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Why do Swedes cooperate with the police?

A SEM analysis of Tyler's procedural justice model

Abstract

The present article examines why Swedes cooperate with the police using the framework of the procedural justice theory. This theory assumes that trust in procedural justice and in the effectiveness of the police are important issues in shaping citizens' perceptions of police legitimacy. Additionally, perceived legitimacy is necessary for the recognition of police authority. When citizens recognize the right of the police to exercise authority, they are assumed to feel an obligation to obey the police, and ultimately they will have a greater tendency to cooperate with them. Because of the ongoing discussion about the meaning and conceptualization of the concept of 'legitimacy', some additional ideas are described and are also taken into account in the model that we tested. We used structural equation modelling (SEM) to do the analysis, which was conducted on data available from the European Social Survey (ESS) Round 5. The results indicate that trust in the procedural justice of the police plays an important role in the explanation of citizens' willingness to cooperate with the police through perceptions of moral alignment and feelings of obligation to obey the police. However, there is still a high percentage of individual variance in willingness to cooperate with the police that cannot be explained by the model we tested. The implications of the findings are discussed.

Keywords: Trust in the police, cooperation, procedural justice, European Social Survey.

Introduction and research problem

Trust in modern democracies has long been said to be declining (Catterberg and Moreno 2005; Nye 1997). This theme has been studied by scholars in the fields of psychology, sociology and especially the political sciences. Trust in the institutions of law enforcement is at the basis of the democratic political system. Without trust, democracy is at risk, mainly because law enforcement loses its legitimacy in the absence of trust. According to Huyse, a scholar in the sociology of law, 'legitimacy and clout' are the pillars upon which every democracy rests. Legitimacy means 'the conviction, in large sections of the population that political institutions and their equipment are worth public trust'. Huyse defines clout as 'the government's ability to take care of insecurity, work and prosperity'. A long-term weakening

of one of these pillars may cause the fall of a democracy (Huyse 1996, p.7). Without legitimacy, institutions of law enforcement such as the police, the judiciary and the public prosecution service risk losing important resources: the willingness of the public to obey them and to consider them legitimate might disappear, and young people might lose their motivation to apply for jobs in law enforcement (Tyler 2006a, 2007, 2011). Furthermore, the willingness of the public to comply with the law might decrease when the institutions of law enforcement are distrusted (Nye 1997). The central idea that lies behind this study is that if people trust the criminal justice system, they will regard it as a form of legitimate authority; they will then defer to this authority, obey the law, and in consequence cooperate with the justice system (Hough et al. 2010; Jackson et al. 2012). The aim of this article is to test this idea to see if it explains why Swedes are willing to cooperate with the police, who are part of the criminal justice system.

The present study draws on insights gained from Tyler's procedural justice model; this has primarily been explored in English-speaking cultures, but has not yet been sufficiently tested in the varied cultural settings of continental and Northern Europe. For that reason, a common criticism of the procedural justice model is that it has most frequently been applied in English-speaking countries with common law legal systems that are substantially different from the continental legal systems (Hough et al. 2010; Reisig, Tankebe & Mesko 2013). A significant question is therefore whether this theoretical framework can be applied in other contexts, such as Northern Europe, where the legal systems and the position of the police within them are often very different (although in all countries both these institutions want to be perceived as legitimate). This question is of particular relevance given the ever-increasing pluralism and mobility of the modern world. That consideration apart, it is also essential to test the scope of theories. A theory cannot pretend to be the final, certain truth. A theory can be corroborated, and should be retained provisionally as the best available theory only until it is shown to be false (Popper 1959). This study is of practical as well as theoretical relevance. A test of procedural justice theory in the Swedish context could offer a contribution to the further development of policing strategies. As Tankebe (2009) noticed, studies in which a theory is re-tested enable us to learn about the differences and similarities between societies. On the one hand, similar societies can copy ideas or policy innovations from each other; on the other hand, studies like these can help to avoid the 'blind' transportation of strategies from one social context to another.

Before taking a closer look at the results of the theory test, we will sketch out the theoretical framework of this study. We also consider the ongoing discussion about the

1 meaning and conceptualization of the concept of ‘legitimacy’, which is a key concept within
2 procedural justice theory. In the next paragraph we highlight some earlier studies on trust in
3 Sweden. We also consider some studies in which the role of procedural justice was tested to
4 explain the willingness of people to cooperate with the police. The theoretical framework and
5 the different views of the conceptualization of legitimacy have led to a testable path model to
6 explain the willingness of the public to cooperate with the police. The analysis is based on the
7 most recent edition of the European Social Survey (ESS 2010). The testable path model led us
8 to specific hypotheses that are described in detail below, and we follow these by a description
9 of the data and of the operationalization of the concepts. After a brief explanation of the
10 method used in the study, the results of the test are shown. We end with a conclusion and
11 discussion.
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22 **Can the attitudes and behaviour of citizens be shaped by the actions of legal authorities?**

23 According to procedural justice theory, which was extensively developed by Tom Tyler
24 (1988) and provided with an empirical basis by Thibaut and Walker (1975), public trust in the
25 criminal justice system depends on *perceptions of procedural fairness or justice* on the one
26 hand and *perceptions of effectiveness* on the other (Benesh and Howell 2001; Hough et al.
27 2013a, 2013b; Jackson et al. 2012; Sunshine and Tyler 2003a, 2003b; Thibaut and Walker
28 1975; Tyler 2006a). With regard to the police, public trust may be affected by the extent to
29 which the police are able to treat people fairly and to fight crime and disorder effectively. In
30 several publications, Tyler (2003, 2006a, 2007, 2011) has shown that perceived procedural
31 justice is more important in shaping public trust than perceived effectiveness. Fair and
32 respectful treatment that ‘follows the rules’ is thus more important to citizens than obtaining
33 outcomes that they regard as either fair or favourable to themselves (Hough et al. 2010). In
34 general, there are two criteria for judging the fairness of the procedures that are used by the
35 legal authorities: (1) *the quality of decision-making* and (2) *the quality of the personal*
36 *treatment one receives*. First, citizens want to feel that authorities handle their questions
37 and/or problems honestly, without bias, and objectively. A citizen wants to be treated and
38 helped in the same way as any other individual in the same situation. Neutrality has to be
39 central in the process of decision-making. Second, citizens want to be treated with dignity and
40 respect, regardless of whether their role is that of victim, suspect or witness. They want
41 respect for their rights and for their position within society. Lastly, in relation to both these
42 criteria, Tyler and Fagan (2008) argued that it is important for citizens to have the opportunity
43 to explain their views and behaviour before the police take decisions. They want to participate
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1 actively in discussions during the decision-making process. If an individual believes that an
2 authority has attempted to be fair to him/her, has treated him/her with dignity and respect and
3 has dealt with him/her in an impartial manner, the feelings of fairness will be enhanced
4 (Murphy 2003, 2005). Public trust in the police is thus based on perceptions of police activity,
5 but police activity itself also depends on public trust. In fact, public trust enhances the
6 perception of police legitimacy. When citizens perceive the police to be legitimate, it means
7 that the legal authority of the police is accepted. This results in the public being willing to
8 obey the police, to comply with the law and even to cooperate with the police in dealing with
9 crime and criminality. If an individual is not willing to testify, report a crime, comply with the
10 law or obey the police, not only is the belief that the police are worthy of public trust put at
11 risk, but public safety is also affected. Therefore, it is the responsibility of the government and
12 the legal authorities to gain public trust (Van Damme 2013).
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23 **The concept of ‘legitimacy’**

