The Pragmatics of the Past: A Novel Typology of Conditionals with Past Tenses in Ancient Greek

Abstract: This article argues for a typology of conditionals in Ancient Greek based on pragmatic rather than formal (e.g. mood) or semantic (e.g. temporal reference) criteria. It does so by proposing a novel pragmatic typology of conditionals with past tenses for Archaic and Classical Greek based on a corpus analysis of 973 conditionals. I distinguish 6 different pragmatic usages which generalize over mood and temporal variations: predictive, direct inferential, indirect inferential, illocutionary, metalinguistic and generic. They are distinguished by the pragmatic relationship between conditional and matrix clause and its direction, the illocutionary force of the matrix clause (e.g. declarative vs assertoric (rhetorical) question (wh-, yes-no, open)) and types of implicature (e.g. contradictory vs counterfactual). Despite some correlations with the pragmatic types such as order of *p* and *q*, pragmatic types cover multiple possible world distinctions based on formal marking such as mood or temporal reference; for example past tenses are used counterfactually but have different pragmatic usages, e.g. predictive, direct and indirect inferential or illocutionary, and temporal references, e.g. past and present. The diachrony of these conditionals also cuts across the pragmatic types, since direct inferential conditionals are a starting point for the replacement of the counterfactual optative by the counterfactual indicative (la Roi 2022b), and generic conditionals with a past tense start to replace the so-called 'iterative' optative in Classical Greek and replace it in Postclassical Greek (la Roi 2022c). The paper concludes with suggestions for applying this typology to conditionals in Ancient Greek in general.

Keywords: Ancient Greek; conditionals; counterfactuality; implicature; pragmatics;

1. Towards a pragmatic typology of conditionals in Ancient Greek

Ever since the seminal dissertation by Wakker 1994, our understanding of the pragmatics of conditionals in Ancient Greek has been greatly improved. Previous research typically proposed *form-based* classifications of the prototypical conditional structures in Ancient Greek and consequently divided them according to their *chance of fulfilment* e.g. in terms of mood used (Wakker 1994, 35–42).[1] By contrast, Wakker convincingly argued that conditionals should be distinguished on the basis of the type of relation that they specify with regard to their matrix clause:[2]

(i)   *if it rains, I'll take an umbrella* ("predicational")
(ii) *if my mother is not mistaken, John is at home* ("propositional")
(iii) *if you are thirsty, there is beer in the fridge* ("illocutionary")[3]

In the first type, the realization of the matrix clause, henceforth called *q*, depends on the realization of the conditional clause, henceforth called *p*.[4] In the second, it is rather the truth of *q* that depends on *p*, instead of the actualization of *q*. In the third type, the *p* clause formulates a condition of appropriateness or relevance for the utterance in the matrix clause. These three classes largely overlap with Sweetser's influential typology of conditionals into respectively *content*, *epistemic* and *speech act* conditionals (see Sweetser 1990, 113–121).

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[1] For an overview of the different theoretical approaches to conditionals, see Wakker 2013.
[2] I use the term matrix clause here, since the matrix clause of a conditional is not always the main clause itself.
[3] See Wakker 2013 for a compact overview.
[4] For this convention, see Wakker 1994: 24 and Declerck and Reed 2001: 10.

Ever since these important steps forward, very little research has concerned itself with the pragmatics of conditionals.[5] In fact, when one opens the section on conditionals in the Cambridge Grammar of Classical Greek, the classification that is given is one mainly based on chance of fulfilment: "Greek has a complex system of *five basic types* of conditional clauses: *neutral, prospective, potential, counterfactual and habitual conditions*. Each type expresses a different attitude of the speaker towards the likelihood of the condition in the protasis being fulfilled. Different moods and tenses are used in each of the different types" (van Emde Boas et al. 2019, 550, *my italics*). They do briefly allude to Wakker's model when they subsequently qualify that some conditional protases rather concern the *truth* or *relevance* of the apodosis (van Emde Boas et al. 2019, 551), but the classification of conditionals provided subsequently is based mainly on the chance of fulfillment. In addition, every section lists the mood combinations in each type (e.g. optative in conditional and matrix clause with potential conditions) after which a section follows on so-called mixed conditions within their classification (similar to the list of mixed constructions list found in Goodwin 1889, 188-195). Traditional classifications such as Goodwin's used the notion of temporal reference as main guide for classification (e.g. future-referring conditional or not, Goodwin 1889, 139).

In this paper, I argue that an extension of the pragmatic approach advocated by Wakker's work provides a more fruitful and even more economical way forward in describing conditionals in Ancient Greek. First of all, a focus on the pragmatic functions of conditionals takes into account both the linguistic and non-linguistic context rather than just form or temporal reference. Secondly, as I show in the analysis of this article, pragmatic types of conditionals cover multiple formal variations which despite the formal variation have a similar pragmatic function. As such, the pragmatic approach provides a more economic descriptive apparatus. Third, the same pragmatic types can have multiple different temporal references, as shown by the overview in table 1. Even Wakker's pragmatic model cannot capture these different pragmatic types. To substantiate these three points, I therefore analyze the pragmatic functions of conditionals with *past tenses* in the protasis and propose a novel typology (cf. table 1 below). Despite the formally stable past tense in the protasis, these conditionals have different pragmatic functions, different temporal references and different formal variations in the matrix clause even with the same function (e.g. direct inferential of past protasis with a potential optative in the matrix clause).

Conditional type	Pragmatic relationship	Order(s)	Illocution	Temporal range	Formal correlations
Predictive	•causality •sequentiality	p, q q, p	•Declarative	•past, present, future •CFpast, CFpresent, CFfuture	•Attitudinal adverbs •Negation of p
Direct inferential	•non-causality •non-sequentiality	p,q q, p	•Declarative •Interrogative	•past, present •CFpast, CFpresent	•Argumentative expressions (likely, it is clear that) •Negation of p •Indicative or (CF) optative mood in q
Indirect inferential	•non-causality •non-sequentiality •Contradictory or counterfactual implicature	p,q q, p	•Declarative •Assertoric wh-question •Assertoric yes-no question •Assertoric open question	•past, present •CFpast, CFpresent	•Negation of q •contrastive vocabulary (now, but, in fact) •indicative or optative mood in q
Illocutionary	•Condition of appropriateness or relevance for speech act in *q*	p, q q, p	•Declarative •Directive •Performative	•Past, present •CFpresent, CFfuture	•Evaluative vocabulary •Form with directive force •Performative verb

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[5] One obvious exception is Wakker 2006a; 2006b.

Metalinguistic	•Comment on how *q* is said	q, p	•Declarative •Interrogative •Exclamative	•past •CFpresent	•Negation of p •πότε (if ever…)
Generic	•Describe generic past situations as frame for habitual *q*	p, q	•Declarative	•past	•Habitual in *q* (e.g. past+ἄν)

Table 1 Pragmatic typology of conditionals with past tenses

To find parameters to classify conditionals in Ancient Greek, we should make use of more recent advances on conditionals in general linguistics. Firstly, the role of the order of *p* and *q* should be taken into account, since a more standard order such as *p, q* is open to a wider array of pragmatic usages than *q, p* (Dancygier 2006, 145–153) which, for example, can be used for so-called "metatextual" conditionals that reflect on what has just been said (Dancygier 2006, 103–109 e.g. *he trapped two mongeese, if mongeese is the right form*). Secondly, the function of the past tenses in past conditionals (esp. counterfactual) has been re-evaluated. Whereas previous studies in what may be called a conceptualist approach[6] saw the role of the past in counterfactual conditionals as indicating distance from reality, a more pragmatically oriented approach has recently argued the reverse: the reason that the past is typically knowable is why it is used to express counterfactual states of affairs, since the speaker and hearer will realize that the presented past scenario was unrealizable (Dahl 1997; Ziegeler 2000; Van linden & Verstraete 2008, 1879). Thus, the past rather signifies closeness to reality or epistemic proximity. This pragmatic understanding of the past better explains why we find past conditionals being used in various types of inferential conditionals (see section 3) to reason about evidence available to speaker and hearer.[7] Thirdly, I incorporate distinctions from recent more elaborate typologies of conditionals (e.g. Declerck & Reed 2001) such as types of inferential conditionals, the different implicatures that are generated and the role of the illocutionary force of the *q* clause. In this way we can identify types more accurately in terms of pragmatic criteria which cover formal and functional variation. Of course, we should still aim to maintain a balance between maximalist and minimalist description and not lean towards a too maximalist description,[8] but instead define macro-types based on clear linguistic criteria where subtypes may serve further interpretational purposes.[9] I return to this theoretical matter in the concluding remarks where I suggest how we could apply this typology to conditionals in Ancient Greek more generally.

Now, the typology that I develop in this paper is conceived with a distinct pragmatic angle, meaning that pragmatic value (e.g. function, implicature, illocutionary force) rather than morphosyntactic form (e.g. tense, mood) determines the classification of Ancient Greek conditionals. The most important motivation for this approach is that, as I show, pragmatic usages cut across potential possible world distinctions based on formal marking. This is for example demonstrated by past tenses which are used counterfactually[10] but have different pragmatic usages, e.g. predictive and (direct and indirect) inferential, see section 2 and 3. Thus, conditionals with past tenses are a welcome test-case for a broader pragmatic approach to classifying conditionals. After pragmatic classification, I contrast formal and semantic factors

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[6] The conceptualist approach (e.g. James 1982; Fleischman 1987), is used by Cognitive Grammar (see Langacker 1995). For this idea applied to counterfactual past tenses in Ancient Greek see Allan 2013: 35.

[7] Of course, the (counterfactual) past is also used for politeness. I return to this matter below.

[8] For example, the elaborate typology by Declerck & Reed 2001 can be viewed as too maximalist, since they further distinguish many pragmatic subtypes which they also divide according their possible world distinctions.

