Smith remarks:

> [T]he issue of problematic similarity or identity seems to be particularly prevalent in religious discourse and imagination.[13]

Indeed, the group of *titthiya* narratives that we selected for examining the process of othering in the Pāli Vinaya reflects an anxious concern of the early Buddhists to be

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[10] This phrasing of "us" and "them" is inspired by the writings of Green and Smith on the specific issue of 'double metonymy'. Cf. Green (1985: 50) and Smith ([1992] 2004: 232). The issue of double metonymy is addressed in part III.

[11] Smith ([1992] 2004: 245).

[12] Smith ([1985] 2004: 275).

[13] Smith ([1985] 2004: 275).

distinctive from their contemporary ascetics. Before turning to a close reading of these Vinaya narratives, we need to make explicit that the 'proximity' of the various contemporary ascetic others is – naturally – gradated. As such there is not one but multiple proximate others. The presence of certain ascetic communities had dialectically a greater impact than others, or certain ideological claims and practices could dynamically challenge the Buddhist ideology and practices more fiercely than others. Considering the 'issue of problematic similarity or identity,' we can conclude that the 'closer' a (practice or ideology of a) community presents itself to the Buddhist community at a certain place and time, the 'further' the Buddhist community will need to differentiate itself from it.

Part II: Othering with one's proximate others

titthiyas as proximate others

The selected group of Pāli Vinaya passages contain references to supposed practices of *titthiyas* that explicitly serve as negative reference points for the formulation of several regulations. In other words, characteristic of our selected group of *titthiya* references is the fact that they serve to argue the importance to and for a Buddhist *bhikkhu* to not adopt a certain custom that would have supposedly been practiced by *titthiyas*. A recurrent narrative pattern in this context are Buddhist *bhikkhus* being rebuked for a particular action because it made them look like '*seyyathāpi titthiyā*' or 'just like adherents of a different ascetic community.' It may be noted that already the occurrence of this stock phrase '*seyyathāpi titthiyā*' in the Pāli Vinaya is, in itself, reflective of the early Indian Buddhist *saṅgha's* on-going preoccupation to be marking boundaries from its ascetic, proximate others. Before we turn to a detailed analysis of the process of othering by means of a selective group of such *titthiya* references, a brief overview of these references may be given.

Discussing suitable and unsuitable places for entering upon the rains (*vassaṃ upagacchati*), Mahāvagga III.12 declares a *cāṭī* (a large tank-type of vessel) to be unsuitable on the basis that Buddhist *bhikkhus* using a *cāṭī* had been rebuked by people for being '*seyyathāpi titthiyā.*'[14] For the same reason Cullavagga V.10 prohibits the use of a

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[14] Cf. Vin I 153 (BD IV 202, emphasis added): "*tena kho pana samayena bhikkhu cāṭiyā vassaṃ upagacchanti. manussā ujjhāyanti khīyanti vipācenti,* **seyyathāpi titthiyā 'ti.** *bhagavato etam atthaṃ ārocesuṃ. na bhikkhave cāṭiyā vassaṃ upagantabbaṃ. yo upagaccheyya, āpatti dukkaṭassā 'ti.*"

gourd and a *ghaṭikaṭāha*-vessel as alms-bowl.'[15] The motivation of '*seyyathāpi titthiyā*' is further also found in a secondary introductory story to *nissaggiya* XXII. While *nissaggiya* XXII prohibits Buddhist *bhikkhus* to ask for a bowl an exception is made for *bhikkhus* whose bowl is broken. According to the secondary introductory story, the reason for formulating the exception was caused by the fact that Buddhist *bhikkhus* were being rebuked by people for being '*seyyathāpi titthiyā*' because one of them, having a broken bowl, had gone for alms to be put into his hands (*hatthesu piṇḍāya carati*), an action which appeared to have been associative of '*titthiyas*.'[16] Similarly, at Mahāvagga I 70.1 Buddhist *bhikkhus* are rebuked for being '*seyyathāpi titthiyā*' for not using any begging bowl, and a little further, at Mahāvagga I 70.2 for not wearing any robe.

Other *titthiya* references serving as negative reference points occur in the eighth chapter of the Mahāvagga. Mahāvagga VIII.27 lists various types of garments that the monk-editors of the Pāli Vinaya perceived to be marking ascetics others, i.e. *titthiyas*. The garments are significantly termed *titthiya-dhaja* or an 'emblem of an ascetic other.' They consist of those made of *kusa*-grass, bark, wood-shavings, head-hair wool, animal wool, owl's wings, antelope hide and also occur, as we have seen, in the list of ascetic practices of the so-called *attantapa* mentioned in the Kandaraka Sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya.[17] According to the offences prescribed in this section of the Mahāvagga, a Buddhist *bhikkhu* commits a grave offence (*āpatti thullaccayassā*) if he wears such a garment since he should stay away from a *titthiya-dhaja*.

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[15] In Cone's *Dictionary of Pāli* (DP) '*ghaṭikaṭāha*' is defined as "a bowl that is a water-pot (or a turtle's shell)." DP II 78, *sv.* Cf. Vin II 114-5 (BD V 156, emphasis added): "*tena kho pana samayena bhikkhu tumbakaṭāhe piṇḍāya caranti. manussā ujjhāyanti khīyanti vipācenti, **seyyathāpi titthiyā** 'ti. bhagavato etam atthaṃ ārocesuṃ. na bhikkhave tumbakaṭāhe piṇḍāya caritabbaṃ. yo careyya, āpatti dukkaṭassā 'ti. tena kho pana samayena bhikkhu ghaṭikaṭāhe piṇḍāya caranti. manussā ujjhāyanti [khīyanti vipācenti, **seyyathāpi**] titthiyā 'ti. bhagavato etam atthaṃ ārocesuṃ. na bhikkhave ghaṭikaṭāhe piṇḍāya caritabbaṃ. yo careyya, āpatti dukkaṭassā 'ti.*"
It may be noted that a begging bowl made of bottle-gourd (*lâupâya*) is explicitly allowed in the Jain Āyāraṅga Sutta, next to those made of wood (*dâru*) and clay (*maṭṭiyâ*). Cf. AS II 102: 6.1 § 1.

[16] Cf. Vin III 245 (BD II 119, emphasis added): "*tena kho pana samayena aññatarassa bhikkhuno patto bhinno hoti. atha kho so bhikkhu bhagavatā paṭikkhittaṃ pattaṃ viññāpetun ti kukkaccāyanto na viññāpeti, hatthesu piṇḍāya carati. manussā [ujjhāyanti khīyanti] vipācenti: kathaṃ hi nāma samaṇā Sakyaputtiyā hatthesu piṇḍāya carissanti **seyyathāpi titthiyā** 'ti. assosuṃ kho te bhikkhu bhagavato etaṃ atthaṃ ārocesuṃ. atha kho bhagavā etasmiṃ nidāne etasmiṃ pakaraṇe dhammiṃ kathaṃ katvā bhikkhu āmantesi: anujānāmi bhikkhave naṭṭhapattassa vā bhinnapattassa vā pattaṃ viññāpetun ti.*"

[17] Cf. Vin I 305-306 (BD IV 436-437). Cf. p.67 ff. It may be noted that many of these types of garments (such as antelope hide) are listed under the insignia of the '*brahmacārin*' or student in the prescriptive Dharmasūtras (DS). See e.g. the DS of Āpastamba I.2.39-3.10; DS of Baudhāyana I.3.14. The DS of Baudhāyana and the DS of Vasiṣṭha also prescribes 'clothes of bark or skin' for the forest hermit (*vānaprastha; vaikhānasa*) (DS of B II.11.15; DS of V 9.1). The Vasiṣṭha also prescribes that the *parivrājaka* 'should wrap himself with a single piece of cloth, or cover his body with an antelope skin or with a garment of grass nibbled by cows.' cf. DS of Vasiṣṭha 10.9 (DS ed. & trsl. Patrick Olivelle 2000).

Finally, there are two more references to supposed practices of *titthiyas* that may be considered illustrative of the early Buddhist *bhikkhus'* process of othering. It consists of the negative references to the practice of silence (*mūgabbata*) and to the practice of nakedness (*naggiya*) of so-called *titthiyas*. Mahāvagga IV.1.11-12 (Vin I 159) and Mahāvagga VIII (Vin I 305) prohibit these two practices for Buddhist *bhikkhus* on the basis that a *titthiya-samādāna* ('observance of *titthiyas*') should not be observed.[18]

Having enumerated all negative references to supposed practices of *titthiyas*, I proceed now to a detailed analysis of the processes of othering reflected in such types of negative *titthiya* references. I begin with a discussion of Mahāvagga I 70.1-6.

Mahāvagga I 70.1-6 consists of six small narratives determining the offence committed for ordaining a candidate into the Buddhist *saṅgha* without having provided him first with what Isaline Blew Horner has termed the two "symbols of entry into the Order,"[19] these being the Buddhist robe (*cīvara*) and begging bowl (*patta*).[20] For instance, Mahāvagga I 70.2 determines a *dukkaṭa* offence for monks who ordain a candidate into the Buddhist *saṅgha* without having provided him first with a Buddhist robe. The accompanying introductory story tells how a Buddhist *bhikkhu* who is *acīvara* and who, in this case, goes for alms naked ('*naggā piṇḍāya caranti*')[21] is thought to be '*seyyathāpi titthiya*.' The concerning Vinaya passage reads as follows:

> *tena kho pana samayena bhikkhū acīvarakaṃ upasampādenti. naggā piṇḍāya caranti. manussā ujjhāyanti khīyanti vipācenti: seyyathāpi titthiyā 'ti. bhagavato etam atthaṃ ārocesuṃ. na bhikkhave acīvarako upasampādetabbo. yo upasampādeyya, āpatti dukkaṭassā 'ti.* (Vin I 90; MV I 70.2)

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[18] Cf. Vin I 159: "*na bhikkhave mūgabbataṃ titthiyasamādānaṃ samādiyitabbaṃ. yo samādiyeyya, āpatti dukkaṭassa.*" and Vin I 305: "*na bhikkhave naggiyaṃ titthiyasamādānaṃ samādiyitabbaṃ. yo samādiyeyya, āpatti thullaccayassā 'ti.*" See further p. 128 ff where this passage is discussed in detail.

[19] Cf. BD III 13, fn. 5.

[20] When considering the various ordination formulas (*kammavācā*, see e.g. Vin I 56; 57), we may deduce that the rule that a candidate should at the time of his ordination be 'complete as to bowl and robe' (*paripuṇṇ' assa pattacīvaraṃ*) was, relatively speaking, a late stipulation. For, the stock phrase '*paripuṇṇ' assa pattacīvaraṃ*' only appears in the youngest ordination formulas.
MV I 70.1 states that one should not ordain one who is *apattaka* ('without a bowl'); MV I 70.2 states that one should not ordain one who is *acīvaraka* ('without robe'); MV I 70.3 states that one should not ordain one who is *apattacīvaraka* ('without bowl and robe'); MV I 70.4 states that monks cannot ordain by means of lending a bowl; MV I 70.5 states that monks cannot ordain by means of lending a robe; MV I 70.6 states that monks cannot ordain by means of lending a bowl and robe. As all six narratives form one unit, I have chosen to discuss the process of othering by specifically focusing on MV I 70.2.

[21] As the term *cīvara*, often used short for *ticīvara*, stands for the three-piece Buddhist garb (*antaravāsaka* or inner robe; *uttarāsaṅga* or upper robe; and *saṅghāṭi* or outer cloak, cf. BD II 1, fn. 2; BD II 158) '*acīvaraka*' could either mean (1) 'one who is not in norm regarding the three-piece Buddhist garb [but still is wearing a or some robe]' or (2) 'one who does not have a robe at all [and who is thus naked]'.

Now at that time monks [each] ordained one who had no robe [*acīvarakaṃ*]. They walked naked for almsfood. People were irritated, angry [and] speaking dispraisingly: "just like an adherent of a different ascetic community." [*seyyathāpi titthiyā*]. They told this matter to the Bhagavat. He said:

"Monks, one without a robe [*acīvaraka*] should not be ordained. [For] whoever should ordain [such one], there is an offence of wrong-doing." (trsl. partly following I.B. Horner, BD IV 114-5)

The apparent difficulty here for allowing a Buddhist *bhikkhu* to be *acīvara* and, in our case, to be without any robe and thus naked, is that his distinctiveness from other ascetics risks to dissolve.[22] Nakedness appears thus to be for the Buddhist *saṅgha* a signifying characteristic of a community other than itself. A Buddhist *acīvaraka* certainly is an *acīvaraka* but only perhaps a Buddhist. In other words, the problem is that the Buddhist *acīvaraka* might, from the Buddhist's point of view, become too similar with or even identical to a *titthiya* (Skt. *tīrthika*). In an identical manner, at Mahāvagga I 70.1 Buddhist *bhikkhus* are being rebuked for walking for alms without a begging bowl (*apatta*) on the basis that they are '*seyyathāpi titthiyā*' or just like adherents of another ascetic community.

These Mahāvagga passages together with Pāli Vinaya narratives wherein types of begging materials and robes are declared unfit for the Buddhist *bhikkhu* may be quoted, and justly have been, to argue how the early Buddhist community desired at a certain point to be visually distinctive from its ascetic, proximate other.[23] Though this is true, this is not all. In these narratives 'the' Buddhist *bhikkhu* is also dialectically defining himself in relation to his ascetic, proximate other. First, the Buddhist *bhikkhu* is relating to his real or imagined proximate other by simply becoming this other (here, in our case, by becoming naked or *acīvara*) before he, in a second instance, distinguishes himself from this very other by rejecting the practices he came to associate with him. As such these narratives contain informative traces of the processes of othering of the early Buddhist community. They show how the early Buddhist ascetic community, or at the very least the monk-editors of the Pāli Vinaya, reflected on the importance of the Buddhist robe and begging materials in direct relation to the ones of their ascetic others. Further, in such-like Pāli Vinaya narratives, practices of ascetic others, whether

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[22] The fact that in our concerning Vinaya narrative it are people ('*manussā*') pointing out the inappropriateness for Buddhist *bhikkhus* to be *acīvara* does not alter our observation that nakedness was considered by the Buddhist community to be typifying a community other than itself. At Maes (2010-2011:90-102) it is argued that stock phrases such as '*manussā ujjhāyanti khīyanti vipācenti*' mainly help structuring the Vinaya narratives and as such should not be taken to reflect the motive for the precepts they introduce. However, the varying subjects that may possibly be encountered in the stock phrase *ujjhāyanti khīyanti vipācenti* ('people,' 'householders,' 'lay followers,' 'monks', 'modest monks' etc.) reflect the (groups of) individuals who might to a greater or lesser extent have had a say in the ascetic organization and legislation of the *saṅgha*.

[23] Holt ([1981, 1995²] 1999: 135).

real or imagined, are never simply referred to. Practices supposedly marking *titthiyas* are drawn in, their significance and value experimented with to, at the end of this process, either be adopted as 'Buddhist' or rejected as 'other' (*titthiya*). In both cases, it will have effected a re-evaluation and if found necessary a (re-)negotiation of the Buddhist community's own practices and values. These arguments will shortly be substantiated with a close reading of other Vinaya narratives prohibiting nakedness.

With the theory of Jonathan Smith we have seen that it is especially the presence of a proximate other that is problematic. Generally speaking a theory of the other is a *sine qua non* for the establishment of any society, but in the vicinity of a proximate other, or in the presence of a community that is similar to one's own, the need for a 'theory of the other' becomes "an urgent necessity."[24] The underlying dynamics of a society's theory of the other have been discussed with great clarity by William Scott Green in the theoretical introduction of his essay 'Otherness Within: Towards a Theory of Difference in Rabbinic Judaism'.[25] In a most basic sense a theory of the other establishes or confirms the singularity of a community in (re)defining its collective identity. It further makes a community draw and reflect upon its boundaries. On a more dialectical level the theory of the other, and then, particularly of those viewed as proximate, are means by which communities can

> explore their internal ambiguities and interstices, experiment with alternative values and symbols, and question their own structures and mechanisms.[26]

With these observations let us return to our Vinaya narrative wherein Buddhist *bhikkhus* are prohibited from being *acīvara* ('without robe') and thus naked on the basis that they might be perceived to belong to a community other than their own. What does this narrative do? Perhaps it relates the historical event wherein *bhikkhus* indeed went for alms naked and indeed were mistakenly thought of to be *titthiyas*, but perhaps it does not. What the narrative does tell, however, is how the early Buddhist ascetic

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[24] Green (1985: 49-50).

[25] Cf. fn. 8. Both Green's (1985) and Smith's ([1985] 2004) essays present similar views on the problem of the 'proximate other' (though only Smith explicitly refers to this dialectical other with the term 'proximate other'), but both have a unique approach. Green discusses the problem of the proximate other by means of a concrete ancient rabbinic discourse on the gentile ("non-Jew"). Defining the rabbinic Jewish community as principally a "textual community" and thus viewing their text as their authoritative center and source of definition, he argues that the "problematic proximity" of its others are conceived in terms of their attitude towards the texts. Smith, on the other hand, discusses in a somehow surprising but highly lucid manner, the problem of the proximate other with its political and linguistic aspect respectively by means of (1) the history of taxonomy in biology and the place of 'parasite' therein, and by means of (2) analyzing the 'linguistic conquest' of America.

[26] Green (1985:51).

community evolved in dialogue with its ascetic others. Containing traces of the processes of othering, it provides a glimpse of the dynamic, reflexive impact ascetic others had on the development of the early Buddhist ascetic community. Referring to a practice of ascetic other, whether real or imagined, the narrative illustrates how Buddhist *bhikkhus,* or at least the monk-editors of the Pāli Vinaya, questioned their own customs in direct relation to the ones of their ascetic others. Or also, the narrative shows how through processes of othering they, to follow Green's formulation, 'explored their own ambiguities' and 'experimented' with alternative practices and values. When referring to the *titthiyas'* ascetic practice of wandering naked, the monk-editors of the Pāli Vinaya reflect, so to speak, on the significance or additional value of being *acīvara* and thus, simultaneously (re)question their own practice of being *cīvara* or a wearer of robes. How quirky this issue might appear to the present day mind, it most probably was not a random matter for the early Indian Buddhists. On a historical note, we know that certain ascetics belonging to the *ajīvīka* community and most probably also the *nigaṇṭha* took up nakedness as an essential ascetic observance on their path to liberation (cf. p. 69 ff.). This certainly was a known and shared fact amongst the early Indian Buddhists. It is telling, for instance, that also another Mahāvagga passage reflects on the significance of nakedness by again prohibiting it and especially by, as we have mentioned at the onset, referring to it as a *titthiya-samādāna* or 'an observance of ascetics belonging to a different community.' It is worth quoting the passage at length:

> *tena kho pana samayena aññataro bhikkhu naggo hutvā yena bhagavā ten' upasaṃkami, upasaṃkamitvā bhagavantaṃ etad avoca: bhagavā hi bhante anekapariyāyena appicchassa santuṭṭhassa sallekhassa dhutassa pāsādikassa apacayassa viriyārambhassa vaṇṇavādī. idaṃ bhante naggiyaṃ anekapariyāyena appicchatāya santuṭṭhiyā sallekhāya dhutattāya pāsādikatāvya apacayāya viriyārambhāya saṃvattati. Sadhu bhante bhagavā bhikkhūnaṃ naggiyaṃ anujānātū 'ti. Vigarahi buddho bhagavā: ananucchaviyaṃ moghapurisa ananulomikaṃ appaṭirūpaṃ assāmaṇakaṃ akappiyaṃ akaraṇīyaṃ. kathaṃ hi nāma tvaṃ moghapurisa naggiyaṃ titthiyasamādānaṃ samādiyissasi. n' etaṃ moghapurisa appasannānaṃ vā pasādāya. vigarahitvā dhammikathaṃ katvā bhikkhū āmantesi: na bhikkhave naggiyaṃ titthiyasamādānaṃ samādiyitabbaṃ. yo samādiyeyya, āpatti thullaccayassā 'ti.* (Vin I 305; MV VIII 28.1)

> Now at that time a certain monk, having become naked [*naggo hutvā*], approached the Bhagavat; having approached he spoke thus to the Bhagavat: "Bhagavat, in many a figure is the Bhagavat a speaker in praise of desiring little, of contentment, of expunging (evil), of punctiliousness, of graciousness, of decreasing (the obstructions), of putting forth energy. Bhagavat, this nakedness [*idaṃ naggiyaṃ*] is, in many a figure, useful for desiring little, for contentment, for expunging (evil), for punctiliousness, for graciousness, for decreasing (the obstructions), for putting forth energy. It were good, Bhagavat, if the Bhagavat were to allow nakedness [*naggiyaṃ*] for monks."

The Buddha, the Bhagavat rebuked him, saying: "It is not becoming, it is not suitable, it is not fitting, it is not worthy of a recluse [*assāmaṇakaṃ*], it is not allowable, it is not to be done. How can you, foolish man, observe nakedness [*naggiyaṃ*], an observance of adherents of a different ascetic community [*titthiyasamādānaṃ*]? It is not, foolish man, for pleasing those who are not (yet) pleased. ..."

Having rebuked him, having given *dhamma* talk, he addressed the monks saying: "Monks, nakedness, an observance of adherents of a different ascetic community [*titthiyasamādānaṃ*], is not to be observed. [For] whoever who should observe it, there is a grave offence." (trsl. partly following I.B. Horner, BD IV 436)[27]

Underlying the rejection of nakedness (*naggiya*) in this Vinaya passage lies a deeper rejection of the *titthiyas'* doctrinal motivation of this practice. Nakedness is here not linked with being *acīvara* as in MV I 70.2, but with a '*samādāna*' or an observance of other non-Buddhist ascetics. This is a significant fact showing how nakedness was considered to be encompassing both doctrinal points and an ascetic practice of other non-Buddhist communities. Translating this thought to the historical ascetic landscape of early Buddhist India, we may note that one of the few fundamental points to have internally divided the *nigaṇṭha* community was the observance or rejection of the ascetic practice of nakedness and its doctrinal motivation. The great significance the two *nigaṇṭha* communities attached in being or not being '*naggiya*' is nowhere else best seen in their later developed and adopted denominations of 'Śvetāmbāra' ('White Clad') and 'Digambara' ('Sky Clad').

Regarding the associative powers of nakedness with the *ājīvika* community, we may refer to Vinaya I 290-92 (BD IV 414-17) and Vinaya III 212 (BD II 45-7). Also these Vinaya passages beautifully reflect, so to speak, the Buddhist's fear for nakedness. At Vinaya I 290-92 *bhikkhus* were *acīvara* or naked as they were letting their bodies getting wet with the rain. Because of their nakedness, they were being mistaken for *ājīvikas*. To avoid a recurrence of this mistaken identity, a faithful householder asked the Buddha whether she could donate 'cloths for the rains' (*vassikasāṭika*) to the *saṅgha*, condemning nakedness (*naggiya*) as being impure (*asuci*) and objectionable (*paṭikkūla*).[28] At Vinaya III 212 we read how a *bhikkhu* in the unfortunate event of being robbed and, as the narrative implies, being stripped off his robe (*achinnacīvara*), is exceptionally allowed to

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[27] I.B. Horner (BD IV 436, fn 4) considers the term '*samādāna*' to be a word play as "*samādāna* means both going for alms without taking the three robes with one . . ., and also adopting, undertaking, taking upon oneself." Horner opines that the latter meaning must be intended here as it can be read in analogy with *mūgabbata samādāna* ('vow of silence') mentioned at Vin I 159 (cf. above p. 125).

[28] Cf. Vin I 293 (BD IV 418) where nakedness of women is also declared 'impure' (*asuci*), 'abhorrent' (*jeguccha*), and 'objectionable' (*paṭikkūla*).

beg for a robe from a householder,[29] or if he is in the neighbourhood of a dwelling of fellow *bhikkhus* to ask for one there. In the absence of these options, he is instructed to cover himself with either a bed-cover (*uttarattharaṇa*), a ground-cover (*bhummattharaṇa*) or a mattress-cover (*bhisicchavi*)[30] and if these options too would be unavailable, he should cover himself with grass (*tiṇa*) or leaves (*paṇṇa*), in short, with anything as long as he does not come naked. If he does come naked, however, he commits an offence of wrong-doing. According to the accompanying introductory story, the event supposedly effecting these regulations was the misrecognition of certain *bhikkhus* to be *ājīvikas* as they, having been robbed of their robe, were wandering naked.

From these Vinaya passages prohibiting monks from wandering naked, we may safely deduce the fact that the early Buddhist community conceptualized 'nakedness' (*naggiya*) to be much more than the mere absence (*a-*) of robes (*cīvara*). For the Buddhist community nakedness was clearly not an accidental feature of being temporarily *acīvara*; nakedness was the robe or *cīvara* typifying ascetic communities other than itself. As such, these introductory stories throw light on the processes of othering of the early Buddhist ascetic community. They show how Buddhist *bhikkhus,* or at the very least the monk-editors of the Pāli Vinaya*,* re-questioned and if necessary re-accommodated their own practices through reflection on the practices of their so-called ascetic other. When referring to the ascetic practice of nakedness, they, as it were, temporarily 'internalize' it, 'experiment' with it, to subsequently distance themselves from the possibility altogether by marking it as a difference between themselves and *titthiyas.* The difference thus marked is utterly significant as it starts to symbolize the very distinction between "us" and "them." For, it is realized, if the "us" adopts the practice of nakedness it simply might become "them."[31] In other words, the awareness is raised of, what William Scott Green, calls "the possibility or the reality of otherness within."[32] Conversely, the *cīvara* in the presence of the possibility of being *acīvara* has become an essential part of what constitutes the early Buddhist identity.

Householder as proximate other

That the so-called *titthiyas* were the early Buddhist *bhikkhus* real or imagined proximate other is now, I hope, abundantly clear. Before turning to a discussion of the metonymical denomination *acela(ka),* I first would like to pause on the fact that also 'the'

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[29] The precept preceding this narrative prohibits a monk from asking a robe from a householder, unless he is a relative. Cf. *nissaggiya* ('forfeiture') VI at Vin III 211; BD II 45.

[30] For I.B. Horner's interpretation of these technical terms, see BD II 46 & 47, fn. 3, 4 & 1.

[31] Cf. fn. 10.

[32] Green (1985: 50). Also quoted by Smith in *Differential Equations*, cf. Smith ([1992] 2004: 232).

householder could be considered as a, to a higher or lesser degree, proximate other of the early Buddhist *bhikkhus.* In accordance with our given explanation of 'proximate other' - namely that it invites a process of othering wherein differences and similarities are negotiated, 'the' householder may justly be noted to also have constituted a proximate other. For, as already noted in the section Contact, a Buddhist *bhikkhu* is in a way a *bhikkhu* insomuch as he is *not* a householder (*gihin*). Also the presence and interaction with the householder community dialectically helped shaping the Buddhist ascetic organisation and identity. When viewing the householder in this light, various narratives in the Mahāvagga and Cullavagga that negatively refer to supposed practices of householders can be understood in a similar fashion as the narratives with *'seyyathāpi titthiyā.'* This is, as offering a space wherein typifying features of 'the' householder are drawn in and 'experimented with.' In such narratives, the Buddhist *bhikkhu* is being dialectically defined in apposition to his householder other. When negatively referring to practices of their so-called householder other, Buddhist *bhikkhus* reflect upon the meaning of their own practices in direct relation to the ones of their householder other, resulting in a further (re)definition of what it means to be a Buddhist *bhikkhu.* To give one such example of a Vinaya narrative dialectically referring to householders:

> *tena kho pana samayena chabbagiyā bhikkhū uccāvace patte dhārenti sovaṇṇamayaṃ rūpiyamayaṃ. manussā ujjhāyanti [khiyyanti vipācenti seyyathāpi gihī] kāmabhogino 'ti. bhagavato etam atthaṃ ārocesuṃ. na bhikkhave sovaṇṇamayo patto dhāretabbo, na rūpiyamayo patto dhāretabbo, ... yo dhāreyya, āpatti dukkaṭassa. Anujānāmi bhikkhave dve patte ayopattaṃ mattikāpattan ti.* (Vin II 112; CV V 9.1)

> Now at that time the group of six monks used various kinds of bowls, made of gold, made of silver. People were irritated, [angry and speaking dispraisingly: "Just like householders] who enjoy pleasures of the senses." They told this matter to the Bhagavat. He said: "Monks, a bowl made of gold should not be used, a bowl made of silver should not be used. [...] . [For] whoever should use [such one], there is an offence of wrong-doing. (trsl. partly following I.B. Horner, BD V 152)

The similarity with the *'seyyathāpi titthiyā'* narratives is evident. The significance of both types of narratives does not lie in the fact whether or not they are recounting *la petite histoire* of the early Buddhist community, but in the fact that, through these narratives, their own customs and/or "internal ambiguities and interstices" can be envisaged and questioned. In our quoted example, the value of material wealth for the Buddhist *bhikkhu* is questioned in dialectical apposition with its place in the householder's life. Associating the luxurious materials of gold and silver with the

householder realm, the question is considered how much a *bhikkhu* would still be a *bhikkhu* and not a householder in the presence of these luxurious items.[33]

On a historical note, if such narratives cannot guarantee that Buddhist *bhikkhus* actually did avoid the use and possession of golden or silver objects, they nevertheless throw light on the fact how the early Buddhist community reflected on the significance of these materials in a *bhikkhu's* life in relation to its place in a householder's life.[34] Apart from reflecting on this significance of (not) using various luxurious materials, many other practices and attitudes of the ideal *bhikkhu* is thought of in direct relation to the ones of householder. Thus we encounter the motivation of *'seyyathāpi gihī kāmabhogino'* for prohibiting certain 'fancy' clothes and footwear;[35] luxurious furniture;[36] types of bodily care or 'beauty treatments;'[37] various 'worldly' activities or sensual pleasures;[38]

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[33] It may be noted that also within the Jain Āyāraṅga Sutta bowls made of luxurious material are explicitly prohibited. Thus we may read at AS 102: II 6.1. § 3 in Jacobi's translation: "A monk or a nun should not accept any very expensive bowls of the following description: bowls made of iron, tin, lead, silver, gold, brass, a mixture of gold, silver, and copper, pearls, glass, mother of pearl, horn, ivory, cloth, stone, or leather; for such very expensive bowls are impure [*aphāsuya*] and unacceptable." Jacobi SBE 22: 166-167.

[34] Various other passages in the Mahāvagga and Cullavagga prohibit golden and silver objects on the basis that Buddhist *bhikkhus* using them are 'just like householders enjoying the sensual pleasures.' Thus we encounter the motivation of *'seyyathāpi gihī kāmabhogino'* at MV VI.12.1 (Vin I 203) for ointment-boxes made of gold or silver MV VI.12.3 (Vin I 204.1) for ointment-sticks made of gold or silver; MV VI 13.1 (Vin I 204.18) for nose-spoons made of gold or silver; CV V.9.1 (Vin II 112.20) for bowls (*patta*) made of gold or silver; CV V.9.2 (Vin II 112.32; Vin II 113.5) for circular bowl-rests (*pattamaṇḍala*) made of gold or silver and ornamentally carved; CV V.11.1 (Vin II 114.29) for the use of small knives with handles made of gold or silver; CV V.11.5 (Vin II 117) for the use of thimbles made of gold or silver; and at CV V.27.6 (Vin II 135.5) for the use of a dirt removing instrument for the ears made of gold or silver.

[35] MV V.2 V.2 (Vin I 185-186) prohibits all types of coloured, ornamented, and shaped sandals (*upāhanā*) because Buddhist *bhikkhus* wearing these were 'just like householders enjoying sensual pleasures.' MV V.12 (Vin I 194) Buddhist *bhikkhus* are being criticized with *'seyyathāpi gihī kāmabhogino'* for entering a village with their sandals on. Identical rebuke is found at MV VIII.11.2 (Vin I 287) for ivory coloured and 'uncut' (*acchinnaka*) robes; MV VIII.29 (Vin I 306) for variously coloured and decorated types of robes (*cīvara*), and for wearing jackets, garments of the Tirīṭa tree and turbans; CV V.2 (Vin II 105-6) for wearing all types of ornaments and jewellery; CV V.4 (Vin II 108) for wearing woollen clothes with the fleece outside; CV V.29.2 (Vin II 136.8 & 19 & 30) for the use of various types of waistbands; and for wearing buckles and blocks (to prevent the upper robe from being blown up by the wind) made of gold or silver; and CV V.29.5 (Vin II 137.8 & 12) for wearing householders' (*gihini*) under and upper garments.

[36] Passages prohibiting luxurious furniture items on the basis that Buddhist *bhikkhus* using them are *'seyyathāpi gihī kāmabhogino'* are MV V.10.4-6 (Vin I 192) for certain shapes, material, decoration, rugs, animal hides of and for sitting furniture; CV VI.2.5 (Vin II 149.37) for the use of high couches (*ucca mañca*); CV VI.2.6 (Vin II 150.20) for the use of very large squatting mats.