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25 Tyler (1997) has specifically shown that individuals who feel they have been fairly treated by
26 the authorities view those authorities as having legitimate power. But what does legitimacy
27 mean? Because of the ongoing discussion about the meaning and conceptualization of this
28 ‘slippery’ concept, Hough, Jackson and Bradford (2013b) tried to answer this question. First
29 of all, in line with Hinsch (2010) they made a distinction between *normative* and *empirical*
30 legitimacy. Normative legitimacy exists when authorities meet various agreed objective
31 criteria, like the absence of corruption. However, empirical legitimacy is based on citizens’
32 perceptions. In this case it does not matter whether institutions meet objective criteria, as only
33 the public perception of legitimacy matters. In this respect, it is possible to have a system of
34 policing that commands high levels of perceived legitimacy from the policed citizens whilst
35 also, paradoxically, failing to meet the criteria of legitimacy that would generally be accepted
36 in a democratic society. Cultural and historical reasons can be at the basis of the different
37 orientations of populations to authorities (Hough et al. 2013b). Only an institution that
38 commands high levels of empirical (or perceived) legitimacy can count on public support
39 (Hough 2010).¹ Hough and his colleagues defined empirical legitimacy as ‘the recognition
40 and justification of the right to exercise power and influence’ (Hough et al. 2013b, p.1). This
41 definition is in line with that of Beetham, who defined legitimacy as ‘the right to rule and the
42 recognition by the ruled of that right’ (Beetham 1991; Jackson et al. 2012; Tyler 2006b).
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59 ¹ The focus of our study is on perceptions of legitimacy. Thus, when we use the term ‘legitimacy’ without an
60 adjective, we refer to empirical or perceived legitimacy.
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Thus, a *legitimate authority* means not only that citizens recognize *the existence of this authority* and *the right of this authority to command respect and use force* (Tyler 2006a, 2006b), but also that the power of this authority *is justified* (Jackson et al. 2012). With regard to the police, this means that a police force that is regarded as legitimate has an entitlement to command and use force when laws are not followed, and this entitlement is recognized by the public. The justification of police power is based on the perception that the *police and public share similar values and norms* and that the *police act according to the law*. Following this idea about the meaning of legitimacy, Hough et al. (2013b) conceptualized empirical legitimacy as having three subcomponents, namely *obligation to obey*, *legality* and *moral alignment*. Feeling the *obligation to obey* refers to the recognition by the public of police power, and can be seen as a behavioural component of legitimacy. Because of the respect citizens have for the police as a legitimate authority, they will *voluntarily obey* them (Hinds and Murphy 2007). In other words, people see it as their duty to obey the police even when they disagree with the police or dislike how they act. *Legality* and *moral alignment* refer to the justification of police power. These components can be seen as the grounds on which the consent of citizens to defer to the police is built (Hough et al. 2013b). If (1) people believe that the police *act according to the law* (legality), (2) people believe that the police *share the same sense of right and wrong, values and norms as they do* (moral alignment), and (3) people feel a positive *duty to obey* the instructions of police officers (obligation to obey), then people will see the police as legitimate authorities (Hough et al. 2013b).

Tankebe (2013) and Bottoms and Tankebe (2012) have taken a slightly different approach. They argue that legitimacy has a dialogic character in which power-holders make claims, power-subjects respond, power-holders then perhaps adjust their claims and so on. They believe that these dialogues can take different forms in different societies, and that the dimensions of legitimacy can thus vary in different socio-political settings (Tankebe 2013). According to Tankebe (2013), *effectiveness*, *distributive fairness*, *procedural fairness* and *lawfulness* are likely to be some of the main contents of the dimensions of police legitimacy in a liberal democracy. Effectiveness, distributive fairness and procedural fairness have to be seen as *specific shared values and beliefs*, and the law is an expression of *recognized and accepted values* within a democratic society. This conceptualization thus also draws on Beetham's (1991) idea that legitimacy contains the notions of *legality* and *shared values*. According to Tankebe (2013), police officers will be perceived as legitimate when people believe that the police: (1) are able to fight crime and disorder effectively (effectiveness); (2) act fairly, neutrally and respectfully (procedural fairness); (3) deal with all kinds of people


(rich and poor, people from different ethnic groups, people with different sexual orientations) in the same way (distributive fairness); and (4) act according to the law (lawfulness). On the one hand this conceptualization is in line with Tyler's original work in which legitimacy was measured by *perceived obligation to obey the law* and *trust in or support for legal authorities* (Tyler and Fagan 2008). In this respect, effectiveness, distributive fairness and procedural fairness can be seen as components of trust in, or support for, legal authorities, although Tankebe does not use the word 'trust'. On the other hand, Tankebe (2013) argues that an obligation to obey theoretically differs from legitimacy, which he believes is a much wider concept. According to Tankebe, feeling the obligation to obey can be considered as a dependent variable that can be explained not just by citizens' recognition of police power as normatively valid (perceived legitimacy), but also by other variables such as fear of the costs of non-obedience or a feeling of powerlessness. Feeling the obligation to obey the police is thus considered to be an outcome, not a constituent of perceived legitimacy in Tankebe's framework (Hough et al. 2013b). This is also one of the major points of difference between Tankebe's framework and the framework of Hough, Jackson and colleagues. Another different point of view is shown in their conceptualizations of the notion of *shared values*. Tankebe (2013) believes that the concept of moral alignment, which is used in the framework of Hough, Jackson and colleagues, is too general and vague. He believes that it is possible, depending on the particular society, to identify specific values that are shared between police and citizens. He therefore identifies procedural justice, distributive justice and effectiveness as examples of shared values in a liberal-democratic society. Hough, Jackson and colleagues also used the concepts of procedural justice, distributive justice and effectiveness, not as specific values, but as dimensions of trust. As we have already mentioned, public trust in the police can be considered as a determinant of perceived legitimacy, not as a constituent of it.

In this study, following the framework of Hough, Jackson and colleagues, we also consider trust in police procedural justice and trust in police effectiveness as a *means*, and perceived legitimacy as an *end*. In other words, public trust in the police depends on how the police act, and these feelings of trust will affect perceptions of police legitimacy. But we are also aware of Tankebe's argument that an obligation to obey is theoretically different from perceived legitimacy. We also believe that feeling obliged to obey the police can, among other possible explanations, be the result of a citizen's belief that police power is justified because the police act legally and according to the main shared values that exist within

society. Why should one feel obliged to obey the police? One of the possible answers is because one simply believes that the police are legitimate.²

Several scholars have found an association between, on the one hand, *perceptions of police legitimacy* and, on the other hand, different forms of public support for the police such as the willingness to *cooperate* with the police (e.g. Hough et al. 2010; Jackson et al. 2012; Murphy 2009; Murphy and Cherney 2012; Reisig and Lloyd 2009; Reisig et al. 2007; Tyler 2006a; Tyler and Fagan 2008; Tyler and Huo 2002). Because of the different approaches that exist, we have analysed a model for the explanation of the willingness of Swedes to cooperate with the police (see Figure 3) which is a combination of Tankebe's (see Figure 1) and Hough, Jackson and colleagues' (see Figure 2) frameworks. We have not taken distributive justice into account as a component of trust in the police because we believe that distributive justice is closely related to procedural justice. Handling all kinds of people in the same way can also be considered as fair handling. However, we are aware that procedural and distributive justice can be conceptually and practically distinguished.