[9] La Roi 2021 applies this principle to insubordination in the history of Ancient Greek.

[10] A sentence or clause is generally called contrary-to-fact or counterfactual when it is implied or assumed by the speaker that what is said does not hold in the actual world (cf. Declerck and Reed 2001: 7; Dancygier 2006: 25).

to the pragmatic types such as the order of *p* and *q*,[11] temporal reference of the verb, adverbs, mood and negation. In addition, the typology proposed in this paper has a diachronic dimension which, for example, accounts for changes in temporal references of counterfactual past tenses from the past to the non-past. Earlier classifications mention such diachronic differences between Archaic and Classical Greek conditionals only as peculiarities which are filtered out in Classical Greek.[12] By contrast, I analyse these peculiarities from a pragmatic perspective and explain their diachronic relevance to the replacement of counterfactual optatives and the so-called 'iterative' optative by the past indicative.[13]

  This paper is organized in the following way. Sections 2 to 6 introduce and describe the different pragmatic types of conditionals with past tenses: predictive (2), direct and indirect inferential (3), illocutionary (4), metalinguistic (5), and generic (6). Every section first introduces the pragmatic type by clarifying the label, detailing its distinctive characteristics and offering a qualitative analysis of examples. I also note how these constructions are classified in existing grammars and existing typologies of conditionals such as those by Sweetser (1990), Wakker (1994), Declerck and Reed (2001) and Dancygier (2006). The choice of a label, then, was determined by its transparency in function as well as its representation in existing linguistic literature. At the end of the section, I repeat the relevant part of table one for purposes of clarity. Section 7 presents concluding remarks and offers future avenues of research. The typology proposed in this paper is based on a corpus-based analysis of conditionals with past tenses in both Archaic and Classical Greek: 99 from Archaic Greek and 874 from Classical Greek, of which, respectively, 95 and 592 were counterfactual. The examples were collected using the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae.[14] The corpus covers Archaic Greek (Homer, Hesiod's *Works and Days* and *Theogony* and the Homeric Hymns) and Classical Greek (the non-fragmentary works by Aeschylus, Sophocles and Euripides and Aristophanes, the histories of Thucydides, Herodotus and Xenophon, the authentic works of Plato and the orators from which we possess the largest amount of speeches, viz. Lysias, Isocrates, Isaeus and Demosthenes).

2. Predictive conditionals with past tenses

Predictive conditionals make a *prediction of actualization* of the *q* clause, implying that if *p* is realized *q* will be realized (Dancygier, 2006, 25–61), e.g. (i) *if it rains, the match will be cancelled,* (ii) *if it rained, the match would be cancelled,* (iii) *if it had rained, the match would have been cancelled.*[15] In other words, there is a causality between the actualization of the events expressed in the conditional and the matrix clause, viz. *p* and *q.* This causality is absent for other conditional types such as *inferential* conditionals (i.e. deduce the truth of a state of affairs from another one, e.g. *if my mother is not mistaken, John is at home* or *John is at home, if my mother is not mistaken*). With inferential conditionals one might only speak of causality in an epistemic sense, for example that the knowledge of *p* guarantees the knowledge of *q* or the reverse (see Dancygier, 2006, 87). In addition, predictive conditionals display temporal

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[11] For discussion of the order of *p* and *q* and statistics, see Wakker 1994: 57–103.

[12] E.g. Wakker 1994: 205–214. La Roi 2022b provides a diachronic analysis for Archaic and Classical Greek.

[13] Two diachronic aspects which are beyond the scope of this paper are (i) the insubordinate uses of conditional clauses (e.g. previously subordinate conditional clauses as pragmatically independent wish or directive clauses), for which see la Roi 2021, and (ii) the diachronic distribution of aspect and temporal reference in counterfactuals, for which see now la Roi 2022b.

[14] The data stems from collocation searches within a set distance (i.e. conditional subordinator and past indicative 7 words apart) and subsequently sifting through all the cases. Therefore, I cannot claim to be exhaustive for Classical Greek in its entirety. However, due to my large corpus and broad distance parameters it is expected to cover at least the vast majority of the examples in Classical Greek.

[15] The reason that I chose the term predictive over "predicational" (Wakker 1994) or "content" (Sweetser 1990), is (1) that predictive is more intuitive in providing the association of causality and sequentiality that predictive conditionals display, and (2) is not closely associated with one linguistic framework as for example predicational is with Functional Grammar.

sequentiality, meaning that the temporal relationship between *p* and *q* is presented as *iconic* of the temporal order of events (Dancygier, 2006, 73). As a result, the temporal reference[16] of predictive conditionals are broad, since their *q* can follow in the past, present or future.

In this first example the prediction of actualization holds between something which happened in the past and what will therefore happen in the future, i.e. Hector predicts that Achilles having left his former hiding place by the ships will lead to his doom (ἄλγιον with an ellipse of the main predicate).

(1)   **εἰ** δ᾽ **ἐτεὸν** παρὰ ναῦφιν **ἀνέστη** δῖος Ἀχιλλεύς,
ἄλγιον αἴ κ᾽ ἐθέλῃσι τῷ ἔσσεται. οὔ μιν ἔγωγε
φεύξομαι ἐκ πολέμοιο δυσηχέος, ἀλλὰ μάλ᾽ ἄντην
στήσομαι, ἤ κε φέρῃσι μέγα κράτος, ἦ κε φεροίμην (*Il.* 18.305-309)
But **if in truth** noble Achilles **has roused himself to action** by the ships, the worse will it be for him, if he is so minded. I certainly will not flee from him out of dolorous war, but face to face will I stand against him, whether he will win great victory, or perhaps I. (Murray & Wyatt)[17]

In my view, ἐτεόν is here inserted by Hector to mark his scepticism about Achilles having left his hiding place. At the same time, he still predicts future doom which underlines his confidence: Hector will cause Achilles' future doom regardless of whether he actually came to action now. After all, as argued by Wakker 1994, 127–128, such attitudinal adverbs with the indicative highlight the scepticism that conditionals with the indicative can express, since the indicative marks the reality of the state of affairs as indeterminate rather than a type of factuality. Also, conditionals with the indicative are often used in a resumptive way, taking up what the speaker has been told (as in example 1) without indicating responsibility for its truth. Examples with the same sequential causal relationship but with the reverse order also exist, for which see example (2). I give the preceding sentence in translation as context to make interpretation for the reader easier.

(2)   ἀλλ᾽ ὀΐω χάσσονται ὑπ᾽ ἔγχεος, **εἰ ἐτεόν** με
ὦρσε θεῶν ὤριστος, ἐρίγδουπος πόσις (*Il.* 13.153-154)
[Not for long will the Achaeans hold me back, though they have arrayed themselves like a wall;]
but I think they will give ground before my spear **if truly** the highest of gods **has urged** me **on**, the loud-thundering lord of Hera." (Murray & Wyatt)

As in example (1), Hector here confidently addresses his fellow fighters and predicts victory.
The remainder of predictive conditionals with past tenses are counterfactual. They are more frequent than the non-counterfactual predictive conditionals with past tenses just discussed: they make up 58% of Classical Greek counterfactual conditionals (344 out of 592). States of affairs are counterfactual when the condition for realization is deemed unrealizable or false by the speaker for the past, present or future. Counterfactual conditional sentences can

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[16] Following Bertinetto & Delfitto 2000, 190–191 I distinguish between tense, aspect and actionality in order not to confuse the layers of interpretation. These domains crucially need to be kept separate to describe counterfactuals, since counterfactuals may be in the past tense with a perfective aspect but refer to the present (cf. the present-referring aorist discussed by Wakker 1994, 132–133), thus going against expected past temporal reference for the combination of past tense and perfective aspect, la Roi 2022b.
[17] The translations in this paper are the Loeb translations available via https://www.loebclassics.com/. I give the name of the translator in between brackets following the translation. On the rare occasions where I had to adapt the translation because it was too free, I added an asterisk behind the name of the author to indicate that a minor change has been made to the original translation.

refer to the past, present or future, and present an intimate relationship between two unrealizable events, i.e. the states of affairs in the *p* and *q* clause. Although counterfactual state of affairs often concern events which did not happen (i.e. unrealized past events), they can refer to events which from a logical perspective are realizable in that they follow the moment of speaking, but from the speaker's perspective counterfactual, e.g. uttered in the morning *I wish she was coming round tonight.* The point of entertaining counterfactual worlds is to stress that they are unrealizable at the moment concerned according to the speaker, e.g. *I wish she were coming round*=this unfortunately cannot be realized *now*, or *if he had come tomorrow instead of today, he would have found me at home*=this cannot be realized in the *future* according to the speaker. In other words, counterfactuals entertain lost possibilities[18], even when it is only the speaker who is making it out to be a counterfactual state of affairs: (indirect inferential) *if I were guilty, they would have charged me now* = having charged me is false according to the speaker and therefore me being guilty is. The source for the counterfactuality of the conditional is often in the common ground[19], which comprises "the sum of [interlocutors'] mutual, common or joint knowledge beliefs, and suppositions" (Clark 1996, 96).[20] With counterfactual conditionals, the source of counterfactuality is prototypically based on either personal linguistic common ground or (less often) communal common ground meaning that the state of affairs in the conditional conflicts with what both speakers acknowledge to be true. This conflict generates the polarity reversal expressed by counterfactual constructions, giving positive sentences a negative force and a negative sentence a positive force (contrast examples (3) and (4)). For this reason contrary-to-fact is somewhat of a misnomer, since counterfactuals concern what is *deemed* counterfactual rather than what is logically contrary to reality.[21] In example 3, the peasant utters these words about Electra knowing well that he is not that man of standing (ἀξίωμ' ἔχων ἀνήρ) and therefore undeserving of Electra. As a result, there was no punishment for the murder of Agamemnon in the past (τότε), since Electra did not marry a man of standing in the past. The negative implicature from the conditional is transferred from the past counterfactual conditional to the past counterfactual in the main clause.[22]