[37] Concerning types bodily care or what may be called beauty treatments or those types of activities that reflect a conscious concern with outward appearance, the motivation of *'seyyathāpi gihī kāmabhogino'* is found at CV V.2.2-5 (Vin II 106) for respectively wearing the hair long; smoothening the hair; examining a face mark in a mirror or water-bowl; and for anointing the face; CV V.27.2 (Vin II 133.31) for polishing the nails; CV V.27.5 (Vin II 134.20 & 35) for respectively cutting the hair with scissors (*kattarikā*) [and thus not shaving it off

and, finally, for specializing in particular areas of knowledge.[39] The householder community can, therefore, correctly be conceived as being one of the several proximate others of the early Buddhist community that codetermined its organisation and identity.

Part III: *acela(ka)* in the Pāli Vinaya

This section analyses the denomination *acela(ka).* It shows how also the presence of this metonymical denomination in the Pāli Vinaya is reflective of the early Buddhist ascetic community's processes of othering. More specifically, just as the introductory stories discussed in the previous part, the term *acela(ka)* points to the fact that Buddhist *bhikkhus* reflected on the significance and value of their practice of wearing a robe (or better 'cloth' or *cela*) in direct relation to the practice of their ascetic others of wandering naked. On a more general level, I wish to draw attention to the fact that the development and/or use of metonymies within a community, shows the dynamic, dialectic impact proximate others have on a community's development and self-perception.

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with a razor (*khura*)]; and for removing grey hairs; CV V.27.3 (Vin II 134.9) for respectively shaving the beard, chest-hair, stomach-hair, whiskers into particular shapes and for removing body hair. The latter specifically concerns for *bhikkhus,* as the opposite is true for *bhikkhunīs.* At Vin III 260 (Bhikkhunīvibhaṅga, *pācittiya* II) *bhikkhunīs* bathing together with prostitutes are being rebuked by those latter for being 'like women householders enjoying the sensual pleasures' ('*seyyathāpi gihiniyo kāmabhoginiyo')* because they 'let the body hair [*sambādhe lomaṃ*] grow' which is subsequently turned into a *pācittiya* offence.

[38] The rebuke is *seyyathāpi gihiniyo kāmabhoginiyo* is thus found for *bhikkhus* going to a festival and enjoying the dancing, singing and music there (CV V.2.6; Vin I 107; cf. Vin IV 267 where the same rebuke is given for *bhikkhunīs* and a *pācittiya* offence is being stipulated); CV VI.3.2 (Vin II 152) for *bhikkhus* decorating their dwelling places with bold designs of women and men; CV V.1.3 (Vin II 105) for *bhikkhus* respectively using a rubbing board (*aṭṭāna*); a *gandhabba*-hand, a string of vermilion covered beads, and a scrubber (*mallaka*) while bathing; CV V.18 (Vin II 123.20) for *bhikkhus* sleeping on beds scattered over with flowers; CV V.19.1 (Vin II 123.34) for *bhikkhus* eating while leaning against cushions.

In this context also note how at CV V.19.2 (Vin II 124.8) Buddhist *bhikkhus* are rebuked for being '*seyyathāpi gihī kāmabhogino'* because they ate from one dish, drank from one beaker, and shared one couch, cloth, covering and covering-cloth; and how at MV V.9 (Vin I 191) *bhikkhus* are similarly rebuked for respectively having got hold of cow, for having mounted a cow's back, and for having touched the cow's privy parts with lustful thoughts; and, finally, for killing a young calve.

[39] CV V.33.2 stipulates a *dukkaṭa* offence for learning or teaching metaphysics (*lokāyata*) as *bhikkhus* studying it were rebuked for being '*seyyathāpi gihī kāmabhogino.'* Similarly for 'worldly knowledge' (*tiracchānavijjā*).

At Vinaya IV 91-92 a group of ascetic, proximate others (*titthiyas*) is denominated with the term '*acelaka*' ('one without cloth').[40] The denomination *acela(ka)* is a typical metonymical denomination.[41] In terming a particular proximate other *acela(ka)* the Buddhist community is differentiating itself from that proximate other by highlighting in this denomination an ascetic custom (here, nakedness), expressed as the lack of a familiar practice among its members (the wearing of a 'cloth' or *cela*).[42] The term *acela(ka)* therefore not only tells us a little bit about a real or imagined group of proximate others, but it also and mainly informs us how the monk-editors attached great importance to the practice of wearing a cloth of the Buddhist *bhikkhus*. In historical terms this means that the one denominated with *acela(ka)* might but not necessarily must have been *acela*, whereas the implied fact that the Buddhists were wearing a cloth most certainly was true, or at least, desired to be.

The reflexive, dialectical aspect of metonymical denominations has also been noted by Jonathan Smith and William Green in their cultural theory of the other.[43] The latter, for instance, in stressing the importance of the semantic component of a society's theory of the other cuttingly remarked that

> [T]he terminology it [i.e. a society] invents to describe and classify those besides itself, along with the social action such language entails, are primarily clues to its self-understanding.[44]

He further noted that a society's theory of the other is "an exercise in caricature" for, a society "does not simply discover its others, it fabricates them … ."[45] With respect to metonymies this is easily understood. In metonymies such as *acela(ka)* only one aspect of

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[40] More specifically, the term *acelaka* is mentioned in *Pācittiya* XLI: "Whatever monk should give with his own hand solid food or soft food to a naked ascetic [*acelaka*] or to a wanderer [*paribbājaka*] or to a female wanderer [*paribbājikā*], there is an offence of expiation." The *Padabhājaniya* gives for *acelaka: "yo koci paribbājakasamāpanno naggo,"* or "whoever being naked has reached (the stage of) a wanderer." Cf. Vin IV 92; trsl. I.B. Horner BD II 348-9. See 'MN I 342.23,' fn. 24, p. 70.

acela(ka) is used over a 180 times in the *Suttapiṭaka*. This shows that the term was frequently used to refer to the early Buddhist's ascetic others.

[41] It may be noted that the reflections I make on the term *acela(ka)* in the Pāli Vinaya are by extension also valid for all (sections of) early Indian ascetic communities who used the term to refer to one of their real or imagined proximate others (or insiders).

[42] My explanation of the metonymical denomination *acela(ka)* is based on Smith's cultural analysis of "the 'other' represented metonymically." He writes: "The metonymical model most frequently occurs in connection with naming. One group distinguishes itself from another by lifting up some cultural feature, expressed as the lack of some familiar cultural trait, the use of some unfamiliar cultural object (e.g., "fish-eaters," "garlic-eaters"), the presence of some marked physical feature (e.g., "whites," "blacks"), or the characterization of difference by naming the other as a nonhuman species." Smith ([1992] 2004: 232).

[43] See especially Smith ([1992] 2004: 232-3).

[44] Green (1985: 49).

[45] Green (1985: 50).

the proximate other's life is highlighted that, moreover, comes to represent this group of *titthiyas* (here the supposed fact that they were 'without cloth' and thus wandering naked). In the words of William Scott Green a society fabricates its proximate other by

> selecting, isolating, and emphasizing an aspect of another's people's life and making it symbolize their difference. To evoke the significant disparity of which otherness is composed, the symbol must correspond powerfully to the naming society's sense of its own distinctiveness. .... . To be revealing and meaningful, it must reach inside the culture of the people who employ it, correlate to some piece of themselves that they believe prominently displays who they are, and induce response, perhaps fear or disgust, but also perhaps envy or respect. The construction of a theory of the other thus involves a double metonymy and a double distortion. In creating its others, a society confuses some part of its neighbor with its neighbor, and a piece of itself with itself, and construes each in terms of the other.[46]

Bearing in mind these gained notions that through metonymies the proximate other is not just referred to but also 'fabricated,' and that through them a double dialectical process of (self-) definition is taking place, we can comprehend the additional value of metonymies to both one-to-one denominations and generic denominations. Through metonymies the possibility or the significance of an alternative practice or an internal ambiguity is reflected upon. Through these, alternative praxes and values are, so to speak, taken to the very boundaries of a community and experimented with. The result of such an 'experiment' is that at the end of the exercise the practice or value in question will either be internalized and further adopted, or alternatively, it will be rejected and marked as 'other.' It is important to underscore that the practice which comes to be rejected and marked as 'other' contributes as much to the 'making-off' of a community as the one which is internalized and adopted. The only difference being that the on-going definition of a community through rejection of what is so-called 'other' negatively takes shapes, effecting differences between one-self and one's proximate other. These effected differences are highly significant. For,

> Difference is rarely something simply to be noted; it is, most often, something in which one has a stake. Above all, it is a political matter.[47]

This is also true with respect to the processes of othering of the early Buddhist ascetic community. The importance of the differences marked between Buddhists and non-Buddhists during processes of othering, lies in the fact that they develop specific power relations. The negotiated differences start to represent typifying features on the

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[46] Green (1985: ibid).

[47] Smith ([1985] 2004: 252).

basis of which the Buddhist community can distance itself from its proximate other. And it is on the very ground of such formulated differences that the proximate other will be perceived and consequently treated as 'other' by the Buddhist community. A proximate other who desires to join the Buddhist ascetic *saṅgha* will first have to give up his 'otherness' to be able to become a Buddhist mendicant and to be recognized as such. Several regulations within the Pāli Vinaya can be understood within this framework, namely as aiming to dismantle the 'otherness' of candidates desiring the going forth. We can think, for instance, of the small regulations for *aññatitthiyapubbas* ('those who previously belonged to a different ascetic community') such as "if an *aññatitthiyapubba* comes naked (*naggo āgacchati*) a robe belonging to a preceptor should be looked about for."[48] Also the four month probation period (*parivāsa*) asked of certain *aññatitthiyapubbas* may be understood from this perspective.[49]

To conclude, just as the discussed introductory stories referring to supposed practices of proximate others, also the metonymy '*acela(ka)*' is reflective of the processes of othering of the early Buddhist ascetic community. Using the term *acela(ka)* to refer to some (groups of) ascetic, proximate others, the monk-editors show how they negotiated a 'Buddhist' identity in direct relation to these proximate others. Further, the use of the denomination *acela(ka)* reflects how in the existing reality - or in the imagined possibility - of nakedness as an ascetic practice, the importance of their own practice of wearing a cloth comes to be articulated. Finally, in using the term *acela(ka)* the difference between the practice of wearing a cloth and the ascetic practice of being naked comes to be marked as a typifying difference between themselves and their ascetic, proximate others.

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[48] Vin I 70: *sace bhikkhave aññatitthiyapubbo naggo āgacchati, upajjhāyamūlakaṃ cīvaraṃ pariyesitabbaṃ.* Directly following this instruction, another such regulation for *aññatitthiyapubbas* may be found: *sace acchinnakeso āgacchati, saṃgho apaloketabbo bhaṇḍukammāya.* ("If he comes without the hair of his head cut off, the Order should be asked for permission for shaving it close," BD IV 89)

[49] Vin I 69 (BD IV 85): *yo bhikkhave añño pi aññatitthiyapubbo imasmiṃ dhammavinaye ākaṅkhati pabbajaṃ, ākaṅkhati upasampadaṃ, tassa cattāro māse parivāso dātabbo.* A notable exception to this four month probation is given to fire-worshipping *jaṭilakas* on the alleged basis that they are *kammavādin* and *kiriyavādin* and to *aññatitthiyapubbas* who are Sakyan by birth (Cf. Vin I 71; BD IV 89). Be as it may, it is noteworthy that the exception is granted on the basis of a shared and what must have been important similarity between the *aññatitthiyapubba* and the followers of the Buddha. See also Appendix 'Labelling the Ascetic other,' p. 145 ff., and p.168 ff.

Conclusion

Though othering was a most important and dynamic process underlying the development of the early Buddhist ascetic community, it is a process that is generally not easy to identify and examine due to the normative nature of our sources. In this section we were to a certain extent able to break through the traditional story of the Pāli Vinaya and to identify some traces of the early Buddhist ascetic community's processes of othering, thanks to our examination of the Pāli Vinaya's multiple terms for ascetic others; our particular attention to the term *acela(ka)*; and our close reading and analysis of a selected group of Vinaya passages. I pointed out how already the presence of a wide array of terms referring to the early Buddhist *bhikkhu's* ascetic others, as well as the stock phrase '*seyyathāpi titthiya*,' are reflective of the dynamic, reflexive impact proximate others exerted on the development of the early Buddhist ascetic community. Further, we have seen how in the normative body of the Pāli Vinaya, both the metonymy *acela(ka)* and the references to real or imagined practices of proximate others, are reflective of the early Buddhist community's on-going process of othering. More specifically, they showed how early Buddhist *bhikkhus*, or at the very least the monk-editors of the Pāli Vinaya, reflected on the significance of their practices of wearing a cloth (*cela*) or a 'Buddhist' robe (*cīvara*) and of carrying an alms-bowl (*patta*) by considering the value of alternative practices of their so-called ascetic, proximate others. When observing the (real or imagined) possibility of not wearing any cloth (*acela*) or robe (*acīvara*) and to, hence, wander naked, the monk-editors revalued their own practice of wearing a cloth or robe and emphasized the importance to Buddhist *bhikkhus* to observe it. Otherwise, a meaningful difference between themselves and their proximate other could not be guaranteed. In their process of othering, they marked the difference (whether simply observed or negotiated) between themselves and their proximate other as a signifying difference. It is on the basis of such noted differences that the early Buddhist *bhikkhu's* proximate other was related to and treated as 'other.' Similarly, we have seen how the monk-editors stressed the importance to Buddhist *bhikkhus* to adhere to the practice of carrying a begging-bowl by considering the value of the alternative practice of their ascetic, proximate others of not using a bowl (*apatta*). In the course of this discussion we also noted how 'the' householder could also be viewed as one of the early Buddhist *bhikkhus'* proximate others. Several practices for Buddhist *bhikkhus* have been established in relation to their so-called householder other, as well as their reflection on and declaration of the (un)suitability of possessing certain objects.

Finally, a last point may be made explicit. When during their processes of othering, Buddhist *bhikkhus* were considering the value of the practices of their so-called proximate others, they were, so to speak, temporarily 'internalizing' them and 'experimenting' with them. On such moments they were, to use a Pāli Vinaya phrase,

'*seyyathāpi titthiyā* or just like their ascetic, proximate others. In other words, the processes of othering of the early Buddhist ascetic community entailed an on-going flirtation with the other.

Appendix 'Labelling the Ascetic other'

This appendix discusses in some detail the Pāli Vinaya's denominations for the early Buddhist's ascetic others by examining their reference field and occurrences in the text.

One-to-One Denominations

Nātaputta Nigaṇṭha; *nigaṇṭha*; *nigaṇṭhasāvaka*

Pāli 'Nātaputta' concurs with Ardhamāgadhī 'Nāṭaputta,' being one of the various names current for Mahāvīra.[1] The denomination '*nigaṇṭha*' (with its variant spellings *niggaṇṭha* and *nigandha*)[2] used in the Pāli Vinaya and other Buddhist texts to refer to Jain ascetics, also concurs with the internal naming policy of the early Jain ascetic community. This is, the Ardhamāgadhī term *niyaṃṭha* with its alternative forms *nigaṇṭha* and *niggantha* are one of the several denominations found in Jain texts to refer to their own ascetics.[3] Thus we have the many injunctions of the Jain Kappa Sutta being addressed to the '*niggantha*' and '*nigganthi*' of the community,[4] and the Āyāraṅga Sutta frequently referring to "the well-controlled Nirgrantha" or the "*saṃjata niyaṃṭha.*"[5]

The Pāli term '*nigaṇṭha*' bears "Māgadhism" in its spelling. Noticing that *nirgrantha* is the Sanskrit equivalent for Pāli *nigaṇṭha,* Jacobi correctly remarked that the expected form for Pāli should be '*niggaṃtha*,' a form encountered in Ardhamāgadhī but not in Pāli.

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[1] See e.g. AS 125: II.15 § 17, trsl. Jacobi SBE 22: 194. A variant spelling for AMg. Nāṭaputta is Nāyaputta. Among the other names/epithets found for Mahāvīra are Vaddhamāṇa (Skt. Vardhamāna) and Samaṇa. Cf. AS 124: II.15 § 15, trsl. Jacobi SBE 22: 193.

[2] Cf. Jacobi 1880: 158. On the term *nigaṇṭha,* see also 'MN I 342.23, or on the ascetic practice of nakedness.'

[3] In addition to *niyaṃṭha* (or *nigaṇṭha* and *niggantha*) other denominations may be found in Jain disciplinary texts referring to their ascetics. The AS addresses its precepts to the *bhikkhu* and *bhikkhuṇi* (e.g. AS 49: II). Also the terms *muṇi* ('sage'), *acela* ('naked') and *aṇagāra* ('without home') may be found, though the latter will be less frequently encountered in disciplinary texts. For *muṇi, acela* and *aṇagāra* see e.g. e.g. AS 28 -9: I.6.2 § 2 and I.6.3 § 1, § 2. For an overview of the various denominations of the Jain mendicant collected from the Jain disciplinary texts *Kappa* and *Vavahāra-sutta, Nisīha-sutta* and *Jīyā-kappa* see "The Jaina Religious: their Titles" in Caillat 1975, *Atonements in the Ancient Ritual of the Jaina Monks,* pp. 33-46 (translation from the French edition of 1965).

[4] Cf. *Kalpa-Sūtra,* Schubring, ed. & tr., 1977 (1905). For a discussion of the Kappa Sutta, see p. 197.

[5] See e.g. AS 53: II.2.1.2 § 7, trsl. Jacobi SBE 22: 94.

Jacobi therefore suggested that the Pāli form *nigaṇṭha* must have been adopted from a Māgadhī dialect, a fact he also observes for the Pāli term 'Nātaputta,' that with its Sanskrit form Jñatṛputra should have developed a palatal *ñ* instead of the dental *n*, this is, according to the phonetic laws of Pāli. Within Jacobi's argumentation of the independent origin of the Jain community (cf. Section I 'Scholarly Frameworks'), these "Māgadhisms" in the spelling of both *nigaṇṭha* and Nātaputta were drawn upon as testimony to the fact that "[N]igaṇṭha Nātaputta must have made part of the most ancient tradition of the Bauddhas, and cannot have been added to it in later times as both words conform, not to the phonetic laws of the Pāli language, but to those of the early Māgadhī."[6]

In the Pāli Vinaya, Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta and his (lay) disciples are explicitly mentioned in only two separate narratives. At Mahāvagga VI.31 (Vin I 233, BD IV 318 ff.) we find Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta (i.e. Mahāvīra) dissuading his lay-follower (*nigaṇṭhasāvaka*) the general Sīha to go and see 'the recluse Gotama.' His dissuasion was in vain, however, as the general Sīha not only goes to meet the Buddha but also becomes the Buddha's lay-follower. When the general Sīha subsequently invites the Buddha and his order of *bhikkhus* to a meal, the *nigaṇṭhas* are presented as reacting rather emotionally. Thus we read how 'Nigaṇṭhas, waving their arms, were moaning from carriage road to carriage road, from cross road to cross road in Vesālī: "Today a fat beast [*pasuṃ*], killed by the general Sīha, is made into a meal for the recluse Gotama, the recluse Gotama enjoys this meat [*maṃsa*], knowingly it was prepared for him, the deed [i.e. the killing of the animal] was done for his sake [*paṭiccakamma*]."'[7] According to our Mahāvagga narrative, this Jain public condemnation would have stirred the Buddha to formulate a *dukkaṭa* offence for one who consumes meat when knowing that it had been especially prepared for him.[8] Though the ascetic practice of abstaining from meat eating certainly knew some early Buddhist adherents and caused some intra-communal discussions on its

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[6] Jacobi 1880, *op. cit.*: 159. On the various Pāli, AMg., and Sanskrit forms for '*nigaṇṭha*' see also Norman 1961: 349f.

[7] Cf. Vin I 237: "*ajja Sīhena senāpatinā thullaṃ pasuṃ vadhitvā samaṇassa Gotamassa bhattaṃ kataṃ, taṃ samaṇo Gotamo jānaṃ uddissakaṭaṃ maṃsaṃ paribhuñjati paṭiccakamman ti.*" (trsl. partly following I.B. Horner BD IV 324).

[8] Cf. Vin I 238: "*na bhikkhave jānaṃ uddissakaṭaṃ maṃsaṃ paribhuñjitabbaṃ. yo paribhuñjeyya, āpatti dukkaṭassa. anujānāmi bhikkhave tikoṭiparisuddhaṃ macchamaṃsaṃ adiṭṭhaṃ asutaṃ aparisaṅkitan ti.*"
"Monks, one should not enjoy meat knowingly it was prepared for one. Whoever should enjoy [this meat], there is an offence of wrong-doing. I allow you monks, fish and meat [*macchamaṃsaṃ*] that are quite pure in three respects: if it is not seen, heard, suspected [to have been prepared for a monk]." (trsl. partly following I.B. Horner BD IV 325)

(un)importance for leading a virtuous ascetic life,[9] the actual issue expressed in this introductory story and *dukkaṭa* offence is not the meat eating *in se* but concerns the ethical question whether an ascetic can accept meat (and by extension any food) knowing that it had been prepared for his sake. Be as it may, this whole Mahāvagga passage is exceptional because it not only explicitly refers to Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta and his (lay-)disciples, but also because it openly accredits the *nigaṇṭhas'* (albeit negative) influence on the formulation of an ascetic regulation, a rare feature for the traditional Pāli Vinaya.

Further, regardless whether the recorded incident actually occurred or effected the formulation of the *dukkaṭa* offence, the passage strongly suggests that some Buddhists and Jains disagreed and debated on the question whether it was permissible to eat meat or fish that had been especially prepared for you. For, it is telling that for the monk-editors this issue was evocative of *nigaṇṭhas.* Again, it should be stressed that the issue was not the meat or fish eating, but one's degree of personal involvement in having alms-food prepared for his sake. Though Jains are well-known for having traditionally been strong advocators of strict vegetarian diets, passages of the Āyāraṅga Sutta suggests that this was not always the case. Early Jain ascetics, as has already been noted by Dundas and others,[10] appeared to have been 'pragmatic' meat and fish eaters. This is, if meat or fish came to be donated as alms-food to a Jain ascetic, he was allowed to consume it on condition that the meat or fish had not *been especially prepared for him*, or did not contain too many bones. Regarding the latter, we read at Āyāraṅga II.I.10 § 5 how:

> "A [Jain] monk or nun on a begging-tour should not accept meat [*maṃsa*] or fish [*maccha*] containing many bones [*bahukaṃṭaga*], so that only a part of it can be eaten and the greater part must be rejected; for such meat or fish, &c., is impure and unacceptable." [11]

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[9] Among the more 'ascetically inclined' early Buddhist *bhikkhus* there certainly must have been advocators and practitioners of the ascetic practice of abstaining from eating meat and fish. The restrain from eating meat and fish was one of Devadatta's *dhutaṅgas,* that was made an optional practice by the Buddha. This latter indicates that within the framework of the Vinaya it was not considered to be an essential practice for attaining the soteriological goal of *mokkha.* See also p. 75.
For scholarly works treating the question of 'vegetarianism' in early Theravāda Buddhism and/or Jainism, see Asdorf & Bollée (ed.) 2010; Harvey 2003 (2000): 159ff (note, however, that he erroneously states that vegetarianism was practiced by Jains in the Buddha's day); Schmithausen 1991a; Schmithausen 1991b; Schmithausen 2009 and Stewart 2010.

[10] Dundas 1985.

[11] trsl. Jacobi SBE 22: 114. See also AS II.I. 10 §6.

The presence of this precept (cp. also AS II.I.9 § 3 and AS II.I.10 § 6) only makes sense in the reality that early Jain ascetics ate meat or fish. When considering this fact together with the many disciplinary prescriptions of the Āyāraṅga prescribing a *nigaṇṭha* to, as we have seen,[12] strictly avoid alms food that has been especially prepared for him, it becomes reasonable to assume that our recorded introductory story in the Mahāvagga indeed alludes to a Jain-Buddhist dissension on the issue of eating meat knowing that it had been prepared for your own sake.

A second (and already last) Pāli Vinaya narrative with an explicit *nigaṇṭha* reference is Cullavagga V.8 (Vin II 111, BD V 149-152) where Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta is mentioned in the standard list of the six so-called 'heretical teachers' who each in turn try to fetch a special sandalwood bowl that could only be caught by a perfected one with psychic powers (cf. DA ii 388). Needless to say Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta, just as the other 'heretical teachers,' fails to catch the bowl, the honour being reserved for a Buddhist *bhikkhu*.

ājīvika

In the complete absence of primary *ājīvika* textual sources, we are unable to establish whether the denomination *ājīvika* was internally used by the so-called *ājīvika*-ascetics themselves. If it is nevertheless classified as a one-to-one denomination, it is because not only Buddhist texts, but also Jain texts use the term *ājīvika* (in AMg. *ājīvaga*) to refer to the followers of Makkhali Gosāla.[13] The denomination *ājīvika* is found in the Aśokan inscriptions ('*ājīvikesu;*' '*ājīvikehi*'),[14] further suggesting that it was a well-known and

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[12] Cf. p. 74 ff.

[13] From inscriptional evidence *ājīvikas* survived in India until the fourteenth/fifteenth century CE. Cf. Bronkhorst 2010: 266-7. On *ājīvikas* see Basham 1981 (1951), today still being the most comprehensive collation of *ājīvika* references taken from a wide variety of textual, sculptural and epigraphical sources. On the *ājīvikas'* so-called philosophy of fatalism, see Bronkhorst 2000 and Bronkhorst 2002.

It may be noted that another current Pāli form for *ājīvika* is *ājīvaka*. Though *ājīvika* is the favoured form in modern treatises on the subject, the most current form in the PTS edition of the Pāli canon is *ājīvaka*. Cp. Bronkhorst 2002: 521, n.3.

For a discussion on the possible etymology of the term *ājīvika,* see Basham 1981 (1951): 101.

Makkhali Gosāla is in Jain canonical literature termed Gosāla Maṅkhaliputta. On the alleged initial proximity between Mahāvīra and Makkhali Gosāla see especially the Jain *Bhagavatī Sūtra.* See also Basham 1981 (1951): 39f.

[14] The denomination occurs in the Aśokan Edict VII on the Delhi-Torpa Pillar and *supposedly* in the Aśokan dedicatory inscriptions at the Barābar and Nāgarjunī Caves. In the Edict VII we thus read, in the edition and translation of Radhagovinda Basak: "देवानं पिये पियदसि हेवं आहा (:—) धंममहामाता पि मे ते बहुविधेसु अठेसु आनुगहिकेसु वियापटा (,) से पवजीतनं चेव गिहिथानं च (;) **सव(पासं)डेसु** पि च वियापटा (,) से संघठेसि पि मे कटे (,) इमे पियापटा होहं ति ति (;) हेमेव **बाभनेसु आजीविकेसु** पि मे कटे (,) इमे वियापटा होहंति ति (।) **निघंठेसु** पि मे कटे (,) इमे

usual term within early Indian society to refer to the "*ājīvika*" ascetic community or to (one of) its members.

In the Pāli Vinaya, *ājīvikas* are mentioned in nine different narratives. Though not disclosing a wide spectrum of information, the differing occurrences do nevertheless allow us, in a first instance, to confirm the historicity of the *ājīvika* movement. Both Vin II 130 and Vin III 135-137 confirm that *ājīvikas* constituted together an ascetic organisation that could be distinguished from others by mentioning *ājīvakasāvakas* or lay-followers of the *ājīvikas*. The very development of the term *ājīvakasāvaka* points to the fact that within early Indian society, certain householders identified themselves as being specific followers and/or supporters of *ājīvikas*, which could only be possible if *ājīvikas* were identifiable within the ascetic landscape as, precisely, *ājīvikas*. A certain coherence and distinctiveness of the *ājīvika* ascetics is also suggested by the mentioning of an *ājīvikaseyyā* or a 'sleeping place for *ājīvikas*' in the Bhikkhunivibhaṅga at Vin IV 224.

वियापटा होहीत (;) **नानापासंडेसु** पि मे कटे (,) इमे वियापटा होहंति ति (।) पटिविसिठं पटीविसिठं तेसु तेसु ते (ते) (म)हामाता

(।) धंममहामाता चु मे एतेसु चेव विया(प)टा (,) **सवेसु** च **अंनेसु पासंडेसु** (।)" (*Aśokan Inscriptions*, 1959: 108, emphasis added)

"*devānaṃ piye piyadasi hevaṃ āhā (:—) dhamamahāmātā pi me te bahuvidhesu aṭhesu anugahikesu viyāpaṭā (,) se pavajītanaṃ ceva gihithānaṃ ca (;) **sava(pāsaṃ)ḍesu** pi ca viyāpaṭa (,) se saṃghaṭhesi pi me kaṭe (,) ime viyāpaṭā hohaṃti ti (;) hemeva **bābhanes**u **ājīvikes**u pi me kaṭe (,) ime viyāpaṭā hohaṃti ti (I) **nighaṃṭhesu** pi me kaṭe (,) ime viyāpaṭā hohīta (;) **nānāpāsaṃḍesu** pi me kaṭe (,) ime viyāpaṭā hohaṃti ti (।) paṭivisiṭhaṃ paṭīvisiṭhaṃ tesu tesu te (te) (ma)hāmātā (।) dhaṃmamahāmātā cu me etesu ceva viyā(pa)ṭā (,) **savesu** ca **aṃnesu pāsaṃḍesu** (।)*"

"Thus says King Priyadarśī, the Beloved of the Gods: — I have also employed the High state-officers called *Dhamma-mahāmatas* on many objects of favour or kindness, which may affect both ascetics and householders and they are also employed among **all sects (or denominations)**. With regard to the interest of the congregation I have so ordered that they shall remain engaged (in their good). I have done this with regard to the **Brāhmaṇas** and the **Ājīvikas** also, so that they should remain employed (for their good). So also have I done this with regard to the **Nirgranthas** (Jainas), so that they should remain employed (for their good). With regard to **various (miscellaneous) sects** too I have done this that they should remain employed (for their good). The *mahāmatas* (High state-officers) of various kinds (are employed) to look after their respective duties, but the *dhammamahāmatas* are employed on such things and also on **all other sects or denominations**." (trsl. Basak, *Aśokan Inscriptions*: 111-112, emphasis added)

The other occurrence of '*ājīvika*' would have been on the Barabar Hill Cave that treats dedicatory inscriptions. According to these inscriptions two caves would have been donated by Aśoka to *ājīvikas*. However, in both cases the reading of '*ājīvika*' has been reconstructed, leaving thus some doubt whether '*ājīvikas*' really were mentioned. Thus we have: "A. (1) लाजिना पियदसिना दुवाडसवसा (भिसितेना) (2) (इयं) (निगो)हकुभा दि(ना आजीवि)

केहि (।) B. (1) लाजिना पियदसिना दुवा — (2) डसवसाभिसितेना इयं (3) कुभा खलतिकपवतसि (4) दिना (आजीवि) केहि

(।)" (*Aśokan Inscriptions*, 1959: 153) "A. By King Priyadarśī, when he had been consecrated twelve years, was given (or granted) this Banyan-cave to the Ajīvikas. B. By King Priyadarśī, when he had been consecrated twelve years, was given this cave in the Khalatika hill." (trsl. Basak, *Aśokan Inscriptions*: 154)

Of the last two referred to Vinaya passages it can be added that both the *ājīvikasāvakas* and *ājīvikas* are put in a rather poor light, reflecting a negative perception or rivalry sentiment of the monk-editors of the passages. Bearing reference to the members of a certain household, the *ājīvika* lay-followers at Vin III 135-137 are presented as both untruthful and as mistreating their daughter-in-law. At Vin IV 224 a certain man seeks to take revenge on *bhikkhunī* Thullanandā for having had him punished by the chief ministers because he tried to reclaim a store-room his deceased father once donated to the *bhikkhunī saṅgha.* A negative perception of *ājīvika* ascetics shines through when the man decides, as revenge, to make a sleeping place for *ājīvikas* (*ājīvikaseyyā*) near the 'nunnery' (*bhikkunūpassaya*) and when he asks them to talk down the *bhikkhunīs.* By presenting *ājīvikas* as vile speakers and as a (physically) threat for *bhikkhunīs,* the monk-editors of this passage betray their negative perception of *ājīvikas.* The same is true for Vin IV 91 where an *ājīvika* having just received food of a Buddhist lay-follower at a *vihāra,* is presented as ungrateful by speaking vilely about the Buddhist community to other *ājīvikas.*[15]

In addition to confirming the historicity of the *ājīvika* community, and of providing some insights into the perception of the Buddhist monk-editors on this community, two other *ājīvika* occurrences in the Pāli Vinaya allow us to establish the fact that nakedness, as we have seen, was practiced by (certainly some) *ājīvikas.*[16]

A somewhat isolated but interesting *ājīvika* reference occurs at Vin IV 74 where in a secondary introductory story to *pācittiya* XXXII, which prohibits Buddhist *bhikkhus* to participate in a group-meal (*gaṇabhajana*), we read how an *ājīvika* ascetic and close relative to King Seniya Bimbisāra of Magadha expresses his desire to the latter to organize "a meal for all the heretics" (*sabba-pāsaṇḍika-bhatta*). The *rāja* agrees on the condition that the *ājīvika* "would first entertain the *bhikkhu saṅgha* with the Buddha at their head." On the *ājīvika's* subsequent invitation of the Buddha and his *bhikkhu saṅgha* to the group-meal, the Buddha modifies the previously formulated *pācittiya* precept to allow Buddhist *bhikkhus* to participate in a "*samaṇa-bhatta-samaya*" or a "meal time for recluses." In the light of our previous discussion of direct contact opportunities this is a very interesting passage as it points, once again, to the close interaction possible between the members of the various ascetic communities.