Fig.1 Possible paths to cooperation, Tankebe's approach



² In the ESS 'obligation to obey' was measured by three items beginning with: 'To what extent is it your duty to...' Duty can be interpreted in different ways, which is why interviewers were given an instruction to clarify 'duty' as meaning 'duty' in the sense of citizens' moral duty to the state, when people asked. In a way, this could counter Tankebe's arguments, but we believe that the instruction given to the interviewers was not strong enough. Not everyone asks for clarification of 'duty'. If we only look at the question referring to 'obligation to obey', which is translated very well in the Swedish questionnaire, we do have to take Tankebe's argument into account.

Fig.2 Possible paths to cooperation, Hough, Jackson and colleagues' approach





Fig.3 Possible paths to cooperation, our approach



Previous studies on trust in Sweden

Public trust in the institutions of law enforcement such as the police force is generally quite high in Sweden. Compared with the citizens of other countries, Swedes are often glad to report a crime to the police (Van Dijk et al. 2007). Several researchers have sought explanations for the high levels of trust in institutions in the Scandinavian countries. Some of them have associated the high levels in these countries with the Human Development Index, which is an indicator of a good standard of living, with higher levels of trust. Others have found a positive direct effect of ethnic homogeneity and Protestantism on trust, and this could

1 explain the higher level of trust in Scandinavia (Delhey and Newton 2005). Lappi-Seppälä
2 (2008) linked the lower levels of detention (and the lower crime level) and lower levels of
3 fear of crime in Scandinavian countries with these higher levels of trust. Since 2006, large-
4 scale surveys by the National Council for Crime Prevention have been conducted regularly in
5 Sweden. In these surveys, a number of questions are asked about individuals' trust in the
6 institutions of law enforcement (Brå 2012). In 2011, about two-thirds (64%) of the
7 respondents reported a high level of trust in the institutions of law enforcement. Moreover,
8 there seems to have been a slight increase in trust over time. Of all the public authorities, the
9 police are the most trusted. The Swedish Prison and Probation Service seems to be least
10 trusted by the public. In general, it seems that authorities that the public are more familiar
11 with are more trusted. The police are more visible on the streets and are therefore easily
12 accessible (Bradford et al. 2009). When citizens experience problems, they find it natural to
13 ask the police for help. Public trust in the police is built by (in)direct contact or just because
14 the police are visible; by contrast, most Swedish citizens never have contact with the Swedish
15 Prison and Probation Service. Van de Walle (2005) also argued that differences in the degree
16 of trust in institutions of criminal justice arise from the nature and people's appreciation of the
17 product delivered by the specific institution. The courts, for instance, will usually be
18 associated with punishment, whereas the police fulfil a double role, on the one hand 'rescuer
19 in case of emergency' and on the other hand 'law enforcer' (Van Damme et al. 2010).
20 Previous studies in Sweden on the trust in law enforcement agencies are largely descriptive,
21 and no Swedish study has so far explored why people are willing to cooperate with the police.
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40 **Recent studies on procedural justice to explain public cooperation with the police**

41 Most of the studies in which procedural justice theory has been tested have focused on
42 compliance as the ultimate dependent variable (e.g. Jackson et al. 2012; Murphy 2003, 2005;
43 Tyler 2006a). This can be explained by saying that procedural justice theory can be seen as an
44 answer to deterrence models. According to deterrence models, crime, or non-compliance, can
45 be explained through the idea that people are rational economic creatures who make a cost-
46 benefit analysis before considering breaking the law. When the benefits – the advantages from
47 committing a crime – are greater than the cost – the risk of (harsh) punishment – people will
48 commit crime (Matsueda et al. 2006; Paternoster 2010; Pauwels et al. 2011). Some
49 criminologists recognize that it is not only instrumental motivations that can explain why
50 people obey the law, but also normative motivations. This normative approach assumes that
51 people comply with the law, not because of the fear of being punished, but because they
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1 believe it is the right thing to do and they feel morally obliged to do it (Jackson et al. 2012,
2 Tyler 2006a, Tyler and Huo 2002). This is called a ‘process-based model’ because
3 compliance is considered to be a result of perceived police legitimacy that is based on
4 citizens’ perceptions about police functioning, or more precisely about their procedurally just
5 and effective behaviour (Tankebe 2009). The same approach has been used by several
6 researchers to explain why people are willing to cooperate with the police (Bradford 2012;
7 Bradford and Jackson 2010; Hough et al. 2013b; Huq et al. 2011; Murphy et al. 2008; Myhill
8 and Quinton 2011; Sunshine and Tyler 2003b; Tankebe 2009, 2013; Tyler 2004; Tyler and
9 Fagan 2008; Van Damme 2013). Most of these studies have found that perceptions of police
10 legitimacy positively affect people’s willingness to cooperate with the police, and that
11 perceived police legitimacy itself is mostly shaped by perceptions about police procedural
12 justice (Bradford 2012; Hough et al. 2013b; Huq et al. 2011; Murphy et al. 2008; Myhill and
13 Quinton 2011; Sunshine and Tyler 2003b; Tyler 2004; Tyler and Fagan 2008). In what
14 follows we describe some recent studies in which a slightly different approach³ was used
15 and/or different results were obtained. We only highlight the results that are relevant to this
16 study.
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18 In their research, Tyler and Fagan (2008) examined whether the perceptions of the
19 residents of New York City about *police legitimacy*, in the form of *obligation to obey*, *trust*
20 *and confidence in the police* and *identification with the police*, shape two specific forms of
21 cooperative behaviour; more precisely, these are not only *cooperation with the police* in their
22 response to crime but also *cooperation with neighbours* to maintain social order within the
23 community. They found an effect of perceived legitimacy on citizens’ willingness to
24 cooperate with the police. They measured this by asking the respondents how likely they
25 would be to call the police to report a crime, to help the police find someone suspected of a
26 crime or to report dangerous or suspicious activity. Cooperation with neighbours was
27 measured by asking the respondents how likely they would be to volunteer time to help the
28 police, to patrol the streets with others or to attend community police meetings about crime.
29 Tyler and Fagan found that only the perceptions about legitimacy of people of ethnic
30 minorities had an effect, but the perceptions of white people had no effect. Perceived
31 legitimacy itself was found to be linked to perceptions of police procedural justice, which is in
32 line with most procedural justice studies. Similar results were found in the study by Van
33 Damme (2013). In this study the procedural justice model was tested on the Belgian ESS data
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60 ³ These differ mostly in the operationalization of *cooperation with the police* and/or *legitimacy*.
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1 to explain the willingness of the public to cooperate with the police, in the form of their
2 willingness to call the police when a crime occurred, to identify a suspect and to give
3 evidence in court against the accused. The results show that procedural justice seemed to be
4 the most important factor in the explanation of both the *obligation to obey* the police and
5 *moral alignment* as the dimensions of perceived legitimacy. But only moral alignment with
6 the police seemed to have an influence on the willingness of Belgians to cooperate with the
7 police. No empirical support was found for the effect of feeling an obligation to obey. Thus,
8 in Belgium, the perception of whether or not people are treated honestly and with respect by
9 the police is very important in feeling morally aligned with the police. This feeling that police
10 and citizens share the same values and norms is in turn of significant importance for the
11 willingness of the public to report a crime or identify a suspect. In their UK study, Myhill and
12 Quinton (2011) also found that the most important factor for the explanation of cooperation
13 with the police (such as, for example, reporting a crime or suspicious activity) was *perceived*
14 *police legitimacy*, but legitimacy was only measured in the form of *shared values* between the
15 police and the public. Also in this study, legitimacy, or more correctly the feeling that police
16 and citizens share the same values, was itself particularly shaped by perceptions about police
17 fairness, and not by perceptions about police effectiveness. Likewise, Murphy, Hinds and
18 Fleming (2008) found in their Australian study that people who believed the police to be more
19 legitimate were more willing to assist them. The key antecedent of perceived legitimacy also
20 seemed to be procedural justice, although the operationalization of perceived police
21 legitimacy was not in line with most of the earlier studies.⁴ Police legitimacy was measured
22 here by asking citizens about their level of respect for the police, how much confidence they
23 had in the police, and how well they thought the police did their job and performed in a
24 professional manner. The element of shared values, which is one of the key notions of the
25 concept of legitimacy, was not taken into account here. Furthermore, the last two components
26 are more related to police performance or effectiveness. But expanding further on this point
27 would lead us again to the ongoing discussion about the concept of legitimacy. Moreover, in
28 their London study Bradford and Jackson (2010) did not measure legitimacy directly as earlier
29 researchers did, but they had data on cooperation and trust in both police effectiveness and
30 police procedural justice. In this respect, they had assessed the direct effects of trust on
31 cooperation rather than the indirect effects through perceived legitimacy. They found that
32 people were not only more willing to cooperate with the police if they thought the police act