(3) εἰ γάρ νιν **ἔσχεν** ἀξίωμ' ἔχων ἀνήρ,
     εὕδοντ' ἂν ἐξήγειρε τὸν Ἀγαμέμνονος
     φόνον δίκη τ' ἂν ἦλθεν Αἰγίσθωι τότε. (E. *El.* 39-41)
     For **if** a man of standing **had married** her, he would have awakened from its slumber the murder of Agamemnon, and punishment might have come thereafter to Aegisthus. (Kovacs)

Now, with a negation[23] in the example such as the following, the implication has the reverse effect. With the negated past counterfactual conditional the narrator implies that nightfall *did* stop them with the result that they left Magoi alive. Thus, due to the inherent

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[18] The French term *possibilité perdue* seems particularly apt, cf. Wakker 1994: 45 & 132 with further references.
[19] Of course, common ground is not only relevant to counterfactual predictive conditionals, as communal common ground codetermines whether a causal relation holds between *p* and *q* in non-counterfactual conditionals or linguistic common ground is often the source for the *p* from which inferential conditionals deduce a *q*.
[20] Earlier applications of common ground to other domains of Ancient Greek such as particles and moods are Thijs 2017; la Roi 2020a, 2022a; Allan 2021.
[21] Cf. the useful discussion of this term by Van Emde Boas et al. 2019: 443.
[22] For this implicature transfer, see Wakker 1994: 301; Declerck & Reed 2001: 107–108.
[23] See Muchnová 2016 for an overview of Ancient Greek negation.

polarity reversal of counterfactuals, negated counterfactual conditonals imply the opposite of the negated affairs that they mark (cf. Declerck & Reed 2001, 107–108).[24]

(4)   εἰ δὲ **μὴ** νὺξ ἐπελθοῦσα **ἔσχε**, ἔλιπον **ἂν** οὐδένα μάγον (Hdt 3.79.11)
        and **if** nightfall **had not stayed them**, they would not have left one Magus alive
        (Godley)

While such past counterfactuals depend on knowledge accepted as true in the common ground, they still display a degree of subjectivity because these conditional structures assign a causal relationship between two state of affairs which either were not realized or could not take place. In other words, the supposedly accepted causal link between two counterfactual events can be abused for rhetorical purposes: both events were unrealizable and therefore are, at least to some extent, a source of uncheckable evidence for hearers. To illustrate, in example (4) it could be said that the prediction of causality between nightfall and their actions is primarily a subjective view of the speaker, i.e. the narrator. Therefore, the supposed common ground link between the two counterfactual events is abused for the rhetorical purpose of the narrator.[25]

 Predictive counterfactual conditionals can also predict something for the present. In the next example the nurse apologizes to Phaedra for not having been able to find the right solution for her malady. She then extrapolates that if she would in fact have found a solution in the past (ἔπραξα), she would now be numbered among the wise (ἦ). In other words, a counterfactual past is used to project a counterfactual present outcome.

(5)   εἰ δ' εὖ γ' **ἔπραξα**, κάρτ' **ἂν** ἐν σοφοῖσιν **ἦ**· (E. *Hipp.* 699-700)
        But **if** I **had had success**, **I would be numbered** among the very wise. (Kovacs*)

Keen observers will also note that the tense-aspect of the counterfactual past tenses here follow the often heard axiom of aorists being used for past counterfactuals and imperfects from present counterfactuals. However, this is an incorrect generalization: counterfactual past and presents occur with the aorist, imperfect and the pluperfect in Classical Greek (cf. Wakker, 1994, 146–150; and now la Roi 2022b with more corpus data).[26]

 Finally, predictive conditionals can in fact also refer to a counterfactual future although more rarely. The existence of counterfactual futures is somewhat debated, since some linguists have contended that the fact that the future is inherently unknowable would make it impossible to produce counterfactual predictions for the future (e.g. Patard 2019, 180).[27] As often in linguistics, such a logical view of language does not do justice to its rich possibilities[28]: speakers can feel confident enough to make predictions for the counterfactual future, for example '*If you had come tomorrow instead of today, you would have found me at home*' (Dahl 1997, 106–107; Declerck & Reed 2001, 99). As noted by Declerck and Reed 2001, 181, counterfactuals for the future depend on the certainty of a plan or arrangement for the future: a "present intention, plan,

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[24] In technical terms, counterfactuals display polarity symmetry because positive counterfactuals have a negative and negative counterfactuals have a positive interpretation.

[25] See for background on narrators in Ancient Greek literature, de Jong, Bowie and Nünlist (2004).

[26] As explained by la Roi 2022b, this incorrect generalization still often resurfaces in general linguistic descriptions of the Ancient Greek data, e.g. Beck, Malamud, & Osadcha, 2012; Yong 2018: 190.

[27] See the discussion by Declerck & Reed 2001: 179–182. By contrast, Wakker 1994: 158 note 72 summarizes it concisely: "There may be philosophical objections to equating future time and counterfactuality, since, in an absolute sense, it may be impossible to utter any prediction in the knowledge that it will prove false (counterfactual). But what matters for language (and the particular means of expression selected) is the speaker's presupposition at the time of utterance".

[28] The same logical thinking has affected how linguists have dealt with the category of future marking, Markopoulos 2009: 8–10.

programme, arrangement or agreement about the future or another proposition describing the actual world, like the expression of a permanent habit or other kind of state". Consequently, future counterfactuals typically need clear contextual anchors which allow a speaker to make a confident counterfactual prediction for something to extend into the future. In general, such examples are very rare in Classical Greek sentences, cf. the future referring imperfect indicative ἔζων in E. *Alc.* 295 which expresses an atelic state of affairs κἀγώ τ᾽ ἂν ἔζων καὶ σὺ τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον "[Had they agreed to die for you in your place,] you and I would live the remainder of our lives together" (la Roi 2022b). However, in conditionals they are only expressed by using the past future auxiliary μέλλω.[29] In example (6), we find a counterfactual future expressed by ἔμελλον διαγνώσεσθαι: was to make a decision. The counterfactuality of this phrase is signalled by εἰ ..ἄλλοι τινὲς, "if *another court*", since it is the current count which has the set arrangement to pass judgment. In other words, the conditional expresses a counterfactual future where another court would pass judgment.

(6)   **εἰ** μὲν οὖν ἄλλοι τινὲς **ἔμελλον** περὶ ἐμοῦ **διαγνώσεσθαι**, σφόδρα ἂν ἐφοβούμην τὸν κίνδυνον (Lys. 3.12)
        Now **if** it were any other court that **was to make a decision** upon me, I should be terrified by the danger (Lamb)

Conditional type	Pragmatic relationship	Order	Temporal range	Illocution	Formal correlations
Predictive	•causality •sequentiality	p, q q, p	•past, present, future •CFpast, CFpresent, CFfuture	Declarative	•Attitudinal adverbs •Negation of p

Table 2 Predictive conditionals with past tenses

3. Direct and indirect inferential conditionals with past tenses
3.1 Classifying inferential conditionals with past tenses
Inferential conditionals (Declerck & Reed 2001, 42-44) distinguish themselves from predictive conditionals in that they express non-sequential and non-causal relations with the *q* clause. They operate on the epistemic plane between *p* and *q*.[30] They can be subdivided into *direct* and *indirect* inferential conditionals, the difference being in their argumentative structure:

- if *p* true, then *q* must be true =direct inferential
  - e.g. If my mum is not mistaken, my dad is at home.
- if *p*, *q*. since *q* is true, *p* must be true =indirect inferential
  - e.g. If you earned as much as you claim you do, you would not go around in that old car[31]

Thus, direct inferential conditionals use the truth of *p* to prove *q*, whereas indirect inferential conditionals use the truth of *q* to prove *p*. Both types share that they are means for speakers to specify the *evidential source* of their information and avoid part of the Gricean maxim of quality, namely to not say things for which they lack adequate evidence (see Wakker 1994, 229).

In contrast to Wakker's model where these types fall under the broader type of propositional conditionals, I distinguish these two main subtypes. Also, I take into account a

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[29] Another example is Lys. 7.16.2. For the arrangement use of μέλλω in the past tense, cf. Allan 2017b: 62 note 37.
[30] Sweetser 1990 calls these conditionals "epistemic conditionals", whereas Wakker 1994 calls this type "propositional conditionals". I distinguish several new subtypes (e.g. direct versus indirect inferential conditionals) and take into account more pragmatic factors (e.g. implicature, illocutionary force) than has been done.
[31] Dahl 1997: 109.

number of new factors to identify the different subtypes of inferential conditionals: (1) the role of the illocutionary force of the *q* clause (e.g. declaratives versus various types of rhetorical questions), (2) the type of implicature generated by the *p, q* combination (e.g. contradictory versus counterfactual), (3) the variation of order of *p* and *q*, (4) the temporal reference range, (5) mood and (6) negation.

3.2 Direct inferential conditionals with past tenses

Most commonly direct inferential conditionals use evidence from the *past* to argue for the truth of something in the *past* (see the non-counterfactual examples (8) and (9)). In contrast to indirect inferential conditionals, I found them especially with *q* clauses that have a declarative illocutionary force and only rarely with a *q* with interrogative illocutionary force.[32] The argumentative goal may be signalled explicitly by argumentative expressions e.g δῆλον ὅτι (ex. 8) or εἰκός ἦν.[33] In (8), the speaker uses Onetor's own past actions to cast doubt on his sincerity and to imply that it was his plan all along to commit fraud.