Finally there are two more references to *ājīvikas* which, as Johannes Bronkhorst noted, are "least informative."[17] For beyond confirming the fact that the *ājīvikas* referred

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[15] See p. 108 ff. where the complete Vinaya passage is discussed in great detail.

[16] Thus Vin I 290-292 and Vin III 212 where naked Buddhist *bhikkhus* are being mistaken for *ājīvikas.* See p. 129 for a critical discussion of these Vinaya passages.

[17] Cf. Bronkhorst 2000: 511 who also offers an examination of the *ājīvika* occurrences in the Pāli Vinaya as well as in some Pāli Suttas.

to in these passages (Vin I 291 and Vin II 284) were *ājīvikas,* they do not disclose any other type of information. Thus we have Upaka the *ājīvika* at Vin I 291 asking the Buddha about his teacher when the latter was on his way to Isipatana to teach *dhamma* after having attained enlightenment. And at Vin II 284 we read how 'a certain *ājīvika'* who had picked up a *mandārava* flower was asked by the venerable Mahākassapa whether he knew about the Buddha's *nibbāna.*

paribbājaka (one-to-one)

See the lemma under the section of generic denominations, where I argue that the term could both have had a one-to-one correspondence, as well as a general reference field to refer to any ascetic of any community.

jaṭila

The term *jaṭila* as a one-to-one denomination bears reference to a particular group of *brāhmaṇa* ascetics whose headdress, as indicated by the term *jaṭila* ('matted hair') itself, constituted one of their important distinguishing characteristics.[18] The *brāhmaṇa* identity of *jaṭilas* or 'matted hair ascetics' is seen confirmed at various places in the Pāli Vinaya.[19]

It is, for instance, unambiguously stated at Vin I 25 (BD IV 35) where the narrative refers to the *jaṭila* Uruvelā-Kassapa with the term '*brāhmaṇa.'* The *brāhmaṇa* identity is further evident from the *jaṭilas'* socio-geographical location. The *jaṭilas* in the Pāli Vinaya are socio-geographically linked with 'hermitages'. This is, they are found residing in an *assama* (Skt. *āśrama*) that, moreover, is said to be equipped with a 'fire-room' (*agyāgāra*). Some Pāli Vinaya narratives further specify that the *assama* is being located within an *arañña* or forest. Finally, their *brāhmaṇa* identity can also be inferred from what *jaṭilas* are recorded to be doing, namely, as making sacrifices (*[mahā]yañña*, Skt. yajña).[20] As executors of sacred sacrifices *jaṭilas* constituted, just as the Buddhist

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[18] Within the prescriptive Dharmasūtras (ed. & trsl. Patrick Olivelle 2000) the *jaṭila* headdress is prescribed for the *vānaprastha.* The DS of B. (2.11.15), for instance, says of the *vānaprastha* that 'he shall wear matted hair [*jaṭila*] and clothes of barks or skin'. Cp. DS of V 9.1. Also the DS of G. prescribes the same for the *vaikhānasa* or anchorite at 3.34: 'he shall wear matted hair and clothes of bark or skin.' The *brahmacārin* or student may also wear matted hair. See e.g. DS of G. (I.27): 'students may shave their heads completely, wear their hair matted, or keep just the topknot matted.'

[19] On the historical question whether the early Buddhist ascetic community evolved in a *brāhmaṇa* (ideological) dominated environment, see Bronkhorst 2007; Bronkhorst 2010 and Schlieter 2010. For an analysis of '*brāhmaṇa*' in early Buddhist texts, see Tsuchida 1991. For a study of the representation of the *brāhmaṇa* sacrifice, see Freiberger 1998.

[20] It may be noted that in the Dharmasūtras the forest hermit (who wears matted hair, *jaṭila*) is required to establish and maintain the sacred fire. Cf., e.g., DS of V 9.10.

bhikkhu saṅgha, a merit-making field for donating householders. In this respect *jaṭilas* were competitors of the early Buddhist *bhikkhu.* This competitiveness is nicely reflected in the following Pāli Vinaya (I 26-27) passage:

> Now at that time a great sacrifice (made by) the *jaṭila* Uruvelakasspa was going forward, and the entire (population of) Anga and Magadha, taking abundant solid food and soft food, wanted to go (to it) . . . . and then it occurred to the Jaṭila Uruvelakassapa . . . if the great recluse [*mahāsamaṇa,* i.e. the Buddha] does a wonder of psychic power before the populace, the great recluse's gains and honour will much increase, my gains and honour will decline. (trsl. I.B. Horner BD IV 36-37)

It is interesting to note how *jaṭilas* as competitors of the early Buddhist *bhikkhu* stand out in the Pāli Vinaya. This is, compared to *nigaṇṭhas* and *ājīvikas,* *jaṭilas* are dealt with differently. A most obvious example is the preferential treatment given to *jaṭilas* who wish to go forth into the Buddhist *bhikkhu saṅgha.* At Vinaya I 69-71 (BD IV 85-89) we learn that whoever is an *aññatitthiyapubba,* this is, one who previously belonged to a different ascetic community, and who wishes to go forth into the Buddhist *bhikkhu saṅgha* needs to first undergo a four month during probation period (*parivāsa*). Exception is given, however, to *aññatitthiyapubbas* who are Sakyan by birth (*jātiyā Sākiya*)[21] and, interestingly, to fire-worshipping (aggika) *jaṭilas* too.[22]

Another remarkable difference between *jaṭilas* and *nigaṇṭhas* and *ājīvikas* is their narratological treatment. Though direct and indirect contact with *nigaṇṭhas* and *ājīvikas* constituted a dynamic and dialectic force in the development of the early Buddhist community, the explicit mentioning of *nigaṇṭhas* and *ājīvikas* appeared, as we have seen, to have been something to be avoided in the Pāli Vinaya. As we have pointed out a few times, the normative and traditional character of the Pāli Vinaya certainly partly accounts for this near silence. If the Pāli Vinaya would openly accredit the ascetic organisation and practices of *samaṇa* others to have inspired ascetic developments within the *bhikkhu saṅgha,* it would directly affect both the authority of the Buddha and, herewith correlated, the authority of the Pāli Vinaya itself. In this light, one understands how explicit references to *samaṇa* others in the Pāli Vinaya was something to be avoided, or how positive acknowledgements of their contribution was simply not done.

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[21] This is a special privilege given to the Buddha's relation.

[22] The reason given is that *jaṭilas* would be affirming deeds (*kammavādino*) and affirming what ought to be done (*kiriyavādino*).

In comparison to *samaṇa* others, *jaṭilas* receive a different narratological treatment. It is not so that they are mentioned in much more separate narratives of the Pāli Vinaya,[23] but in the narratives where they do occur their presence and interaction with the Buddha is unproblematic.

In the famous section of 'The Wonders at Uruvelā' (*uruvelapāṭihāriyaṃ*) with the three *jaṭila Kassapas* (BD IV 46ff., Vin I 35ff.), for instance, a remarkably long and intense interaction is recorded between the Buddha and the *jaṭila* Uruvelā-Kassapa. Before the *jaṭila* Uruvelā-Kassapa decided to become a disciple of the Buddha, we find the Buddha staying at his *assama.* While staying in this *assama,* the Buddha is being provided with food by this very *jaṭila* and performs one psychic wonder after the other.[24] Among the many wonders the Buddha performed there is the chopping of wood when wood could not be chopped and the kindling of the sacred fires when the sacred fires of the *jaṭilas* could not be kindled. These two wonders are significant, for unlike many other passages in Buddhist texts, the Buddha is found here not condemning the *brāhmaṇical* practice of sacred fire, but as offering help for enabling its very execution. After each psychic wonder performed by the Buddha (the Pāli Vinaya gives the numerical total of 3500 wonders) the *jaṭila* Uruvelā-Kassapa reflects: "Truly the great recluse [*mahāsamaṇa*] is of great psychic power . . . but yet he is not a perfected one as I am [*na tv eva ca kho arahā yathā ahan ti*]," until the Buddha, losing patience, decides to deeply stir Uruvelā-Kassapa with a *saṃvega* effect.[25] How does the Buddha bring about this *saṃvega* effect or deep realization? Not by performing another 3500 psychic wonders, but with the following plain remark: "Neither are you, Kassapa, a perfected one [*n'eva kho tvaṃ Kassapa arahā*] nor have you entered on the way to perfection [*na pi arahattamaggaṃ samāpanno*], and that course is not for you by which you either could be a perfected one or could have entered on the way to perfection." Hearing this, Uruvelā-Kassapa wishes at once to go forth, and so he does. He goes forth together with his 500 disciples and, as the narratives continues, he and his disciples all let their "hair (*kesa*), their braids (*jaṭā*), their bundles

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[23] *jaṭilas* (whether individual *jaṭilas* or groups of *jaṭilas*) occur in four distinct narratives in the Pāli Vinaya. Vin I 24ff. (BD IV 46ff.) being the famous section of 'Wonders at Uruvelā' with the 'going forth' of the three *jaṭila* Kassapas and their disciples into the Buddhist *saṅgha*; Vin I 69-71 (BD IV 85-89) containing the exception for *aggika jaṭilas* to the probation period; Vin I 245ff. (BD IV 336ff.) where Keniya the Jaṭila invites the Buddha and his order of *bhikkhus* for a meal; Vin IV 107ff. (BD II 382ff.) where the Buddhist *bhikkhu* Sāgata stays in the fire-room of Ambatittha the Jaṭila and remains unaffected by the venomous snake because of his psychic powers.

[24] Note how within the Dharmasūtras (ed. & tr. Patrick Olivelle 2000), *vānaprasthas* or forest hermits are prescribed to receive guests in their hermitage and provide them with almsfood. See e.g. DS of V 9.7-8: 'when guests come to his hermitage, [he should] honor them with almsfood of roots and fruits. He should only give, never receive [...].'

[25] Cf. BD IV 42-43, Vin I 32: "Now, suppose I should deeply stir [*samvejjayyaṃ*] this matted hair ascetic [*imaṃ jaṭilaṃ*]?"

on carrying-poles (*khārikāja-missa*) and their implements for fire-worship (*aggihutta-missaṃ*) be carried away in the water." In other words, the *jaṭilas* are shedding off the attributes of their ascetic identity.

When considering the different legal (i.e. probation period) and narratological treatment of *jaṭilas* in the Pāli Vinaya, we can conjecture that *jaṭilas* were perceived and related to, at the very least by the monk-editors of the Pāli Vinaya, as a different type of dialectic other than the *nigaṇṭha* or *ājīvika* other. The question that presses itself then is why? Why were *jaṭilas* and not (also) *nigaṇṭhas* and *ājīvikas* excluded from the probation period (*parivāsa*) in the Pāli Vinaya? Why is the interaction with the Buddha and the three *jaṭila* Kassapas of Uruvelā, or with Keniya the *jaṭila* not problematized? Or why does the overall representation of *jaṭilas* in the Pāli Vinaya not follow the representative pattern of *nigaṇṭhas* or *ājīvikas*?

One possibility for the different treatment of *jaṭilas* is that they were considered to be less 'proximate' than *nigaṇṭhas* or *ājīvikas.* With Jonathan Smith's concept of 'proximate other' we have seen how contact with a proximate other is more challenging and problematic than contact with a remote other. The proximity of a proximate other was one that needed to be dealt with. When considering that within the basic division of the early Buddhist *saṅgha's* wider environment *nigaṇṭhas* and *ājīvikas* were just as Buddhist *bhikkhus* located within the *samaṇa* realm, we understand how the proximity of *nigaṇṭhas* and *ājīvikas* offered a greater challenge than *jaṭila brāhmaṇas* who were located within the '*non-samaṇa*' realm. This may explain why in the few instances in which *nigaṇṭhas* and *ājīvikas* are referred to explicitly they are held up to caricature or put in a bad daylight. Further, it also may account for the differing legal and narratological treatment of the *jaṭilas.* Being less proximate to early Buddhist *bhikkhus* than *nigaṇṭhas* and *ājīvikas,* the *jaṭilas'* presence and interaction with the Buddha did not need to be problematized in a similar manner. However, though the differing proximity could in part account for the unproblematic references to the Buddha staying at a *jaṭila's assama* and being provided with food by a *jaṭila,* or for the unusual long interaction of the Buddha with the three *jaṭila Kassapas* in the Mahāvagga section 'Wonders at Uruvelā,' it does not explain the function of these narratives. I would like to suggest that an important reason for these narratives to be included within the Pāli Vinaya lies in the fact that they establish the authority of the Buddha and the validity of his ascetic path *to* a '*brāhmaṇa*' audience *via* a *brāhmaṇa* authority. This argument will now be expounded.

Let us consider the Pāli Vinaya passage (Vin I 245, BD IV 336-337) where the Buddha is thanking Keniya the Jaṭila for having invited him and his *bhikkhu saṅgha* to a meal. When considering the complete narrative, we note a *brāhmaṇa* affirming the venerability of the Buddha in, so to speak, *brāhmaṇa* terms. The Vinaya narrative in question reads:

Then the Bhagavat, walking on tour, in due course arrived at Āpaṇa. Keniya the Jaṭila heard: "Verily, the recluse Gotama, the son of the Sakyans, who has gone forth from a Sakyan family, has reached Āpaṇa and is staying in Āpaṇa. A lovely reputation has gone forth concerning the Bhagavat Gotama, thus: . . . He explains with the spirit and the letter the Brahma-faring completely fulfilled and wholly pure. Good indeed it were to see perfected ones like this." Then it occurred to Keniya the Jaṭila: "Now, what could I get conveyed to the recluse Gotama?"

Then it occurred to Keniya the Jaṭila: "Now, those who were formerly seers of the *brāhmaṇas* [*brāhmaṇānaṃ pubbakā isayo*], makers of mantras, whose ancient mantras as sung, taught, and composed the *brāhmaṇas* of today still sing, still speak; they still speak what was spoken, they still teach what was taught, that is to say (by) Aṭṭhaka, Vāmaka, Vāmadeva, Vessāmitta, Yamataggi, Angirasa, Bhāradvāja, Vāseṭṭha, Kassapa, Bhagu – these abstaining from food at night, restrained from eating at the wrong time, (yet) consented to such things as drinks. **"The recluse Gotama also abstains from food at night and is restrained from eating at the wrong time; the recluse Gotama is also worthy to consent to such things as drinks," [...].** (trsl. I.B. Horner with minor modifications BD IV 336-337, emphasis added)

This passage is very meaningful. The worthiness of the Buddha is here being explicitly stated by a *brāhmaṇa* and this in *brāhmaṇa* parlance. When noticing that the Buddha shares with the ancient seers (*isi,* Skt. *ṛsi*) the practice of restrain from eating at 'the wrong time,' and when deciding upon this that the Buddha is worthy of the same type of donation (here 'drinks') as the ancient seers (*isi,* Skt. *ṛsis*), the *brāhmaṇa* Keniya the Jaṭila is placing the Buddha on the same pedestal as the ancient seers of the *brāhmaṇas.* The fact that the worthiness of the Buddha is explicitly expressed by a *brāhmaṇa* in *brāhmaṇa* terms (this is, the Buddha is being compared to ancient seers and not, for instance, to the *Jina* of the *nigaṇṭhas*) leads one to suspect that this narrative was intended for a *brāhmaṇa* audience and this, one may further postulate, to address some specific tenets of their so-called *brāhmaṇical* ideology. What is considered to be worthy of respect within the *brāhmaṇical* ideology are, among other things, the tradition of Vedic seers and *brāhmaṇas* themselves. For those *brāhmaṇas,* whether *brāhmaṇa* householders or *jaṭilas,* who desired to go forth into the Buddhist *saṅgha,* and who carried with them these tenets of *brāhmaṇical* ideology, acknowledging the authority of the Buddha and the validity of his teachings could have given rise to conflict. Pāli Vinaya narratives such as the one with Keniya the Jaṭila in which the authority of the Buddha is confirmed *via* the authority of a *brāhmaṇa* must have encouraged *brāhmaṇas* who had gone forth into the *bhikkhu saṅgha* to (gradually) abandon the *brāhmaṇical* ideology they might have adhered to and that might have given rise to conflict, and to instead (gradually) accept and conform to the authority of the Buddha and his ascetic path.

Other examples may be drawn from the section 'Wonders at Uruvelā. At several places within the section 'Wonders at Uruvelā' the authority of the Buddha is explicitly stated *via* the authority of a *brāhmaṇa,* more specifically, via the *jaṭila* Uruvelā-Kassapa. For instance, among the many psychic wonders that the Buddha performed while staying at Uruvelā-Kassapa's *assama,* are the wonders of the Buddha arriving at the fire-room before Uruvelā-Kassapa despite the fact that Uruvelā-Kassapa had departed for the fire-room first. When the Buddha would then offer the astounded Uruvelā-Kassapa a special fruit or flower he had plucked on his way to the fire-room, Uruvelā-Kassapa replied each time with the words: "No, great recluse, you alone are worthy of it, you alone eat it."[26] Though short, this answer is significant as it establishes the worthiness of the Buddha above the one of *jaṭilas* **through** the very authority of a *jaṭila* himself.

Similarly, a little further in the section the superiority of the Buddha's path above the one of *jaṭilas* is voiced **by** a *jaṭila* **to** a *jaṭila.* Once the *jaṭila* Uruvelā-Kassapa had gone forth together with his five hundred disciples, he was successively approached by Nadī-Kassapa (head of three hundred *jaṭilas*) and Gayā-Kassapa (head of two hundred *jaṭilas*) who both asked about his experience of faring the Brahma-faring (*brahmacariyā*) under the Buddha. To their simple question: "Is this better, Kassapa?"[27] Uruvelā-Kassapa powerfully answers: "Yes, friend, this is better."

Further, it may be noted that the distinctive *brāhmaṇa* language of the section 'Wonders at Uruvelā' is also seen in the denomination 'Angirasa' (being the name of one of the Vedic seers) used to refer to the Buddha when he conquered with his psychic power the fierce serpent king who lived in Uruvelā-Kassapa's the fire-room.[28]

In conclusion, the Pāli Vinaya narratives with 'Keniya the Jaṭila' and 'the Wonders at Uruvelā' stand out not just for their unproblematic and, in the case of 'the Wonders at Uruvelā,' long and intense interaction of the Buddha with *jaṭilas,* but also for what they establish. What these narratives appear to do is the establishment of the authority of the Buddha and the validity of his ascetic path *to* a *brāhmaṇa* audience *via* a *brāhmaṇa* authority. The fact that *jaṭilas* as ascetic others were less proximate and, therefore, less problematic than *nigaṇṭhas* and *ājīvikas* cannot, as I have argued, fully account for their different legal and narratological treatment in the Pāli Vinaya. In general, it is against the normative structure of the Pāli Vinaya to *explicitly* refer to the early Buddhist *bhikkhu's* ascetic others, regardless of their degree of proximity.[29] One could suggest,

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[26] BD IV 39, Vin I 30: "*alaṃ mahāsamaṇa, tvaṃ yev' etaṃ arahasi, tvaṃ yev' etaṃ paribhuñjāhīti.*"

[27] BD IV 44, Vin I 33 (MV I.20.20, MV I.20.22): "*idaṃ nu kho Kassapa seyyo 'ti. āmāvuso idaṃ seyyo 'ti.*"

[28] BD IV 35, Vin I 25 (MV I.15.7).

[29] If the various ascetic others (*samaṇa* and *brāhmaṇa*) needed to be referred to (for whatever reasons) the monk-editors of the Pāli Vinaya could and did appeal to the generic, indefinite term (*añña)titthiya.*

however, that the long and intense interaction of the Buddha with the three *jaṭila* Kassapas is due to the fact that *jaṭilas* formed one of the most prominent groups of early Buddhist "converts," which is ultimately what the narrative 'the Wonders at Uruvelā' claims. But again, even if the narrative would contain a historical kernel, and *jaṭilas* formed indeed an important group of early Buddhist "converts," it still would not account for the different narratological treatment of *jaṭilas* in general. Also *nigaṇṭhas* and *ājīvikas* went forth into the early Buddhist community, and yet, a similar narrative for these "converts" has not been developed. Part of the reason for these Pāli Vinaya narratives with *jaṭilas* must, therefore, lie in what they do: confirming the authority of the Buddha and his ascetic path. The fact that this is being established, as we have seen, in '*brāhmaṇa*' terms and via the authority of a *brāhmaṇa* himself, made me suggest that these narratives were intended for *brāhmaṇas.* Finally, since the Pāli Vinaya is a text redacted by *bhikkhus for bhikkhus,* I would like to suggest that these narratives were directed at *brāhmaṇas inside* the Buddhist *saṅgha.* This is, these narratives may be seen to address those members of the Buddhist *saṅgha* who previously had been either a *brāhmaṇa* householder or a *jaṭila* and who, therefore, might have been active agents or passive carries of tenets of the so-called *brāhmaṇical* ideology.

Generic Denominations

sabbapāsaṇḍika

Horner translates '*sabba-pāsaṇḍika*' with "all heretics." The term is used only once in the Pāli Vinaya. It occurs at Vin IV 74 where an *ājīvika* asks King Seniya Bimbisāra of Magadha to organize "a meal for all heretics" (*sabba-pāsaṇḍika-bhatta*). (Cf. above, p. 144). It may be noted that Edict VII of Aśoka mentions respectively '*sava(pāsaṃ)ḍesu*' '*nānāpāsaṃḍesu*', and '*savesu … aṃnesu pāsaṃḍesu,*'[30] suggesting that the term *pāsaṇḍa/pāsaṇḍika* might have been a neutral and commonly used and understood umbrella denomination to refer to (ascetic of) all ascetic/religious folds within early Indian society.

samaṇakuttaka

The term *samaṇakuttaka* meaning "sham recluse" occurs in the introductory story to *pārājika* III. It is used at Vin III 68 ff. (BD I 116 ff.) in connection with the infamous Migalaṇḍika who deprived many Buddhist *bhikkhus* of their lives. According to the story, Buddhist *bhikkhus* being troubled because of contemplating on the impure asked

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[30] Cf. fn. 14.

Migalaṇḍika the *samaṇakuttaka* to deprive them of their lives. He did, wrongly thinking he was helping to cross over those who had not crossed (*atiṇṇa*).

samaṇa-brāhmaṇa

Within the Pāli Vinaya the compound *samaṇa-brāhmaṇa* (Skt. *śramaṇa-brāhmaṇa*) most regularly comes up with the stock phrase envisaging all groups of beings residing in the 'world,' this is the *loka* with its "*devas, Māras, and Brahmās;* [*and*] with [*its*] *samaṇas and brāhmaṇas* [*sa-samaṇa-brāhmaṇa*], with its creatures [*pajā*], *devas* and men."[31]

Next to the Pāli Vinaya, the compound *samaṇa-brāhmaṇa* is also abundantly found in early Jain texts (AMg. *samaṇa-māhaṇa*) as well as being mentioned in the Aśokan inscriptions.[32] Within the Sanskrit grammar Mahābhāṣya of the second century BCE grammarian Patañjali, the compound is cited as an example of a *dvandva* or a compound whose members oppose one another.[33] Despite the fact that this *dvandva* compound suggests that, as Oliver Freiberger lucidly remarked, *samaṇas* and *brāhmaṇas* were considered to be two different groups within Indian society, it also suggests that they were considered, in some respect at least, to be similar, this is, to belong to – or to be constituting together - one larger category.[34] Freiberger refers to this category as the category of 'religious experts' and argues that what is binding or bringing *samaṇas* and *brāhmaṇas* together into this compound – into this category of religious experts - is the fact that both *samaṇas* and *brāhmaṇas* function as a merit making field for donating householders. In other words, the *samaṇa-brāhmaṇa* compound brings together all ascetics of the early Indian landscape - to whom donating was generally considered to

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[31] See e.g. BD I 2 (Vin III 1): "*so imaṃ lokaṃ sadevakaṃ samārakaṃ sabrahmakaṃ sassamaṇabrāhmaṇiṃ pajaṃ sadevamanussaṃ.*" Also BD I 157 (Vin III 90).

[32] Within the Jain Āyāraṅga Sutta the compound *samaṇa-māhaṇa* appears, among other places, in a stock enumeration listing (groups of) individuals who subsist on food donations, e.g. AS II.1.2. §1: "*behave samaṇamâhaṇe atihikavaṇavaṇîmae pagaṇiya,*" meaning "many *śramaṇas* and *brāhmaṇas,* guest, paupers, and beggars."

For the occurrence of the *samaṇa-brāhmaṇa* compound in Aśokan edicts, see Anālayo 2009 where he notes how the sequence of the compound may vary both between edicts, and within one and the same edict and suggests that "[t]hough the sequence of the two terms employed in the early Buddhist discourses may indeed be reflecting a revaluation of the *samaṇa* vis-à-vis the Brahmin, similar to the tendency in the same discourses to mention the warriors (*khattiya/kṣatriya*) before Brahmins, Asoka's edicts suggest that the sequence of such listings may not always have been invested with as much importance as nowadays assumed." Cf. Anālayo 2009: 155.

[33] Cf. Oliver Freiberger 2011.

[34] Cf. podcast on the Oslo Buddhist Studies Forum: "Freiberger, Oliver, 2011, Religion and Religions in the Construction of Early Buddhism." - *Institutt for Kulturstudier Og Orientalske Språk.* <http://www.hf.uio.no/ikos/forskning/nettverk/obsf/podcast/2011/obsf20110523.html>. Last accessed on the 10th of August 2014.

be beneficial, but simultaneously separates Buddhist *bhikkhus,* Jain *bhikkhus, ājīvikas* and other '*samaṇas*' that might have been around at that time, from the group of *brāhmaṇa* ascetics. Both '*samaṇa*' and '*brāhmaṇa*' are umbrella terms, together referring to 'the ascetics' of society, individually each respectively referring to a *samaṇa* ascetic or leader and a *brāhmaṇa* ascetic or leader without, however, specifying the affiliation (in case of *samaṇa*) or the typifying practices or dress features (in case of *brāhmaṇa*).

That the compound *samaṇa-brāhmaṇa* should be considered as bearing reference to a socio-historical category of religious experts is seen confirmed at various places within the Pāli Vinaya and other Buddhist texts where the compound is incidentally being referred to as a, so to speak, 'donating category.' At Vin III 44 (BD I 69-70), for instance, in one of the various secondary introductory stories to *pārājika* II, we read how King Seniya Bimbisāra is reminded by a *bhikkhu* [Dhaniya the potter] to once have said: "let the *samaṇas* and *brāhmaṇas* (*samaṇabrāhmaṇānaṃ*) enjoy gifts of grass, wood and water."[35] Early Buddhist *bhikkhus* who relied on the householders' community for their material subsistence undoubtedly viewed *brāhmaṇas* in their specific capacity of merit-making field as their competitors. It is in this light of competitiveness that we may understand the verses of thanks uttered by the Buddha to Keniya the Jaṭila for having invited and served him and his order of monks with a meal despite the fact, so we read, that he is one devoted to *brāhmaṇas* (*brāhmaṇesu abhippasasanna*) (cp. also p. 88). The verses of thanks read as follows:

> Sacrifices [*yañña*] are chief in fire worship [*aggi-hutta-mukhā*], Sāvitrī chief of (Vedic) metres,
> A king is chief of men, the ocean chief of waters,
> The moon is chief of the lamps of night, the sun chief of the luminaries
> **For those giving alms, desiring merit, the Order is indeed the chief."** (Vin I 246, trsl. I.B. Horner BD IV 340, emphasis added)

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[35] Strictly speaking it is the venerable Dhaniya repeating the words of the king to the king himself. Vin III 44 (BD I 69): '*dinnañ ñeva samaṇabrāhmaṇānaṃ tiṇakaṭṭhodakaṃ paribhuñjantū 'ti.*'
For another example in the Pāli Vinaya see Vin III 207 (BD II 37): "Then that robber-chief, taking the best meats of the cooked meat, tying (them up) in a leaf-packet, and hanging it up on a tree near the nun Uppalavaṇṇā, said: "Whatever recluse or brahmin [**yo samaṇo yo brāhmaṇo**] sees it, it is given (to him), let him take it, ..."
Another example where the compound *samaṇa-brāhmaṇa* is clearly understood as a 'donating category' may be taken from DN I 51.7-20 (14): "Lord, ... there are various craftsmen . . . [who] enjoy here and now the visible fruits of their skills [*sandiṭṭhikaṃ sippa-phalaṃ upajīvanti*], ... [who] themselves are delighted and pleased with this, as are their parents, children and colleagues and friends, **... [who] maintain and support ascetics and Brahmins [*samaṇa-brāhmaṇesu*],** thus assuring for themselves a heavenly, happy reward tending towards paradise." (trsl. Walshe 1987: 93, emphasis added)

samaṇa

As noted in the previous section on Contact, in Buddhist texts the Buddha and Buddhist *bhikkhus* are referred to by outsiders (householders and non-Buddhist ascetics alike) with respectively 'samaṇa Gotama' and 'samaṇa Sakyaputtiya.' Such references account for the bulk of the *samaṇa* occurrences in the Pāli Vinaya. At Vin IV 74 we find, however, a *samaṇa* reference wherein the term is applied to refer to the category of *samaṇa* ascetics in general. When an *ājīvika* invites the Buddha and his *bhikkhu saṅgha* for a meal with the words: "The revered Gotama is gone forth; I, too, am gone forth. One who has gone forth is worthy to accept alms-food of one who has gone forth. Let the revered Gotama consent to (take) a meal with me on the morrow together with the Order of monks,"[36] the Buddha accepts the invitation and formulates the following allowance: "I allow you, monks, to eat a group-meal at a meal-time for recluses (*samaṇabhattasamaya*)."[37] Here *samaṇa* is generically applied, referring to all *samaṇa* ascetics within society. When considering references as this one, together with the facts that in direct contact, as we have seen, early Buddhists profiled themselves as *samaṇas*, it is clear that they considered themselves to fall under the reference field of the term 'samaṇa.'[38] This is also true for the early Jain ascetics. Jain texts often use the term *samaṇa* as an epithet for Mahāvīra,[39] and Jain ascetics are also recorded to be addressed by householders with 'âusaṃto samaṇâ' ('o long lived *samaṇa*'), showing once again the wide currency of the term and hence the institution of 'samaṇa' in early Indian society.

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[36] Vin IV 74 (trsl. I.B. Horner BD II 311): "*bhavaṃ pi Gotamo pabbajito ahaṃ pi pabbajito, arahati pabbajito pabbajitassa piṇḍaṃ paṭiggahetuṃ. adhivāsetu me bhavaṃ Gotamo svātanāya bhataṃ saddhiṃ bhikkhusaṃghenā 'ti.*"

[37] The Padabhājaniya explains *samaṇabhattasamaya* with "*samaṇabhattasamayo nāma yo koci paribbājakasamāpanno bhattaṃ karoti, samaṇabhattasamayo 'ti bhuñjitabbaṃ,*" meaning: "whoever makes a meal, being one who has attained (to the stage of) a wanderer, this means that at the meal-time of recluses (a group-meal) may be eaten." (Vin IV 75; trsl. I.B. Horner BD II 312)
It may be noted that outside the Pāli Vinaya one finds the term *samaṇa* more frequently used to refer to non-Buddhist ascetics. Within the well-known Sāmaññaphalasutta ('Sūtra Concerning the Fruit of Recluseship'), for instance, King Ajātasattu because of an auspicious full-moon night asks his ministers: "Can we not today visit some ascetic [*samaṇa*] or Brahmin [*brāhmaṇa*], to visit whom would bring peace to our heart?" On his question, the visit of the following ascetic leaders is suggested Pūraṇa Kassapa; Makkhali Gosāla; Ajita Kesakambalī; Pakudha Kaccāyena; Sañjaya Belaṭṭhaputta; Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta; and, finally, the Buddha. Cf. DN I 46 (trsl. Walshe 1987: 91).

[38] See also the Sāmaññaphalasutta where king Ajātasattu asks the Buddha whether *samaṇas* or *brāhmaṇas* gain visible fruits for having forsaken the world. Cf. n. 37. Before answering, the Buddha asks: "*Abhijānāsi no tvaṃ mahā-rāja imaṃ pañhaṃ **aññe samaṇa-brāhmaṇe** pucchittho ti?*" (DN I 51: 15, own emphasis)
"Your majesty, do you admit that you have put this question to **other recluses or to Brahmins**?" (trsl. Walshe 1987: 93, own emphasis).
From the adjective '*añña*' (*aññe samaṇa-brāhmane)* it is clear that the Buddha is considered to also belong to the *samaṇa* tradition.

[39] Cf. Kappasutta of Bhadrabāhu, ed. Jacobi, p.33: *samaṇe bhagavaṃ Mahāvīre* (trsl. Jacobi SBE 22: 217).