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⁴ Most studies use *shared values* and/or *obligation to obey* and/or *legality* and/or *trust* to measure the concept of legitimacy.

fairly, but also if they perceived the police to be effective in fighting crime. In his study, Tankebe (2009) tested Tyler's procedural justice model in the Ghanaian context. He did not find a significant association between procedural fairness and cooperation with the police. On the contrary, perceptions about police effectiveness in fighting crime seemed to shape public cooperation with the police. These results are not in line with the previously-mentioned studies in which procedural justice seemed to play the most important role. Tankebe has thus shown that findings can differ when the procedural justice theory is tested in different societies. The reason why these results differ from earlier studies can be found in the history of policing in Ghana. During colonial and military rule, policing in Ghana was characterized by abuse, violence, intimidation and widespread corruption. These abuses have led to a deficit in police legitimacy, and the alienation of the public from the police in Ghana. Tankebe therefore argued that policing in societies such as Ghana has to focus on performance. In this respect, the police have to make it clear that they are effective in fighting crime and that they are able to provide security to the public. Only when citizens believe that the police are able to do their work will they have a greater tendency to call the police to report a crime or suspicious activities or to help the police with information on a suspect or a crime.


Considering this overview, in most of the societies in which the procedural justice theory is tested, acting in a procedurally just way is thus important in order for police officers to encourage members of the public to cooperate in combating crime. But, as Tankebe (2009) has proved, different results can be found in different societies. The aim of this study is therefore to test the procedural justice theory in the Swedish context.

Current focus

Figure 4 specifies a number of routes leading to cooperation with the police which are tested in the current study. The basic idea is to gain insight into the magnitude of the direct effects of all exogenous variables on all endogenous variables. The exogenous variables are *trust in police procedural justice* and *trust in police effectiveness*. *Moral alignment*, *feeling an obligation to obey the police* and *cooperation* are treated as endogenous variables. Cooperation is the ultimate dependent variable in the present study. As we have already mentioned, the model has been inspired by previous studies (especially those of Hough et al. 2010; Jackson et al. 2012; Tankebe 2009). We have not taken perceived legality of the police into account as a dimension of perceived police legitimacy, because we do not believe that the ESS dataset contains a useful operationalization of this dimension. For the ESS data collection, people were questioned about how often they would say that the police in their

country took bribes. Hough et al. (2013b) consider this question to be the legality dimension of legitimacy. We believe that this question refers to the level of corruption of the police. It is not because people believe the police are not corrupt that they also believe that the police always act according to the law. Taking bribes is only one aspect of non-legal behaviour.

Fig.4 Testable path model



This article aims to test the procedural justice theory to explain Swedes' willingness to cooperate with the police, and Figure 4 visualizes possible paths in our approach.

The following hypotheses can be distilled:

H1. Perceived police legitimacy in the form of moral alignment with the police can be explained by trust in police procedural justice and trust in police effectiveness.

H1a. Relative to police effectiveness, the effect of procedural justice on moral alignment will be stronger.

H2. Feeling obliged to obey the police can be explained by feeling morally aligned with the police.

H2a. Considering Hypothesis 1, there will be an effect of trust in the police, through moral alignment, on feeling an obligation to obey the police.

H3. The willingness of Swedes to cooperate with the police can be explained by their feeling obliged to obey the police.

H3a. Considering Hypotheses 1 and 2, there will be an effect of trust in the police, through moral alignment and the feeling of obligation to obey the police.

Data

The European Social Survey is a repeated international cross-sectional survey covering over 30 European countries. The ESS survey (Round 5) is funded jointly by the European Commission's Fifth Framework Programme, the European Science Foundation and academic funding bodies in each participating country. The survey is designed and carried out to exceptionally high standards. The ESS aims to monitor changing public attitudes and values within Europe, to investigate how they interact with Europe's changing institutions, and to advance and consolidate improved methods of cross-national survey measurement in Europe and beyond. The survey involves strict random probability sampling, a minimum target response rate of 70% and rigorous translation protocols. The ESS survey is conducted by means of face-to-face interviews that take about one hour and include (amongst others) questions on immigration, citizenship and social and political issues. Only those aged 15 or older who are resident within private households are questioned, regardless of their nationality, language or (il)legal status. For this study we extracted the sample taken in Sweden. The sample contained 1157 respondents. The age of the respondents ranged from 15 to 95 with a mean of 49 years. Almost the same numbers of men and women were questioned. Twenty per cent of the respondents reported having an immigrant background.⁵ In order to obtain a sample with a comparable social composition to that of the population we performed the analyses with the prescribed weighting procedure (Jowell and the Central Co-ordinating Team 2003; ESS 2010).

Measures

To make abstract concepts tangible or measurable, they need to be operationalized. This is required for the translation of a theoretical model into empirical terms and relations (Billiet 1996). In the European Social Survey, Likert scales were used for the measurement of attitudes toward the police, so that abstract concepts were measured by well-considered sets of items (Pauwels 2012). These items or indicators were questions or statements that had to be answered in the survey. The validity of every scale was tested by estimating Cronbach's alpha.⁶ A frequent criticism of secondary data is that the researcher cannot choose the

⁵ A table with the background characteristics of the respondents in the Swedish sample can be found in the Appendix.