(8)   καὶ τί ποιεῖ; τοὺς ὅρους ἀπὸ τῆς οἰκίας ἀφαιρεῖ, καὶ τάλαντον μόνον εἶναι τὴν προῖκά φησιν, ἐν ᾧ τὸ χωρίον ἀποτετιμῆσθαι. καίτοι **δῆλον ὅτι** τοὺς ἐπὶ τῆς οἰκίας ὅρους **εἰ** δικαίως **ἔθηκεν** καὶ ὄντως ἀληθεῖς, δικαίως καὶ τοὺς ἐπὶ τοῦ χωρίου τέθηκεν·
(Dem. 31.3.3)
What, then, does he do? He removes the pillars from the house, and declares that the marriage portion was a talent only, which sum was guaranteed by a mortgage on the land. Yet, if the inscription on the house **was set up** by him in fairness and sincerity, **it is plain that** the one on the land was also. (Murray)

In example (9) Herodotus argues that we can deduce what the Attic nation must have done with its language from its past predecessors.

(9)   εἰ τούτοισι τεκμαιρόμενον δεῖ λέγειν, ἦσαν οἱ Πελασγοὶ βάρβαρον γλῶσσαν ἱέντες. εἰ τοίνυν **ἦν** καὶ πᾶν τοιοῦτο τὸ Πελασγικόν, τὸ Ἀττικὸν ἔθνος ἐὸν Πελασγικὸν ἅμα τῇ μεταβολῇ τῇ ἐς Ἕλληνας καὶ τὴν γλῶσσαν **μετέμαθε** (Hdt. 1.57.9-12)
if (I say) one may judge by these, the Pelasgians spoke a language which was not Greek. If then all the Pelasgian stock so **spoke**, then the Attic nation, being of Pelasgian blood, **must have changed** its language too at the time when it became part of the Hellenes. (Godley)

Such direct inferential conditionals may also be used to refute a competing version of past events, esp. in Classical Greek rhetoric. In example (10), the speaker refutes the claim by Apollodorus that Phormio would have illegitimately obtained an agreement with Apolodorus' deceased father.

(10)   ὅτε γὰρ τὰ μητρῷα πρὸς μέρος ἠξίους νέμεσθαι, ὄντων παίδων ἐκ τῆς γυναικὸς Φορμίωνι τουτῳί, τόθ' ὡμολόγεις κυρίως δόντος τοῦ πατρὸς τοῦ σοῦ κατὰ τοὺς νόμους αὐτὴν γεγαμῆσθαι. **εἰ γὰρ** αὐτὴν **εἶχε λαβὼν** ἀδίκως ὅδε μηδενὸς δόντος, **οὐκ ἦσαν** οἱ παῖδες κληρονόμοι, τοῖς δὲ μὴ κληρονόμοις οὐκ ἦν μετουσία τῶν ὄντων.
(Dem. 36.32.1-10)
For when you claimed the right to distribute your mother's estate share by share—and

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[32] Counterfactual of the type "Why would he have done that, if he did not need the money?", cf. Lys. 7.16 or *Il.* 22.202.
[33] Other examples of this type are Hdt. 2.28.16, Lys. 3.42.8, 8.11.2, 12.57.4, Dem. 19.42.2, 45.13.4, 57.14.7, Pl. *Grg.* 514c4 or *R.* 408c2.

she had left children by the defendant, Phormio—you then acknowledged that your father had given her with full right, and that she had been married in accordance with the laws. For **if** Phormio **had taken her** to wife wrongfully, and no one had given her—**then** the children **were not** heirs, and if they were not heirs they had no right of sharing in the property. (Murray)

In addition to direct inferentials situated in the past, we also find direct inferential conditionals that use past evidence as source of evidence for the *present*.[34] Crucially, the mood of the matrix clause can be both the indicative and potential optative, cf. (11) versus (12). Note that mood-based classifications could not fit such examples within their classification, but a pragmatically oriented one can. The argumentative function of the past conditional clause is signalled partially by ὀρθῶς 'correctly'.

(11)   **εἰ** γὰρ ὀρθῶς **ἐλέγομεν** ἄρτι, καὶ τῷ ὄντι θεοῖσι μὲν ἄχρηστον ψεῦδος, ἀνθρώποις δὲ χρήσιμον ὡς ἐν φαρμάκου εἴδει, **δῆλον ὅτι** τό γε τοιοῦτον ἰατροῖς δοτέον, ἰδιώταις δὲ οὐχ ἁπτέον. (Pl. *R.* 389b2-6)
         If we were right in what **we were saying** just now and falsehood really is of no use to the gods, although it is to men in the form of medicine, then **it should be clear** that as such we should sanction it for doctors, but laymen should not touch it. (Emlyn-Jones & Freddy)

Note also how it can be explicitly marked that such conditionals are used argumentatively, see δῆλον ὅτι (ex. 11) or ὡς οὗτοι ἔφασαν (Is. 6.44.4)[35] In example (12) Cleon summarizes his reasoning on why the Athenians should uphold their previous decisions about the Mytileans.

(12)   **εἰ** γὰρ οὗτοι **ὀρθῶς ἀπέστησαν**, ὑμεῖς ἂν οὐ χρεὼν ἄρχοιτε. (Th. 3.40.6)
         for **if** these people **had a right to secede**, it would follow that you are wrong in exercising dominion. (Smith)

Futhermore, direct inferential conditionals can occur with a reversed order, but they are counterfactual when they do and refer either to the past or the present (81 in Archaic Greek (=85% (!) of Archaic Greek counterfactual conditionals) vs 92 in Classical Greek (=16% of Classical Greek counterfactual conditionals, 173 in total). Such direct inferential conditionals are not temporally iconic and used for a variety of rhetorical reasons, e.g. steer the expectation of the hearer (example (13)), suggest that a counterfactual scenario was on the verge of happening (example (14)),[36] or that something cannot happen now that the counterfactual scenario was averted (example (17)).

(13)   Ἔνθά κεν ὑψίπυλον Τροίην ἕλον υἷες Ἀχαιῶν,
         εἰ μὴ Ἀπόλλων Φοῖβος Ἀγήνορα δῖον ἀνῆκε
         φῶτ' Ἀντήνορος υἱὸν ἀμύμονά τε κρατερόν τε. (*Il.* 21.544-546)
         Then would the sons of the Achaeans have taken high-gated Troy, **if** Phoebus Apollo had **not** roused noble Agenor, Antenor's son, an incomparable warrior and mighty. (Murray & Wyatt)

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[34] Cf. Wakker 1994: 230 note 9 who gives some examples of this type. Other examples are Thuc. 1.86.1, Pl. *R.* 389b2, Lys. 20.12.5 or 20.20.1. A variation on this use is where the speaker treats a past situation as counterfactual (with a concessive conditional), but suggests that the evidence from it does not impair a present state of affairs, see Is. 6.44.3, 8.31.7, 9.27.3, 11.23.2 or Dem. 18.95.

[35] Examples can be found at *Il.* 6.128, Isoc. 15.75.4, , Dem 19.32.8, 22.7.3, Is. 1.21.4 or Pl. *Cra.* 433c3.

[36] For a cross-linguistic study of means to express such a narrowly averted action, see Kuteva 1998.

As discussed by de Jong 1987, Richardson 1990, Lang 1989 and Bouxsein 2020, these if-not counterfactuals are used by the narrator to steer the expectations of the narratees, not only in the narrative portions of Homeric texts but also in character speech. Moreover, this type of counterfactual conditional is also relevant from a diachronic perspective. Conditionals of this type make use of explicit pragmatic cues (e.g. 'if not', but also 'but' or 'now') to counter the averted scenario with reality.[37] They provide a so-called bridging context in which the counterfactual indicative replaces the counterfactual optative, since it can use pragmatic cues to help signal the counterfactuality of the indicative (la Roi 2022b). A bridging context is a context in which a new target meaning provides a more likely interpretation of the marker than the older source meaning (Heine 2002, 83–101). The reason why we find this bridging context so unusually often is that it is a favourite narratorial strategy of the Homeric narrator to play with the expectations of the audience. It also explains why we both find archaic combinations where the main clause is still in the counterfactual optative such as example 14 and examples such as 13 where the formula has undergone morphological renewal:

(14) καί νύ κεν ἔνθ᾽ **ἀπόλοιτο** ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν Αἰνείας,
εἰ μὴ ἄρ᾽ ὀξὺ **νόησε** Διὸς θυγάτηρ Ἀφροδίτη
μήτηρ, ἥ μιν ὑπ᾽ Ἀγχίσῃ τέκε βουκολέοντι (*Il.* 5.311-313)
And now **would** the lord of men, Aeneas, **have perished**, **had not** the daughter of Zeus, Aphrodite, been quick to **notice**, his mother, who conceived him to Anchises as he tended his cattle. (Murray & Wyatt)

Furthermore, these conditionals are actually also used in non-narrative settings, as in example (15) to state that Ajax' plan to kill the Argives was only just averted. What Athena says is that she was not negligent and therefore Ajax did not accomplish his plan.

(15) Odysseus   ἦ καὶ τὸ βούλευμ᾽ ὡς ἐπ᾽ Ἀργείοις τόδ᾽ ἦν;
Athena   κἂν ἐξεπράξατ᾽, **εἰ κατημέλησ᾽** ἐγώ. (S. *Aj.* 44-45)
Odysseus   Was his plan aimed against the Argives?
Athena   Yes, and he would have accomplished it, **had I been negligent**. (Lloyd-Jones)

Similar to counterfactual predictive conditionals, counterfactual direct inferential conditionals have diachronically been extended to referring to the present (la Roi 2022b). In example (16) Chrysothemis rebukes Electra using a direct inferential conditional. He uses this structure to suggest that Electra does *not* think sensibly and *therefore* does not have an agreeable life.[38]

(17) Chrys.   βίου δὲ τοῦ παρόντος οὐ μνείαν ἔχεις;
Electra   καλὸς γὰρ οὑμὸς βίοτος ὥστε θαυμάσαι.
Chrys.   ἀλλ᾽ **ἦν** ἄν, **εἰ** σύ γ᾽ εὖ φρονεῖν ἠπίστασο. (S. *El.* 392-394)
Chrys.   But do you feel no concern for the kind of life you now enjoy?
Electra   Yes, my life is wonderfully agreeable!