Despite the facts that early Buddhist *bhikkhus* actively negotiated their right to the *samaṇa* denominator, and were perceived and recognized by outsiders to be *samaṇas,* they will not use the term *samaṇa* to refer to one another. This is, the term *samaṇa* will not be found applied internally in the Pāli Vinaya. To refer to its own members the Pāli Vinaya hosts, so to speak, its own set of terms.[40] The point that needs to be stressed here is the fact that it is not because a term denoting an ascetic other and/or an ascetic category within Indian society is not applied internally, that this means that early Buddhists did not see themselves to fall under the term's reference field, or that they could not positively associate with the ideas and ideals represented by the term. This is true not only for the term *samaṇa* but also, as we will see, for the generic denominations *paribbājaka* and *(añña)titthiya.* To be able to note how early Buddhist *bhikkhus* associate themselves with the ideas and ideals represented by the denominations they use for their ascetic others, helps us to better understand how the early Buddhist community perceived itself and related to its ascetic others within the Indian ascetic landscape.

paribbājaka (generic)

The term *paribbājaka* 'wanderer' (Skt. *parivrājaka*) is another term used in the Pāli Vinaya to refer to some - real or imagined - early Buddhists' ascetic others. It appears to be a term that could be both applied with a one-to-one correspondence and generically.

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[40] The basic set being *bhikkhu* and *bhikkhunī* to which various qualifications can be added telling something about (1) the seniority of the *bhikkhu* or *bhikkhunī* (*thera bhikkhu(nī)* versus *navaka bhikkhu(nī)* 'young,' or 'newly ordained'; and *majjhima bhikkhu* 'a monk of middle standing'), or (2) about his or her qualities or shortcomings (*appapuñña* 'of little merit;' *pesala* 'well-behaved;' *alajjin* 'shameless;' *patirūpa* 'suitable;' *appiccha* 'modest'; *pāpa* 'depraved;' *vyatta paṭibala* 'experienced and competent'); (3) about his '(im)purity' (*suddha bhikkhu anāpattika* 'pure monks who are not offenders' versus a *bhikkhu sāpattika* 'a monk who is an offender' [see e.g. Vin I 170]); (4) about his field of expertise (e.g. *byatta vinayadhara* 'experienced, expert in discipline; *suttantika* 'knowing the Suttantas;' *dhammakathika* 'teaching the *dhamma*;' *jhāyin* 'engaged in '*jhāna*' [see e.g. Vin I 158]); or (5) about their particular task in the running of the monastery (e.g. *senāsanapaññāpaka* 'assigner of lodgings;' *bhattuddesaka* 'distributor of meals;' *yāgubhājaka* 'apportioner of conjey;' *phalabhājaka* 'approtioner of fruit;' *khajjabhājaka* 'apportioner of solid food;' *appamattakavissajjaka* 'disposer of trifles' [see Vin IV 34; 155]; *navakammikā bhikkhunī* 'a nun who is overseer of repairs' [see e.g. Vin IV 211]). For a systematic analysis of the various administrators and administrative roles in Indian Buddhist monasticism, see Silk 2008. Other terms current in the Pāli Vinaya to refer to their own Buddhist ascetics reflect the apprentice stage or teaching role of the members (e.g. a *samaṇudda; samaṇera* meaning 'novice' versus *upasampanna* 'one who is ordained'); *sikkhamānā* 'a female probationer;' *sāmaṇerī* 'a female novice'; and *ācariya* 'teacher;' *upajjhāya* 'preceptor'). Other terms reflect the cohabitation of members (*saddhivihārika* 'one who shares a cell;' *antevasin; antevāsika; antevāsibhikkhunī* 'apprentice').

Who were the *paribbājakas*?

Regarding the term's possible reference field, differing scholarly opinions exist. Some scholars have argued to take the term *paribbājaka* in Buddhist texts as exclusively referring to *brāhmaṇas* while others claimed the term to be referring to all but Buddhist wanderers and still others to both Buddhist and non-Buddhist wanderers.[41] Spurred by this scholarly dissension, Oliver Freiberger undertook a fresh contextual reading of the term in the Pāli canon and concluded that '*paribbājaka*' should be understood as a general term for non-Buddhist ascetics whose particular ascetic affiliation the editors of the texts were unable or unwilling to identify. If differing scholarly opinion exists regarding the possible reference field of '*paribbājaka*,' it is because the term is not univocally applied within Buddhist texts.

The association of the term *paribbājaka* with *brāhmaṇas* is justified not only because the *brāhmaṇa* Dharmasūtras use the term *parivrājaka* to designate the fourth *āśrama* ('order of life'),[42] but also because in a few places within Buddhist texts the term is directly connected with *brāhmaṇa*. Thus we have, for instance, the '*paribbājaka brāhmaṇa Sutta*' or the 'Brāhmaṇa Wanderer Discourse' in the Aṅguttara Nikāya.[43] However, despite this fact that the term '*paribbājaka*' may explicitly be linked with *brāhmaṇa*, it would be problematic to conclude on this basis that '*paribbājaka*' in Buddhist texts exclusively refers to (a particular group of) *brāhmaṇa* ascetics, as some scholars have.

The term seems at times to be used in simple apposition to the householder community, thus bearing ideally reference to any member of the ascetic landscape, or to anyone 'having gone forth' (*pabbajita*). In such cases, the term can generically be applied to refer to any ascetic without, however, specifying his or her affiliation. This accounts for the many ambiguous *paribbājaka* references.

Further complexifying the reference field of *paribbājaka* is the fact that the term is also found in enumerations of groups of ascetics, raising the possibility that *paribbājaka* could also have stood for a demarcated and identifiable group of wanderers within the ascetic landscape.[44]

Differing possibilities of the term's reference field also occur in the Pāli Vinaya. There are eighty-two *paribbājaka* occurrences spread over thirteen individual narratives in the

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[41] See Freiberger 1997: 121-122 for an overview of the various scholarly opinions regarding *paribbājaka's* reference range.

[42] e.g. see DS of B 2.11.16. On the *āśrama* system, see Olivelle 2004 (1993).

[43] AN I 157. See also Freiberger 1997: 124 (1.2 '*brāhmaṇa paribbājaka*')

[44] See for instance AN III 276ff. giving the following enumeration of ten groups of ascetics: *ājīvika; nigaṇṭha; muṇḍasāvaka; jaṭilaka; paribbājaka; Māgaṇḍika, Tedaṇḍika, Aviruddhaka, Gotamaka;* and *Devadhammika*. Cp. Freiberger 1997: 127.

Pāli Vinaya.[45] While some of these occurrences legitimate the scholarly proposition that *paribbājaka* might have denoted a recognized ascetic organisation or institution within the ascetic landscape, other occurrences point, as we will see, to a generic application of the term.

paribbājaka – a specific wandering institution

According to a tradition recorded in the first chapter of the Mahāvagga (Vin I 39-42), Sāriputta and Moggallāna were *paribbājakas* prior to having become disciples of the Buddha. When they went forth into the Buddhist *saṅgha,* they were joined by some two hundred and fifty other *paribbājakas* who had all up till then been leading the *brahmacariyā* life under the leadership of *paribbājaka* Sañjaya. In this recorded tradition, *paribbājakas* appear to have constituted a wandering community. Other references in the Pāli Vinaya support this possibility that individual *paribbājakas* might together have constituted a unit or an identifiable organization within the ascetic landscape. Thus we have at Vin III 240-1 a *paribbājaka* who, after having exchanged cloaks with a Buddhist *bhikkhu,* returns to the *paribbājaka-ārāma* or *paribbājaka* park. Such a reference to a park exclusively allotted to *paribbājakas* raises the possibility that *paribbājakas* formed an organized community. Further, at Vin II 130 we read of the infamous group of six *bhikkhus* that are mistaken for *paribbājakas* by a Buddhist lay-follower.[46] The very fact that Buddhist *bhikkhus* could be mistaken for *paribbājakas* also suggests this possibility that *paribbājakas* could be identified and distinguished from other ascetic members of Indian society and might thus have constituted a separate community or institution. The same is true for Vin IV 120 and Vin IV 91. At Vin IV 120 Buddhist *bhikkhus* are prescribed to 'disfigure' their robe when new.[47] According to the accompanying introductory narrative, the supposed reason behind this rule was the need to visually distinguish the robe (*cīvara*) of a Buddhist *bhikkhu* from the one of *paribbājakas.* Thus we read that when hirelings of the king (*rājabhaṭa*) retrieved the stolen robes of both *paribbājakas* and Buddhist *bhikkhus* and asked the latter to come and identify their robes, Buddhist *bhikkhus* were unable to do so. Being criticized for this, as the narrative structure of introductory stories demands it, the Buddha would have thereupon prescribed the precept to 'disfigure' a new robe, implying that a visual distinctiveness from *paribbājakas'* robes would thus be ensured. What is of interest here is the need to

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[45] The number of individual passages excludes the Parivāra.

[46] The fact that the *bhikkhus* were wandering with *sunshades* (*chatta*) caused the lay-follower to mistake them for *paribbājakas.*

[47] This is applying one of the three modes of disfigurement (*dubbaṇṇakaraṇa*), being the application of a dark green, or mud(-coloured), or black dot or smudge on the new robe. See *pācittiya* LVIII and BD II 407 n. 1 for more information on the interpretation of this practice.

ensure a visual distinctiveness from *paribbājakas* (whether factual or imagined), confirming the possibility that *paribbājakas* might have constituted a group of wanderers distinguishable from other ascetic groups such as the Buddhist one. Also at Vin IV 91 a certain distinctiveness and thus unity of *paribbājakas* is implied when *pācittiya* XLI prohibits a *bhikkhu* to give food with his own hands to *acelakas, paribbājakas* and *paribbājikās*.[48] These Pāli Vinaya passages make the proposition that *paribbājakas* constituted an identifiable and separate group of ascetic wanderers legitimate.

paribbājaka – generic denomination

However, at other places the term does not seem to designate a concrete, separate group of wanderers, but appears to function as a general denomination that can bear reference to all or any ascetic(s) of the early Indian society. That '*paribbājaka*' could bear reference to differing ascetics when functioning as a generic denomination is seen confirmed in the fact that the compound '*paribbājaka-samāpanna*' ('having reached the stage of a wanderer) is in the Padabhājaniya once used to explain '*samaṇa*' and once to explain '*acelaka.*'[49]

Though early Buddhists will not be seen to use the term to refer to one another (for the same reasons as mentioned above for the term *samaṇa*, namely they had their own set of terms to refer to one another), they nevertheless appeared to consider themselves to fall under the term's reference field when generically applied.

At Vin I 101 King Bimbisāra of Magadhā observing that '*aññatitthiya paribbājakas*' or '*paribbājakas* having a different doctrine' gained adherents by regularly coming together to recite *dhamma,* suggested the Buddha to do the same.[50] The need for the qualification of *paribbājaka* with the adjective *aññatitthiya* ('having a different doctrine') is telling. The qualification *aññatitthiya* suggests that without it also Buddhist *bhikkhus* would have been designated with the term *paribbājaka.*

Further, from the manner in which the Padabhājaniya explains '*paribbājaka*' and '*paribbājikā*' it is clear that the compilers considered their fellow *bhikkhus* and *bhikkhunīs* to fall under the reference field of these terms. The commentary reads:

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[48] For a detailed discussion of the introductory story to *pācittiya* XLI see 'Contact Possibilities at '*vihāras,*' p. 108 ff. For a discussion of '*acela(ka)*' see p. 69 ff. and p. 133 ff.

[49] See respectively the Padabhājaniya to *pācittiya* XXXIII (Vin IV 75) and *pācittiya* XLI (Vin IV 92). See also Vin IV 224 mentioning the compound *samaṇaparibbājaka* which Horner views as a *kharmadhāraya,* thus taking the meaning 'a *paribbājaka* who is a *samaṇa.*' I see, however, no reason to exclude the possibility that this might be a *dvandva* compound.

[50] On the translation of '*aññatitthiya paribbājaka*' as '*paribbājakas* having a different doctrine,' see 160 ff. where the concerning Vinaya passage is also discussed in more detail.

paribbājako nāma bhikkhuṃ ca sāmaṇerañ ca ṭhapetvā yo koci paribbājakasamāpanno. paribbājikā nāma bhikkhuniñ ca sikkhamānañ ca sāmaṇeriñ ca ṭhapetvā yā kāci paribbājikasamāpannā.[51]

Which may be translated as:

paribbājaka means: setting aside [a Buddhist] monk and [a Buddhist] novice, whoever [else who] has entered the wanderer['s-lifestyle]. *paribbājikā* means setting aside [a Buddhist] nun and a [Buddhist] female probationer, whoever [else who] has entered the wanderer['s-lifestyle].[52]

The reason why the Padabhājaniya provides a negative definition of the term lies in the fact that it explains '*paribbājaka'* and '*paribbājikā'* contextually, this is, it explains the terms in explicit relation to the precept it comments upon.[53] In other words, the Padabhājaniya aims to further help a correct understanding and application of the precept. For instance, *pācittiya* XLI prohibits, as we have seen, a *bhikkhu* from giving food to an *acelaka, paribbājaka* and *paribbājikā.* When the Padabhājaniya to this precept separates (*ṭhapetvā*) Buddhist ascetics from the category of *paribbājaka* it means - in specific relation to the precept - that the *bhikkhu,* is *allowed* to give food to a fellow *bhikkhu* but is prohibited from giving it to other *paribbājakas.*[54] The fact that the commentary finds it necessary to explicitly separate Buddhist *bhikkhus* and *bhikkhunīs*

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[51] Vin IV 92; BD II 349.

[52] I.B. Horner translates '*yo koci paribbājakasamāpanno'* with 'whoever has reached (the stage of) a wanderer,' hereby showing that she understands *paribbājaka* as not referring to an individual wanderer but rather as representing, as it were, *paribbājaka-tva,* i.e. the (ideal) qualities of a *paribbājaka.* I join Horner to understand *paribbājaka* as not referring to an individual wanderer here, but instead of taking it to represent the abstract ideal of wanderer, I understand it rather as representing the 'wandering lifestyle' in opposition to the householder's lifestyle.

[53] Not all words in the *Padabhājaniya* are explained in the same manner. Some are explained in a typical thesaurus fashion when either a near-synonym is offered or a (technical) definition of the term. These lexicographical explanations are complete on their own and can be understood in isolation from the precept it comments upon. On the other hand, we also have terms explained in specific relation to the precept. For a correct understanding of this explanation the broader Vinaya context needs to be considered. In a certain sense, these 'contextual' definitions provide an additional dimension to the precept; they (can) adjust or further specify how the precept needs to be understood or applied. This is here the case with '*paribbājako*' and '*paribbājikā*'.

[54] Similarly for the Padabhājaniya's explanation of (1) the term *paribbājikā* mentioned in *pācittiya* XXVIII at Vin IV 285 (Bhikkhunīvibhaṅga) and of (2) the terms *paribbājaka* and *paribbājikā* mentioned in *pācittiya* XLVI at Vin IV 302 (Bhikkhunīvibhaṅga).
It may be noted that Freiberger draws upon these same Padabhājaniya passages to argue that *bhikkhus* as followers of the Buddha wished to dissociate themselves from the terminology of other ascetics and did not want to be considered to be *paribbājakas.* Cf. Freiberger 1997: 125 & 130.

from the terms '*paribbājaka*' and '*paribbājikā*' evidences the fact that the monk-editors considered their fellow *bhikkhus* and *bhikkhunīs* to fall under the terms' reference field.

Concluding this excursion of the possible reference fields of the term *paribbājaka*, one may note that the term could be classified both as a one-to-one denomination (when referring to a representative of the *paribbājaka* institution that could be distinguished and demarcated from other ascetic organizations) and as a generic denomination (when bearing reference to any ascetic, this is to any member within the Indian society who 'went forth'). It may be noted that within the Jain Āyāraṅga Sutta the terms *parivāyaa* and *parivāia,* being the Ardhamāgadhī equivalents for Pāli *paribbājaka* and *paribbājikā,* are also seen used as generic denomination, leaving the affiliation of the denoted ascetic other undetermined.[55]

aññatitthiya

The compound *aññatitthiya* appears in the syntactic function of both adjective and substantive in the Pāli Vinaya. When employed as an adjective, *aññatitthiya* further defines the term *paribbājaka.* As adjective, *aññatitthiya* may be rendered as (a *paribbājaka*) 'having a different (*añña*) doctrine/community' or (a *paribbājaka*) 'following a different path to liberation.' As substantive, *aññatitthiya* may be understood as '(an adherent or the head of) a different ascetic community.'

The term *aññatitthiya* is mentioned in four distinct narrative contexts, all of which belong to the Khandhaka. Just as the other generic denominations discussed thus far, *aññatitthiya* is in its core an indefinite term, referring to early Buddhists' ascetic others while leaving their specific affiliation, doctrine, or teacher undetermined. Peculiar to the term *aññatitthiya,* however, is the fact that it not only generically refers to a group of early Buddhists' real or imagined ascetic, proximate others (*titthiyas*), but that it also establishes a relation of differentiation with another group of *titthiyas.* The term's differential nature is established by its first constituent '*añña*' meaning 'other' or 'different.' The '*añña*'-component indirectly relates to a different, this is, a second group of *titthiyas* from whom the (group of) individuals (who are directly pointed to with the term *aññatitthiya*) is differentiated. We will see how in all four Pāli Vinaya narratives the '*añña*'-component of the term unmistakably relates to the Buddha and/or his disciples, suggesting that early Buddhist *bhikkhus* considered themselves, and were considered by others, to be *titthiyas,* at least for some time.

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[55] See e.g. AS 53: II.1.3 §2 (Jacobi SBE 22: 94).

A first occurrence of *aññatitthiya* can be found in the second section of the Mahāvagga (MV II 1-4) where the *uposatha* ceremony comes to be prescribed and regularized into the bimonthly recital of the Pātimokkha by a complete Order. The accompanying narrative relates that lying at the basis of the Buddha's institutionalization of the *uposatha* ceremony is the custom of '*aññatitthiya paribbājakas,*' which King Seniya Bimbisāra brought to the Buddha's notice, to assemble and recite *dhamma.* Thus we read how King Seniya Bimbisāra shared the following thought with the Buddha:

> At present *aññatitthiya paribbājakas* assemble and speak *dhamma* on the fourteenth, fifteenth and eighth days of the half-month. These people approach them to hear *dhamma.* They obtain affection for the *aññatitthiya paribbājakas*, they gain faith [in them], the *aññatitthiya paribbājakas* gain adherents [*pakkha*]. Suppose the masters should also collect together on the fourteenth, fifteenth and eighth days of the half-month? [56] (MV II 3, trsl. partly following I.B. Horner BD IV 130)

Regarding the ascetic affiliation of the *aññatitthiya paribbājakas,* the narrative does not provide sufficient additional information to identify it. The group of *titthiyas* with whom the term *aññatitthiya* establishes a relation of differentiation can, on the other hand, unmistakably be identified as the Buddha's disciples. The *añña*-component bears reference to 'the masters' (Pāli *ayyā*) and since Bimbisāra's words are directly addressed to the Buddha, it is clear that it are his disciples who are to be understood here by 'the masters.'

The introductory narrative to the establishment of the rain retreat (*vassavāsa*; MV III 1-3) also mentions *aññatitthiyas.* According to this narrative, while Buddhist monks had not yet taken up the habit to put on hold their itinerant existence during the rainy season, some group(s) of *aññatitthiyas* had. With green life abundantly sprouting up during the rainy season, touring Buddhist *bhikkhus* would inevitably trample down many of this green life and the small creatures it hosts. The lack of the Buddhist *bhikkhus* to adhere to a rain retreat and to hence harm plant live and other small beings was, according to our introductory story, subject to criticism. This criticism is voiced here by means of the common stock phrase of '*manussā ujjhāyanti khīyanti vipācenti*' ('people are angry, irritated [and] speaking dispraisingly'). The people in their criticism

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[56] Vin I 101: "*etarahi kho aññatitthiyā paribbājakā cātuddase pannarase aṭṭhamiyā ca pakkhassa sannipatitvā dhammaṃ bhāsanti. te manussā upasaṃkamanti dhammasavanāya. te labhanti aññatitthiyesu paribbājakesu pemaṃ, labhanti pasādaṃ, labhanti aññatitthiyā paribbājakā pakkhaṃ. yaṃ nūna ayyāpi cātuddase pannarase aṭṭhamiyā ca pakkhassa sannipateyyun ti.*"

contrast Buddhist *bhikkhus* with *aññatitthiyas* who unlike the Buddhist *bhikkhus* adhered to a rain retreat. At Vinaya I 137 we can read the people's annoyance:

> People were angry, irritated [and] speaking dispraisingly: 'How can these recluses, sons of the Sakyans, walk on tour during the cold weather and the hot weather and the rains, trampling down crops [and] grasses, harming life that is one sensed facultied [*ekindriyaṃ jīvaṃ viheṭhentā*] and bringing many small creatures to destruction. Will it be that those *aññatitthiyas*, whose *dhamma* is badly preached, cling to and prepare a rain retreat, will it be that these birds, having made their nests in the tree-tops, cling to and prepare a rain retreat, while these recluses, sons of the Sakyans, walk on tour during the cold weather and the hot weather and the rains, trampling down crops [and] grasses, harming life that is one sensed facultied and bringing many small creatures to destruction?'[57] (trsl. partly following I.B. Horner, BD IV 183)

Just as with the occurrence of '*aññatitthiya*' in the introductory story to the establishment of the *uposatha* ceremony, here too the narrative context *as it stands* offers insufficient information to determine with certainty the ascetic affiliation of the *aññatitthiyas.* However, as I have extensively argued elsewhere that the presence of the Jain technical term 'one sensed facultied life' (*ekindriya jīva*) in the Pāli Vinaya should be understood as a remnant of an inter-communal debate between early Buddhists and Jains on the principle of non-violence (*anārambha*), it is very likely that the *aññatitthiyas* referred to in this passage are Jains.[58] Regarding the group of *titthiyas* from whom the *aññatitthiyas* (i.e. Jains) are differentiated, they too can be determined here to be the Buddha's disciples or, as the people refer to them, 'the sons of the Sakyans' (*Sakyaputtiyā*).

A third occurrence of *aññatitthiya* is in the lengthy introductory narrative to the *dukkaṭa* offence for the consumption of meat that has purposively been prepared for a *bhikkhu's* sake. As it may be remembered, part of this narrative (MV VI.31)[59] has already been discussed under the lemma '*nigaṇṭha*' as it was one of the only two places in the Pāli Vinaya where *nigaṇṭhas* are explicitly mentioned. The narrative presented the *nigaṇṭhas*

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[57] Vin I 137: "*manussā ujjhāyanti khīyanti vipācenti: kathaṃ hi nāma samaṇā Sakyaputtiyā hemantam pi gimham pi vassam pi cārikaṃ carissanti haritāni tiṇāni sammaddantā ekindriyaṃ jīvaṃ viheṭhentā bahū khuddake pāṇe saṃghātaṃ āpādentā. ime hi nāma aññatitthiyā durakkhātadhammā vassāvāsaṃ alliyissanti saṃkāpayissanti, ime hi nāma sakuntakā rukkhaggesu kulāvakāni kartivā vassāvāsaṃ alliyissanti saṃkāpayissanti, ime pana samaṇā Sakyaputtiyā hemantam pi gimham pi vassam pi cārikaṃ caranti haritāni tiṇāni sammaddantā ekindriyaṃ jīvaṃ viheṭhentā bahū khuddake pāṇe saṃghātaṃ āpādentā 'ti.*"

[58] Cf. Maes 2010-2011.

[59] This narrative is also taken up in the AN I 179ff.

as losing their lay-disciple the general Sīha to the Buddhist community, and as openly disapproving of the Buddhist custom to eat meat knowing the animal was prepared for their own sake (cf. p. 140 ff.).

The term *aññatitthiya* is pronounced by the general Sīha in a conversation with the Buddha. The general Sīha, who gained *dhamma* insight through the Buddha enunciating several of his doctrinal tenets, wished to be accepted as a lay follower (*upāsaka*). The Buddha, before admitting the general Sīha into his *saṅgha,* requested him to carefully consider his wish to become a Buddhist lay follower. The Buddha's incitement seemed to have delighted the general Sīha who replied:

> I, reverend sir, am exceedingly pleased [and] satisfied because the Bhagavat spoke thus to me: 'Now, Sīha, thoroughly consider [it], thorough consideration is good for well-known men like yourself.' For, reverend sir, if *aññatitthiyas* would have secured me as a disciple [*sāvaka*], they would have paraded a banner all round Vesālī, saying: 'The general Sīha has joined our disciplehood.'[60] (trsl. partly following I.B. Horner, BD IV 322-323).

The manner in which the term *aññatitthiya* is applied in this passage is similar to the two previously discussed cases: whereas it remains uncertain which specific group(s) of *titthiyas* is being referred to with '*aññatitthiya,*' the differential aspect bears on the Buddhist ascetic community. The latter can be concluded from the fact that the general Sīha, who is the one referring to the so-called *aññatitthiyas*, is addressing himself to the Buddha. In other words, the *añña*-component of the term *aññatitthiyas* bears thus once again reference to the Buddhist ascetic community.

Regarding the specific group(s) of *titthiyas* the term *aññatitthiya* refers to, one could argue that the narrative context does offer sufficient information to unambiguously discern the ascetic affiliation of the *aññatitthiyas* to be Jain. Given the fact that the above quoted conversation between the general Sīha and the Buddha is set against the backdrop of a confrontation between the Jain and Buddhist community (cf. p. 140 ff.), one could indeed reasonably postulate that the term *aññatitthiya* refers to members of the Jain community. Further, the general Sīha's remark that *aññatitthiyas* would have paraded a banner around Vesalī proclaiming his accession if he would have joined their community, could be interpreted as an allusion to the *dīkṣā-mahotsava* tradition of Jains. Being the "great initiation festival" of a candidate who has been granted permission to

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[60] Vin I 236: "*iminā p'āhaṃ bhante bhagavato bhiyyosomattāya attamano abhiraddho yaṃ maṃ bhagavā evam āha: anuvijjakāraṃ kho Sīha karohi, anuvijjakāro tumhādisānaṃ ñātamanussānaṃ sadhu hotīti. mamaṃ hi bhante aññatitthiyā sāvakaṃ labhitvā kevalakappaṃ Vesāliṃ patākaṃ parihareyyuṃ Sīho amhākaṃ senāpati sāvakattaṃ upagato 'ti.*"

go forth into the Jain ascetic community, the *dīkṣā-mahotsava* entails, among other things, a public procession during which the candidate gives away his worldly possessions to (lay)people, who gathered to celebrate this auspicious event. Needless to say, the higher the social status of the Jain disciple-to-be, the greater the public display.[61] Nevertheless, despite these two arguments in favour of identifying the *aññatitthiyas* with Jains, there remains a serious objection against this identification.

As stated above, the introductory narrative is one of the only two narratives of the Pāli Vinaya to openly mention Jains. For instance, the general Sīha introduced at the start of the narrative as being a '*nigaṇṭhasāvaka*' or, 'a (lay-)disciple of the Jains.' Mahāvīra is also explicitly referred to and this with the term 'Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta.' Further, when the Buddha and his disciples were enjoying a meal offered by the general Sīha, the text records that 'in Vesālī many *nigaṇṭhas* were wailing with outstretched arms... ' (Vin I 237). By designating Jains with terminology peculiar to their community itself, the narrative clearly shows no hesitation here to explicitly refer to them. This raises the question why in the above quoted conversation the general Sīha would have opted for the generic, indefinite term *aññatitthiya* if the narrative specifically intended to refer to *nigaṇṭhas*. Undoubtedly, the monk-editors could have opted for the unambiguous term '*nigaṇṭha*,' a choice which would have been in accordance with the terminology of the rest of the narrative. To reformulate our question from a narratological point of view: what *effect* does the use of the generic term *aññatitthiya* produce in the alleged conversation?

The *effect* of employing the indefinite generic term *aññatitthiya* here is, I believe, twofold. Firstly, since, as stated above, '*añña*' bears on the Buddha and his ascetic community, the use of '*aññatitthiya*' effects a reaffirmation of the active membership of the Buddhist *saṅgha* in the larger ascetic landscape. Secondly (and simultaneously), the use of '*aññatitthiyā*' elevates as superior the Buddhist *saṅgha* from this amorphous ascetic landscape. This is clear from the tone of the conversation between the general Sīha and the Buddha. When the general Sīha's reply to the Buddha is considered again, it becomes apparent that the tone is in true praise of the Buddha (cf. Vin I 236: "I, reverend sir, am exceedingly pleased [and] satisfied because the Bhagavat spoke thus to me..."). Therefore, when the general Sīha compares the attitude of the Buddha towards his wish to become a layfollower with the praxis of *aññatitthiyas* to flaunt a new disciple, he goes beyond juxtaposing two 'facts' but openly chooses the Buddha's attitude in

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[61] For a description of the *dīkṣā* ceremony, see Jaini 2001 (1979): 243 ff, 244: "Every dīkṣā ceremony is accompanied by great pomp and by the performance of various religious acts in the lay community: Jina-worship, charity in honor of the new initiate, and so forth." For a description of the *dīkṣā-mahotsava* among Jain *bhikkhunīs,* see Shāntā 1997 (1985): 458 ff.

For a description of initiation ceremony among Digambara Jains, see Deo 1956: 355 ff.

preference to the one of *aññatitthiyas.* This outspoken preference for the Buddha's attitude places the Buddha and his *saṅgha* in a superior position to all other ascetic communities, creating an appraising dichotomy between Buddhist and non-Buddhist ascetics. In short, the rhetorical effect of the term *aññatitthiya* here is that it validates the participation of the Buddhist *saṅgha* in the ascetic landscape and simultaneously differentiates the Buddhist *saṅgha* from this landscape as a distinctively better community.

The fourth and final reference to *aññatitthiya* in the Pāli Vinaya occurs in the famous Cullavagga narrative relating the establishment of the order of *bhikkhunīs.* According to the narrative, shortly after Mahāpajapatī was granted ordination, she requested the Buddha through the agency of Ānanda, to allow greeting between *bhikkhus* and *bhikkhunīs* according to seniority (*vuḍḍha*). Her request amounted to a suspension of the first of the eighth 'important rules' (*garudhamma*), which states that a *bhikkhunī* should always pay proper homage to *bhikkhus*, even if she has been ordained for a century and he but a day.[62] The Buddha did not consent. When considering the part of the narrative preceding Mahāpajapatī's request, the reader would tend to assume that the grounds the narrative will provide for the Buddha's refusal must lie in the fact that this first and other seven *garuddhammas* played too much of a paramount importance for the admission of women in the Buddhist *saṅgha* to be abolished. For, the narrative states that Mahāpajapatī's earlier acceptance of the eight *garudhammas* constituted her actual ordination. It also greatly emphasizes the importance to comply with these *garudhammas* by ending the formulation of each one of them with the injunction that "this rule is to be honoured, respected, revered, venerated, [and] never to be transgressed during her life."[63] According to the narrative, the motivation for the Buddha's refusal does not rest, however, on the importance of the *garudhammas*, but on the fact that among *aññatitthiyas* male and female followers would equally not greet each other according to seniority, but according to gender. When at Cullavagga X.2.3 Ānanda conveys Mahāpajapatī's request to the Buddha, the Buddha's reply reads as follows:

> This is impossible, Ānanda, it is impracticable that the Tathāgata would allow respectful greeting, rising from one's seat, saluting with joined palms [or] paying

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[62] Cf. Vin II 255: "*vassasatupasampannāya bhikkhuniyā tadahupasampannassa bhikkhuno abhivādanaṃ paccuṭṭhānaṃ añjalikammaṃ sāmīcikammaṃ kātabbaṃ.*"
"A nun who has been ordained [even] for a hundred rainy seasons should respectfully greet, rise up from her seat, salute with joined palms, do proper homage to a monk [even if he is] ordained but that day." (trsl. partly following I.B. Horner, BD V 354).

[63] Ibid: "*ayam pi dhammo sakkatvā garukatvā mānetvā pūjetvā yāvajīvaṃ anatikkamanīyo.*" BD V 354, trsl. I.B. Horner.

proper homage to women [by monks]. For, Ānanda, these *aññatitthiyas*, whose *dhamma* is badly preached, will not respectfully greet, rise from one's seat, salute with joined palms [or] pay proper homage to women; why then should the Tathāgata allow respectful greeting … [or] paying proper homage to women?[64]

The differential aspect of *aññatitthiyas* again unmistakably bears on the Buddhist ascetic *saṅgha*. In this fragment it is the Buddha who is referring to *aññatitthiyas* signifying that the '*añña*'–component is reflexive, i.e. denoting the Buddha himself and consequently his followers, too. The ascetic affiliation of the *aññatitthiyas* is, just as for the other three *aññatitthiya* references, admittedly harder to determine. Though the *ājīvika* and/or Jain community might appropriately be presumed here, the context as such provides insufficient additional information to validate this conjecture.[65]

Two notable features of the *aññatitthiya* reference under discussion are, first, that it is a positive reference, meaning that the greeting custom of *aññatitthiyas* is quoted to act accordingly, and second, that it is the Buddha himself who quotes their custom. The point here is not whether (a real specific group of) *aññatitthiyas* actually practiced this greeting custom, or whether the Buddha really referred to it, but that *the narrative admits the Buddha* to have mirrored his decision on what was customary among *aññatitthiyas*. In other words, what is striking here is that the narrative permits the Buddha himself to positively refer to a supposed praxis of *aññatitthiyas* to, as it were, legitimate the continuation of the observance of the first *garudhamma*. The combined effect of these two features may be made explicit. As the Buddha constitutes the highest legal authority in the general rhetoric of the introductory stories of the Pāli Vinaya, the recognition of praxes of *aññatitthiya* by the Buddha himself, validates them as a source of authority to rest ascetic decisions upon.[66] This type of reference is very rare in the Pāli Vinaya, but the more valuable for precisely that reason.