⁶ Cronbach's alpha is a coefficient of internal consistency. All items have to measure the same concept. A value of less than 0.80 indicates little consistency between the items. In practice, values of 0.60 or higher are acceptable (Baarda and De Goede 1995; Pauwels 2012).

operationalization of the concepts. However, the trust module developed for the ESS was carefully prepared. A multidisciplinary team of researchers, the Euro-Justis team, was responsible for this module.⁷ On the basis of a well-considered theoretical framework, questions were developed for the trust module. Pilot surveys in Bulgaria and the United Kingdom tested the quality of the module. Attention was paid to the wording of the questions, the expected relationships between the variables, the identification of the best indicators and the time needed to answer the questions (Jackson et al. 2011). Eventually only the 45 best indicators were selected. Although we are limited in this study by the content of the ESS, the operationalizations are nevertheless of high quality (although we have already mentioned the limited operationalization of legality). In the following paragraph we describe the operationalizations of the concepts used in this study.

Trust in the *procedural justice or fairness* of the police was measured by a summated Likert scale of three items concerning the quality of citizens' treatment by the police and the quality of decision-making by the police. These three items were: 'Based on what you have heard or your own experience, how often would you say the police treat people in Sweden with respect?' (D15), 'About how often would you say that the police make fair, impartial decisions in the cases they deal with?' (D16), and 'When dealing with people in Sweden, how often would you say the police generally explain their decisions and actions when asked to do so?' (D17). Each time four answer categories were offered ranging from *not at all often* to *very often*. High scores on the scale reflect a high level of perceived procedural fairness. (Cronbach's alpha = 0.64).

The perception of trust in the *effectiveness* of the police was also measured by a summated Likert scale consisting of two items:⁸ 'Based on what you have heard or your own experience, how successful do you think the police are at *preventing* crimes in Sweden where violence is used or threatened?' (D12) and 'How successful do you think the police are at *catching* people who commit house burglaries in Sweden?' (D13). People had to answer on a 10-point scale on a range from 0, *extremely unsuccessful* to 10, *extremely successful*. A high score on this scale indicates high trust in the effectiveness of the police.

For the operationalization of *perceived police legitimacy* only a moral dimension (moral alignment with the police) was taken into account. Jackson et al. (2012) also considered a behavioural dimension (obligation to obey the police). Although the two

⁷ More information about Euro-Justis can be found on the following website: <http://www.eurojustis.eu>

⁸ Originally three items were available in the data set, but the third item ('How quickly would police arrive at a violent crime scene near to where you live?') was omitted because it seriously affected the reliability scores. When the item was included, Cronbach's alpha score was low at 0.57.

summated Likert scales are related, exploratory factor analysis showed that the two dimensions are empirically different. Following Tankebe's arguments (2009), we also distinguished feeling the obligation to obey the police from perceptions about police legitimacy. In this respect, *moral alignment with the police* was measured by the following items: 'The police generally have the same sense of right and wrong as I do' (D21), 'The police stand up for values that are important to people like me' (D22) and 'I generally support how the police usually act' (D23). Respondents were asked to score the extent to which they agreed with these statements on a range from 1, *agree strongly* to 5, *disagree strongly*. Items on this scale were recoded and a high score refers to a high level of moral alignment with the police (Cronbach's alpha = 0.74).

Obligation to obey the police was measured by the following three items: 'To what extent is it your duty to...?' '...back the decisions made by the police even when you disagree with them?' (D18), '...do what the police tell you even if you don't understand or agree with the reasons?' (D19), '...do what the police tell you to do, even if you don't like how they treat you?' (D20). People were asked to answer on a 10-point scale on a range from 0, *not my duty at all* to 10, *completely my duty*. High scores on the scale reflect a strong feeling of obligation to obey the police (Cronbach's alpha = 0.79).

A summated scale was used to measure the willingness of the respondents *to cooperate with the police*. Respondents had to answer several questions about what they would do if they witnessed a crime. More precisely, they were asked: 'Imagine that you were out and saw someone push a man to the ground and steal his wallet. How *likely* would you be to call the police?' (D40; with responses ranging from 1 = *not at all likely* to 4 = *very likely*; D40), 'How willing would you be to identify the person who had done it?' (D 41; with responses ranging from 1 = *not at all willing* to 4 = *very willing*) and 'How willing would you be to give evidence in court against the accused?' (D42; with responses also ranging from 1 = *not at all willing* to 4 = *very willing*). High scores on this scale refer indicate great willingness to cooperate with the police (Cronbach's alpha = 0.77).

Analytical strategy

To test the hypotheses, we used structural equation modelling (SEM). SEM offers the opportunity to explore the extent to which a specific theoretical model can explain the relations between the observed variables. Structural equation models consist of a measurement model and a structural model. In the measurement model the relations between the observed and the latent variables are specified. In the study in hand, the factor analytical

constructed variables from Tyler's theory are the latent variables. The variables or items used in a factor analysis need to fulfil certain conditions otherwise the factor analysis is not meaningful. First, the variables need to be measured at least at interval level. Second, the number of respondents has to be satisfactory (rule of thumb: preferably at least ten times as many respondents as variables). Third, the sample must not be homogeneous (or the factor analysis does not provide clear factors), but at the same time, the sample must not consist of several subgroups (or the different factor structures will flow through each other).

All analyses were carried out with LISREL 8.53 (Jöreskog and Sörbom 2003). The models presented in this paper show standardized factor solutions, and for the evaluation and fit of the models the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) is preferred over the chi-square value because large samples inevitably tend to result in large chi-square values and therefore in a negative evaluation of the model fit. As the RMSEA is least affected by the sample size, it is a good measure of close fit (Mueller 1996). RMSEA values below 0.05 are considered acceptable (Billiet and McClendon 2000).


Because all 'attitude item sets' are ordinal, we used weighted least squares (WLS) estimations which are based on polychoric correlations and an asymptotic covariance matrix.⁹

Results of the structural equation model

The theoretical path model of Figure 4 was tested. Figure 5 depicts the results of the statistical model that fits best with the data.

Fig.5 Results – Path model for the explanation of cooperation with the police in Sweden

⁹ Although WLS estimations should be used if some or all of the observed variables are ordinal or discrete, and maximum likelihood (ML) estimations in the case of normally distributed variables, the choice between the two is not as straightforward as it seems. Jöreskog and Sörbom state that 'if the sample size is not sufficiently large to produce an accurate estimate of the asymptotic covariance matrix, it is probably better to use ML or GLS (generalized least squares)' (1989, p.223). Although a 'sufficiently large sample' is a relative notion, the survey used in this contribution has a large number of observations combined with only a few variables, so we think WLS estimations are an appropriate choice.



Several models were run to test the relationships between the exogenous variables *trust in police procedural fairness* and *trust in police effectiveness* on the one hand, and the endogenous variables *moral alignment*, *feeling the obligation to obey the police* and *willingness to cooperate with the police* on the other. We expected that moral alignment with the police would be explained by trust in police effectiveness and procedural fairness, and that moral alignment is the key mediator in explaining a feeling of obligation to obey the police and willingness to cooperate with the police, whereas we expected obligation to obey to have a direct impact on cooperation.