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[37] Note that the following disproving *p* can also be expressed by other expressions such as a participle, e.g. Pl. *Prt.* 318d8.
[38] For a similar example from philosophical dialogue, see Pl. *Smp* 199d5-7 where Socrates implies that Agathon did not want to give the right answer εἶπες ἂν δήπου μοι, εἰ ἐβούλου καλῶς ἀποκρίνασθαι ὅτι ἔστιν ὑέος γε ἢ θυγατρὸς ὁ πατὴρ πατήρ· ἢ οὔ; "Surely you would have said, if you wished to give the proper answer, that the father is father of son or of daughter, would you not?" (Emlyn-Jones & Freddy)

Chrys.   It **would be**, **if** you knew how to think sensibly! (Lloyd-Jones)

3.3 Indirect inferential conditionals with past tenses

There is a wider variety of indirect inferential conditionals than has thus far been acknowledged in the literature. Wakker 1994, 231–235, for example, only discusses a set of "rhetorical" uses of propositional conditionals which would also classify as indirect inferential conditionals (e.g. *If you're the Pope, I'm the Empress of China*, i.e. I'm not the Empress of China so you are not the Pope[39]) and did not incorporate the relevant factors mentioned above and below.

The indirect inferential type that one finds most often (152 times in my corpus (=26% of Classical Greek counterfactual conditionals)) is of the logical structure *p, cfq. now that q=cf, p must be cf as well*. This usage is not found in Archaic Greek yet. The following scheme exemplifies the complex reasoning behind such conditionals:

1. if (as you say) he won the lottery,
    2. he would have shared the money with me as his wife.
    2. why would he not have shared the money with me as his wife?
        3. Now that he did not it must be the case that he has *not* won the lottery.

This type is found in declarative or interrogative illocutions. There both *p* and *q* refer either to the past (example (17) and (18)) or to the present (example (19)). In example (17) Menecles' son, who is defending himself and Menecles, uses the indirect inferential to refute the idea that Menecles was not in his right mind when adopting him but under the influence of the son's sister. After all, then Menecles would have adopted one of the boys of the son's sister instead, which he evidently did not because he adopted the son.

(17)   ὥστ᾽ **εἴ** γ᾽ ἐκείνῃ πεισθεὶς τὸν υἱὸν ἐποιεῖτο, τῶν ἐκείνης παίδων τὸν ἕτερον
         ἐποίησατ᾽ ἄν· δύο γάρ εἰσιν αὐτῇ. (Is. 2.19.8)
         if it had been under her influence that he was adopting his son, **he would have adopted** one of the other boys; for she has two. (Forster)

It is also possible to signal the counterfactual character of the *q* clause more explicitly by means of negation, e.g. δῆλα γὰρ δὴ ὅτι, εἰ *μὴ* αὐταὶ ἐβούλοντο, *οὐκ* ἂν ἡρπάζοντο. (Hdt. 1.4.8) "For plainly, had they *not* wanted it themselves, the women would *never* have been carried away".[40] On the other hand, the argumentative reasoning is not made explicit at all times and can be more compressed, as for example in example (18) from a dialogue in Aristophanes:

(18)   **εἰ** γὰρ πονηρὸν ἦν, Ὅμηρος **οὐδέποτ᾽** ἂν **ἐποίει**
         τὸν Νέστορ᾽ ἀγορητὴν ἄν, οὐδὲ τοὺς σοφοὺς ἅπαντας. (Ar. *Nub.* 1057-1058)
         If it were something bad, Homer **would** never have **called** Nestor, and every other sagacious person, "man of the agora." (Henderson)

In example (19) the speaker refutes the presupposition that he actually is a man with financial means as suggested by the accuser. In this example, the argumentative reasoning is made fairly explicit as one can see by how the speaker contrasts this counterfactual scenario to what is actually happening: see the clauses introduced by ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ 'but not' and νυνὶ 'now/in fact'.

(19)   **εἰ** γὰρ ἐκεκτήμην οὐσίαν, ἐπ᾽ ἀστράβης **ἂν ὠχούμην**, *ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀλλοτρίους*
         *ἵππους ἀνέβαινον: **νυνὶ** δ᾽ ἐπειδὴ τοιοῦτον οὐ δύναμαι κτήσασθαι, τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις*

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[39] Such conditionals are often called *ad absurdum* conditionals, Dahl 1997: 109; Declerck & Reed 2001: 296–300.
[40] Similar examples are Hdt. 1.4.8, 3.21.11.

ἵπποις ἀναγκάζομαι χρῆσθαι πολλάκις. (Lys. 24.11)
if I were a man of means, **I should ride** on a saddled mule, and *would not mount other men's horses. But **in fact**, as I am unable to acquire anything of the sort, I am compelled, now and again, to use other men's horses* (Lamb)

To sum up, indirect inferential conditionals with a declarative main clause are an effective means to combat presuppositions on the part of the hearer(s) by making them look in the mirror of the factual past or present (see table 3 below).[41] In other words, they are another linguistic means of Classical Greek to challenge what is in the common ground (e.g. in addition to for example μήν or ἀλλά, see Thijs 2017 and Allan 2017a).

In non-declarative illocutions, indirect inferential conditionals can be distinguished based on the type of rhetorical question they express, whether they generate a contradictory or counterfactual implicature, and their mood and negation usage. Importantly, in questions, indirect inferential conditionals only occur in so-called assertoric questions. So-called assertoric questions such as rhetorical questions present an affirmative message, i.e. they have the illocutionary force of a declarative (Declerck & Reed 2001 41 & 60). These indirect inferentials can be subdivided in wh-questions, yes/no-questions and open questions. Indirect inferentials wh-questions with a non-counterfactual main clause imply a contradiction between the assumption described in the *p* clause and the second assumption connected to it which together become anomalous, e.g. *If he was working abroad, why would he pay taxes here?* (Declerck & Reed 2001 303). In other words, the assumptions seem irreconcilable. In example (20) I would argue that the translator Godley accurately represents the rhetorical force of the question, because the question is translated as a declarative sentence. The indirect inferential wh-question[42] signals the contradiction between the assumption that there was once no land for Egypt and their preoccupation with finding out which language was the earliest.

(20) **εἰ** <u>τοίνυν</u> σφι χώρη γε μηδεμία ὑπῆρχε, **τί** περιεργάζοντο δοκέοντες πρῶτοι ἀνθρώπων γεγονέναι; (Hdt 2.15.12)
Then if there was once no country for them, it was but a useless thought that they were the oldest nation on earth, (Godley)

Similarly in example (21), the speaker implies that there was no need for the disagreement, since the child would stand to gain something if there were in fact a deal. Thus, the contradiction between the state of affairs in the condition and the main clause implies the reversal of the polarity of the state of affairs contained in the wh-question, i.e. τί ἔδει question= οὐκ ἔδει declarative.

(21) Φησὶ γὰρ ὁμολογῆσαί με τοῦ κλήρου τῷ παιδὶ τὸ ἡμικλήριον μεταδώσειν, εἰ νικήσαιμι τοὺς ἔχοντας αὐτόν. Καίτοι **εἰ** μέν τι καὶ αὐτῷ μετῆν κατὰ τὸ γένος, ὡς οὗτος λέγει, **τί ἔδει** γενέσθαι ταύτην αὐτοῖς παρ' ἐμοῦ τὴν ὁμολογίαν; Ἦν γὰρ ὁμοίως καὶ τούτοις ἐπίδικον τὸ ἡμικλήριον, εἴ περ ἀληθῆ λέγουσιν. (Is. 11.24.2-9)
He declares that I agreed, if I won my case against the present possessors of the estate, to give the child a half-share of the inheritance. Yet if the child had any right to a share in virtue of his relationship, as my opponent declares, **what need was there** for this agreement between me and them? For the half of the estate was adjudicable to them just

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[41] A good example of an indirect inferential conditional which also has relevance on the level of impoliteness is Pl. *Euthphr.* 14b8-c1 πολύ μοι διὰ βραχυτέρων, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, εἰ ἐβούλου, εἶπες ἂν τὸ κεφάλαιον ὧν ἠρώτων· ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐ (c) πρόθυμός με εἶ διδάξαι—δῆλος εἶ. "You might, if you wished, Eutyphro have answered much more briefly the chief part of my question. But it is plain that you do not care to instruct me." (Lamb)
[42] Examples are Lys. 13.56.7, Dem. 18.72.5, 18.101.9 or 20.127.3.

as much as to me, if what they say is true. (Forster)

I did not find indirect inferential *wh*-questions[43] which generated a counterfactual implicature. Its absence might be explained by the fact that counterfactual wh-questions tend to be rhetorical (i.e. assertoric) anyway, e.g. who would have thought/done x?=nobody would have thought/done x.

Indirect inferential yes/no questions in a similar way use the seemingly contradictory (but not counterfactual) relation between the *p* and *q* to imply that *q* is most likely not the case. In example (22), the contradiction between the lark (a songbird representing the generation of Birds which are the topic of this play) existing *before* the gods but not having the kingship (a presupposition of *q*), implies that they would have the kingship: *if X, Y?=if X, then Y should be the case* [but strangely is not the case].