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[64] Vin II 257-58: "*aṭṭhānam etaṃ Ānanda anavakāso yaṃ tathāgato anujāneyya mātugāmassa abhivādanaṃ paccuṭṭhānaṃ añjalikammaṃ sāmīcikammaṃ. ime hi nāma Ānanda aññatitthiyā durakkhātadhammā mātugāmassa abhivādanaṃ paccuṭṭhānaṃ añjalikammaṃ sāmīcikammaṃ na karissanti, kim aṅga pana tathāgato anujānissati mātugāmassa abhivādanaṃ paccuṭṭhānaṃ añjalikammaṃ sāmīcikamman ti.*" (trsl. BD V 358, trsl. partly following I.B. Horner).

[65] Cf. Mari Jyväsjärvi 2011: 2, where it is noted that it is unclear who is to be understood with the *aññatitthiya*-reference under discussion, albeit that a post-canonical Jain text contains a similar injunction for their female renunciants.

[66] Jyväsjärvi dissertation 'Fragile Virtue' makes a similar observation based on this *aññatitthiya* reference. In the introduction of her dissertation 'Fragile Virtue' she states that this positive reference to the *aññatitthiyas*' praxis "suggests that South Asian monastic and ascetic traditions that allowed women to renounce were looking to each other in trying to establish models for acceptable conduct for these female renunciants, particularly regarding how they should relate to male renunciants of their community." Cf. Jyväsjärvi 2011: 2.

In conclusion, we may note how three of the four references to the practices of *aññatitthiyas* were positive references: their practices would have resulted in concrete disciplinary guidelines for the Buddhist *saṅgha*, these being the implementation of the rainy season retreat, the institutionalization of the *uposatha* ceremony and the insistence to observe the first *garudhamma*. Regardless whether the *aññatitthiyas'* practices really would have effected these disciplinary guidelines, such positive references to the early Buddhist *bhikkhu's* ascetic other are, as we noted, a very rare feature for the Pāli Vinaya. They are one of the very few instances to explicitly confirm the truism that the early Buddhist *saṅgha* modelled itself upon contemporary ascetic organizations.

Further, the indefinite generic nature of the term *aññatitthiya* causes specific narrative effects which both underline the Buddhist *saṅgha's* recognition of other ascetic communities and the Buddhist *saṅgha's* self-validation as being the better one amongst them. The first of these two generated effects is best seen in the three positive references, with the Buddha's supposed reference to the greeting regulations of *aññatitthiyas* to legitimate the continuation of the first *garudhamma* being the paradigmatic example. The term's narrative effect of validating the Buddhist community as being the best one within the ascetic landscape is best represented with the reference to the custom of *aññatitthiyas* to flaunt a new disciple around town. The negative aspect of this reference results, as we have seen, in elevating as superior the Buddhist *saṅgha* from the wider ascetic landscape.

Finally, one last result of our contextual reading needs to be stressed. We pointed out that the '*añña*'-component of *aññatitthiya* established a relationship of differentiation with a second group of *titthiyas*. In all four Pāli Vinaya narratives, the '*añña*'-component bore reference to members of the Buddhist ascetic community, implying that early Buddhists considered themselves and were considered by others to fall under the denomination range of the term *titthiya*. The meaning of this fact will be fully explored in the final section From 'Ascetic' to 'Ascetic other.'

titthiya; aññatitthiyapubba

titthiya is the generic denomination most frequently used in the Pāli Vinaya to refer to the early Buddhists' ascetic others (cf. p.120). The various references to *titthiyas* in the Pāli Vinaya can broadly be divided into four categories.[67] In the course of this discussion, the term *aññatitthiyapubba* will also be treated.

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[67] A philological analysis of both the terms *titthiya* and *aññatitthiya* is given in section IV From 'Ascetic' to 'Ascetic other.'

Incidental and neutral

A first category of references to *titthiyas* consists of "incidental and neutral references." In line with our previous discussion of Nattier's 'principle of irrelevance,' I understand by this references to *titthiyas* that are characterized by the fact that they are not the focus point of the context wherein they occur (in this respect they are 'incidental'),[68] nor do they give information regarding how these *titthiyas* were perceived or related to by the early Buddhist community (in this respect they are 'neutral'). In other words, these references do not offer any insight regarding the nature of the various relations between Buddhist *bhikkhus* and *titthiyas,* but only support the truism that the early Buddhist ascetic community lived in close symbiosis with *titthiyas.* Several of such incidental and neutral references have already been discussed in the section Contact. Thus we had the occurrence of 'a sleeping place of (a) *titthiya(s)*' (*titthiyaseyyā*) mentioned in a small standardized list of places that seem to have been frequented by Buddhist *bhikkhus.* As we have seen, the casuistry to *Pācittiya* LXXXV,[69] which prescribes that a monk should enter a village at the 'right time,'[70] mentions that a *bhikkhu* commits no offence "if he is going into a village; if he is going to the nun's quarters; if he is going to the sleeping place of (a) *titthiya(s)*; [. . .]."

Another incidental and neutral reference to *titthiyas* that has already been discussed in the section Contact, is the reference at Vin IV 70.1 where it is said that *titthiyas* started to avoid going to a particular *āvasatha* or public-rest house as the group of six *bhikkhus* stayed there on and on.[71]

Further, we have '*titthiya*' and '*titthiyasāvaka*' occurring in a standard enumeration of possible (groups of) people from whom a *bhikkhu* may have heard a valid reason to doubt the 'purity' (*suddha*) of a fellow *bhikkhu* (i.e. he committed an offence) and to subsequently suspend the 'Invitation' or *pavāraṇā* ceremony. The possible (groups of) people are: *bhikkhus, bhikkhunīs,* probationers, male and female novices, kings and their ministers, and finally also *titthiyas* and *titthiyasāvakas.*[72] The reference to *titthiyas* and *titthiyasāvakas* in this passage is incidental and neutral. Being part of a standard enumeration, the two terms are not the focus point of the passage (incidental), nor does the reference involve a value judgment regarding *titthiyas* or their lay-followers (neutral).

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[68] Cf. p. 84 ff.

[69] Vin IV 164-66; BD III 82-6. Similarly for *pācittiya XLVII* and *pāṭidesaniya I.* '*titthiyaseyyā*' respectively occurs at Vin IV 166.30; Vin IV 101.6 and Vin IV 176.37. Cf. p. 94 ff.

[70] 'wrong time' is defined as after noon until sunrise. Cf. BD III 86.

[71] Cf. Contact 'Public Rest-Houses (*āvasatha*),' p. 88 ff.

[72] Vin I 172 (BD IV 227): "*bhikkhussa sutaṃ, bhikkhuniyā s., sikkhamānāya s., sāmaṇerassa s., sāmaṇeriyā s., upāsakassa s., upāsikāya s., rājūnaṃ s., rājamahāmattānaṃ s., titthiyānaṃ s., titthiyasāvakānaṃ sutan ti.*" (= Vin I 173.3-4)

A final incidental and neutral reference to *titthiyas* is found in the lengthy introductory story to *saṃghādisesa* II of the Bhikkhunīvibhaṅga where we read how an adulterous woman being on the run from her husband had tried to join a group of '*titthiyas*' but had not been permitted by them.[73]

Competitiveness - Outspoken rivalry

In terms of gaining adherents and of receiving both material support and recognition of one's ascetic lifestyle and doctrinal tenets, the different ascetic communities constituted, as already pointed out a few times, each other's opponents. A sense of rivalry and competitiveness might, therefore, at times have predominantly coloured the perception of early Buddhists of their ascetic others. Indeed, an explicit example of a rather strong sentiment of rivalry is recorded in the introductory story to *pācittiya* I, which prohibits the telling of a conscious lie (*sampajānamusāvāda*). Being overthrown in a debate with *titthiyas*, the *bhikkhu* Hatthaka went on to deceive these *titthiyas* by telling various lies. On being reprimanded for doing so, Hatthaka defended himself by remarking that: "[T]hese *titthiyas* should be conquered in whatever way, victory should not be given to them."[74]

Another example where the rival spirit between the Buddhist community and *titthiyas* is perceptible, is in the phrase "*ime … titthiyā avaṇṇakāmā buddhassa avaṇṇakāmā dhammassa avaṇṇakāmā saṃghassa,*" meaning "these *titthiyas* desire blame for the Buddha, they desire blame for the [Buddhist] *dhamma*, they desire blame for the *saṅgha*."[75]

Competitiveness - Gaining disciples from titthiyas and loosing disciples to titthiyas

The Pāli Vinaya holds particular terms, references and regulations indicating that the early Buddhist community not only attracted '*titthiyas*' into its *saṅgha*, but also lost some of its own disciples to *titthiyas*. A few passages also suggest the possibility that some ascetics might have gone back and forth a few times between various ascetic communities.

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[73] The story continues to tell how the woman, being refused to go forth among *titthiyas*, approached the Buddhist *bhikkhunī* Thullanandā who did let her go forth. This would have caused the formulation of *saṃghadisesa* II which reads: "Whatever nun should knowingly receive a woman thief found to merit death, without having obtained permission from a king or an Order or a group or a guild or a company, unless she is allowable, that nun also has fallen into a matter that is an offence at once, entailing a formal meeting of the Order involving being sent away." Vin IV 225 (trsl. I.B Horner BD III 182).

[74] Cf. Vin II 1 (BD II 165): "*ete kho, āvuso, titthiyā nāma yena kenaci jetabbā, neva tesaṃ jayo dātabbo 'ti.*"

[75] Cf. Vin IV 91 (BD II 348). This is put in the mouth of Buddhist lay-followers and is part of the lengthy introductory story to *pācittiya* XLI wherein the venerable Ānanda is distributing the *saṅgha's* food left-overs to those who 'eat scraps of food.' For a detailed discussion of this introductory story, see p. 108 ff.

The term *aññatitthiyapubba* or 'one who has previously belonged to another ascetic community,' together with a small set of precepts regulating what should be done if an *aññatitthiyapubba* should desire to join the Buddhist *saṅgha* are indicative of the fact that the early Buddhist community gained adherents from other ascetic communities.[76] At the same time, the development of a term such as *titthiyapakkanta* or 'one who has gone over to another ascetic community,' points to the reality that the early Buddhist community also lost some of its members to other ascetic organisations. Before discussing the various references to *titthiyapakkantas,* the small narrative introducing the formulation of the four month probation (*parivāsa*) or test period for *aññatitthiyapubbas* may be quoted. The narrative hints at the possibility of certain ascetics going over from one ascetic organisation to the other before, so to speak, making up their mind. Vin I 69 reads:

> Now at that time one who had previously belonged to another ascetic community [*aññatitthiyapubba*] when he was being spoken to by his preceptor regarding a rule, having refuted the preceptor, went over to the fold of that same ascetic community [*titthāyatana*] (as before), but having come back again, he asked the *bhikkhus* for ordination. (trsl. partly following I.B. Horner BD IV 85)

The Buddha upon hearing this prescribes that such a particular *aññatitthiyapubba* should not receive ordination, whereas other *aññatitthiyapubbas* could providing that they successfully completed the probation period. Drawing on the principle of counter-argument,[77] one may deduce from this passage and accompanying regulations that some ascetics might actually have gone back and forth between various ascetic communities. If this was indeed the case, then this both might point to a certain (initial) degree of fluidity between the various ascetic communities, and further account for the facts how early Buddhist *bhikkhus* knew their ascetic others well (cf. p. 63 ff. and p. 68), and also

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[76] The Padabhājaniya to *saṃghādisesa* II of the Bhikkhunīvibhaṅga also incidentally confirms this reality of members of other ascetic communities going forth into the Buddhist *saṅgha* when defining [a woman thief] to be *kappā* or "*allowable*" [to receive ordination] as one who has [already] gone forth among other *bhikkhunīs,* or as one who has [already] gone forth among *titthiyas* (cf. Vin IV 227: "*kappan nāma dve kappāni titthiyesu vā pabbajitā hoti aññāsu vā bhikkhunīsu pabbajitā.*").

For the special regulations for an *aññatitthiyapubba* desiring to go forth and to receive ordination see Vin I 69 – 71 (BD IV 85-89). Apart for a *jaṭila* and an *aññatitthiyapubba* who is Sakyan by birth, they all should undergo a probation (*parivāsa*) or a test period of four months. It is interesting to note that one of the reasons given for the *aññatitthiyapubba* to fail his probation period is if he becomes displeased when dispraise is being spoken about "the teacher, the views, the approval, the persuasion, the creed of that of the fold [*tittha*] from which he has come over [*saṃkanto hoti*]," or also if he becomes displeased when praise is being spoken about the Buddha, the *dhamma* and *saṅgha*. Cf. MV I.38.7 (Vin I 70, BD IV 86).

See also p. 136 the importance of these regulations are discussed in the context of "othering."

[77] Cf. p. 84.

how 'new' ascetic customs could be introduced. Also Vin I 86 and Vin II 279 confirm the possibility of ascetics going back and forth between communities, when regulating that respectively a *titthiyapakkanta* and a *bhikkhunī* wearing the saffron robes but joining the fold of another ascetic community, should no longer be able to receive ordination on coming back.[78]

If various passages in the Pāli Vinaya incidentally confirm the reality of the Buddhist *saṅgha* losing members to other ascetic communities,[79] others express a conscious effort or desire to prevent it. Mahāvagga I.27.4 (Vin I 54), for instance, stipulates a *dukkaṭa* offence for preceptors (*upajjhāya*) who do not forgive their *saddhivihārikā* ('cell mate') when the latter apologizes himself for not having conducted himself properly.[80] The supposed incident that would have triggered the formulation of this *dukkaṭa* offence are *saddhivihārikās* leaving the Buddhist *saṅgha* and going over to a different ascetic community (*titthiyesu saṃkamanti*) because their preceptors did not forgive them when being apologized to.[81]

To do like *titthiyas* do

A third category consists of references to an ascetic practice or custom of *titthiyas* functioning as a positive reference point to implement a similar practice or custom. Not surprisingly, this category is with only one reference (three if we include '*aññatitthiya*' references, cf. p. 160 ff.) the least represented category. At Vin II 151 (BD V 212) the

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[78] Vin I 86 (BD IV 110): "*titthiyapakkantako bhikkhave anupasampanno na upasampādetabbo, upasampanno nāsetabbo 'ti.*"

Vin II 279 (BD V 387) : "*yā sā bhikkhave bhikkhunī sakāsāvā titthāyatanaṃ saṃkantā, sā āgatā na upasampādetabbā 'ti.*"

[79] *titthiyapakkantaka* is incidentally mentioned at Vin I 125.5; Vin I 136.1; Vin I 168.7; Vin I 307.7; Vin I 320.22; Vin I 322.10, all confirming that the possibility of losing adherents to other ascetic communities was a very actual one. See also Vin III 25.10-11 (BD I 43) where the Padabhājaniya to *pārājika* I mentions how there is for a *bhikkhu* a "declaration of weakness with the training not disavowed," when he, among other possibilities, longs to become a *titthiya,* or longs to become a lay-disciple of *titthiyas* (*titthiyasāvaka*).

[80] Mahāvagga I.25 (Vin I 44-50; BD IV 57-67) stipulates what is due of a *saddhivihārika* to his preceptor. Among other things, a *saddhivihārika* should rise up early and arrange tooth-wood and a seat for his preceptor, he should provide him with drinking-water and conjey, he should wash the bowl of his preceptor once he finishes eating, he should sweep the cell if it gets soiled etc.

[81] Cf. Vin I 54: *tena kho pana samayena upajjhāyā khamāpiyamānā na khamanti. bhagavato etam atthaṃ ārocesuṃ. anujānāmi bhikkhave khamitun ti. n'eva khamanti. saddhivihārikā pakkamanti pi, vibbhamanti pi, titthiyesu pi saṃkamanti. bhagavato etam athaṃ ārocesuṃ. na bhikkhave khamāpiyamānena na khamitabbaṃ. yo na khameyya, āpatti dukkaṭassā'ti."* Cp. also MV I 57.2 (Vin I 84; BD IV 106, emphasis added): "*tena kho pana samayena bhikkhu sāmaṇerānaṃ sabbaṃ saṃghārāmaṃ āvaraṇaṃ karonti.* **sāmaṇerā** *ārāmaṃ pavisituṃ alabhamānā pakkamanti pi vibbhamanti pi* **titthiyesu pi saṃkamanti.**" ("Now at that time *bhikkhus* made a prohibition for novices in respect of an *saṃgha's* entire monastery [*ārāma*]. The **novices**, on being unable to enter the monastery, went away, and left the *saṃgha,* and **went over to other ascetic communities.**")

Buddha allows a dwelling-place (*vihāra*) to be whitewashed, black coloured and red chalked because, according to the small narrative introducing this allowance, the sleeping place (*seyyā*) of *titthiyas* being whitewashed, black coloured and red chalked attracted many people visiting them.[82] Regardless whether some particular sleeping places of *titthiyas* really lay at the basis of this allowance, it is a rare feature of the Pāli Vinaya to openly accredit *titthiyas* to have been a positive source of inspiration.

To not do like titthiyas do

A final category consists of the references to an ascetic practice or custom of *titthiyas* that serve as a negative reference point. These *titthiya* references throw valuable light on the early Buddhist ascetic community's processes of othering. For a detailed discussion of these *titthiya* references, see '*titthiyas* as proximate others.'

Metonymical Denomination

acela(ka)

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[82] Cf. Vin II 151 (emphasis added): "*tena kho pana samayena **titthiyānaṃ seyyāyo** setavaṇṇā honti kāḷavaṇṇakatā bhūmi gerukaparikammakatā bhitti. bahū manussā seyyāpekkhakā gacchanti. bhagavto etam atthaṃ ārocesuṃ. anujānāmi bhikkhave vihāre setavaṇṇaṃ kaḷavaṇṇaṃ gerukaparikamman ti.*"

From 'Ascetic' to 'Ascetic *other*'

This section argues for opening up the conventional semantic range of the term '*titthiya*' from 'one belonging to a non-Buddhist ascetic community' to also include '***an*** adherent,' or '***a*** founder of ***an*** ascetic community.' The reason for widening the semantic scope of the term '*titthiya*' lies in the fact that early Buddhist *bhikkhus,* as I will make explicit, considered themselves, and were also considered by others, to fall under the semantic range of the term *titthiya,* at least for some time during the *saṅgha's* early development. The reference field of '*titthiya*' did not always, as it is commonly assumed, start by default outside the borders of the early Buddhist community. Conversely, during the earliest stages of the development of the Buddhist ascetic community, the reference field of '*titthiya*' started within the very borders of the Buddhist community itself. This fact does not have to mean that early Buddhist *bhikkhus* used the term reflexively. For, as we have seen, to refer to one another early Buddhist *bhikkhus* had a wide set of terms, of which '*titthiya*' was not a part.[1] What it does mean, however, is that early Buddhist *bhikkhus* could, for some time at least, positively associate themselves (and be associated) with the term *titthiya.*

This section aims to raise the awareness that even though the term *titthiya* in the Pāli Vinaya is being employed to (usually negatively) refer to the early Buddhist *bhikkhu's* ascetic others, the term was in Buddhist and other circles not always and solely understood to point to ascetic others, and this in a negative manner. The term *titthiya* appeared to initially have had a more general and neutral meaning of ***an*** adherent/head of ***an*** ascetic community. It is in this general application of the term that the members of the early Buddhist ascetic *saṅgha* considered themselves, and were considered by others, to be *titthiyas.* This is an important observation. It points to a shift in application and understanding of the term *titthiya* which, in turn, indicates an underlying shift of

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[1] Cf. p.155, fn. 40.

the manner in which early Buddhist *bhikkhus* perceived both their ascetic others and themselves vis-à-vis them.

This section is divided into two parts. In the first part, I demonstrate how the semantic range of *titthiya* should indeed be opened up to '***an*** adherent/head of ***an*** ascetic community.' This will be done in three moves. I start with a brief discussion of the manner how '*titthiya*' is customarily understood and translated. In this discussion I point to the distinction between the meaning inferred from the use of the term *titthiya,* and *titthiya's* etymological meaning. Second, the possibility that *titthiya* may indeed have initially meant ***an*** adherent/head of ***an*** ascetic community will be argued by means of a critical discussion of Edgerton's understanding of *titthiya's* corresponding form in Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit, i.e. '*tīrthika.*' Third, I will substantiate my argument to widen up the semantic range of the term *titthiya* by (re)considering the meaning of the presence of the compound *aññatitthiya* alongside the simplex *titthiya* in the Pāli Vinaya*.*

In the second part, I proceed to explain how we are to understand the early Buddhist *bhikkhu's* initial positive understanding of the term *titthiya* by means of (1) a philological excursion of *titthiya* and other kindred terms, and (2) by considering their application in literal versus metaphorical settings.

Part I: The Semantic Range of *titthiya* Reassessed

titthiya, Primary Denotations Reconsidered

Thus far the term *titthiya* has been consequently translated with '(an adherent of) a different ascetic community.' Lexicographers of the Pāli language provide a similar meaning, but generally appeal to terms that are deeply rooted in Christian theological language, such as 'sect' and 'heretic.'[2] The same is true for Isaline Horner who, in her translation of the Pāli Vinaya, usually rendered '*titthiyā*' with 'members of other *sects.*'[3] As it has already frequently and justly been noted that it is not unproblematic to transpose Christian theological terms in the understanding or translation of non-

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[2] Cp. Cone's *A Dictionary of Pāli* Part II 325, *sv*: "an adherent of another sect; a non-Buddhist ascetic." Cf. *The Pali Text Society's Pali-English Dictionary* 302, *sv*: "An adherent of another sect (often as añña°), an heretic."

[3] See e.g. BD III 182; BD V 156. Other translations of '*titthiyā*' given by Horner are 'members of (other) sects' (BD IV 332); 'followers of other sects' (BD II 303); 'adherents of other sects' (BD II 367); 'followers of sects holding other views' (BD II 164).

Christian 'religious' movements,[4] I have opted in my translation of '*titthiya*' for the more neutral term 'community' instead of 'sect,' and '(non-Buddhist) ascetic' instead of 'heretic.' When we deal with the early Buddhist ascetic others, the terms 'sect' and 'heretic' are simply inappropriate not only because they wrongly suggest that these ascetic others would have 'branched-off' from a 'mainstream Buddhist tradition,' but also because the terms imply that early Buddhists would a-priori have had a negative perception of those referred to with the term '*titthiya.*' Though the manner how *titthiyas* are mentioned in the Pāli Vinaya often betray, as we have seen, a sense of competitiveness and rivalry,[5] it would nevertheless be erroneous to consider a negative perception as being inherent to the term *titthiya* itself. This is, *titthiyas* are not *per definition* antagonistically perceived by the speaker or writer of the text; the term '*titthiya*' does not in itself entail any value judgment towards the ascetic other who is being referred to. In Buddhist texts the term *titthiya* is in itself, thus without considering the context in which it occurs, a neutral and general term to refer to the early Buddhist's ascetic other. In short, when we consider its use, '*titthiya*' may aptly be translated with '(an adherent/head of) a different ascetic community' or an 'ascetic other.'

Buddhagosa, just as the present-day lexicographers of Pāli-English dictionaries, considers the term '*titthiya*' to be a derivative of '*tittha.*'[6] More specifically, *titthiya* is an adjective of appurtenance derived from the stem *tittha* and may thus be viewed to have the primary etymological denotation of (one) 'belonging to a *tittha.*'[7] There are three, interrelated, basic meanings for the Pāli term *tittha* (Skrt. *tīrtha*), these being: (1) fording place; (2) (head of a) community of ascetics; and (3) doctrine. The interrelatedness of these three meanings will be made explicit in the following part. For now, it suffices to note that the etymological meanings of *titthiya,* (one) 'belonging to a fording place;' (one) 'belonging to a community of ascetics;' and (one) 'belonging to a (particular) doctrine,' have as such nothing exclusive in their denomination range. Unlike the

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[4] Cp. Dundas 2002² (1992): 45 who notes how "the use of the term 'sect', although ubiquitous in the description of religions, is not without problems, for it implies the existence, often awkward to substantiate, of a mainstream 'official' brand of a religion, from which a group emerges with a claim to purvey a purvey a purer variety of the faith."

[5] Cf. p. 168 ff and p. 123 ff.

[6] See e.g. Cone's *A Dictionary of Pāli* Part I 45, *aññatitthiya, sv.*

Buddhaghosa explains '*aññatitthiya*' with: "*aññatitthiyā 'ti ettha titthaṃ vuccati laddhi, aññaṃ titthaṃ aññatitthaṃ, aññatitthaṃ etesaṃ atthī 'ti aññatitthiyā. ito aññaladdhikā 'ti vuttaṃ hoti.*" This may be translated with: "'*aññatitthiyā*' means: here, '*tittha*' is to be called doctrine [*laddhi*]; another doctrine is '*aññatitthaṃ;*' '*aññatitthiyā*' means there is another doctrine for them; therefore it [i.e. *aññatitthiyā*] is called '*aññaladdhikā.*' Cf. Sp Vol V 1034.

[7] Cf. p. 188 ff. where *titthiya* as an 'adjective of appurtenance' is explained in detail.

manner how *titthiya* is used in the Pāli Vinaya to refer to the early Buddhist *bhikkhu's* ascetic *others*, the etymological meanings do not per se bear exclusive reference to *others;* they point to some particular aspect of an individual, leaving aside whether the individual being referred to should be considered as an 'other' or not. This will help us to understand how '*titthiya,*' as I now turn to discuss, might initially have indeed just meant *an* adherent of *an* ascetic community.

Edgerton's consternation with the term '*tīrthika*'

Franklin Edgerton translates '*tīrthika*' in his *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary* with 'heretic' and adds that the term is 'like its relatives, pejoratively used.'[8] Defining *tīrthika* in this manner, Edgerton joins the lexicographers of the Pāli language who give, as we have seen, a similar translation for *titthiya.* However, Edgerton was consternated by a passage in the Mahāvastu ('Great Chapter') of the Mahāsāṃghika-Lokottaravādins[9] in

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[8] See Edgerton's *BHS Dictionary* 254, *sv.*

Previous to Edgerton's *BHS Grammar and Dictionary* (1957) the language of northern Buddhist texts was termed "mixed Sanskrit" (cf. Winternitz 1999 [1983, revised edition] Vol. II: 233) or also 'Buddhist Sanskrit' (cf. *Mahāvastu,* Jones 1949: x). Jones, in the introduction to his translation of the Mahāvastu, already critically remarked that the term 'Buddhist Sanskrit' conveys "nothing as to its origin and relation to other Indian dialects."(*Mahāvastu,* Jones *op.cit.*) To a certain degree the same may be said of Edgerton's term 'Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit (BHS).' Though both terms reflect the (varying) degrees of Sanskritization of the language of northern Buddhist texts, they fail to reflect its underlying Prākrit. For this reason Gustav Roth's designation 'quasi-Prākrit-cum-Sanskrit' may be more apt, though being even more cumbersome than the designation BHS. Cf. Roth 2005[2] (1970): lx.

Edgerton initially conceived the Prākrit of the northern Buddhist texts as an indication of the text-compilers having a poor command of Sanskrit, but he later reviewed this idea to its opposite. Edgerton's revised conception may be summarized in the words of Emeneau: "The composers wrote or attempted to write in a Middle Indic (Prākrit) language, but they and/or the copyists knew Sanskrit and its prestige too well and could not keep Sanskrit out of it." Cf. Emeneau 1954: 475; see also p. 477 for a clear outline of Edgerton's view on the types of Prākrits underlying the BHS.

[9] The compilation date of the Mahāvastu is generally fixed between the 2nd century BC and the 4th century AD. Cf. *Mahāvastu*, Jones 1949: xi; Winternitz 1999 (1983, revised edition) Vol II: 237. The compilation was certainly completed by the 6th century AD, as from this time onwards the Mahāvastu is mentioned as an autonomous text in other sources, see Tournier 2012: 94.

The Mahāvastu is a highly composite text and although it classifies itself into the Vinayapiṭaka, most scholars have usually dismissed its Vinaya claim and tend to regard it instead as an Avadāna collection on the twofold basis that (1) too little of its content directly concerns strict Vinaya matters (cf. *Mahāvastu,* Jones 1949: xii-xiii; Winternitz 1999 [1983, revised edition] Vol II: 232) as it mainly seems to narrate "practically all the history, quasi-history and legends (*avadānas*) relating to the Buddha..." (*Mahāvastu,* Jones 1949: xii) and (2) that "In almost all the colophons to the chapters the work is styled the *Mahāvastu-Avadāna.*" (*Mahāvastu,* Jones 1949: xiii). See also Tournier 2012 for a recent and critical assessment of the main scholarly contributions to our present day reception of the Mahāvastu text.

which the application of this term does not seem to lend itself to the interpretation of a non-Buddhist ascetic. The passage in question occurs in the Daśabhūmika section[10] and concerns a celebration in verse of the activities of Bodhisattvas who have reached the eighth *bhūmi* ('stage in their career'). We are informed, for example, that Bodhisattvas having reached the eighth stage 'attain deep (levels of) meditations;' 'renounce life because of its vileness' and that:

अतः प्रभृति तीर्थिका वा भवन्ति भवसूदनाः |

अतः प्रभृति कुच्छन्ति कामां शंसन्ति निर्वृतिं ||

*ataḥ prabhṛti **tīrthikā** vā bhavanti bhavasūdanāḥ |*
ataḥ prabhṛti kucchanti kāmāṃ śaṃsanti nirvṛtiṃ || (*Le Mahâvastu,* Senart 1977 (1882) Vol I: 106.8-9, emphasis added)

Henceforth [i.e. from the eighth *bhūmi* onwards] as **tīrthikā** they become destroyers of existence;
[and] they despise the objects of desires and praise release [*nirvṛtiṃ*]. (trsl. partly following J.J. Jones 1949 Vol I: 84, emphasis added)

It is the use of '*tīrthikā*' in this latter verse that probably confused Edgerton. With reference to this verse he remarks: "I suspect a corruption, and cannot explain the text as it stands . . ."[11] His consternation is justifiable since in this verse the application of '*tīrthikā*' appears to conflict with its commonly attested meaning: it is used here not to refer to someone outside of the Buddhist realm, but it is said of Bodhisattvas; it is not

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Vincent Tournier, who recently made a new critical edition of the first two *nidānas* and the prologue to the Daśabhūmika section of the Mahāvastu, pleads to view the text as part of the Vinayapiṭaka of the Mahāsāṃghika-Lokottaravādins. He finds the '*avadāna*-label' from a narratological perspective only "an approximate appreciation" of its manifold textual genres and from a historico-critical perspective simply "inappropriate" since, as he points out, in the oldest retrieved Mahāvastu manuscript up till now (12-13th century), which was not available to the first generation of Buddhologists, the "expression *Mahāvastu-Avadāna* is a ghost word." Cf. Tournier 2012*:* 98-99; 93; 95.

[10] If the complex composite nature of the Mahāvastu (Mv) could loosely be rendered as a patchwork, then its Daśabhūmika section may be conceived as a patchwork within this patchwork. Nevertheless, the various 'units' making up the Daśabhūmika section (Mv I 63-157; *Mahāvastu* Jones 1949: 53-124) are linked together by a clear narrative thread and purpose: the main aim of the Daśabhūmika is to present the ten stages to enlightenment for Bodhisattvas. The greatest part of its content is presented as Kātyāyana's answers to questions of Kāśyapa regarding various aspects of Bodhisattvas' lives, such as their 'characteristics' (BHS *adhyāśaya*); their 'state of heart' (BHS *citta*) as they pass from one *bhūmi* to another; the deeds they refrain from doing; the merit they obtain for having thought 'May we become perfect Buddhas;' or also the reasons why they fail to progress to a next *bhūmi* etc. The Mahāyānic elements of the Daśabhūmika such as the description of the path of Bodhisattvas has already been noted by Winterntiz 1999 (1983, revised edition) Vol II: 236-237.