The Swedish data is in line with most procedural justice studies. We found strong evidence that trust in procedural justice is a key mechanism for explaining individual differences in perceived police legitimacy in the form of moral alignment. Swedes who more strongly perceived the police to be fair and respectful showed that they felt more morally aligned with the police. They believed, more than other Swedes, that the police stand up for values that are important to people like them and that the police generally have the same sense of right and wrong as they do, and they also indicated a greater level of support for how the police usually act. The findings show also a positive but less strong effect of trust in police effectiveness on moral alignment. This means that people who perceived the police to be successful at preventing crimes and catching suspects also felt more morally aligned with the police. But in this respect the effect of trust in police procedural justice (0.67) is far stronger than the effect of trust in police effectiveness (0.18). The results thus endorse our first hypothesis (H1 and H1a). Forty-four per cent of the individual variances in moral alignment are explained by trust in procedural justice and trust in police effectiveness. This is rather high. Only 56% of the individual variances in moral alignment can be explained by other variables that are not included in the model.

Our second hypothesis (H2 and H2a) is also endorsed. The results show a positive, moderate effect of moral alignment on feeling an obligation to obey (0.45). Those with a greater belief that police and citizens share the same values and norms feel more obliged to do what the police tell them to do. The explained individual variance of feeling an obligation to obey the police is 21%. This means that 79% of the individual variances cannot be explained by our model. Because of the ongoing discussion about the operationalization of the concept of legitimacy, we also analysed a path model based on the approach of Hough, Jackson and colleagues (see the Figure in the Appendix). The value of the RMSEA (0.026) shows that the model fit is similar to the one in our approach (RMSEA = 0.027). Both models are thus satisfactory. This means that the statistics do not give an answer to the question of how legitimacy should be measured. The discussion on the concept of legitimacy is thus a discussion of substance. However, looking at the results obtained from Hough, Jackson and colleagues' approach, trust in police effectiveness was not found to have any direct effect on feeling an obligation to obey the police. This means that perceptions about how effectively the police perform their job do not directly influence a feeling that one is obliged to do what the police tell one to do.

Lastly, our third hypothesis (H3 and H3a) is also endorsed. The results in Figure 5 show a positive but modest effect (0.17) of feeling an obligation to obey the police on willingness to cooperate with the police. In other words, respondents who indicated a stronger feeling of obligation to obey also indicated a greater tendency to report a crime, to identify a suspect or to give evidence in court. Only 3% of the individual differences in Swedes' willingness to cooperate with the police is explained by the model. Thus, 97% of the individual differences are due to other variables.

If we evaluate the structural equation model in total, procedural justice theory has received empirical support, although there are a high percentage of the individual differences in willingness to cooperate with the police that cannot be explained by our model. Adding legality as a dimension of legitimacy could probably explain a little more. However, we believe that there are many other possible explanations, such as an individual's personal morality.

Conclusion and discussion

According to the procedural justice perspective, people consider the police to be a legitimate authority when police officers act in a procedurally just and effective manner. Furthermore, it is the perception of police legitimacy that encourages people to cooperate with the police. But

1 what do the data say about this theory applied to the context of Sweden? The findings are in
2 line with the theory and with most of the earlier studies. Trust in police procedural justice
3 does indeed seem to be a very strong predictor of moral alignment as a dimension of
4 perceived police legitimacy, and trust in police effectiveness is a weaker predictor. Following
5 Tankebe's arguments (2009), we also considered whether feeling an obligation to obey the
6 police is a possible outcome of perceived legitimacy. In this respect, moral alignment itself
7 seems to have a positive effect on feeling an obligation to obey the police. This therefore
8 means that it is necessary for the Swedish police to treat citizens fairly and respectfully, so
9 that citizens perceive the police as legitimate, or, more precisely, so that citizens believe that
10 they and the police share the same values and norms. This is of paramount importance,
11 because the feeling that police and citizens are on the same side influences attitudes towards
12 the police in the form of feeling an obligation to obey them. Trust in police procedural justice
13 even leads to a greater willingness to cooperate with the police through moral alignment and
14 feeling an obligation to obey the police, which means that the effectiveness of the police also
15 depends on public trust, although we must mention that only 3% of the individual variances
16 could be explained by the model tested. This means that many other determinants might play
17 a role in the explanation of Swedes' willingness to cooperate with the police.

18 Although empirical evidence is found in favour of procedural justice theory in the
19 Swedish context, the theory has to be tested in more countries. Tankebe (2009) has proved
20 that results can differ between countries. In his study, he did not find a statistically significant
21 effect of perceptions of procedurally just handling by the police on willingness to cooperate
22 with the police. On the contrary, in Ghana perceptions about police effectiveness play a more
23 important role. Different findings between countries could be explained by the different legal
24 systems and the position of the police within those countries. Even the history of a country
25 can offer an explanation. Also, the ongoing debate about the definition and operationalization
26 of police legitimacy can help to explain different results. In particular, *feeling the obligation*
27 *to obey* the police, which is considered to be a dimension of legitimacy in a large number of
28 procedural justice studies, is not free of dispute. Some researchers argue that it is not a
29 constituent of perceived legitimacy, but an outcome of perceived legitimacy. As we have
30 already said, we follow Tankebe's reasoning and argue that a possible answer to the question
31 of why one should feel obliged to obey the police is that one not only believes the police are
32 legitimate, but also that one is afraid if one does not obey. We have analysed two models, one
33 in which moral alignment and feeling the obligation to obey are considered as antecedent and
34 outcome and one in which they are both treated as dimensions of legitimacy. Both models

showed an equal model fit, which means that statistics cannot offer an answer to the question of what is actually meant by legitimacy and how it has to be measured. It is therefore a discussion of substance. In our approach, we believe that perceptions of legitimacy are not behavioural in content. We believe that one of the reasons and probably the most important reason why people feel an obligation to obey the police is because they believe the police act legally and that the police as an institution is a moral exemplar. But we also believe that there are other possible explanations of why a person feels an obligation to obey. Moreover, *moral alignment* or *shared values* as a dimension of legitimacy is also questioned. In this respect, Tyler et al. (in press) note: ‘Whether moral alignment is important in other countries, and whether it can be reasonably thought of as legitimacy, remains an open and empirical question’. In some societies the police are seen as a last resort. In these societies it is of less importance that police and citizens share the same values and norms. It is possible that the public supports the police even though there is no feeling of moral alignment. We therefore believe that moral alignment as a key notion of perceived legitimacy depends on the society. Furthermore, there is no consensus about how *perceived police legality* should be measured in surveys. In the ESS, the question concerning this dimension was more about perceptions of police corruption than about whether the police generally act according to the law. We therefore did not add this dimension of legitimacy to the model, although, following Beetham’s definition of legitimacy, we do consider it to be a dimension of legitimacy. Some researchers also consider *trust in the police* as a constituent of legitimacy. Here, we followed the reasoning of Hough, Jackson and their colleagues, who see trust in police procedural justice and in police effectiveness more as antecedents of perceived legitimacy. In this respect, we believe that trust in police functioning contributes to whether the police are perceived as legitimate. Considering all these different approaches, we hope to have made a contribution to the ongoing discussion about the concept of legitimacy. What is legitimacy? Is there a correct answer to this question? Regarding this discussion, we believe that the answer changes from society to society. In this respect, we believe that moral alignment and legality can be seen as constituents of legitimacy in a democratic society like Sweden.