(22) Peisetaerus   οὔκουν δῆτ', **εἰ** πρότεροι μὲν γῆς, πρότεροι δὲ θεῶν **ἐγένοντο**,
                   ὡς πρεσβυτάτων ὄντων αὐτῶν ὀρθῶς **ἐσθ'** ἡ βασιλεία;
     Euelpides   νὴ τὸν Ἀπόλλω· (Ar. *Av.* 477-479)
     Peisetaerus   So **if** they **were born** before Earth and before the gods, **doesn't it** follow that the kingship is rightfully theirs by primogeniture?
     Euelpides   I swear by Apollo! (Henderson)

Yet, when an indirect inferential yes/no question is *counterfactual*, it is indicated that the main clause state of affairs is false and *therefore* the presupposition contained in the preceding conditional is false. In example (23), the speaker signals that the presupposition 'would he not have thought fit' is counterfactual, because the presupposition that the deposition was real and therefore demanded serious attention refutes the presupposition that he would not have summoned friends to help with this deposition. In other words, the rhetorical question 'would he not have' actually means *he surely would have*[44] and through counterfactual implicature that therefore the deposition was *not* real, i.e. not *p*.[45]

(23) Εἶτα ἐπὶ ταύτην ἂν τὴν μαρτυρίαν, **εἰ** ἦν ἀληθής, **οὐκ ἂν** ἅπαντας τοὺς οἰκείους τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ παρακαλεῖν ἐκεῖνος **ἠξίωσε;** *Ναὶ μὰ Δία, ὡς ἔγωγε ᾤμην, εἴ γε ἦν ἀληθὲς τὸ πρᾶγμα.* (Is. 3.25.2)
     To attest a deposition like this, **if** it were really true, **would he not have thought fit** to summon all his own friends? Most assuredly he would have done so, I should have thought, if the deposition had been genuine. (Forster)

In open rhetorical questions, as in indirect inferential yes/no questions, we find both contradictory and counterfactual usages. In example (24) the rhetorical question implies the reverse polarity of the polarity marked in the question by πῶς οὐ(κ) with the indicative present. Demosthenes uses Aeschines' supposed past actions against him. He points out how they contradict the message which Aeschines is trying to pass off now, namely that the measures were bad. Thus, the rhetorical questions with πῶς οὐ(κ) use the contradictory relation between the events in *p* and *q* to strongly imply that the state of affairs in *q* must be the case: *how is/was it not the case that=it surely must be/have been the case that.*[46]

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[43] For a detailed study of Classical Greek wh-clauses, see Faure 2021.
[44] Further examples are Is. 3.39.1, 7.33.3, Dem. 27.56.1 or 29.48.1.
[45] Wakker 1994: 152 makes some pertinent remarks as to the quantity implicature transfer from *p* to *q*. As these contexts show, the implicature can also be transferred in the reverse direction to reverse a presupposition in the *p*.
[46] Other examples are Is. 2.27.7, 9.36.8, 11.12.8 or Lys. 24.12.1.

(24) εἰ μὲν γὰρ παρῆν καὶ μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἐξητάζετο, **πῶς οὐ** δεινὰ ποιεῖ, μᾶλλον δ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ὅσια, εἰ ὧν ὡς ἀρίστων αὐτὸς τοὺς θεοὺς ἐποιήσατο μάρτυρας, ταῦθ᾽ ὡς οὐκ ἄριστα νῦν ὑμᾶς ἀξιοῖ ψηφίσασθαι τοὺς ὀμωμοκότας τοὺς θεούς; εἰ δὲ μὴ παρῆν, **πῶς οὐκ** ἀπολωλέναι πολλάκις **ἐστὶ δίκαιος**, εἰ ἐφ᾽ οἷς ἔχαιρον οἱ ἄλλοι, ταῦτ᾽ ἐλυπεῖθ᾽ ὁρῶν; (Dem. 18.217.5-11)
If he was present as one of the throng, **surely** his behavior is scandalous and even sacrilegious, for after calling the gods to witness that certain measures were very good, he now asks a jury to vote that they were very bad—a jury that has sworn by the gods! If he was not present, **he deserves** many deaths for shrinking from a sight in which everyone else rejoiced. (Vince & Vince)

Due to the polarity reversal of rhetorical questions, the indirect inferential open question in 25 implies the reverse of polarity that the sentences is marked with, meaning that the positive sentence πῶς αἰσχρὸν ἦν "how was it dishonorable?" means "it surely was *not* dishonourable" (to associate with him). After all, he associated with him before.

(25) χρῆν γὰρ ὑμᾶς ἢ μὴ κακῶς λέγειν ἢ μὴ ξυνεῖναι, καὶ ταῦτα φανερῶς ἀπειπόντας ὁμιλίαν. **εἰ** δὲ αἰσχρὸν ἡγεῖσθε τοῦτο, **πῶς αἰσχρὸν ἦν** ὑμῖν ξυνεῖναι, πρὸς ὃν οὐδὲ ἀπειπεῖν καλὸν ἡγεῖσθε; (Lys. 8.6.1-5)
You ought to have refrained either from defaming him or from associating with him, and that by an open renunciation of his company. But **if** you felt that to be dishonourable, **how was it dishonourable** for you to associate with a man whom you did not even feel it honorable to renounce? (Lamb)

In addition to with the past and present indicative, we also find this usage with the potential optative to challenge the existence of a possibility (e.g. Lys. 25.14.6) much like a negated potential optative in a declarative clause would do (la Roi 2019, 72). Yet, functionally, this combination expresses the same pragmatic function, underlining the importance of pragmatics over formal marking.

Finally, we find open indirect inferential questions which are counterfactual and thus argue for the counterfactuality of a presupposition contained in the conditional clause.[47] In example (26) Simonides points out the counterfactuality of the presupposition that despots obtain far fewer pleasures than men of modest means (see the summary by εἰ γὰρ οὕτως ταῦτ᾽ εἶχε "were it so"). He points to the counterfactual implication of such a counterfactual scenario which everyone would agree we observe all around, namely that most people desire the position of the king for its expected pleasures.

(26) ἄπιστα λέγεις, ἔφη ὁ Σιμωνίδης. **εἰ** γὰρ οὕτως ταῦτ᾽ εἶχε, **πῶς** ἂν πολλοὶ μὲν **ἐπεθύμουν** τυραννεῖν, καὶ ταῦτα τῶν δοκούντων ἱκανωτάτων ἀνδρῶν εἶναι; πῶς δὲ πάντες ἐζήλουν ἂν τοὺς τυράννους; (X. *Hier.* 1.9.1-5)
"Incredible!" exclaimed Simonides. "**Were** it so, **how** should a despot's throne **be an object of desire to** many, even of those who are reputed to be men of ample means? and how should all the world envy despots?" (Marchant & Bowersock)

As a coda to this section we should note that we do not find the reverse order of *q, p* for indirect inferentials with the past tense. Although the reversed order is not impossible (e.g. *But Superman wouldn't be Superman if he let this kind of injustice happen* (Declerck & Reed, 2001,

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[47] Another example is Is. 3.69.3.

45) the strong preference for *p, q* can be explained by the fact that indirect inferentials have as their main goal to let the hearer make an inference about *p* by virtue of the value of *q*. As such, *p* would first need to be established before it can be attacked with *q*. Table 3 summarizes the pragmatic features of inferential conditionals and their wide internal variation.

Conditional type	Pragmatic relationship	Order	Illocution	Temporal range	Formal correlations
Direct inferential	•non-causality •non-sequentiality	p,q q, p	•Declarative •Interrogative	•past, present •CFpast, CFpresent	•Argumentative expressions (likely, it is clear that) •Negation of p •Indicative or (CF) optative mood in q
Indirect inferential	•non-causality •non-sequentiality •Contradictory or counterfactual implicature	p,q q, p	•Declarative •Assertoric wh-question •Assertoric yes-no question •Assertoric open question	•past, present •CFpast, CFpresent	•Negation of q •contrastive vocabulary (now, but, in fact) •Indicative or optative mood in q

Table 3 Direct and indirect inferential conditionals with past tenses

4. Illocutionary conditionals

Illocutionary conditionals specify a condition for appropriateness or relevance of the speech act performed in *q* (Wakker, 1994, 236–256, 2013), e.g. *if you're thirsty, there is beer in the fridge*.[48] What distinguishes illocutionary conditionals from predictive or inferential conditionals is the pragmatic relationship with the main clause: whereas predictive conditionals express the condition for actualization and inferential conditionals the condition for the epistemic validity of the main clause, illocutionary conditionals specify the circumstances under which the speech act in *q* can appropriately (e.g. politely) or relevantly take place. As already highlighted by Wakker 1994, 237, the *q* clauses are not limited to declarative illocutions even though they outnumbered non-declarative illocutions in her corpus. Illocutionary conditionals with past tenses are of roughly three subtypes:

(1) with a directive *q* (examples (27) and (28)),
(2) preceding a performative main clause (example (29)),
(3) following or preceding an evaluative declarative clause (example (30).

When an illocutionary conditional with a past tense is combined with a directive in the matrix clause, it uses a supposed fact to specify the appropriateness for carrying out the directive in the main clause.[49] For example, in (27) Amphitruon has just told king Theseus what horrible thing Heracles has done and here Theseus politely asks Amphitruon to make Heracles uncover himself. In that way Theseus will be able to comfort him and remind him that friendship such as theirs transcends any type of pollution. Thus, the use of the past illocutionary conditional here specifies the appropriateness of Heracles' uncovering, since Theseus comes to sympathize (συναλγῶν γ᾽ ἦλθον) and can be seen as a polite hedge to the directive directed at Amphitruon.