[11] Cf. BHS Dictionary 254, *sv.*

used negatively but positively. Also Émile Senart, who painstakingly undertook the first critical edition of the Mahāvastu, appears to have been confounded by this use of '*tīrthikā*' as he comments:

> On attend ici la négation au lieu de वा; cette qualité de तीर्थिक, d'*hérétiques,* est bien
>
> étrange à promettre à ces futurs "destructeurs de l'existence [*bhavasūdanāḥ*].[12]

Just as for Edgerton, the problem for Senart also appears to be the incompatibility of the notion that Bodhisattvas as *tīrthikās* could achieve the desirable goal of enlightenment or, in the words of the verse, destroy (the birth of their future) existence, as this would compel a positive understanding of the term *tīrthikā.* Therefore, in order to be able to read the usual negative denotation of 'heretics' in '*tīrthikā,*' Senart would prefer to see the verse negated. This would mean an emendation of 'vā' (वा) to 'na' (न), which would change the verse's meaning to: 'Bodhisattvas as *tīrthikās* do **not** become destroyers of existence.' However, when the larger narrative context of the verse in question is considered more closely, it becomes apparent that it is sound to not have a negation here and to attribute instead a positive meaning to '*tīrthikā.*' For the sake of clarity Mv 105.9 to Mv 107.7 may be quoted here:

कुतः प्रभृति भो जिनपुत्र बोधिसत्वाः सर्वस्वपरित्यागांश्च परित्यजन्ति दुष्करपरित्यागांश्चेति ॥ एवमुक्ते महाकात्यायन आयुष्मन्तं महाकाश्यपमुवाच ॥ अष्टमां भूमिं प्रभृति भो धुतधर्मधर बोधिसत्वाः सर्वस्वपरित्यागांश्च परित्यजन्ति दुष्करपरित्यागांश्च कुर्वन्ति इति ॥ अष्टमां भूमिं प्रभृति भो धुतधर्मधर बोधिसत्वाः सम्यक्संबुद्धपूजया पूजयितव्या इति ॥ तत्रेदमुच्यते ॥

अष्टमां प्रभृति भूमिं बोधिसत्वा जिनात्मज ।
सम्यक्संबुद्धा इति द्रष्टव्या अतः प्रभृत्यनिवर्तियाः ॥
अतः प्रभृति ध्यानानि गम्भीराणि लभन्ति ते ।
अतः प्रभृति उत्तप्तं ज्ञानं तेषां प्रवर्तते ॥
अतः प्रभृति भाषन्ति वाचां ज्ञानपुरोगमां ।
अतः प्रभृति कुच्छत्ता आयुं मुञ्चन्ति पण्डिताः ॥
अतः प्रभृति या शुद्धा तां जातिमनुयान्ति ते ।

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[12] *Le Mahâvastu,* Senart 1977 (1882) Vol I: 460.

अतः प्रभृति यं शुद्धं तद्रूपमनुभवन्ति ते ॥

अतः प्रभृति यं लिङ्गं इच्छन्ति भवन्ति तथा ।

अतः प्रभृति यं देवं इच्छन्ति भवन्ति तथा ॥

अतः प्रभृति तीर्थिका वा भवन्ति भवसूदनाः ।

अतः प्रभृति कुच्छन्ति कामां शंसन्ति निर्वृतिं ॥

अतः प्रभृति भूयिष्ठा भवन्ति वदतां वराः ।

शिष्या देवातिदेवानां संबुद्धानां यशस्विनां ॥

अध्येष्यन्ति ततः परेत्य बुद्धैर्धर्मप्रकाशनैः ।

धर्मं देशयथ प्राज्ञा प्रतिगृह्णथ ऋषिध्वजं ॥

अतः प्रभृति विनयन्ति अर्हत्वे सुबहुं जनं ।

अतः प्रभृति विनयन्ति शैक्षभूमौ बहुं जनं ॥

अतः प्रभृति अनुबद्धा देवा यक्षा सगुह्यकाः ।

बोधिसत्वं महासत्वं यावत्प्राप्ता स्वयंभुता ॥

अतः प्रभृति तद्रूपं अग्र्यं सदेवके लोके ।

अतः प्रभृति वर्णो पि तेजोकीर्तियशोबलं ।

लोकेन विषमं भवति बोधिसत्वानमुत्तमं ॥

अनुत्पादाच्च बुद्धानां पंचाभिज्ञा भवन्ति ते ।

नैष्क्रम्यमनुवर्णयन्ति कामेषु दोषदर्शिनः ॥

अतः प्रभृति देवाश्च असुरा ब्रह्मणा सह ।

गुणैः तेषां अनुरज्यन्ता आगच्छन्ति कृतांजली ॥

वशीभूतान या चेष्टा बोधिसत्वान तादृशी ।

अष्टमाभूमिं या चेष्टा भवन्ति तादृशी तथा ॥[13]

[13] *kutaḥ prabhṛti bho jinaputra bodhisatvāḥ sarvasvaparityāgāṃśca parityajanti duṣkaraparityāgāṃśceti // evamukte mahākātyāyana āyuṣmantaṃ mahākāśyapamuvāca // aṣṭamāṃ bhūmiṃ prabhṛti bho dhutadharmadhara bodhisatvāḥ sarvasvaparityāgāṃśca parityajanti duṣkaraparityāgāṃśca kurvanti iti // aṣṭamāṃ bhūmiṃ prabhṛti bho dhutadharmadhara bodhisatvāḥ samyaksaṃbuddhapūjayā pūjayitavyā iti // tatredam ucyate //*
aṣṭamāṃ prabhṛti bhūmiṃ bodhisatvā jinātmaja /
samyaksaṃbuddhā iti draṣṭavyā ataḥ prabhṛtyanivartiyāḥ //
ataḥ prabhṛti dhyānāni gambhīrāṇi labhanti te /
ataḥ prabhṛti uttaptaṃ jñānaṃ teṣāṃ pravartate //

[The venerable Mahā-Kāśyapa asked the venerable Mahā-Kātyāyana:] "O son of the Jina, from what point onwards do Bodhisattvas renounce [the world] [*parityajanti*], by giving up all their possessions and abandoning wrong actions?" When this had been said, Mahā-Kātyāyana spoke to the venerable Mahā-Kāśyapa: "My pious friend,[14] it is from the eighth *bhūmi* onwards that Bodhisattvas [begin to] renounce [the world], by giving up all their possessions and abandoning wrong actions.[15] From the eighth *bhūmi* onwards, my pious friend, Bodhisattvas are to be honoured with the honour due to a perfect Buddha (*saṃbuddha*). On this point it is said [in verse]:

ataḥ prabhṛti bhāṣanti vācāṃ jñānapurogamāṃ /
ataḥ prabhṛti kucchattā āyuṃ muñcanti paṇḍitāḥ //
ataḥ prabhṛti yā śuddhā tāṃ jātimanuyānti te /
ataḥ prabhṛti yaṃ śuddhaṃ tadrūpamanubhavanti te //
ataḥ prabhṛti yaṃ liṅgaṃ icchanti bhavanti tathā /
ataḥ prabhṛti yaṃ devaṃ icchanti bhavanti tathā //
ataḥ prabhṛti tīrthikā vā bhavanti bhavasūdanāḥ /
ataḥ prabhṛti kucchanti kāmāṃ śaṃsanti nirvṛtiṃ //
ataḥ prabhṛti bhūyiṣṭhā bhavanti vadatāṃ varāḥ /
śiṣyā devātidevānāṃ saṃbuddhānāṃ yaśasvinām //
adhyeṣyanti tataḥ paretya buddhairdharmaprakāśanaiḥ /
dharmaṃ deśayatha prājñā pratigṛhṇatha ṛṣidhvajaṃ //
ataḥ prabhṛti vinayanti arhatve subahuṃ janaṃ /
ataḥ prabhṛti vinayanti śaikṣabhūmau bahuṃ janaṃ //
ataḥ prabhṛti anubaddhā devā yakṣā saguhyakāḥ /
bodhisatvaṃ mahāsatvaṃ yāvatprāptā svayaṃbhutā //
ataḥ prabhṛti tadrūpaṃ agryaṃ sadevake loke /
ataḥ prabhṛti varṇo pi tejokīrtiyaśobalaṃ /
lokena viṣamaṃ bhavati bodhisatvānamuttamaṃ //
anutpādācca buddhānāṃ paṃcābhijñā bhavanti te /
naiṣkramyamanuvarṇayanti kāmeṣu doṣadarśinaḥ /
ataḥ prabhṛti devāśca asurā brahmaṇā saha /
guṇaiḥ teṣāṃ anurajyantā āgacchanti kṛtāṃjalī //
vaśībhūtāna yā ceṣṭā bodhisatvāna tādṛśī /
aṣṭamābhūmiṃ yā ceṣṭā bhavanti tādṛśī tathā //

[14] '*dhutadharmadhara*,' literally: 'maintainer of the qualities of a purified man.' The venerable Mahā-Kāśyapa is regularly addressed with this term. Cf. Edgerton's *BHS Dictionary* 285 *dhutadharma, sv.*

[15] Mahā-Kātyāyana's reply is a near-verbatim repetition of Mahā-Kāśyapa's earlier question with the exception of the addition of the verb '*kurvanti*'. Thus '*duṣkaraparityāgāṃśca kurvanti*' may be literally rendered: 'they make the act of leaving *duṣkara*.' Jones seems to view '*duṣkara*' as denoting here 'difficult sacrifices.' Cf. *Mahāvastu,* Jones 1949: 83. Though '*duṣkara*' can carry this technical sense, it seems more proper to view it here with the meaning of 'doing wrong, behaving ill, wicked, bad' (cf. Monier-Williams *SED* 487, *sv*) as *duṣkara* occurs in the compound '*duṣkara-parityāgān*' and is hence something to be abandoned or *parityāga*, which Jones seems to omit from his translation.

"From the eighth *bhūmi* onwards, o son of the Jina [i.e. Mahā-Kāśyapa],
Bodhisattvas are to be looked upon as perfect Buddhas, [for] henceforth they are
not regressing [to a lower *bhūmi*].[16]
Henceforth they attain deep [levels of] meditations [*dhyāna*],
[and][17] their knowledge is purified.
Henceforth they speak words that are founded on knowledge,
[and] as wise men they renounce life [*āyuṃ muñcanti*] because of its vileness.[18]

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[16] i.e. Bodhisattvas who have reached the eighth *bhūmi* do not fall back or regress (*anivartiyāḥ*) to an inferior stage (*bhūmi*) when they pass from one life to another. This means that those Bodhisattvas who are in their eighth *bhūmi* can at their moment of passing away rest assured that they will not be reborn in a lower *bhūmi*. The reason given for this in the Mahāvastu is that apparently from the eighth *bhūmi* onwards Bodhisattvas only cultivate 'pure karma' (*śubha karma*) whereas their actions in the previous *bhūmis* still result in 'mixed karma' (*vyāmiśra karma*). Cf. Mv 102.6-9.

anivartiyāḥ: Nom pl m 'anivartiya', being an adjective based on the root *nivṛt* with negative prefix '*a*'. The verb *nivṛt* is here synonymous with the more frequently used *vivṛt*. Both these verbs share similar basic connotations such as "to fall back, to be withheld from" (cf. MW 560: *sv nivṛt*) or also "to turn back or away, depart" (cf. MW 988: *sv vivṛt*) and seem to obtain within the Daśabhūmika section a specific technical sense conveying the failure of Bodhisattvas of reaching the subsequent *bhūmi* of their career.

In the Daśabhūmika the verb *vivṛt* if not standing on its own - as it is the case here with *anivartiyāḥ* - always occurs in connection with the reasons (*karaṇa*) why Bodhisattvas who are in a certain *bhūmi* fail to attain the succeeding one. In each description of the first seven *bhūmis* we come across Mahā-Kātyāyana giving the reasons why Bodhisattvas fail to proceed to a next *bhūmi*. So we can read, e.g., in the description of the second *bhūmi*:

"*aṣṭāviṃśadbhiḥ [...] kāraṇehi bodhisatvā dvitīyāyāṃ bhūmau vartamānāḥ tṛtīyāyāṃ bhūmau vivartante.*

"Bodhisattvas who are staying [*vartamānāḥ*] in the second *bhūmi* **"fall back" [vivartante]** in the third *bhūmi* for twenty eight reasons." (Mv 89.10-12, own translation, emphasis added; see also Mv 96.1-5; 110.1-5; 120.4-8; 127.1-4 for identical formulations concerning the failure to progress to the next *bhūmi*).

Jones who attaches the meaning of 'to lapse' to *vivṛt* - but not, it seems, in *vivṛt's* literal sense of 'falling back,' but in the sense of 'committing faults' - finds the double locative case hard to interpret as it does not make clear in which *bhūmi* 'the faults are committed in.' He proposes therefore to either "not press too closely the present force of the participle vartamānās .... or ... [to] give the second locative bhumau an ablative force, i.e. those who have successfully lived through one bhūmi lapse from the next." (*Mahāvastu,* Jones 1949: 70, n. 2). I suggest that the second locative could remain in its 'locative force' if we interpret the literal sense of *vivṛt*, namely 'falling back,' in the technical sense of a 'falling back, or regressing to a lower *bhūmi*' and this at the moment of passing from one life to another and hence to fail to reside *in* the subsequent *bhūmi*. Supporting evidence for interpreting 'the falling back' as a regression (and not, as Jones saw it, as a 'committing of faults' – which, of course, might be the cause of the regression) is the fact that in the Daśabhūmika section '*vivṛt*' is first introduced in apposition to '*saṃvṛt*' ('to turn towards, to accomplish,' i.e. to advance; Monier-Williams *SED* 1116 *saṃvṛt, sv*). Further, that it is a regression taking place when passing from one life to another is clear from the fact that in its very first use it is said of Bodhisattvas who are '*saṃsaranto,*' i.e. who are going through the cycle of life and death. For the use of '*vivṛt*' and '*saṃvṛt*' in this verse, see also *Le Mahâvastu,* Senart 1977 (1882) Vol I: 436.

[17] The text gives '*ataḥ prabhṛti*' or 'henceforth.' Each verse usually has twice '*ataḥ prabhṛti*.' For the readability I have opted to not translate the second '*ataḥ prabhṛti*' and to replace it with an 'and' instead.

Henceforth, whatever birth is pure, that is what they achieve,

[and] whatever form is pure, that is what they win.

Henceforth, they are born of whatever sex they wish,

[and] they become the deva they wish to be.[19]

Henceforth, as *tīrthikās*, they become destroyers of existence.

[and] they despise objects of desires and praise release.

Henceforth, they become the most excellent of eloquent men,

pupils of the illustrious perfect Buddhas [*saṃbuddha*], the *devas* above all

other *devas*.

Thus are they bidden by the Buddhas, the preachers of *dharma*, at the moment of their passing away, "O wise men, teach *dharma* [and] take up the banner of the seer."

Henceforth they train [*vinayanti*] many to become arhants,[20]

[and] they train many people in the [various] stages of discipleship [*śaikṣa*].[21]

Henceforth, devas, Yaksas, Guhyakas,[22] follow the great being, the Bodhisattva, until they realized their own nature.

Henceforth, the form of the Bodhisattvas is supreme in the world of men and devas,

[and] unsurpassed are the lustre, radiance [*kīrtiya*],[23] and strength - which are hard to attain by the world - of Bodhisattvas.

And though there are no Buddhas [in the world at that time] they develop the five super-knowledges,[24][and] perceiving the harm in the objects of pleasure, they praise renunciation of the world (*naiṣkramyam*).

Henceforth, devas, Asuras, together with Brahmās, allured by their virtues, come to them with hands joined in adoration.

Such is the mode of life of the holy Bodhisattvas, such is [their] mode of life when they are in the eighth *bhūmi*.

When we read this Daśabhūmika narrative, it becomes clear that the whole of Mahā-Kātyāyana's answer is in true praise of the Bodhisattvas who have reached the eighth

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[18] *kucchattā* abl. sg. of *kuccha* (Skt. *kutsa*) + *tta* (Skt. *tva*). On the Prākrit of this word, see *Le Mahâvastu,* Senart 1977 (1882) Vol I: 460, cp. *Mahāvastu,* Jones 1949 Vol I: 83, n. 4.

[19] Literally: "Henceforth, that gender which they desire, thus they become. Henceforth, that god who they wish, thus they become."

[20] Literally: "Henceforth, they train many people in arahantship."

[21] *śaikṣa* is a technical term. A *śaikṣa,* or one who is undergoing training, has to traverse seven stages before he reaches the eighth which is *aśaikṣa* or *arhant.* Cp. Edgerton *BHS Dictionary* 532, *sv.*

[22] 'In the popular mythology demigods and guardians of Kuvera's wealth. From the root *guh,* "to hide".' Cf. *Mahāvastu,* Jones 1949: 84, n. 2.

[23] *kīrtiya* or *kīrtika* is a hyper Sanskrit form for Ardhamāghadī *kittiā* = Skt. kṛttikā, cf. Edgerton *BHS Dictionary* 184 *kīrtika, sv.*

[24] *paṃcābhijñā,* see *Mahāvastu,* Jones 1949: 201, n. 2 for an enumeration of these types of knowledge.

stage of their career. If we suppose '*tīrthikā*' has a negative connotation here, this would go against the spirit of the passage that even states how Bodhisattvas who are in their eighth *bhūmi* are "to be looked upon as perfect Buddhas." Jones by translating '*tīrthikā*' in the concerning Mahāvastu passage with "ascetic pilgrims" admits that the context constrains one to view the term here as denoting members of the Buddhist realm and this in a neutral/positive sense. Nevertheless, he too hastens to add in a footnote the odd use of the term as, he notes, '[u]sually in Buddhist Sanskrit this word has the bad connotation of "heretic," Pali *itthiya* [*sic*, i.e. *titthiya*].'[25] In other words, the difficulty for Edgerton, Senart and Jones with this Mahāvastu passage is that, provided that the reading is correct,[26] it raises the possibility that *tīrthikā* could be applied in two distinct and apparently irreconcilable meanings: one being to pejoratively designate non-Buddhist ascetics, the other being to (positively) refer to members of the Buddhist *saṅgha* itself. Regarding this possibility Edgerton reflects: "it is <u>barely</u> possible that this one Mv passage preserves the original m[eanin]g., *adherent* (or *founder*) *of* (any) *religion*."[27] However, given the fact that both in Pāli and Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit texts the term *titthiya* occurs in compounds such as '*aññatitthiya*' (BHS *anyatīrthika*), and *aññatitthiyapubba* (BHS *anyatīrthikapūrva*),[28] this possibility should not readily be dismissed but ought to be fully considered.

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[25] Ibid., 84, n.1.

[26] Vincent Tournier was kind enough to check the reading of this verse in the earliest complete copy of the Mahāvastu text, i.e. 'manuscript Sa' dating from the 12th- 13th century, a manuscript which, it may be noted, was not at Senart's disposition at the time of his critical edition of the text. The manuscript reads for this verse:

> *ataḥ prabhṛti tīrthikā vā bhavanti bhavaḥsūdanāḥ |*
> *ataḥ prabhṛti kucchati kāmāṃ saṃsanti nirvṛtiṃ |* (Folio 30b, 1. 1-2)

The verse clearly shows no major differences with Senart's reading that would compel a different understanding of the word '*tīrthikā*.' In the words of Tournier: "Il n'y a donc en ce cas précis que des variantes mineures (*visarga* intempestif, confusion des sifflantes, *akṣara ti* au lieu de *nti*) par rapport à l'édition de Senart." (Tournier, personal communication, July 06, 2012). Tournier further noted in his research on the extant Nepalese manuscripts of the Mahāvastu that 'manuscript Sa' was rediscovered and copied by the pandit Jayamuni in 1657 AD after having been obsolete for a couple of centuries. Jayamuni's copy, 'manuscript Ta' lay, in Tournier's opinion, at the basis for the later copies of the Mahāvastu and can therefore be seen as "l'ancêtre commun de l'ensemble de la tradition manuscrite népalaise." Tournier, personal communication, July 06, 2012, see also Tournier 2012: 95-99.

[27] See Edgerton *BHS Dictionary* 254, *sv* (emphasis added).

[28] For the Pāli terms, see Appendix 'Labelling the Ascetic other.' Regarding the BHS terms, in the Mahāvastu, for instance, *anyatīrthika* occurs in three distinct compounds: *anyatīrthikacarakaparivrājakā* (Mv III 412.7), *anyatīrthikapūrvo* (Mv III 49.12-16) and *anyatīrthikasaṃśritā* (Mv III 353.14).

Who could be a *titthiya?*

As we have discussed in detail in the previous section on *othering,* both the terms *aññatitthiya* and *titthiya* are generic denominations employed in the Pāli Vinaya to refer to the early Buddhist *bhikkhu's* ascetic others. Despite this fact that both terms are thus reverted to for the same purpose (i.e. to generically refer to an early Buddhist *bhikkhu's* ascetic other), they should not be considered to be identical. For, unlike the simplex *titthiya,* the compound *aññatitthiya* does not only refer to an early Buddhist *bhikkhu's* real or imagined ascetic other, but it also establishes a relation of differentiation between this ascetic other with a second *titthiya,* or group of *titthiyas.* The differential nature of the compound *aññatitthiya* is established, as already noted, by its constituent '*añña,*' meaning 'other' or 'different.'[29] To stress this inherent differential aspect of the term *aññatitthiya,* it could be translated with 'another (group of) *titthiya(s),*' instead of the common (but also correct) translation of 'non-Buddhist ascetics.'[30]

As it might be remembered, from our contextual reading of the term *aññatitthiya* in the Pāli Vinaya we were able to establish that the '*añña*' component bore reference to the Buddha and/or his disciples. In other words, while the term *aññatitthiya* pointed to an indefinite group of *titthiyas,* it simultaneously differentiated this indefinite group of *titthiyas* from a second group of *titthiyas* who appeared to be the Buddha and his disciples. This fact implies that early Buddhist *bhikkhus* fell under the reference range of the term '*titthiya.*' It shows that early Buddhist *bhikkhus* considered themselves, and were also considered by others (i.e. householders), to fall under the denomination range of the term *titthiya,* at least for some time when the term '*aññatitthiya*' (or a Prākrit variant of it) was in vogue among them.[31]

If our observations thus far are correct, then this means that the reference field of the simplex *titthiya* has not always started by default outside the boundaries of the Buddhist ascetic community, in order to point to an ascetic other. But on the contrary, if Buddhist *bhikkhus* indeed considered themselves, for some time at least, to also be *titthiyas* and could thus positively associate themselves (and be associoted) with the term, then the reference range of the term *titthiya* must initially not have started outside but within the very borders of the Buddhist ascetic community. This does not

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[29] Cf. Appendix 'Labelling of the Ascetic other,' *sv.*

[30] I thank Gudrun Pinte for having brought this fact to my attention.

[31] It may be remembered that from our contextual reading that the term *aññatitthiya* was three times used by a householder (more specifically, by the general Sīha and twice by King Seniya of Bimbisāra). This means that Buddhist *bhikkhus* were considered by householders to fall under the denomination range of '*titthiya.*' Further, the term *aññatitthiya* was also once seen used by the Buddha himself, suggesting that also the Buddha/the Buddhist *bhikkhus* considered themselves to fall under the denomination range of '*titthiya.*' Cf. Appendix 'Labelling of the Ascetic other,' *aññatitthiya.*

need to imply, as I mentioned at the onset, that Buddhist *bhikkhus* would have used the term '*titthiya*' reflexively (i.e. to refer to one another). Just as early Buddhist *bhikkhus* could positively associate themselves with the ideas and ideals represented by the term *samaṇa* without, however, using '*samaṇa*' reflexively, just so early Buddhist *bhikkhus* could positively associate themselves with the ideas and ideals represented with the term *titthiya* without reverting to it to refer to one another. When we consider these facts, it becomes clear that the term *titthiya* has not always or solely functioned as a denomination to (negatively) refer to ascetic *others* (as in the Pāli Vinaya), but that it might also have been used to (neutrally) refer to *an* ascetic or *a* head of *an* ascetic community. In this light, the possibility that the term is neutrally used to refer to *an* ascetic in the Mahāvastu verse stating that Bodhisattvas from the eighth *bhūmi* onwards "as *tīrthikā*, they become destroyers of existence; ... they despise the objects of desire and praise release,"[32] becomes contrary to Edgerton's opinion, very likely.

This being said, it remains to be explained how the term '*titthiya*' in the Pāli Vinaya (and other Buddhist texts) is predominantly used to (negatively) refer to non-Buddhist ascetics, while early Buddhists, as I have argued, seemed to have considered themselves to fall under the reference range of the term *titthiya,* at least for some time. The difficulty here is evident. It would be a contradiction *in terminis* that early Buddhists who viewed themselves to be *titthiyas*, would yet apply it to negatively refer to non-Buddhist ascetics. In the following parts, I show how the meaning of '***an*** ascetic' and the meaning of 'ascetic ***other***' were not simultaneously present in the term *titthiya*. They reflect a semantic shift. Underlying this semantic shift, lies a shift from applying the term in analogy with its wider Indian ascetic contexts to a specific Buddhist context.

Part II: The Crossing Over to Liberation

The previous chapters were able to establish that, contrary to what the common English translation 'heretic' or 'adherent of a different sect' suggests, early Buddhist *bhikkhus* had a positive understanding of the term *titthiya*. This means that they could associate with the notions or ideals inherent to or represented with the term *titthiya*. At least, this was true for some time. For, as we have noted, the manner in which the simplex *titthiya* is employed in the Pāli Vinaya alongside the compound *aññatitthiya* ,betrays both a loss

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[32] Mv I 106 8-9.

of association with these notions and ideals, and indicates a negative perception of whom is understood with the term. There where the use of the compound *aññatitthiya* in the Pāli Vinaya showed how early Buddhist *bhikkhus* considered themselves (and were considered by others) to fall under *titthiya's* reference range, the use of the simplex *titthiya* shows a (conscious or unconscious) desire to dissociate from the term's reference field. In other words, there is a perceptible shift in application and hence also in the understanding of the term *titthiya* by early Buddhist *bhikkhus.* This observation calls for further attention. Since the *aññatitthiyas* and *titthiyas* in Buddhist texts generally bear reference to the early Buddhist *bhikkhu's* ascetic others, a shift in the application and understanding of these terms simultaneously indicates an underlying shift of the manner in which early Buddhists perceived both these ascetic others and themselves *vis-à-vis* them. To understand why this semantic shift of the term *titthiya* - most certainly gradually - occurred, is to better appreciate how the development of the early Buddhist community was characterized by an on-going dialogue with its wider ascetic landscape.

In the following two chapters I show how the early Buddhist *bhikkhus'* initial positive understanding of the term *titthiya* was in accordance with the wider Indian ascetic language of liberation. This is to say, I will demonstrate how (1) the term in Buddhist texts is deeply embedded in the expressions conveying the ultimate soteriological goal of enlightenment, or the definite release from the *saṃsāric* cycle of life and death, and how (2) this feature of the term *titthiya* is shared with its corresponding Ardhamāgadhī term in Jain texts.

In order to demonstrate this, I first offer an etymological exploration of the term *titthiya* and some kindred terms such as *titthakara* and *tittha.* This etymological study will establish that *titthiya* and its cognates can be restored to the root √*tṝ*, meaning 'to cross over.' This disclosed fact will lie at the basis for unravelling the notions and ideals represented in *titthiya,* and in explicating how early Buddhist *bhikkhus* had initially a positive understanding of the term *titthiya.*

In the second chapter, I show how the figurative use of the verb √*tṝ* and its derived forms are deeply embedded in the language of liberation, by means of quoting a selective group of early Buddhist and Jain textual fragments.

Etymological Exploration of *titthiya* et al

Table '√*tṝ* and its derivatives' below gives a schematic overview of the terms to be discussed. A horizontal glance at the table clearly shows the phonological closeness between the corresponding Prākrit terms (Pāli and Ardhamāgadhī) and between most of their Sanskrit equivalents. The first horizontal column gives the third person indicative

singular of the root √tṝ. A vertical glance might already throw some insight into how all words are related to √tṝ.

Table 1   √tṝ and its derivatives

	Pāli	Ardhamāgadhī	Sanskrit
√tṝ	**tarati (√tar)** 'to cross over'	*tarati (√tar)*	*tarati (√tṝ)*
	tittha 1. fording place 2. (head of a) community of ascetics 3. doctrine	*tittha*	*tīrtha*
	titthakara 'ford maker'	*titthagara, titthakara, titthayara, titthayaära, titthaṃkara, titthaṃyara*	*tīrthakara, tīrthaṅkara*
	aññatitthiya 'an adherent/head of a different ascetic community'	*aṇṇautthiya*	*anyatīrthika, anyayūthika*
	titthiya 'an adherent/head of a (different) ascetic community'	*titthia*	*tīrthika*

At present I will be mainly concerned in showing how these various terms can be brought to the etymon √tṝ.[33] In a first instance I will point out how (*anya*)*tīrthika* should be viewed as a secondary derivative of '*tīrtha,*' and how '*tīrthakara*' is a *tatpuruṣa* compound consisting of the constituents '*tīrtha*' and '*kara.*'

In a second instance, it will be shown how '*tīrtha*' itself is a noun derived from the root √tṝ. The manner in which the various, and perhaps seemingly broadly differing meanings of these terms still constitute a semantic unit will be dealt with afterwards.

Let us begin with *tīrthakara.* The compound may be broken up into '*tīrtha*' and '*kara.*' Being a *tatpuruṣa* compound, *tīrthakara* can literally be translated as 'a builder or a

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[33] For a historical philological analysis of terms *tīrtha* and *tīrthaṅkara,* see also Parpola 2003.

maker (*kara*) of a ford.' The Pāli and Ardhamāgadhī terms corresponding to *tīrthakara* (cf. Table 1) are unambiguous phonological developments of the latter.[34]

In the Sanskrit word *tīrthika* the suffix *ika*- has been added to *tīrtha.* Of the many functions the suffix *ika*- can fulfil, forming adjectives of belonging (*appurtenance*) is the most common one.[35] Renou in his *Grammaire Sanscrite* cites as examples for this '*ika*- of appurtenance' *āśvika* ('relating to the horse') and *dhārmika* ('belonging to a/the *dharma*').[36] In the same fashion, *tīrthika* should be understood as an adjective of appurtenance or, in other words, as primarily denoting 'belonging to a/the *tīrtha*'.[37]

As the Pāli term *titthiya* and Ardhamāgadhī *titthia* are clear equivalents of the just discussed Sanskrit *tīrthika,* no demonstration is needed to show how both Prākrit terms should equally be viewed as adjectives of appurtenance derived from the stem *tittha-*.[38] The orthography of '*titthiya*' has, however, one peculiarity that calls for explanation: the substitution of –*k*- (of the suffix *ika*-) for –*y*-. For Pāli it is unusual to have a phonetic

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[34] See note 38 below for the phonological development of *tīrtha > tittha.*

[35] The suffix *ika*- evolved from the more frequently used *ka*- through intermediary of the latter's female form *ī-kā*-. Both suffixes effect the same semantic functions, but with different frequency. *ika*- or *ka*- attached to a noun (whose vowel then usually undergoes *vṛddhi*) can bring about adjectives of appurtenance; it can further also make an agent; make diminutives; make a term concrete or technical; or simply create expletives. Cf. *A Sanskrit Grammar,* William D. Whitney 1913⁴ (1886): 466-9, § 1222; *Grammaire Sanscrite,* Renou 1961² (1930): 244-8, § 194-5.

[36] Ibid., Renou 1961² (1930): 248, § 195.

[37] Note that since the suffix *ika*- creates a secondary derivation of *tīrtha* we might justly expect a *vṛddhi*-lengthening of the vowel *ī* into *ai.* The reason why we have no apparent *vṛddhi* lengthening here might be because we should not look at –*ī*- but rather–*īr*- , which can be taken as a lengthening of the root vowel -*ṛ* of √*tṛ* from which *tīrtha,* as we will soon see, is ultimately derived. Or, an alternative explanation might be that –ī- did not undergo a *vṛddhi* alternation simply because it is part of a verbal noun and that "Un grand nombre de racines verbales échappent aux alternances [vocales]. Les gr[ammairiens] excluent ... le guṇa et la vṛddhi pour celles qui comporte un *ī ū* ou une diphtongue entre consonnes." Renou 1961² (1930): 76, § 70.

[38] For both *titthiya* and *titthia* we meet with two phonetic changes typical for the Prākrit languages, viz. the assimilation of a conjunct consonant (here, more specifically, a dominant assimilation of -*rt*- to –*tt*-) and the shortening of a long vowel followed by a consonant cluster (here the long *ī* altered to the short *i* due to the conjunct consonant –*tt*-). The latter is the result of the Law of Morae which demands that a syllable should not have more than two morae. Consequently, "where Skt has a long vowel before a double consonant ..., Pāli [as generally also the other Middle Indic languages] has either: (a) a short vowel before a double consonant or (b) a long vowel with the following consonant simplified." Geiger 1994: 4. See also 'Das Zwei-Moren-Gesetz' in von Hinüber 2001 (1985): 117-118 § 108-110 and Pischel 1999 (1981²): 89 §83 who explicitly cites *tittha=tīrtha* as an example of the shortening of long vowels in close syllables.