The findings of our study could also be affected by how cooperation with the police is operationalized in the ESS. Tyler and Fagan (2008) identified two different forms of cooperation with the police. The first can be seen as ‘one-way’ cooperation (i.e. from the public to the police). As an example, citizens cooperate with the police when they help in solving specific crimes, for example by reporting a crime. The second form of cooperation was called cooperation with neighbours in the study, but it can be seen as a ‘partnership’

1 between police and public if we look at the questions asked in the study, namely: how likely
2 are you to volunteer time to help the police, to patrol the streets with others and to attend
3 community police meetings about crime? Police and citizens are therefore working together to
4 solve problems that occur within society. In the ESS only the willingness to take part in the
5 first form of cooperation was measured. It is possible that other results will be found when the
6 second form of cooperation is taken into account. This is because citizens will experience
7 direct benefits, such as the protection of their own homes, from this partnership. Future
8 studies must consider eventualities like these.

9 To end, we want to acknowledge a methodological point about the discussion,
10 namely the cross-sectional nature of the survey. This means that the results cannot be
11 interpreted in terms of causal relationships. What is more, if respondents reported that they
12 would be willing to cooperate with the police in the future, they will not necessarily do so in
13 reality. A survey contains subjective data. Whether or not people cooperate with the police in
14 real life can only be verified by collecting objective data, for example by making observations
15 in a police setting.

16 Although some critical comments are made, this study has shown the importance of
17 trust in police procedural justice in explaining the attitude of Swedish people towards the
18 police. Empirical support is found for procedural justice theory in the Swedish context.

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
Appendix

Table Background characteristics of the Swedish sample

	N	Min.	Max.	Mean	Std. Deviation
Immigrant background	1500	.00	1.00	.8033	.39761
Educational level	1489	.00	1.00	.2189	.41367
Gender recoded	1500	.00	1.00	.4800	.49977
Age of respondent, calculated	1499	15	95	48.64	19.247
Effectiveness of police	1398	.00	30.00	15.0057	4.87994
Procedural fairness of police	1300	3.00	12.00	8.5992	1.35761
Obedience to the police (legitimacy)	1419	.00	30.00	20.7519	6.29509
Moral alignment (legitimacy)	1436	3.00	15.00	11.4241	1.69786

Cooperation	1463	3.00	12.00	10.1969	1.76516
Valid N (listwise)	1157				

Fig. Results – Path model, approach of Hough, Jackson and colleagues



Chi-square = 127.71, df = 72, p-value = 0.000, RMSEA = 0.026

**Why do the Swedes cooperate with the police?
A SEM analysis of Tyler's procedural justice model
European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research**

First of all, we would like to thank the reviewers for their comments. Because of the new comments, we are aware that the discussion about the concept of legitimacy is still a hot issue. Because we believe that both reviewers have different visions about the meaning and conceptualization of the concept, we have tried to take the comments into account when possible. We hope that the quality of the article is improved.

In the following we respond to the reviewers' comments

Reviewers' comments:

Reviewer #1: This paper is a much revised version of an earlier submission. The authors use data from the 5th round of the European Social Survey (ESS) to test a key claim of Tyler's procedural justice model: that the legitimacy of the police is both strongly shaped by perceptions and experiences of, or trust in, procedural justice and in turn influences people's propensities to cooperate with the officers.

The paper is a very significant improvement on the earlier submission. Rather than list issues that the authors addressed (and which they outline in their detailed response to reviewers), I will confine my comments to one or two outstanding issues.

Most importantly, the paper is now situated such that it addresses very clearly an interesting debate in procedural justice theory, namely, the definition of 'empirical' legitimacy. While the authors support the claim made by Jackson, Hough and colleagues that 'moral alignment' is a key aspect of legitimacy, they also concur with Tankebe that 'obligation to obey' should be seen as an 'outcome' of legitimacy. This latter position seems to be based largely on the claim that people may feel an 'obligation' to obey authorities not because they feel them to be legitimate but for some reason, most notably fear of the consequences of disobedience.

While this debate is on-going, there are a number of points the authors might like to consider that could enable their paper to better address this debate. First, a concept of legitimate that does not concern itself with duty, obedience and the expressed consent of the governed could, in many ways, be considered rather problematic. Could the authors say a little more about why they think these notions can be satisfactorily removed from the core concept and relegated to a secondary effect of it? I think there needs to be a more robust justification that simply a concern about the way people may answer survey questions.

Second, the ESS questionnaire notes that reviewers were given an instruction in relation to

the 'obligation to obey' questions, which actually use the (English) word duty: if an interviewee were to query the meaning of 'duty', they were to reply 'Duty' in the sense of a citizen's moral duty to the state'. More broadly, the idea of duty is wrapped up moral and legal obligation or commitment. Do the authors think this definition of duty obviates the concerns of Tankebe, and if not, why not? This is of course a particularly interesting question given their emphasis on local particularity - how might these things play out in Sweden? Are there translation issues involved?

Thank you for these relevant comments. First of all we want to point out the fact that the main aim of this article is to test procedural justice theory in the Swedish context. But, after we got the first comments on the article, we had to conclude that both reviewers have a different view about the meaning and conceptualization of the concept of legitimacy. That's why it seemed interesting to sketch out the discussion, without going into details. In the article we have shown different views. We believe that these are differences in interpretation. We follow Tankebe's argument that 'obligation to obey' theoretically differs from legitimacy. Why should one obey the police? The answer can be because somebody feels morally aligned with the police, but also because he or she is afraid of the costs of non-obedience or a feeling of powerlessness,... The fact that there was an instruction for the interviewers to clarify the meaning of 'duty' as 'duty' in the sense of citizens' moral duty to the state, can counter Tankebe's argument, but it is too weak. In such a long questionnaire, not everyone will have asked to clarify 'duty'. If we only look at the question about 'obligation to obey', which is translated good in the Swedish questionnaire, we do have to take Tankebe's argument into account. So, we believe that when citizens perceive the police as legitimate, they will have a stronger feeling of obligation to obey the police. That is also the reason why 'obligation to obey' is not taken into account as a dimension of legitimacy in our approach, but as an outcome. This brings us back to the whole discussion: What is the meaning of legitimacy? How do we have to measure legitimacy? Which dimensions are necessary? There are different views in content. There needs to be done more empirical research, such as longitudinal research (panel studies), qualitative in depth-interviews to learn more about how citizens define legitimacy and so on.

We have inserted a footnote in the article about this.

Third, in the SEM shown in the Appendix we find a relatively strong direct path between trust in police procedural fairness and obligation to obey, but no significant link between the latter and trust in police effectiveness. Does this affect the face validity of the claim that obligation to obey might be influenced by fear of the consequences of disobedience? If this is the case, why should trust in police fairness be so strongly associated with obligation, yet effectiveness (which might be read as 'ability to enforce commands') have no association with obligation?