(27)   ἀλλ᾽, **εἰ** συναλγῶν γ᾽ **ἦλθον**, ἐκκάλυπτέ νιν (E. *HF* 1201)

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[48] As noted by Wakker 1994: 236 note 18 this type has gone under different headers such as pseudo-conditionals, commentative conditionals, relevance conditionals, speech-act conditionals" (cf. Comrie 1986; Sweetser 1990; Declerck & Reed 2001; Dancygier 2006)

[49] Note that Wakker 1994: 255-256 limits her subtype to conditional expressions in the indicative *present* of the type 'if you like' with a directive or when accompanying a wish which I do not. For so-called double nature conditionals mixing predictive and inferential or illocutionary qualities and occurring with directives, see Wakker 1994: 263-266. For further examples of directive illocutionary conditionals with a past tense, see Hdt. 4.76.23, 6.85.10, Thuc 4.92.2.1, Is. 1.44.3 or 11.26.1.

but **if** I **came** to sympathize, **you have to uncover** him! (Kovacs*)

A comparable use can also already be found in Archaic Greek, when Eumaeus tries to reproach Melanthius for kicking Odysseus, but does so with a mix of reproach and prayer. In his prayer, he addresses the Nymphs of the fountain with an illocutionary conditional which specifies the appropriateness of them fulfilling his prayer: given the fact that Odysseus burned many pieces of meat for them upon their altar pieces. This implicit recognition is underlined by the adverb ποτ' which poses a contrast between the possibility that he *ever* did, inviting the scalar implicature that he did that often.

(28)   "Νύμφαι κρηναῖαι, κοῦραι Διός, **εἴ** *ποτ'* Ὀδυσσεὺς
     ὔμμ' ἐπὶ μηρί' ἔκηε, καλύψας πίονι δημῷ,
     ἀρνῶν ἠδ' ἐρίφων, τόδε μοι **κρηήνατ'** ἐέλδωρ,
     ὣς ἔλθοι μὲν κεῖνος ἀνήρ, ἀγάγοι δέ ἑ δαίμων. (Od. 17.240-243)
     Nymphs of the fountain, daughters of Zeus, **if** *ever* Odysseus burned upon your
     altars pieces of the thighs of lambs or kids, wrapped in rich fat, **fulfill** for me this
     prayer; grant that he, my master, may come back, and that some god may guide him.[50]
     (Murray & Dimock)

Very similar in usage is the illocutionary conditional with a past tense when used with a performative main clause, as in example (29).

(29)   ἐγὼ δὲ τοσαύτην ὑπερβολὴν ποιοῦμαι ὥστε, ἂν νῦν ἔχῃ τις δεῖξαί τι βέλτιον, ἢ
     ὅλως **εἴ** τι ἄλλ' ἐνῆν πλὴν ὧν ἐγὼ προειλόμην, ἀδικεῖν **ὁμολογῶ**. **εἰ γὰρ** ἔσθ' ὅ τι τις
     νῦν ἑόρακεν, ὃ συνήνεγκεν ἂν τότε πραχθέν, τοῦτ' ἐγώ **φημι** δεῖν ἐμὲ μὴ λαθεῖν.
     (Dem. 18.190.3-7)
     But I will make a large concession. If even now any man can point to a better way,
     nay, **if** any policy whatever, save mine, was even practicable, **I plead** guilty. **If** anyone
     has now discerned any course which might have been taken profitably then, **I admit**
     that I ought not to have missed it. (Vince & Vince)

Here Demosthenes uses an illocutionary conditional clause twice (once with a past and once with a present tense) to signal the alleged fact which would appropriately make him plead guilty and admit his own wrongdoing, an allegation which he refutes in the subsequent lines. As will be clear to the audience, however, there was no practicable policy in Demosthenes' eyes (illocutionary conditional 1) nor is there anyone now who could discern a more profitable course (illocutionary conditional 2). As such, his performatives are effectively worthless in reality but *pragmatically* a suitable rhetorical stepping stone in his refutation of the idea that his actions fell short.

     By contrast, example (30) follows an evaluative declarative clause and specifies why the evaluative declaration can be appropriately made.[51] Pelasgus has been guessing who the

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[50] As suggested by la Roi 2021, this example contains an example of ὡς to introduce an insubordinate wish but the punctuation by the editor (in contrast to the translation here) does not accurately reflect the independence of this usage.

[51] Other examples are D. 23.161.1 and Pl. *Smp.* 215d6-9 and *Lg.* 886e3. Note also that I found an example of what can be called a comparative conditional, *Il.* 15.724-725 ἀλλ᾽ εἰ δή ῥα τότε βλάπτε φρένας εὐρύοπα Ζεὺς ἡμετέρας, νῦν αὐτὸς ἐποτρύνει καὶ ἀνώγει. "But if Zeus, whose voice resounds afar, then dulled our senses, now he himself urges and commands", which Wakker 1994: 235 subsumes under propositional conditionals, but I, following Declerk and Reed 2001: 330, consider a type of illocutionary conditional because it is used to signal why the content of the main clause is worthy of mentioning, namely because it contrasts with the situation expressed in the conditional clause.

suppliant Danaids are and where they are from, but now concludes that it would not be proper to make more conjectures. In other words, the fact that there *is* a person present to explain who they are (see the counterfactual illocutionary conditional) is what makes *stating* that it would not be proper to make more conjectures (=the counterfactual effect of the main clause[52]) improper. Thus, decoding the counterfactual values of the main and conditional clause helps reveal the illocutionary focus of the conditional, since it signals why the main clause can appropriately be uttered.[53]

(30) καὶ τἄλλα πόλλ᾽ ἔτ᾽ εἰκάσαι **δίκαιον ἦν**,
  εἰ μὴ παρόντι φθόγγος ἦν ὁ σημανῶν. (A. *Supp.* 244-245)
  About other things, too, it **would be proper** to make many more conjectures, if there were not a person here with a voice to explain to me. (Sommerstein)

Conditional type	Pragmatic relationship	Order	Illocution	Temporal range	Formal correlations
Illocutionary	•Condition of appropriateness or relevance for speech act in *q*	p, q	•Declarative •Directive •Performative	•Past, present •CFpresent, CFfuture	•Evaluative vocabulary •Form with directive force •Performative verb

Table 4 Illocutionary conditionals with past tenses

5. Metalinguistic conditionals

Metalinguistic conditionals with the past tense belong to a pragmatic category of conditionals which is new to Ancient Greek linguistics[54] but exists in conditional typologies from general linguistics.[55] While they seem similar to illocutionary conditionals to some extent (e.g. their concern with the production of the speech act in the *q* clause), distinctive about metalinguistic conditionals is that they directly comment on *how* something is said rather than *that* something is said/done (i.e. illocutionary conditionals). The metalinguistic comment typically targets an element from the *q* clause. They can be roughly divided into two types: to evaluate a choice of phrasing (example (31) or to signal disbelief about an element of the main clause (example (32) with a declarative *q*, example (33) with a directive *q*, example (34) with an exclamative). In example 31 we see how the metalinguistic conditional used by Socrates targets only the part in italics and evaluates his strong wording (i.e. that he did not care for death).[56]

(31) τότε μέντοι ἐγὼ οὐ λόγῳ ἀλλ᾽ ἔργῳ αὖ ἐνεδειξάμην *ὅτι ἐμοὶ θανάτου μὲν μέλει*, **εἰ μὴ ἀγροικότερον ἦν εἰπεῖν οὐδ**᾽ ὁτιοῦν (Pl. *Ap.* 32d1-3)
  Then I, however, showed again, by action, not in word only, *that I did not care a whit for death* **if that be not too rude an expression.** (Lamb)

In the other usage the metalinguistic conditional expresses disbelief about an element from the main clause (see the underlined) uttered by the speaker him/herself, whether the main clause is a declarative, interrogative or exclamative illocution. Thus, in examples (32), (33) and (34), the metalinguistic conditional expresses the disbelief of respectively Helen that

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Agamemnon was ever truly her brother-in-law (32),[57] of Odysseus that he ever had a son (33), and of Oedipus at his fate (34).[58] Note again that, as we have seen before with the illocutionary conditional in example (28), ποτ᾽ is used to signal disbelief on the part of the speaker.

(32)   δαὴρ αὖτ᾽ ἐμὸς ἔσκε κυνώπιδος, **εἴ ποτ᾽ ἔην** γε (*Il*. 3.180)
        And he used to be *my brother-in-law* to shameless me, **if ever** there **was** such a one. (Murray & Wyatt*)

(33)   ἀλλ᾽ ἄγε μοι τόδε εἰπὲ καὶ ἀτρεκέως κατάλεξον,
        πόστον δὴ ἔτος ἐστίν, ὅτε ξείνισσας ἐκεῖνον
        σὸν ξεῖνον δύστηνον, ἐμὸν παῖδ᾽, **εἴ ποτ᾽ ἔην** γε,
        δύσμορον; (*Od*. 24.287-90)
        But come, tell me this, and declare it truly. How many years have passed since you entertained that guest, that unfortunate guest, *my son*—**if he ever was**—my ill-fated son? (Murray & Dimock*)

(34)   ὦ μοῖρ᾽, ἀπ᾽ ἀρχῆς ὥς μ᾽ ἔφυσας ἄθλιον
        καὶ τλῆμον᾽, **εἴ** τις ἄλλος ἀνθρώπων ἔφυ (E. *Ph*. 1595-6)
        O destiny! From the beginning, how you have created me wretched and unhappy, if any mortal ever was; (Kovacs*)

Table 5 summarizes the features of metalinguistic conditionals in Ancient Greek.