For the Ardhamāgadhī *titthia* we may also note the usual elision for the intervocalic –*k*-. Cf. Pischel 1999 (1981²): 163 §186. For an introductory overview of the common phonetic changes in Prākrit, see Woolner 1972: 7-30; and for specifically Pāli see Warder 2001³: 213-8. For a concise and highly practical grammatical reference manual of Middle Prākrit (i.e. Māhārāṣṭrī, Śaurasenī, Māgadhī, Ardhamāgadhī, Jain-Māhārāṣṭrī and Jain-Śaurasenī) see Van Den Bossche 1999.

change of the intervocalic –*k*- to –*y*-. Though in many other Prākrits it is customary to find the medial –*k*- dropped[39] (as it is, for instance, specifically the case here with Ardhamāgadhī *titthia*) or replaced by the hiatus-bridger -*ẏ*- ,[40] this is not common for Pāli where "k, t, p [usually] remain unchanged."[41] Just as the intervocalic –*k*- (and, in fact, all other medial mutes) also the intervocalic semivowel –*y*- is generally dropped in all Prākrits,[42] with the exception of the eastern Prākrit, Māgadhī that faithfully retained the 'ya.'[43] We might therefore suspect that the -*y*- spelling in *titthiya* was in agreement with the Māgadhī pronunciation of the term. In other words, this –*y*- spelling may be explained as a so-called 'Māgadhism' or a 'Buddhistic Easternism,' being one of the few orthographic reminders of the fact that the Pāli Vinaya is in part the result of a transposition from (an) earlier eastern version(s).[44]

Having analysed *tīrthika* and *titthiya,* we need no separate explanation to see how Sanskrit *anyatīrthika* and Pāli *aññatitthiya* relate in a similar way to respectively *tīrtha* and *tittha.* Less obvious perhaps is the relationship of the Ardhamāgadhī term *aṇṇautthiya* to *tittha* (or, in a first stage to the root √*tṝ*) and its supposed correspondence with the two Sanskrit terms *anyatīrthika* and *anyayūthika.* Before tackling this phonological crux let us briefly pause at the significance of the fact that *aññatitthiya* seems to have been, from a historical-grammatical point of view, first and foremost an adjective. It may be recalled that in the Pāli Vinaya *aññatitthiya* was attested both in the syntactical function of an adjective and substantive.[45] Since *iya*-, as we have seen, bears reference to the Sanskrit suffix *ika*- and forms an adjective of appurtenance, it is reasonable to suggest that *aññatitthiya* was initially used as an adjective (in our Pāli sources always further defining the undetermined *paribbājaka* ascetics) before it

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[39] Cf. Woolner 1972: 11 §9.

[40] The hiatus bridger or weakly articulated -*ẏa*- is only written in Jain manuscripts. Cf. Pischel 1999 (1981²): 163 § 187; Van Den Bossche 1999: 26 § 47.

[41] Cf. Woolner 1972: 12. See also Geiger 1994: 27 §35 where he observes that "on the whole, the free consonants are well preserved in Pāli. Unlike Pkt., it retains intervocalic mutes." Note, however, that under the common phonetic changes of Prākrit which occur occasionally in Pāli he lists as a frequent example the "Interchange between the endings -*ikă* and -*iyă*." This is, as he writes, probably due to borrowings from, or influence of, other (local) dialects. As I suggest a little further in the text, I think the y-spelling of Pāli *titthiya* should be seen as, to use Geiger's terminology, the influence of the Māgadhī dialect. Ibid., 27 §36.

[42] Cf. Pischel 1999 (1981²): 163 §186.

[43] Cf. Woolner 1972: 5-6; 58 where he notes that in Māgadhī the 'ya' (य) not only remains but also replaces the 'ja ' (ज).

[44] Other such Māgadhī remnants or 'Buddhistic textual Māgadhisms' (or also, 'Buddhistic Easternisms') are the occasional –*e* ending for the usual Nominative sg. in –*o*, or the substitution of '*r*' by '*l*'. Cf. Warder *Pāli Metre* 1967: 9. On the Pāli Vinaya being in part the result of a transposition from an eastern version, see Section I, p. 52 ff.

[45] Cf. Appendix 'Labelling of the Ascetic other,' lemma *'aññatitthiya.'*

semantically developed to a noun, but not, it seems, without absorbing the *paribbājaka*-notion in its denotation. This is not to suggest a strict linear development of *aññatitthiya* as adjective to *aññatitthiya* as noun. Both functions of *aññatitthiya* could and most probably did appear simultaneously, but it is very likely that passages with *aññatitthiya* as adjective are indicative of a relative semantic/thematic older layer (than those with *aññatitthiya* as noun). These types of observations may serve as small but nevertheless useful tools when relatively dating the various Vinaya passages.

To return to the philological difficulty in restoring *aṇṇautthiya* to the etymon √*tṝ*. The term has already been the subject of several philological discussions,[46] where the main issue centred around the question whether the Jain texts that Sanskritized the term into *anyayūthika* are, from a strict linguistic and philological point of view, correct or those that Sanskritized it with *anyatīrthika*.[47]

Let us first assume that Sanskrit *anyatīrthika* is phonologically related to Ardhamāgadhī *aṇṇautthiya*. The fact that the intervocalic –*t*- of the then hypothetical base form *aṇṇa-*tutthiya* would have dropped, has, to use Leumann's terms on this matter, "nichts auf sich."[48] Indeed, the elision of the simple intervocalic –*t*- is for Ardhamāgadhī a relatively constant phonetic law, amongst the otherwise still many uncertain trends.[49] The main difficulty for restoring the second segment of the compound *aṇṇautthiya* (i.e. °*utthiya*) to √*tṝ* lays in the presence of the vowel –*u*- instead of the phonologically anticipated –*a*- or –*i*- for the sonantal *ṛ* in √*tṝ* and its derivatives.[50] The development of *ṛ* into –*u*- in Middle Indic vernaculars is, according to Hermann Berger, to be expected when (1) –*u*- occurs in the following syllable (e.g. *ṛtu* 'season'> *utu*) or (2) when it precedes labial consonants (e.g. *bṛhaspati* 'lord'> Mg. *buhaspadi*).[51] Neither of these two conditions are fulfilled here to satisfactorily explain the –*u*- of °*utthiya*. In his introduction to *Das Ältere Mittelindisch im Überblick,* von Hinüber cites "Pkt.

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[46] Cf. Folkert 1993: 298, n. 22. See also Deleu 1977 'Lord Mahāvīra and the Anyatīrthikas.'

[47] Also the *Pāia-Sadda-Mahaṇṇavo (PSM) Prakrit-Hindi Dictionary* gives the two Sanskrit possibilities of °*tīrthika* and °*yūthika* for Prākrit °*utthiya*. See *PSM* 46 अण्ण, *sv.*

[48] *Das Aupapâtika Sûtra*, Leumann (ed.), 1966 (1883): 95.

[49] von Hinüber 2001 (1985): 99 §75.

[50] The normal development of the Sanskrit vowel *ṛ* in Middle Indic forms is –*a*-. Cf. Ibid., 126 § 122 where von Hinüber cites as example "Skt. *kṛta* > P *kata*, Amg *kaḍa*, M *kaa*; Skt. *hṛdaya* > P *hadaya*." In the vicinity of a palatal -*ṛ*- can also develop into –*i*-. For our specific case in the derivative *tīrthika* (< √*tṝ*) *ṛ* occurs near the palatal vowel–*i*- of the suffix *ika*-. Another concrete example is the development of the Sanskrit word *gṛhin* into Pāli *gihin* and AMg *gihiṇ.* Ibid.

[51] Cf. Tedesco 1956 who critically reviews Berger's *Zwei Probleme der mittelindischen Lautlehre.* For a clear summary of Berger's theory of *ṛ* see 498-499. Tedesco notes though the general pattern of Berger's theory of the development of *ṛ* "seems natural and satisfactory [...] there are many words which do not fit in." Ibid., 499. For the development of *ṛ* into *a, i*, or *u* see already Pischel 1999 (1981²): 60-68 §47- 59.

–*utthiya*" as a paradigmatic example to illustrate the fact that certain Middle Indic forms do not immediately find a correspondence in Vedic or Sanskrit.[52] A **(t)ūrthika* form which would easily explain the AMg. °*utthiya* is indeed not found attested in Vedic Sanskrit lexicons. Though it would go against Berger's stipulated phonetic conditions under which ṛ may be expected to develop into *u* (cf. above), it is not unreasonable to suggest that parallel to the widely attested Ardhamāgadhī form *tittha* also a doublet form **tuttha* or **tūtha* (< Vedic Skt. **tūrtha*) would have developed from √*tṝ*. This especially sounds reasonable when we consider the fact that the pronunciation of the sonant ṛ was not univocal in the Prākrit languages and could variably be pronounced "with a tinge of *a*+[C], i+[C] and *u*+[C]."[53] This phenomenon caused ṛ to "vacillate [...] in the same words not only in different dialects, but even within the same dialect."[54] In the light of this phenomenon it is not unlikely that in the derivatives of √*tṝ*, the sonant ṛ knew analogous to the *īr*- also an *ūr*- development. Also Leumann subscribes to this possibility. While favouring a phonological relation between *aṇṇautthiya* and *anyatīrthika* (and thus not with *anyayūthika),* he sees this relation underpinned by the general observation that "Das Prâkṛt hat hier und da den ursprünglichen *r*-Vocal zu ûr entwickelt, wo das skr. îr zeigt," citing *juṇṇa* 'old' (< **jûrṇa*) = *jîrṇa* as supporting example.[55]

Further corroborating our hypothesis from a historical-philological perspective is the fact that already in Vedic Sanskrit the –*i*- and –*u*- vowels occur alongside (next to, it may be noted, the original vowel –*a*-) in the conjugation and verbal noun derivatives of √*tṝ*.[56] Some examples: *tūrtáḥ* is found attested in Vedic Sanskrit as verbal adjective of √*tṝ* side by side *tīrṇáḥ*.[57] Apart from the expected causative *tārayati* also the causative form *tūrvati* recurs in Vedic texts.[58] √*tṝ* when conjugated in the present class III,[59] gives for the third singular indicative present *titarti,* a form which is clearly based on the reduplicated present stem *titar*, whereas the third singular in the potential mood is not

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[52] von Hinüber 2001 (1985): 42 §10.

[53] Cf. Pischel 1999 (1981²): 60 §47, *op. cit.*

[54] Ibid., §48, *op. cit.*

[55] *Das Aupapâtika Sûtra*, Leumann (ed.), 1966 (1883): 95, *op. cit.*

[56] The interchange of *i/u* in derivatives of √*tṝ* in the Ṛgveda has already been observed by von Hinüber. In the presence of Khowār *thūrt* and *avatūvya* he considers the possibility that *u*-forms of *tṝ* originally occurred in North-West India. In the light of various *i/u* (<īr, ūr< *ṝ) interchange in Pāli and Prākrits he finds "eine Zuordnung der –*i*- und –*u*- Formen zu verschiedenen Sprachebenen wohl wahrscheinlicher." Cf. von Hinüber 2001 (1985): 42 §10, *op cit.*

[57] CESD I: 480, *sv tárati.*

[58] CESD I: 480, *sv tárati.*

[59] √*tṝ* can be found conjugated in the present classes I, III and V.

based on the stem *titar* but on *tutur,* giving *tuturyāt.*[60] In the Ṛgveda the *u*-vowel appears in numerous verbal-compounds based on √*tṝ* such as *ap-túr, viśva- túr, āji- túr, pṛtsu- túr, niṣ-ṭúr* etc.[61] The interchange between the *–i-* and the *–u-* vowel (again, it should be stressed, next to the original *–a-* such as in *tarati*) in the conjugation of √*tṝ* is in fact so striking that an independent verbal present stem with *u* may readily be suspected. It is therefore not surprising to see that Hermann Grassmann listed for √*tṝ* next to the present stems *tára* and *tirá* also a present stem *turá.*[62] Of the verbal noun derivatives (Vedic) Sanskrit *tara, tīrtha, tīra* and *tur* (*tūr*) may be quoted to illustrate also here the interchange of the *a, i* (*ī*), *u* (*ū*) in √*tṝ*'s vocalism.[63] Therefore, the floating pronunciation of the vowel *ṛ* noted above for the Prākrit languages was most probably already present in Vedic Sanskrit. This would certainly explain the lively vocalism of the etymon √*tṝ* in its conjugation and derivatives. On the pronunciation of *ṛ* in Vedic Sanskrit, Louis Renou may be quoted here:[64]

> [...] il s'agit d'un phonème composite, ayant pour centre un *r* consonne, de part et d'autre deux voyelles ultra-brèves non précisées [...]; la pronunciation actuelle est *re* chez les YVedin [...] . La graphie *ri* dans certains mss, les variations *ṛ/a, ṛ/i, ṛ/ar,* plus souvent *ṛ/ri* [...] ou *ṛ/ru* [...] d'un texte à l'autre (y compris dans les etymologies du Nir.), font apparaître un flottement assez sérieux [...] .

Both facts that in Vedic Sanskrit the vowel *-u-* appears in many of the conjugated and derived forms of √*tṝ* and that the appearance of *–u-* in these forms generally cannot be subsumed under the conventional phonetic laws for *ṛ/ṝ* > *u/ū*, but that it is most probably due to *ṛ*'s 'floating pronunciation,' support the possibility that alongside *tīrtha* a doublet **tūrtha* developed. And it is this doublet **tūrtha* that must have laid at the basis of Ardhamāgadhī °*uttihiya.* This hypothesis further founds support by the fact that Sanskrit *tīrtha* (or, perhaps better **tūrtha*) gives Aśokan *tuṭha* as it is testified by the compound *tuṭhāyatanāni* occurring in the Delhi-Toprā inscription.[65] Corresponding to

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[60] For the form *tuturyāt* see e.g. RV **6**, 63,2; **5.**15,3 and 77,4; **8**. 16,2. Also *tuturyām* in RV **5.**45, 11 and *tuturvāṇi* **1.**168,1. For a complete alphabetical word index of the Ṛgveda, see Swami Vishweshvaranand & Swami Nityanand 1908.

[61] Ibid.

[62] Grassmann 1976⁵ (1873), *Wörterbuch zum Rig-Veda*: 525 & 540 '*tar, tir, tur*' and *tur, sv.* Grassmann considers of the three possible root vocals of √*tṝ* , *a* as the original vocal, *i* as a result of a shift of accent (from *tára* to *tirá*) and the *u* as "meist durch Einfluss eines auf r folgenden y entstanden." Ibid., *op cit.*

[63] Grassmann 1976⁵ (1873): 529, *sv tára*; 537, *sv tīrthá*; 541, *sv túr*. It is true that the substantive *túr* may be considered as already a second degree verbal noun derivative of √*tṝ* through intermediary of verb '*túr*' which developed in seclusion of *tar* 'going across' a more specific connotation of 'going across swiftly', hence also 'to vanquish'. But *túr* remains nevertheless related to √*tṝ*.

[64] Renou 1952: 11-12.

[65] Turner translates *tuṭhāyatanāni* with 'abodes of suitable recipients', cf. CDIAL 337: 5903, *sv *tūrtha-* .

*tīrtha/*tūrtha* is also Prākrit (Māhārāṣṭrī) *tūha* ('ford') which can be found attested in e.g. Hemachandra's Prākṛt-Vyākaraṇa[66] and Bhadrabāhu's Bṛhat-Kalpa-Niryukti.[67] This all strongly suggest that Ardhamāgadhī *aṇṇautthiya* is, in accordance with *anyatīrthika,* an adjective of appurtenance formed on *tīrtha*'s doublet **tūrtha* (AMg. **tuttha/*tūtha/tūha/*tūṭha*). The preferred Sanskritization of *aṇṇautthiya,* from a philological point of view, should therefore be *anyatīrthika* (in the absence of an attested **anyatūrthika*) since this term, unlike *anyayūthiya,* recognizes *aṇṇauttihiya*'s relation to √*tṝ*. The Sanskritization *anyayūthiya* gives merely a semantic equivalent.[68] The component *'yūtha'* of *anyayūthiya* which carries the meanings of 'a herd, flock, troop, etc'[69] shows how the Jain authors interpreted the *'tittha,'* or more correctly, the **tuttha, *tūtha'*-component of *aṇṇautthiya* as bearing reference on their ascetic community.

To finalize this philological exploration of *titthiya et al* the formality remains to make the relation between *tīrtha* (*tittha*) and the etymon √*tṝ* explicit. This relation may already have become apparent in our discussion of *aṇṇautthiya* and it therefore suffices to state that *tīrtha* is a primary derivative of the root √*tṝ* formed by the attachment of the suffix *tha-*.[70] The suffix *tha-* forms "almost without exception action-nouns (though some have assumed a concrete value)."[71] That *tīrtha* should in a first instance indeed be considered as an action-noun which quickly developed into a noun with concrete denotations will be seen in the upcoming chapter where the semantic unit of √*tṝ* and its derivatives will be argued by means of concrete textual examples.

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[66] See PSM 442, *sv* तूह.

[67] *Bhadrabāhu Bṛhat-Kalpa-Niryukti and Sanghadāsa Bṛhat-Kalpa-Bhāṣya,* Bollée 1998 : 2388, 2395, 4860, 4866-8. This Niryukit dates between 300 and 500 AD.
tūha is further also found attested in the Māhārāṣṭrī Prākrit, cf. Pischel 1999 (1981²): 68 §58.

[68] For further reflections on the *īr/ūr* alternation of √*tṝ* and on the possibility of a doublet **tūrtha* see a.o. CDIAL **tūrtha-,* Whitney 1913⁴ (1896): 271 §756; 274 §766. Renou 1952: 29 §26 where an intermediate form **tṛṇo-* is suggested for √*tṝ's* vowel alternation. Wackernagel, Jakob & Debrunner, Albert, 1957² (1896) see Prākrit *tūha-* as a development of **tṝtha* (p. 27 §24), contrary to Pischel who advocates the **tūrtha* base form for Prākrit *tūha.* Cf. Pischel 1999 (1981²): 68 §58 where he further equally posits a Sanskrit form **anyatūrthika* for AMg. *aṇṇaütthiẏa.*
On Aśokan *tuṭhāyatanāni* see Hettiaratchi (1945: 579) who pleads for reading the term as an equivalent to Pāli *titthāyatanāni* and as having developed from **tuṭṭhāyatanāni.* He further suggests the following line of development for Māhārāṣṭrī *tūha: *tūrtha > * tuttha > * tūtha > tūha.*
For derivatives based on √*tṝ* see CDIAL 5695 **tára-,* 5702 **tárati,* 5793 *tārá-,* 5794 *tāraka-,* 5795 *tāraṇa-,* 5821 *tirátē,* 5823 *tirás,* 5845 *tīrṇa-,* 5846 *tīrthá,* 5847 **tīrthādahana-,* 5903 **tūrtha-,* 5909 **tṛta-.*
An additional literature list on (the development of) √*tṝ* can be consulted in von Hinüber 2001 (1985): 42 §10.

[69] MW 856 *yūtha, sv.*

[70] Cf. Renou 1952: 160 §209.

[71] Whitney 1913⁴ (1896): 436 §1162.

What 'To Cross Over,' 'Doctrine,' and 'Adherent of An(other) Ascetic Community' have in Common

That the Pāli terms *tittha, titthakara, aññatitthiya* and *titthiya,* just as their corresponding Ardhamāgadhī and Sanskrit terms, share an etymological affinity is now clear. In the previous part 'Etymological Explorations of *titthiya* et al' it has been demonstrated how these terms are reducible to the etymon √*tṝ.* This etymological affinity does not, however, immediately or transparently shine through the divergent denotations these cognates carry. For where lies the semantic affinity between, for instance, 'to cross over' (√*tṝ*), 'doctrine' (*tittha*) and 'adherent/head of a different ascetic community' (*añña-titthiya*)? And how are the meanings of 'fording place,' '(head of a) community of ascetics,' and 'doctrine,' which are all associated with the term *tittha,* interrelated?[72]

Despite those various divergent meanings, this chapter argues for a semantic unity of *titthiya* and its cognates. This chapter will delineate how those divergent meanings are the outcome of the application of √*tṝ* and its derivatives in figurative settings expressive of the soteriological aim of liberation (*mokkha*). As it will be shown, it is in these figurative settings that the development of the Pāli term *titthiya* needs to be understood, as well as the early Buddhist *bhikkhus'* initial positive association with the term *titthiya.* More specifically, both the development of the term *titthiya* and the early Buddhist *bhikkhus'* initial positive association with it, are intertwined with the fact, as we will see, that life was soteriologically conceived as cyclic. It is well known that the cyclic conception of life is not unique to early Buddhist *bhikkhus,* but that it equally lies at the basis of the philosophical speculations and ascetic stipulations of early Jain *bhikkhus.*[73] In other words, the metaphorical application of √*tṝ* and its derivatives in the 'language of liberation' is common to both early Buddhists and Jains.[74]

In what follows, the connection will be elucidated between the basic soteriological viewpoint of life as cyclic and this shared metaphorical use among early Buddhists and

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[72] See p.175 and p.207. See also Balcerowicz 1997 where he argues for using the term '*tīrtha*' (instead of the more commonly employed term '*dharma*') when looking for a semantic equivalent of the western concept of 'religion.'

[73] This was most certainly also true for other early Indian ascetic communities. In fact, the conception of life as cyclic was one of the several "cultural features of Greater Magadha," cp. Bronkhorst 2007: 69 ff.

[74] This expression 'language of liberation' has been inspired by a similarly entitled chapter of Katherine Blackstone's *Women in the Footsteps of the Buddha.* This book and particularly its chapter 'Language of Liberation' offers an examination of the metaphors and symbols used in the Therīgāthā to express the quest and achievement of liberation by *bhikkhunīs.* Comparing it with those in the Theragāthā, she unveiled important differences between the two companion texts regarding their metaphor use and their story settings. These differences might be indicative that the Therīgāthā has indeed, as the text itself claims, been compiled by female authors, see Blackstone 1998.

Jains of √tṛ and its derivatives. Several early Jain and Buddhist textual fragments will be quoted to, in a first instance, show the application of √tṛ and its derivatives in literal settings, and subsequently in figurative settings too, hereby both showing the semantic unity of the various cognates and offering a ground for understanding the early Buddhists' positive association with the term *titthiya.*

The Applications of √tṛ in Literal *versus* Metaphorical Language

In early Buddhist and Jain texts numerous conjugated forms of the root √tṛ can be found that carry the literal meaning of 'to cross over.' These forms occur in clear unambiguous literal contexts, that is, the forms are used in such a way and occur in only such type of phrases that do not permit additional interpretation to what has been expressed on the literal level. Though that which can physically 'be crossed over' may both be firm ground or water (such as a river), the verb is most frequently used in the context of water.

A first example of √tṛ expressing the crossing of a physical space on firm ground may be drawn from the Mahāvagga. In the sixth chapter of the Mahāvagga a succession of actions is given of a householder who wishes to approach the Buddha, who at that moment is staying in his dwelling place (*vihāra*). So we read at Vin I 248:

> [H]aving approached quietly, having entered the verandah [ālinda] (but) **without crossing [*ataramāno*]** it, having coughed, [the householder] tap on the door bolt. (tr. I.B. Horner BD IV 342, emphasis added)[75]

This negated present participle (*a-taramāno)* is a rare example of a literal application of √tṛ to express the crossing of something else than water. Conspicuously more frequent is the use of the verb in contexts of water. This is in part seen by the fact that the Padabhājaniya to *pārājika* II explains *nāvā* ('boat') with '*yāya tarati*' or 'that by which one crosses.'[76]

In general, the recurrent setting of √tṛ is the wading through a (mostly specific) river by an animal or a person in order to reach the shore on the opposite side. The wading through is usually mentioned because the river literally lies in the way of the village or city that is to be travelled to. Occasionally, it might explicitly be stated that the crossing of the river takes place at a ford (*tittha*). Vin I 191 mentions the crossing of the river Aciravatī by cows. At Vin III 63 we can read *en passant* how a Buddhist *bhikkhu* crosses a river and a little further, at Vin III 67, we hear of a *bhikkhu* who, living in a certain village, needs to cross a river to visit a fellow *bhikkhu* who lives in the city of Kosambī.

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[75] Vin I 248: *... appasaddo upasaṃkamitvā ataramāno ālindaṃ pavisitvā ukkāsitvā aggaḷaṃ ākoṭesi.*

[76] Vin III 49 (tr. BD I 60): *nāva nāma yāya tarati.*

The crossing of a river seems to have been permitted both by wading/swimming[77] and by boat as Vin I 109 respectively mentions a supposed incident of *bhikkhu* Kassapa wetting his garb due to being caught by a strong current of the river he was crossing, and *pācittiya* XXVIII prohibits *bhikkhus* to embark in a boat with *bhikkhunīs* unless if it is to cross over to the other bank (and thus not for leisure trips). In all Vinaya passages just referred to, the Pāli term *nadī* is used for river and a conjugated form of √*tṛ* to express the crossing of it.[78] Also at Vin I 230 '*nadī*' and a form of √*tṛ*, though with the addition of the preverbium *ud°*- which most probably stresses the fact that the crossing is here done by wading through (and thus not by using a boat),[79] is used when two ministers of Magadha, standing in awe of Gotama the Buddha, thought:

> *... yen' ajja samaṇo Gotamo dvārena nikkhamissati taṃ Gotamadvāraṃ nāma bhavissati,*
>
> *yena **titthena** Gaṅgaṃ **nadiṃ uttarissati** taṃ **Gotamatitthaṃ** nāma bhavissatīti.* (Vin I 230)

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[77] It may be noted here that the present day Hindi word for swimming, तैरना, is also etymologically related to √*tṛ*.

[78] In order of quotation see: Vin I 190-191 (BD IV 254): *tena kho pana samayena chabbaggiyā bhikkhū Aciravatiyā nadiyā gāvīnaṃ **tarantīnaṃ** visāṇesu pi gaṇhanti.* (emphasis added)

Vin III 63 (BD I 106): *tena kho pana samayena aññatarassa bhikkhuno **nadiṃ tarantassa** rajakānaṃ hatthato muttaṃ sāṭakaṃ pāde laggaṃ hoti.* (emphasis added)

Vin III 67 (BD I 113): *atha kho tassa bhikkhuno gāmakā Kosambiṃ gacchantassa antarā magge **nadiṃ tarantassa** sūkarikānaṃ hatthato muttā medavaṭṭi pāde laggā hoti.* (emphasis added)

Vin I 109 (BD IV 142): *tena kho pana samayena āyasmā Mahākassapo Andhakavindā Rājagahaṃ uposathaṃ āgacchanto antarā magge **nadiṃ taranto** manaṃ vuḷho ahosi, cīvarāni 'ssa allāni.* (emphasis added)

Vin III 63 (BD I 106): *tena kho pana samayena aññatarassa bhikkhuno **nadiṃ tarantassa** rajakānaṃ hatthato muttaṃ sāṭakaṃ pāde laggaṃ hoti.* (emphasis added)

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Vin I 109 (BD IV 142): *tena kho pana samayena āyasmā Mahākassapo Andhakavindā Rājagahaṃ uposathaṃ āgacchanto antarā magge **nadiṃ taranto** manaṃ vuḷho ahosi, cīvarāni 'ssa allāni.* (emphasis added)

Vin IV 65-66 (BD II 292-293), i.e. Pācittiya XXVIII: *yo pana bhikkhu bhikkuniyā saddhiṃ saṃvidhāya ekaṃ nāvaṃ abhirūheyya uddhaṃgāminiṃ vā adhogāminiṃ vā aññatra tiriyaṃtaraṇāya, pācittiyan ti.* (emphasis added) Cf. also Vin IV (*saṃghadisesā* III) where nuns are prohibited to cross the river alone.

[79] As preverbium *ud°* according to the PTS' PED carries the '*Original meaning* "out in an upward direction", out of, forth ...[and] hence develop[ed] 2 clearly defined meanings, viz. (1) out, out of, away from [and] (2) up (high) or high up, upwards, on to [...].' (cf. PED 132 *ud-*, *sv*) it is possible that *ud°* in connection with the root √*tṛ* and when √*tṛ* has as specific direct object a stretch of water, it expresses the meaning 'through' water, with the image of 'upward direction' fulfilled by the vertical figure of the wading person. *uttarati nadiṃ* would then mean 'he crosses *through* the river,' stressing the fact that the crossing is accomplished through (vertical) wading and not through using a (horizontal) ferry or any other floating devices. This hypothesis seems to find support in the fact that a little further the Vinaya passage in question suggests that the *ud°*√*tṛ* (or the wading through) was not possible due to too high levels of the river and that a raft or a floating device was needed instead.

or, in Horner's translation:

> By whichever gate the recluse Gotama goes out to-day, that shall be called Gotama's Gate; by whichever ford [*titthena*] he crosses [*ut-tarissati*] that shall be called Gotama's Ford [*Gotama-tittham*]. (I.B. Horner BD IV 314)

A literal application of √*tṝ* in the Jain Āgama may be quoted from the Kappa Sutta, a text traditionally categorized under the group of Cheyasuttas (Skt. Chedasūtras, 'Degradation Manuals') and which third part deals with the conduct of Jain ascetics during the rainy season, hence also its name Pajjosavaṇā Kappa (Skt. Paryuṣaṇā Kalpa).[80] In the edition of Walther Schubring Kappa *sutta* IV 27 reads:

> *no kappai nigganthāṇa vā nigganthīṇa vā imāo pañca mahā-naīo uddiṭṭhāo gaṇiyāo vañjiyāo anto māsassa dukkhutto vā tikkhutto vā **uttarittae** vā **saṃtarittae** vā, taṃ-jahā: Gaṅgā Jauṇā Saraū Kosiyā Mahī. aha puṇa evaṃ jāṇejjā: Eravaī Kuṇālāe – jattha cakkiyā egaṃ pāyaṃ jale kiccā egaṃ pāyaṃ thale kiccā, evaṃ se kappai anto māsassa dukkhutto vā tikkhutto vā **uttarittae** vā **saṃtarittae** vā. jattha no evaṃ cakkiyā, evaṃ se no kappai anto māsassa dukkhutto vā tikkhutto vā uttarittae vā saṃtarittae vā.*

Which may be translated as:

> *Nigganthas* and *nigganthīs* are not allowed to either **wade through [*uttarittae*]** or **ferry across [*saṃtarittae*]** twice or thrice within one month the following five, fixed, enumerated and named large rivers: the Gaṅgā, the Yamunā, the Sarayū, the Kośikā and the Mahī. If, however, they see at places like the Ajiravatī in Kuṇālā – where it is possible to **wade through [*uttarittae*] or cross [*saṃtarittae*]** by putting one foot in the water and the other on the ground, then one may wade through or cross the river twice or thrice within a month, otherwise not. (tr. partly following Burgess 1910: 265)[81]

From these literal applications of √*tṝ* the following facts may be underscored: √*tṝ* in its primary denotation (i.e. in its literal application) necessarily entails that its agent crosses a place by moving from one (specific) point to another (specific) point. Further,

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[80] The Kappa Sutta is traditionally ascribed to Bhadrabāhu. While its third part (which is the oldest part of the Sutta) deals with the conduct of Jain ascetics during the rainy season, the first part gives biographies of the Jina, and the second lists several *gaṇas* and their branches. Though ascribed to Bhadrabāhu, some sections are much later than Bhadrabāhu, dating from the first century AD. Cf. Winternitz 1999 (1983, revised edition): 444 ff. and Deo 1956: 33 ff.

[81] Burgess' translation of the Jain Kappa Sutta is an Enlgish translation of Schubring's German translation The Kappa Sutta has been translated into German by Walther Schubring at the turn of the 19th century (xxx). This translation has been republished in the 1970's by Klaus Bruhn in his *Walther Schubring Kleine Schriften,* cf. Schubring 1977. Schubring's German translation has further been translated into English in 1910 by May S. Burgess, see Burgess 1910.

the notion of this crossing implies that the two locations from which one moves from and to are separated by an area that normally invites someone to move in a direction that is perpendicular to the crossing direction. In other words, √*tṝ* entails a spatial tension with the area that is to be crossed and hence appears to demand a certain (physical) effort of its agent.

In concrete terms, when √*tṝ* is used, for instance, in the context of a river it is immediately understood that √*tṝ's* agent is moving from a certain point of the hither bank to a point that is located on the opposite shore. Both banks from which the agent moves from and to, do not, therefore, need to be explicitly mentioned, they are implicitly understood in the action itself. The space between the two banks is filled up with the river which normally invites a moving that is either upstream or downstream, or, in other words, a moving which direction is perpendicular to the line between the two opposite shores. Further, the direction of the crossing stands in tension with the natural course of the river, and finally the crossing of the river requires more effort than following its natural course.

When we keep these facts of √*tṝ* in mind, it is not difficult to see (in the specific context of rivers, that is) that a little shift of emphasis from the act of crossing to the actual aspect of reaching the opposite shore combined with the facts that the crossing of the river and the reaching of the shore entails respectively a certain tension and effort, √*tṝ* perfectly lends itself to carry next to its literal denotation of "crossing over" the meanings "to reach something," "to overcome something," or even "to vanquish." Indeed, in Vedic Sanskrit texts several examples may be found of √*tṝ* wherein the aspect of reaching (the other shore) has been emphasized at the cost of loosing the crossing aspect.[82] Also in Buddhist and Jain texts √*tṝ* can be seen applied in the meaning of "reaching something," or "overcoming something." An example from the Jain Āyāraṅga Sutta. AS I 16.18-19 (in the edition of Schubring) reads "*saccassa āṇāe uvaṭṭhie mehāvī* **māraṃ tarai,**" meaning: "recognize [only] the truth! (equipped with the knowledge of the truth) the prudent one **overcomes death**."[83]

In Buddhist and Jain texts the implication that the crossing over might also involve a reaching of something (i.e. succeeding), especially becomes relevant when the river that is crossed becomes metaphorically associated with the pitfalls of worldly life or a wrongly advocated ascetic life. This point will soon be explored in greater detail.