The SEM model in the appendix can be seen as extra information. Expanding on this in the article, would lead us too far. But, in the discussion part we say that we have analysed two models, one in which moral alignment and feeling the obligation to obey are considered as antecedent and outcome and one in which they are both treated as dimensions of legitimacy. Both models showed an equal model fit, which means that statistics can't offer an answer to

the question what the meaning of legitimacy actually is and how it has to be measured. It is a discussion in substance. That is the point we want to make in the article by showing the SEM in the appendix.

But, for this specific comment we want to remark that these results are specific for Sweden. It is possible that in other countries an effect exists of trust in the effectiveness of the police on obligation to obey. Just saying that Tankebe's argument can be countered because no effect was found of trust in the effectiveness of the police on obligation to obey, is wrong. We did not argue that obligation can't be a moral obligation. It can, and in Sweden we believe that one's feeling to obey the police most of the time is based on a moral ground. This can explain the strong direct effect of trust in procedural justice on obligation to obey. But, feeling the obligation to obey can also be affected by one's fear when not obeying or a feeling of powerlessness. This is not the same as trust in the effectiveness of the police. Further empirical research, in which fear and other possible determinants are questioned, can give us more insight in this discussion. Also in depth interviews with citizens could offer some more information of why people feel obligated to obey the police or how they understand the question wording in the ESS.

Fourth, another interpretation of the model the authors present in the main text is that it positions police legitimacy as a process, within which moral alignment shapes obligation to obey, but retains the idea that both are components of legitimacy. This seems to me an interesting and appealing 'middle way' in the debate, and something that could be expanded on in the current paper.

This comment is related to the comments above. We hope that we have clarified why we considered obligation to obey as an outcome and not as a constituent of the concept of legitimacy. We believe that perceptions of legitimacy are not behavioural in content. People perceive the police as legitimate when they believe the police act legal and when they believe the police are a moral exemplar. We believe that this could be an important reason (and probably the most important one) why people feel an obligation to obey the police. We expanded a bit on it in the paper.

My other outstanding concern with the paper is the dismissal of the ESS 'legality' question, which refers to police taking bribes. I'm not sure it is justified to claim that this is not a measure of legality (p.16), unless it is the case that it is legal for police to take bribes (or, at least, people think it is legal)! Since this seems highly unlikely, I would have thought this question could indeed be used in the analysis (it is, moreover, more apposite than at least one of the questions used by Tankebe - 'the law represents the moral values of people like me' - which does not even refer to police actions, or indeed to the police at all). An interesting debate here, of course, is the extent to which people think the police merely enforce the law, or engage in the much wider activity of 'policing', which in the UK at least can involve using their discretion to ignore illegal activity. If citizens are more in tune with this later conception it would imply the rules the police need to follow are not merely, or even most importantly, 'the law', but are more specific

to police and policing activity. Again, I would be interested to hear the author's views on this issue in the Swedish context.

We believe that the question in the ESS refers to the level of corruption of the police. It is not because people believe the police are not corrupt that they also believe that the police always act according to the law. Taking bribes is only one aspect of non-legal behaviour. We believe that to measure perceptions of legality, some more items are needed. But we also understand the argument of the reviewer that Tankebe's measurement of lawfulness is not better. We therefore deleted the following sentence: In this respect, we believe that Tankebe (2013) used a better operationalization in his study¹. We believe that future research has to focus on the measurement of legality. Off course, one of the questions can be about bribes, but not all of them. The question used by Tankebe 'When the police deal with people in my neighbourhood, they always behave according to the law' can possibly be a good item too.

Reviewer #2: The paper under publication consideration, entitled "Why do Swedes Cooperate with the Police?", has certainly improved during the revision process. I believe the analysis is much more straightforward and aligned with ongoing theoretical debate. However, the paper is still too lengthy and requires significant copy editing. Here are some thoughts regarding further revisions.

First, the abstract is too long. Please revise. Make it brief and to the point.

As the reviewer suggested, we revised the abstract.

Second, "The concept of 'legitimacy'" section is good. Toward the end of this section the authors should focus on how these two population models inform their model. A sharp discussion on this matter needs to be presented. (NOTE: Using different variable names in Figures 1, 2, and 3 is confusing. Why not use the same names?)

The paragraph 'the concept of legitimacy' is already very long and the discussion isn't the main focus of this article. But we think it is very important to sketch it out. We believe that it is clear why we take Tankebe's argument into account → namely that obligation to obey is an outcome. We also added a footnote in this paragraph. We also believe that it is clear why we believe that perceptions about effectiveness and procedural justice are components of trust. In the discussion part some extra information about this is added. And also in the discussion part a whole paragraph is related to this discussion about the concept of legitimacy.

We did not use the same variable names in the figures because Tankebe doesn't consider perceptions about police effectiveness and procedural justice as elements of trust, but as shared values. Hough and his colleagues and we do see these as dimensions of trust. It is also

¹ In his study, perceived police lawfulness or legality was assessed using a two-item scale. People were asked to indicate how strongly they agreed with the following questions: 'When the police deal with people in my neighbourhood, they always behave according to the law' and 'The law represents the moral values of people like me'.

to point out the different views about the concepts. We did change lawfulness into legality because this can be considered as the same variable.

Third, the "Recent studies" section is unnecessary. The major findings reported here were reported earlier in the paper. This section should be dropped, which will make the paper shorter.

We have written this paragraph because in the first comments one of the reviewers asked to write a paragraph on it. That is why we didn't delete this paragraph. We also believe this paragraph has an added value because this article is about the role of procedural justice in the explanation of people their willingness to cooperate with the police.

Fourth, I would rename the section "Testable path model" to "Current Focus." Also, the presented hypotheses are not very clean. In fact, all three contain a subhypothesis related to the primary hypothesis. This will confuse the reader. Present hypothesis 1, for examples, and then presented the related hypothesis (1a). So,

H1: Procedural justice is positively and significantly associated with moral alignment.

H1a: Relative to police effectiveness, the effect of procedural justice on moral alignment will be stronger.

This approach is much easier to follow.

As the reviewer suggested, we changed the title into 'Current focus'. We also changed the way to present our hypotheses, we hope that it is now much clearer.

Fifth, I still do not understand the need to use "trust in" the variable names for procedural justice and effectiveness. This seems unnecessary.

This is because the different approach. We consider effectiveness and procedural justice as dimensions of trust. That is why we use trust. It is again related to the different approaches that exist.

Sixth, why is it necessary to restate the hypotheses in the Results section? It's not. Please consider removing them from this section.

As the reviewer suggested, we chopped the hypotheses in the results section.

Seventh, the paper falls apart on page 29. Please rewrite this section for clarity.

We are not sure what the reviewer means by this comment. We have read page 29 a couple of times. We think that this comment is based on the fact that the first part of the

conclusion/discussion is a discussion in substance. That is why we added that we also want to acknowledge a methodological point of discussion. We hope that it is now more clearer.

Eighth, EJCPR recently published a procedural justice paper (see Online First articles) that should be included in the literature review.

We have read the article the reviewer suggested and we have referred to it in our article.

Overall, the paper is much improved. With a little more work (see above), I believe it will be a valuable contribution to the literature.

Thank you for this positive note.

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