Conditional type	Pragmatic relationship	Order	Illocution	Temporal range	Formal correlations
Metalinguistic	•Comment on how *q* is said	q, p	•Declarative •Interrogative •Exclamative	•past •CFpresent	•Negation of p •πότε (if ever…)

Table 5 Metalinguistic conditionals with past tenses

6. Generic conditionals

The last category of conditionals with past tenses occurs more rarely but is, I argue, relevant from the perspective of the diachrony of the mood system in Ancient Greek. In example (35) we see that the past indicative could already be used in Classical Greek to describe a type of generic past generalization which here describes the non-specific[59] *situations* of needing to get something to drink, a situation Philoctetes saw himself faced with in his habitual struggle on the island Lemnos (ταῦτ᾽ ἂν ἐξέρπων τάλας ἐμηχανώμην).[60] I would characterize this conditional as a type of generic condition (as also done in general linguistics, Dancygier & Sweetser 2005, 95-102, Dancygier 2006, 63-64). Thus, the conditional clause here generalizes over all those situations and therefore cannot simply be called habitual (*pace* Van Emde Boas et al. 2019, 555), iterative or iterative-habitual (*pace* Allan 2019, 31). The reasons for this are

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[57] As explained by Kirk 1985: 290, the phrase expresses nostalgia and regret at how things have changed. He also lists other examples from Homer such as *Il.* 11.672. See also *Od.* 15.267.
[58] Wakker 1994: 234 classifies this example as an obviously realized propositional conditional. As my discussion demonstrates, I do not think that this conditional is used to evaluate the (perhaps obvious) epistemic validity of the *q* clause, but rather, as the previous examples, expresses Oedipus' profound disbelief at his fate.
[59] Probert 2015 has recently argued that such uses found with both relative and conditional clauses are best called an indefinite construction, a term which is particularly strong in Anglo-Saxon grammar descriptions of Ancient Greek. I chose not to use this term, because indefinite has heterogenous descriptive meanings in linguistics (e.g. indefinite article).
[60] Some other examples in my corpus are X. *HG* 5.4.28.4, 6.5.12.8, 7.4.38.7 and *An.* 5.5.14.4.

that habituals express that something took place in the majority of those different occasions such as *He used to work from 9 to 5* (Dahl 1985, 97; la Roi 2020b, 141) and iterative refers to repeated occurrence on the same occasion such as *search for keys all morning* (Bybee, Pagliuca & Perkins 1994, 159). Moreover, adopting a critical attitude to such terminology pays off in another way: such terminology often perpetuates terminology from grammars written more than a century ago which were based on linguistic frameworks that are not up-to-date anymore.[61] The usual order of *p* and *q* in this conditional type is iconic of the events that it describes.

(35) πρὸς δὲ τοῦθ', ὅ μοι *βάλοι*
νευροσπαδὴς ἄτρακτος, αὐτὸς ἂν τάλας
εἰλυόμην, δύστηνον ἐξέλκων πόδα,
πρὸς τοῦτ' ἄν· **εἴ** τ' **ἔδει** τι καὶ ποτὸν λαβεῖν,
καί που πάγου χυθέντος, οἷα χείματι,
ξύλον τι θραῦσαι, ταῦτ' ἂν ἐξέρπων τάλας
ἐμηχανώμην· (S. *Ph.* 289-295)
and up to what the shaft sped by the bowstring *shot* for me, alone in my misery I would crawl, dragging my wretched foot, right up to that. And **if I had to** get some drink also, or perhaps to cut some wood, when ice was on the ground, as it is in winter, I would struggle along in misery and manage it; (Lloyd-Jones)

This innovative use of the past indicative overlaps with the use of the so-called iterative optative to describe generic past situations (cf. βάλοι in line 289, la Roi 2022c) but this usage of past conditionals is not explicitly discussed in our grammars (for example not by Van Emde Boas et al. 2019, 555; 639–643), but only given as textual example in the discussion of what is called 'iterative ἄν' in the main clause (e.g. Kühner & Gerth 1898, 211).[62] Since this usage of the past indicative is an innovation of Classical Greek, its creation should be understood in the light of the functional reorganization of the optative mood which had already started before Archaic Greek (see la Roi 2021). The innovative counterfactual indicative has already partially replaced the counterfactual optative in Archaic Greek and fully replaces it in Classical Greek (see Allan 2013, 40, la Roi 2022b). Since the so-called iterative optative starts to disappear in Post-Classical Greek (Schwyzer & Debrunner 1950, 335–336; Blass & Debrunner, 1959, 227) I suggest that constructions of the type above are the first signs of the functional limitations on the optative which fully come to the fore in Post-Classical Greek. A parallel development, I think, has taken place in temporal clauses, which in Classical Greek also start to be used innovatively in combination with past habitual main clauses. Similarly, however, such clauses are not discussed explicitly in our standard grammars (e.g. Van Emde Boas et al. 2019, 540–542 which only discuss so-called 'iterative' optatives in temporal clauses in such contexts).

(36) ἐγὼ γὰρ **ὅτε** μὲν ἱππικῇ τὸν νοῦν μόνῃ **προσεῖχον**,
οὐδ' **ἂν** τρί' εἰπεῖν ῥήμαθ' **οἷός τ' ἦν** πρὶν ἐξαμαρτεῖν· (Ar. *Nub.* 1401-1402)
Back **when** I **had** a one-track mind for horse racing, I couldn't get three words out before I stumbled over them. (Henderson)

In this example, Phidippides describes how he used to have a one-track mind for horse racing and used to not be able to get three words out before stumbling over them.

Table 6 summarizes the features of generic conditionals.

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[61] Similarly, the past habitual use of ἄν with the past indicative has incorrectly been classified as 'iterative' due to terminology from older grammars, cf. Goodwin 1889: 56; Schwyzer and Debrunner 1950: 350; Wakker 1994: 159 or Crespo et al. 2003: 286.
[62] An exception is Goodwin 1889: 171–172.

Conditional type	Pragmatic relationship	Order	Illocution	Temporal range	Formal correlations
Generic	•Describe generic past situations as frame for habitual *q*	p, q	•Declarative	•past	•Habitual in *q* (e.g. past+ἄν)

Table 6 Generic conditionals with past tenses

7. Concluding remarks

This paper has put forth a novel pragmatic typology of conditionals with past tenses based on pragmatic rather than formal (e.g. mood) or semantic (e.g. temporal reference) criteria. Importantly, I have argued that the different types of conditionals with past tense can be classified more fruitfully and economically in a pragmatic model, because they generalize over many different formal (e.g. mood) as well as semantic variations (esp. in terms of temporal reference). Building on the findings of this typology, it has been demonstrated that factors which have been characterized as the basic distinctions between conditionals in Ancient Greek by Wakker need revision: "1. the semantic relation between if-clause and main clause: is the conditional clause a predicational, a propositional or an illocutionary one?; 2. the mood chosen; 3. the type of discourse; 4. the time reference" (Wakker, 1994, 117). As discussed above, temporal reference and mood chosen are not unique in distinguishing conditionals pragmatically nor does Wakker's typology allow for enough descriptive granularity of conditionals with past tenses.

The key pragmatic criterion to distinguish the types of conditionals is the pragmatic relationship between the conditional and matrix clause. As discussed above, these types allow us to divide the conditionals with past tenses with the largest degree of generalization possible. Similarly, the syntactic and logical order of *p* and *q* is relevant. As table 1 shows, the pragmatic relationship (indicated by the arrow) of *p* and *q* can be determined by a logical relation from *p* to *q* (e.g. *p* gives a sequential cause for *q*=predictive, *p* gives evidence for truth of *q*=direct inferential, or *p* comments on *q*=metalinguistic) but also from *q* to *p* (e.g. *q* provides evidence that *p* is contradictory or counterfactual=indirect inferential). The illocutionary scope of these types is also revealing. Even though declarative is the basic choice of illocution, conditionals that assert that *p* is true, contradictory or counterfactual can use various types of assertoric questions. Also, conditionals dealing with the appropriateness or relevance of the speech act in *q* may use different illocutions accordingly. Pragmatics is also relevant to the diachrony of conditionals, since some types are the instigator of morphosyntactic change: counterfactual direct inferential conditionals in Archaic Greek for the replacement of the counterfactual optative by the indicative (la Roi 2022b), or the generic conditionals in Classical Greek for the replacement of the so-called 'iterative' optative (la Roi 2022c). However, the variation in temporal reference does not allow us to distinguish the various types due to considerable overlap (esp. in the domain of counterfactual tense usage). This underlines that temporal reference is not a unique characteristic for classification contrary to classifications by our standard grammars (*pace* Wakker 1994, 117). Similarly, the limited list of formal variations cannot be used as exclusive criterion to distinguish the different types (cf. the mood overlap between indicative and optative). A more unique characteristic might actually be negation, since negation reveals a correlation with pragmatic direction, because *p* tends to be negated when there is a logical relation from *p* to *q* (e.g. predictive, direct inferential, metalinguistic) whereas *q* tends to be negated when there is a logical relation from *q* to *p* (e.g. indirect inferential).

Finally, the pragmatic classification of conditional sentences such as the one presented in this paper could, I think, find wider application to Ancient Greek conditionals. In fact, Wakker's seminal work has I think, retrospectively, already laid the foundations for an extension of the pragmatic approach from this paper. First of all, she showed that there also indirect inferential conditionals without past tenses, but with present or future indicatives, again underlining the primacy of pragmatic function over formal factors (see Wakker 1994, 232–233, e.g. Pl. *Phdr.*

228a5–6 and Ar. *Eq.*314–315). Secondly, her rich analysis of illocutionary conditionals (Wakker 1994, 236–257) covers conditionals with a wide range of moods (e.g. present indicative, potential optative, future indicative) but all having an illocutionary function. Just as the typology proposed in this paper, pragmatic function thus covers many formal variations and temporal references. Third and finally, it seems that the choice of mood such as a potential optative may be contextually motivated (cf. Wakker 2013 and the optionality of the optative mood in the main clause of direct and indirect inferential conditionals) but still contribute to the same pragmatic function, as also shown by the use of verbs of volition in different moods to express illocutionary conditionals, e.g. βούλοιο, βουλῃ or βούλει/εσθε (see Wakker 1994, 236–267).

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