The reason why metaphorical expressions are, generally speaking, a widespread feature of language, lies in the fact that they are crucial tools to translate abstract notions to everyday experience. Metaphors bring down, so to say, abstract ideas and realities to

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[82] For textual references see Grassmann 1976[5] (1873), *Wörterbuch zum Rig-Veda*: 525 & 540 *'tar, tir, tur'* and *tur, sv.*
[83] *Pure Life,* Schubring, 2004 (1926): 98.

tangible levels where the activity of comprehension takes place. Seen from the perspective of what is to be expressed, metaphors open up the conventional boundaries of a word's denotation and enable a larger, complex interplay of meanings, implications and sometimes visual conceptions too, that would not have been found or been possible on the literal level. Soteriological concepts very often, if not always, are abstract notions that are in need of metaphorical language to, on a basic level, become expressible and, in a second instance, become understandable. The complex concept regarding the functioning of '*karma*,' for instance, is one such idea that needs metaphorical language to be conveyed and grasped. In an interesting and recent article "Checking the Heavenly 'Bank Account of karma'," Jens Schlieter traces, among other things, the different metaphors used to express the functioning of *karma* in both early Buddhist texts and western scholarship. While the latter extensively seems to draw its imagery from the financial world, and more specifically, its banking account system, early Buddhist texts find their source for explaining *karma* in the agricultural environment, creating its imagery from seeds, their ripening, fruit and (the uncertainty of the quality of) the harvest.[84]

Apart from *karma* many other soteriological notions are best understood when expressed in or illustrated via metaphorical language. Among these are the interconnected soteriological notions of life as cyclic; and of the possibility to put an end to this *saṃsāra* of life and death, provided that one exerts oneself on the ascetic path laid out by his or her teacher. One particular set of metaphors developed in both early Buddhist and Jain texts to help expressing these soteriological notions, appears to have been provided by the imagery of '*the crossing of a river.*' With the river representing ignorance or (types of) deeds obstructing liberation, a wrong view or, even *saṃsāra* itself; with the two shores of the river representing the binary concept of (the to be rejected) household or worldly life and the (more desirable) ascetic life; with the teachings of respectively the Buddha and the Jina representing the raft to cross the river; or with the Buddha and the Jina themselves being the raft- or bridge-makers; and with the notion that crossing entails an effort, the imagery to attain liberation expressed by √*tṝ* and its derivatives is complete. Let us illustrate this metaphorical use of √*tṝ* and its derivatives with a few examples.

We may start by returning to the last quoted Vinaya passage above. At Vin I 230 we could read how two ministers wanted to name the gate (*dvāra*) by which the Buddha would depart, the Gotama-gate and the ford (*tittha*) where he would cross (*uttarissati*) the river Gaṅgā, the Gotama-ford. The application of *tittha* and *uttarissati* were, as I have pointed out, in a literal sense. The passage soon continues, however, in a symbolic tone

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84 Cf. Schlieter 2013.

wherein √*tṛ* and its derivatives are no longer used in a simple literal sense but start to be metaphorically applied. The Vinaya passage continues thus:

> *atha kho bhagavā yena dvārena nikkhami taṃ Gotamadvāraṃ nāma ahosi. atha kho bhagavā yena Gaṅgā nadī ten' upasaṃkami. tena kho pana samayena Gaṅgā nadī pūrā hoti samatitthikā kākapeyyā. manussā aññe nāvaṃ pariyesanti aññe uḷumpaṃ pariyesanti aññe kullaṃ bandhanti orā pāraṃ gantukāmā. addasa kho bhagavā te manusse aññe nāvaṃ pariyesante aññe uḷumpaṃ pariyesante aññe kullaṃ bandhante orā pāraṃ gantukāme, divāna seyyathāpi nāma balavā puriso sammiñjitaṃ vā bāhaṃ pasāreyya pasāritaṃ vā bāhaṃ sammiñjeyya, evam eva Gaṅgāya nadiyā orima*tīre* antarahito pārima*tīre* paccuṭṭhāsi saddhiṃ bhikkhusaṃghena. atha kho bhagavā etam atthaṃ viditvā tāyaṃ velāyaṃ imaṃ udānaṃ udānesi:*
>
> *ye **taranti** aṇṇavaṃ saraṃ setuṃ katvāna vissajja pallalāni,*
> *kullaṃ hi jano bandhati, **tiṇṇā** medhāvino janā 'ti.* (MV VI 28.11-13, Vin I 230, emphasis added)

Which may be rendered into English:

> Accordingly the gate [*dvāra*] by which the Bhagavat departed came to be called Gotama's Gate. Then the Bhagavat approached the river Gaṅgā. Now at that time the river Gaṅgā was full, having the same level as her banks [*samatitthikā*], (so that) a crow could drink (from it) [*kākapeyyā*]. Since they were desirous of going from the hither to the further [bank], some people searched for a boat [*nāva*], some searched for a float [*uḷumpa*], others put together a raft [*kulla*].
> The Bhagavat saw these people, of whom some were searching for a boat, some were searching for a float, others were putting together a raft since they were desirous of going from the hither to the further [bank]. Seeing them, as a strong man might stretch out his bent arm or might bend back his outstretched arm, even so did he, vanishing from the hither bank [*orimatīre*] of the river Gaṅgā, reappear on the further bank [*pārimatīre*] together with the *bhikkhu saṅgha*. Then the Bhagavat, having understood this matter, at that time uttered this solemn utterance:
>
> "**Those cross [*taranti*]** the deeps, the rivers, making a bridge, spanning the swamps. See! People tie their rafts – **but crossed over [*tiṇṇa*]** are the wise." (trsl. partly following I.B. Horner, BD IV 314)

With the river, in the quoted Vinaya passage, presented as unfordable the question of crossing it turns into a question of how to cross it and who can succeed in it. The fact that the passage presents the riverbank crowded with people, who are hopping around, building all sorts of floating devices to cross, suggests that the reaching of the other side is difficult but highly desired too. The symbolic tone of the passage becomes very distinct when the Buddha is said to miraculously disappear for a moment to reappear

the next moment on the other bank (*pārima-tīra*). The passage thus metaphorically equates the Buddha with the functioning raft needed to successfully cross the river. That the *bhikkhu saṅgha* is said to appear together with the Buddha on the other bank (and not the 'common' people) alludes to the idea, 'Buddhist' that is, that the other side can only be reached by those who are following the Buddha and his teachings.[85]

Another example of this metaphorical application of √*tṝ* and its derivatives in Buddhist texts, may be provided by the Jātaka tale entitled 'Good Group of Five' recorded at Mahāvastu III 353 of the Northern Buddhists, the Mahāsāṃghika-Lokottaravādins. In true Jātaka fashion the story tells of a previous birth of the Buddha where he, as Bodhisattva, saved the life of five merchants who, in a subsequent birth, became the Buddha's first disciples.

The gist of the story presents the Buddha as self-sacrificing himself so that his dead body may literally become the raft that will help the five merchants, who were shipwrecked, to successfully cross (*avatīrṇa*) the great ocean (*mahāsamudra*) in order to reach dry land (*sthala*), this is, the ocean's shore (*samudra-tīra*). In this Jātaka tale, √*tṝ* is metaphorically applied to express not a mere crossing, but a crossing over that entails a succeeding, a reaching of, and even an overcoming of false views (*dṛṣṭi*). To see how √*tṝ* is metaphorically applied in this Jātaka it suffices to have a look at its application in the story's prologue:

भिक्षू भगवन्तमाहन्सुः|| भगवता पंच भद्रवर्गीया अन्यतीर्थिकसंश्रिता दारुणेन दृष्टिओघेन वुह्यमाना ततो दृष्टिगतिषु विनिवर्तयित्वा भयभैरवातो संसारसागरातो उद्धरित्वा क्षेमस्थले शिवे शमे अभये निर्वाणे प्रतिष्ठापिताः || भगानाह || न भिक्षवः एतरहिमेव पंचका भद्रवर्गिका मया संसारसागरातो तारिता अन्यदापि मया एते महासमुद्रातो भग्नयानपात्रा अलेन अत्राणा अशरणा अपरायणाः कृच्छ्रप्राप्ता व्यसनमागता आत्मपरित्यागं कृत्वा महासमुद्रातो स्वस्तिना प्रतिष्ठापिताः ||[86] (*Le Mahâvastu,* Senart 1977 (1897) Vol III: 353.14-20)

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[86] *bhikṣū bhagavantamāhansuḥ || bhagavatā paṃca bhadravargīyā anyatīrthikasaṃśritā dāruṇena dṛṣṭioghena vuhyamānā tato dṛṣṭigatiṣu vinivartiyitvā bhayabhairavāto saṃsārasāgarāto udddharitvā kṣemasthale śive same abhaye nirvāṇe pratiṣṭhāpitāḥ || bhagānāha || na bhikṣavaḥ etarahimeva paṃcakā bhadravargikā mayā saṃsārasāgarāto tāritā anyadāpi mayā ete mahāsamudrāto bhagnayānapātrā alena atrāṇā aśaraṇā aparāyaṇāḥ kṛcchraprāptā vyasanamāgatā ātmaparityāgaṃ kṛtvā mahāsamudrāto svastinā pratiṣṭhāpitāḥ//*

The monks said to the Exalted One, "This good group of five monks were once adherents of another sect [*anyatīrthika*], carried away by the strong current of heresy [*dṛṣṭioghena*]. But then the Exalted One turned them away from these paths of false belief [*dṛṣṭigatiṣu*], raised them up out of fear and dismay, out of the ocean of recurrent birth [*saṃsārasāgarāto*], and established them on the firm ground [*kṣemasthale*] of peace, happiness, calm, fearlessness and nirvana." The Exalted One replied, "Monks, that was not the only time that the good group of five were led by me across [*tāritā*] the ocean of recurrent birth. There was another occasion, also, when I, through sacrifice of my own self [*ātmaparityāgaṃ*], saved them from the great ocean [*mahāsamudrāto*] when their vessel [*yānapātrā*] had been wrecked and they were without shelter, protection, refuge or succour but fallen into dire straits and adversity, and established them in prosperity." (*The Mahāvastu,* J. Jones 1952 Vol III: 350)

What is to be crossed here, or better, what needs to be overcome is not a simple river (*nadī*) but the strong current of false views (*dṛṣṭi-ogha*) and herewith linked the ocean of recurrent birth (*saṃsārasāgara*). With the Buddha being the raft to help them cross, the metaphorical application of √*tṛ* is complete.

Also within early Jain texts, a similar metaphorical application of √*tṛ* can be encountered. The *Dasaveyāliya Sutta* (Skt. Daśavaikālika Sūtra, DS),[87] equates *vinaya* or correct discipline (as promulgated by the Jina, that is) to be the means to attain *mokkha,* this is, to cross over *saṃsāra.* This is beautifully illustrated at DS 9.2.1-3 that states how a Jain *bhikkhu* failing to apply himself properly to *vinaya* (AMg. *viṇaa*) will be endlessly carried away in *saṃsāra* 'like a piece of wood in a stream (*soya*)':

मूलाओ खन्ध-प्पभवो दुमस्स,

खन्धाओ पच्छा समुवेन्ति साहा ।

साहा-प्पसाहा विरुहन्ति पत्ता,

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[87] The Sutta may be considered as an early concise manual to lead the Jain ascetic life. It belongs to the group of Mūlasūtras and is traditionally attributed to Sejjaṃbhava who is said to have written the Sutta in the year 98 after Mahāvīra's death. The text contains a reference to the Jain patriarch Govinda Vācaka who lived in the third century A.D Cf. Deo 1956: 24.

The Sutta has been edited and translated by respectively Leumann and Schubring. Cf. *The Dasaveyāliya Sutta,* Ernst Leumann (ed.) & Walther Schubring (tr.), Ahmedabad: The Managers of Sheth Anandji Kalianji, 1932. (Has been republished in Walther Schubring Kleine Schriften of Klaus Bruhn, Glasenapp-Stiftung Band 13, 1977). Leumann also edited the *niryukti* on the text, cf. *Daśavaikālika-sūtra und –niryukti, nach dem Erzählungsgehalt undersucht und herausgegeben von* Ernst Leumann (ed.), 1892. A user friendly edition and translation of the Sutta has also been provided by Lalwani. Cf. *Daśavaikālika Sūtra (Dasaveyalia Sutta),* Kastur Chand Lalwani (ed. & tr.), Delhi, Varanasi, Patna: Motilal Banarsidass, 1973.

तओ से पुप्फं च फलं रसो य ॥१॥

एवं धम्मस्स विणओ मूलं , परमो से मोक्खो ।

जेण कित्तिं सुयं सग्घं निस्सेसं चाभिगच्छई ॥२॥

जे य चण्डे मिए थद्धे दुव्वाई नियडी सढे ।

वुञ्झई से अविणीयप्पा कट्ठं सोय-गयं जहा ॥३॥

(DS 9.2.1-3, ed. Leumann 1932: 177-178)[88]

From the root comes the trunk of the tree, from the trunk shoot up the branches, from the branches and boughs spring up the leaves, from them the blossom, the fruit and [its] sap. In the same manner discipline (*viṇaa*) is the root of Dharma; by it [the monk will] obtain a glorious reputation [and] complete [knowledge of] tradition. [Dharma's] final [fruit is] Salvation (*mokkha*). But [a monk] without discipline (*aviṇīyappā*), [who is] rough, [of a] limited [intellect], full of conceit, harsh in his words, vulgar, and uncouth, [will] be carried away [in the Saṃsāra] like a piece of wood in the stream (*soya*). (DS 9.2.1-3, tr. Schubring 1932: 111)

Contrary to the Jain *bhikkhu* who neglects *vinaya,* the *bhikkhu* who does apply himself properly to *vinaya* and who does follow his *guru's* instructions, that *bhikkhu* crosses (*tarati*) the flood (*oha*) that is difficult to cross (*duruttara*) and 'reaches the highest abode':

निद्देस-वत्ती पुण जे गुरूणं

    सुयत्थ-धम्मा विणयम्मि कोविया ।

तरित्तु ते ओहमिणं दुरुत्तरं

    खवित्तु कम्मं गइमुत्तमं गय ॥ (DS 9.2.23, ed. Leumann 1932: 180)[89]

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[88] *mūlāo khandha-ppabhavo dumassa,*
    khandhāo pacchā samuventi sāhā.
sāha-ppasāhā viruhanti pattā,
    tao se pupphaṃ ca phalaṃ raso ya. (1)
evaṃ dhammassa viṇao mūlaṃ, paramo se mokkho,
jeṇa kittiṃ suyaṃ sagghaṃ nissesaṃ cābhigacchaī. (2)
je ya caṇḍe mie thaddhe duvvāī niyaḍī saḍhe,
vuñjhaī se aviṇīyappā kaṭṭhaṃ soya-gayaṃ jahā. (3) (DS 9.2.1-3, ed. Leumann 1932: 177-178)

[89] *niddesa-vattī puṇa je gurūṇaṃ*
    suyattha-dhammā viṇayammi koviyā,
tarittu te ohamiṇaṃ duruttaraṃ
    khavittu kammaṃ gaïmuttamaṃ gaya. (DS 9.2.23, ed. Leumann 1932: 180)

But they who are obedient to the directions of the Guru, [who] know the Dharma and its meaning, are experienced in discipline, cross (*tarittu*) that dangerous flood [of Saṃsāra,] (*oham duruttaraṃ*) annihilate [their] Karman and reach the highest abode. (DS 9.2.23, tr. Schubring 1932: 112)

A final and paradigmatic application of √*tṝ* in 'the language of liberation' may be provided by the Jain Uttarajjhayaṇa Sutta (Skt. Uttarādhyana Sūtra),[90] lecture 23, *suttas* 63-73, being a part of the famous dialogue between Kesi (Pārśva's disciple) and Gotama (Mahāvīra's disciple):

कुप्पवयणपासण्डी सव्वे उम्मग्गपट्ठिया ।
सम्मग्गं तु जिणक्खायं एस मग्गे हि उत्तमे ॥ ६३

साहु गोयम पन्ना ते छिन्नो मे संसओ इमो ।
अन्नो वि संसओ मज्झं तं मे कहसु गोयमा ॥ ६४

महाउदगवेगेण वुज्झमाणाण पाणिणं ।
सरणं गई पइट्ठा य दीवं कं मन्नसी मुणी ॥ ६५

अत्थि एगो महादीवो वारिमज्झे महालओ ।
महाउदगवेगस्स गई तत्थ न विज्जई ॥ ६६

दीवे य इइ के वुत्ते केसी गोयममब्बवी ।
केसिमेवं बुवंतं तु गोयमो इणमब्बवी ॥ ६७

जरामरणवेगेणं वुज्झमाणाण पाणिणं ।
धम्मो दीवो पइट्ठा य गई सरणमुत्तमं ॥ ६८

साहु गोयम पन्ना ते छिन्नो मे संसओ इमो ।
अन्नो वि संसओ मज्झं तं मे कहसु गोयमा ॥ ६९

अणवंसि महोहंसि नावा विपरिधावई ।
जंसि गोयममारूढो कहं पारं गमिस्ससि ॥ ७०

जा उ सस्साविणी नावा न सा पारस्स गामिणी ।

[90] The Uttarādhyana Sūtra is the first Sūtra of the group of four Mūlasūtras. "The work, consisting 36 sections, is a compilation of various texts, which belong to various periods." Cf. Winternitz 1999 (1983, revised edition): 448. It contains many poems, parables and ballads. Some sections also deal with dogmatics and ascetic duties. A complete edition of the Sūtra has been provided by Charpentier. Cf. *The Uttarādhyayanasūtra,* Charpentier (ed.), 1922. The first chapter of the Uttarādhyana Sūtra has also been individually edited and translated by Norman. See *Uttarajjhayaṇa-sutta,* Norman, 1994. On the relative dating of the text, see Winternitz 1999 (1983, revised edition): 448.

जा निरस्साविणी नावा सा उ पारस्स गामिणी ॥ ७१

नावा य इइ का वुत्ता केसी गोयममब्बवी ।

केसिमेवं बुवंतं तु गोयमो इणमब्बवी ॥ ७२

सरीरमाहु नाव त्ति जीवे वुच्चइ नाविओ ।

संसारो अणवो वुत्तो जं तरन्ति महेसिणो ॥ ७३

(UD 23.63-73, ed. Charpentier 1922: 175-176)[91]

"The heterodox [*kuppavayaṇa*] and the heretics [*pāsaṇḍī*] have all chosen a wrong path [*ummagga*]; the right path [*sammagga*] is that taught by the *Ginas*; it is the most excellent path." (63)

'Well, Gautama, [you possess wisdom, you have destroyed my doubt; but I have another doubt which you must explain to me, Gautama]. (64)

'Is there a shelter, a refuge, a firm ground for the beings carried away by the great flood [*vega*] of water [*mahāudaga*]? Do you know the island, O Gautama?' (65)

"There is a large, great island in the midst of water, which is not inundated by the great flood of water." (66)

Kêsi said to Gautama, 'What do you call this island?' To these words of Kêsi Gautama made the following reply: (67)

"The flood [*vega*] is age and death, which carry away living beings; Law [*dhamma*] is the island, the firm ground, the refuge, the most excellent shelter." (68)

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[91] *kuppavayaṇapāsaṇḍī* savve *ummagga*paṭṭhiyā,
sammaggaṃ tu jiṇakkhāyaṃ esa magge hi uttame. (63)
sāhu goyama pannā te chinno me saṃsao imo,
anno vi saṃsao mañjhaṃ taṃ me kahasu goyamā. (64)
mahāudagavegeṇa vuñjamāṇa pāṇiṇaṃ,
saraṇaṃ gaī païṭṭhā dīvaṃ kaṃ mannasī muṇī. (65)
atthi ego mahādīvo vārimañjhe mahālao,
mahā**udagavegassa** gaī tattha na vijjaī. (66)
dīve ya ïï ke vutte kesī goyamamabbavī,
kesimevaṃ buvaṃtaṃ tu goyamo iṇamabbavī. (67)
jarāmaraṇa**vegeṇa**ṃ vuñjhamāṇa pāṇiṇaṃ,
dhammo dīvo païṭṭhā ya gaī saraṇamuttaṃ. (68)
sāhu goyama pannā te chinno me saṃsao imo,
anno vi saṃsao mañjhaṃ taṃ me kahasu goyamā. (69)
aṇavaṃsi mahohaṃsi nāvā viparidhāvaī,
jaṃsi goyamamārūḍho kahaṃ pāraṃ gamissasi. (70)
jā u sassāviṇī nāvā na sā pārassa gāmiṇī,
jā nirassāviṇī nāvā sā u pārassa gāmiṇī. (71)
nāvā ya ïï kā vuttā kesī goyamamabbavī,
kesimevaṃ buvaṃtaṃ tu goyamo iṇamabbavī. (72)
sarīramāhu nāva tti jīve vuccaï nāvio,
saṃsāro aṇavo vutto jaṃ **taranti** mahesiṇo. (73) (UD 23.63-73, ed. Charpentier 122: 175-756, emphasis added)

'Well, Gautama, [you possess wisdom, you have destroyed my doubt; but I have another doubt which you must explain to me, Gautama]. (69)

'On the ocean with its many currents there drifts a boat; how will you, Gautama, on board of it reach the opposite shore?' (70)

"A boat that leaks will not reach the opposite shore; but a boat that does not leak, will reach it." (71)

Kêsi said to Gautama, 'What do you call this boat?' To these words of Kêsi Gautama made the following reply: (72)

"The body is the boat, life is the sailor, and the Circle of Births [saṃsāra] is the ocean which is crossed [taranti] by the great sages [mahesiṇo]." (73)

(UD 23.63-73, tr. Jacobi 2004 [1985] SBE 45: 126-127)

When we consider the metaphorical application of √tṝ in this Uttarajjhayaṇa passage together with its application in the other quoted Jain and Buddhist textual fragments, it may become clear how *titthiya* and its cognates may be viewed to constitute a semantic unity, despite their divergent meanings. What do the various denotations have in common? What the denotations 'to cross over' (√tṝ), 'doctrine', '(head of a) community of ascetics', 'fording place' (all meanings that, as we have seen, are associated with the term *tittha*), and 'adherent/head of a different ascetic community' (*añña-titthiya*) have in common, is that they all developed within the metaphorical language of liberation. All denotations developed within the symbolic setting expressive of the difficult but much desired goal of liberation (*mokkha*).

From the above quoted early Buddhist and Jain textual fragments it has become clear that both *samaṇa* communities translated the abstract soteriological idea of attaining liberation by means of drawing on the imagery of successfully crossing a river by boat. Within this metaphorical setting, the river, as we have seen, came to represent *saṃsāra,* this is, the endless cycle of life and death. Its treacherous strong currents (*ogha, vega*) preventing one to successfully 'cross' *saṃsāra,* has by both communities been metaphorically linked with the wrong ascetic path (*ummagga*) of so-called heretics. The failure to cross was further also seen presented as the outcome of not applying *vinaya* correctly, or as the result of neglecting the instructions of one's teacher. Conversely, the means to successfully cross the river lies in following 'the right path' (*sammagga*). Finally, within this imagery, the bank (*tittha*) that is to be reached is represented as the safe, dry, firm ground, or, as in our fragment of the Uttarajjhayaṇa Sutta, as the island that prevents one from being swept away by the current of *saṃsāra.* When we consider the fact that within the respective traditions the raft to successfully cross over, or sometimes even the firm ground itself, is linked with the Buddha, the Jina, and their teachings, it becomes clear how '*tittha*' came to carry the –interrelated – denotations of 'fording place,' 'doctrine' and '(head of a) community of ascetics.'

In conclusion, when remembering both how the term *titthiya,* being an adjective of appurtenance, literally means 'belonging to a/the *tittha,*' and the fact that its

development should be understood within this metaphorical setting, we now are able to understand how early Buddhist *bhikkhus* could initially positively associate themselves with the notions represented by the term.

The semantic shift of '*titthiya*' in Buddhist texts may then point to a (gradual) dissociation from and a simultaneous change of the notions represented by it. Be as it may, the semantic shift reflects a shift in the Buddhist community's self-perception vis-à-vis its others, wherein (the concern for) internal coherence amongst its members seems to prevail above the community's participation in the larger *samaṇa* landscape.

Concluding Thoughts

Departing from the truism that the development of the early Indian Buddhist community evolved in intense dialogue with its wider ascetic landscape, I examined how and how much of this dialogue can still be traced in the early Buddhist ascetic text, the Pāli Vinaya. Recognizing that ascetic others constituted an important dynamic and dialectic force within the development of the early Buddhist community, I investigated how the Pāli Vinaya acknowledged, integrated, and dealt with the early Buddhist *bhikkhu's* ascetic others. In other words, this dissertation focussed on the role ascetic others, and in particular the Jain other, exerted on the early Buddhist community's development, and assessed how and how much of their dynamic and dialectic contribution can be identified within the Pāli Vinaya.

The question of *how* to identify the dialogic influence of ascetic others within the Pāli Vinaya, translated itself into the question of *how* to approach and read a normative source. We discussed how the Pāli Vinaya presents itself as a historically complex document. Due to its long textual development; its prescriptive nature; and its provenance within a 'Buddhist' traditional sphere (i.e. it was composed, transmitted and redacted *by* 'Buddhist' *bhikkhus for* 'Buddhist' *bhikkhus*), the Pāli Vinaya cannot be considered as a faithful blueprint of the historical development of the early Buddhist ascetic community. The manner how the narratives within the Pāli Vinaya revert to stock phrases; use a repetitive structure; and place the executive role for every legal decision with the Buddha himself created, as we have seen, a strong traditional story regarding the origin and development of the Buddhist ascetic *saṅgha.* It is evident that within such a traditional story the dynamic role of ascetic others is bound to either be flattened out, misrepresented or simply left out. Throughout this dissertation I explored possibilities to break through this normative, traditional account of the Pāli Vinaya to bring to the foreground the dialogic influence of the early Buddhist *bhikkhu's* ascetic others.

Situating my research within the contemporary scholarly discourse on anti-essentialism (cp. Section I 'Scholarly Frameworks, Past and Present'), I considered it vital to apply to

the Pāli Vinaya only such readings and to raise only such questions that would do full justice to the very concept of dialogue.

We have seen how within nineteenth century scholarly language the question of historical origins and development, because of being informed by the idea of "the purity of the historical prior," effected homogenized products of knowledge. Similarities and differences between the various early Indian ascetic traditions were mapped out and relegated to the interpretative scheme of who copied who; who was prior; who may we consider to be the original source, thus attempting to define the 'original' Buddh'ism', 'original' 'Jain'ism' and 'original' Brahman'ism'. Rejecting the very idea of an original, or essential Buddhism, Jainism, or Brahmanism, I studied the early Buddhist community in relation to its various ascetic others in order to assess not the degree of so-called positive influence these ascetic others had on the Buddhist ascetic community's development, but in order to assess the manner in which these ascetic others stirred the Buddhist ascetic community to dialectically define and redefine itself in terms of similarity and difference.

To identify in the Pāli Vinaya and bring out the dialogic influence of the early Buddhist *bhikkhu's* ascetic others, I applied, in a first instance, Nattier's 'principle of irrelevance' and 'principle of counterargument,' while investigating the contact opportunities between the early Buddhist *bhikkhus* and his ascetic others. For the question of dialogue begs the simple but important question of contact. How easily could Buddhist *bhikkhus* come into contact, whether direct or indirect, with their ascetic others and how did this contact affected their self-perception and ascetic organization? The contact opportunities I drew from the Pāli Vinaya were supplemented with examples from the Jain Āyāraṅga Sutta. My principal aim was not to provide an exhaustive typology of contact opportunities, but to gain insights into the socio-geographical proximity of the early Buddhist *bhikkhu* ascetic others. Where was the ascetic other located? In other words, how easily could the Buddhist *bhikkhu* enter into dialogue with his ascetic other?

We have seen how nearly any daily and basic activity (wandering for alms, sleeping, eating, bathing) of the early Buddhist *bhikkhu* could give rise to contact. In this discussion the paramount role of householders in bringing about contact opportunities also became evident. The fact that (some) householders would donate alms-food whether at their houses, or during public festal events, or at the place of residency itself of a *samaṇa,* irrespective of the latter's specific ascetic affiliation, effected many direct and indirect contact opportunities. Also their establishment of public facilities, such as public rest-houses or travel lodges were conducive in bringing the Buddhist *bhikkhu* into direct and indirect contact with his ascetic others. The discussion of the various contact opportunities, whether arising from the activity (e.g. alms-begging) or place of being (e.g. public rest-house) of the Buddhist *bhikkhu*, made us better appreciate the reason why ascetic practices pertaining to garb, begging bowl and diet were so often the

subject of intra- and inter communal debates. In the absence of a material boundary separating the Buddhist *bhikkhu* from his ascetic others, the remaining locale to place identity rested with the *bhikkhu's* body itself and the (visible) ascetic practices he could exerted with that body.

We further noted how with the establishment of more sophisticated *vihāra* complexes, contact opportunities became both more regulated and, most probably, less frequent too. Exclusive and materially sophisticated *vihāra* complexes started to provide Buddhist *bhikkhus* with a new and important source of (distinctive) identity. With the establishment of materially more sophisticated *vihāra* complexes, the distinction between a Buddhist *bhikkhu* and his ascetic other became, in part, provided and supported by the material boundaries of the *vihāra* complex itself.

In the third section 'Processes of othering,' I further examined the dialogic role of the early Buddhist *bhikkhu's* ascetic other by reverting to Jonathan Smith's theory of 'proximate other.' With Smith's theory we have seen how a community requires a theory of the other when experiencing "otherness" to be "TOO-MUCH-LIKE-US" or when it claims to "BE-US." "It is here," as Jonathan Smith remarked, "that the real urgency of theories of the 'other' emerges, called forth not so much by a requirement to place difference, but rather by an effort to situate ourselves."[1] In a similar context, Green noted how the terminology a community develops to refer to its so-called other are "primarily clues to its self-understanding."[2] These insightful reflections have proven to be very helpful in identifying processes of othering within the Pāli Vinaya.

Considering the early Buddhist *bhikkhus'* ascetic others to be in Smith's understanding of the term 'proximate,' we examined both (1) when, how and why the Pāli Vinaya referred to these others, and (2) the terminology it developed to refer to them. When we keep Jonathan Smith's and Green's theories in mind, the value of examining the Pāli Vinaya's references to the early Buddhist *bhikkhu's* ascetic others and their supposed practices, lies in the fact that one can go beyond the (mere) question of whether the reference is historically faithful or not. This is, when searching for the dialectic and dynamic role of the ascetic others, one does not (per se) need to establish whether a particular reference to a supposed practice; utterance; soteriological idea (etc.) of a so-called proximate, ascetic other is historically correct (whether it has a *factual* correspondence), one can, instead, focus on the reflexive aspect of the reference: what does the reference in question say about the preoccupations of the early Buddhist *bhikkhus* themselves? In this manner, we were able to establish how the early Buddhist *bhikkhus* thought about the importance of the ascetic garb; the value of the ascetic

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[1] Smith 2004 (1992): 245.
[2] Green 1985: 49.

practice of nakedness, and of the importance of a begging bowl in direct relation to its proximate, ascetic other, whether real or imagined.

Further, having examined the various denominations the Pāli Vinaya developed for referring to the early Buddhist *bhikkhu* ascetic other, we were able to establish that though having a knowledge of the manner how contemporaneous ascetic communities denominated themselves, the monk-editors of the Pāli Vinaya preferred to resort to the more neutral and generic denomination (*añña*)*titthiya.* We explained this preference to be in line with their general concern to create the very tradition they claimed to hold.

In the final section, I addressed the dialogic role of the early Buddhist *bhikkhu's* ascetic other by means of a philological examination of *'titthiya'* and kindred terms. Through this examination we were able to identify a semantic shift in the application of the term *titthiya.* Whereas early Buddhist *bhikkhus* could initially positively associate themselves, and could also by outsiders positively be associated with, the term *titthiya,* they nevertheless (gradually) lost their self-identification with the term. Instead *'titthiya'* became exclusively used to generically refer to their real or imagined ascetic others, and this usually in contexts betraying a negative perception of these others. We argued that this semantic shift went hand in hand with a shift in the manner how the early Buddhist ascetic community perceived and related to its ascetic other. If it initially might have related to its ascetic others in terms of *sameness,* the early Buddhist ascetic community gradually, having become well-established and self-conscious of its difference, started to more and more relate to its ascetic others in terms of difference.

Keeping in honour our statement at the beginning of this dissertation on "the importance of an on-going methodological reflection," and recalling how a PhD is "not an endpoint, but just a jumping board to other [yet, unwritten] chapters,"[3] I end my dialogue with the Pāli Vinaya, for now, here.

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[3] Cf. p. vii.

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